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INTRODUCTION
In June 2006, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, at the 
request of the Massachusetts Bar Association, the Boston Bar Associa-
tion, and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, created the 
Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evi-
dence Law to prepare a Guide to the Massachusetts law of evidence. 
The Justices charged the Committee with the mandate “to assemble the 
current law in one easily  usable document, along the lines of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, rather than to prepare a Restatement or to pro-
pose changes in the existing law of evidence.” As Chief Justice Marga-
ret H. Marshall stated in her March 2006 address to the Massachusetts 
Bar Association, “[t]he Advisory  Committee will compile a Guide to 
Massachusetts evidence law as it currently exists, replete with case law 
and reporters’ notes. The Guide will make our rules of evidence more 
accessible to bench, bar, and the public. It will improve the under-
standing, teaching, and presentation of Massachusetts evidence. It  will 
advance the delivery of justice.”
The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence organizes and states the law 
of evidence applied in proceedings in the courts of the Common-
wealth, as set forth in the Federal and State Constitutions, General 
Laws, common law, and rules of court. The Committee invites com-
ments and suggestions on the Guide.
The Guide is organized into “Sections” using the format of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence insofar as the Federal rules comport with 
Massachusetts law and practice. Some sections are different from the 
Federal rules. For instance, Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
which governs the law of privileges, contains one general section 
whereas the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence contains twenty-five 
sections detailing evidentiary  privileges and disqualifications recog-
nized in Massachusetts. Other sections, such as Section 1102, Spolia-
tion or Destruction of Evidence, Section 1103, Sexually  Dangerous 
Person Proceedings, and Section 1104, Witness Cooperation Agree-
ments, have no counterpart in the Federal rules.
Each section contains a statement of the law of Massachusetts, 
current through December 31, 2010, and an accompanying “Note” that 
includes supporting authority. Some sections are based upon a single 
statute or decision, while other sections were derived from multiple 
sources. Certain sections were drafted “nearly verbatim” from a source 
with minimal changes, for instance, revised punctuation, gender-
neutral terms, or minor reorganization, to allow the language to be 
stated more accurately in the context of the Massachusetts Guide to 
Evidence. For the practitioner’s easy reference, the Committee has in-
cluded parallel citations to the North Eastern Reporter.
Many sections of the Guide use the language of the Proposed 
Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (1980) or the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The Committee concluded that such language is preferred when 
it represents an accurate statement of current Massachusetts law. The 
Committee wishes to emphasize two points. First and foremost, in ac-
cordance with its mandate from the Supreme Judicial Court, what the 
Committee has written are not rules, but rather, as the title suggests, a 
guide to evidence based on the law as it exists today. The Committee 
did not attempt, nor is it  authorized, to suggest modifications, adopt 
new rules, or predict future developments in the law. Second, the 
Committee has recommended to the Supreme Judicial Court that the 
Guide be published annually to address changes in the law and to 
make any other revisions as necessary. The Committee’s goal is to re-
flect the most accurate and clear statement of current law as possible. 
Ultimately, the law of evidence in Massachusetts is what is contained 
in the authoritative decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court and of the 
Appeals Court, and the statutes duly enacted by the Legislature.
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Currency, Usage, and Terminology
Currency and usage. The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence has been 
updated to state the Massachusetts law of evidence as it exists through 
December 31, 2010. The Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee 
on Massachusetts Evidence Law has made every effort to provide ac-
curate and informative statements of the law in the Massachusetts 
Guide to Evidence. Counsel and litigants are encouraged to conduct 
their own research for additional authorities that may be more applica-
ble to the case or issue at hand. Importantly, given the fluidity  of evi-
dence law, all users of this Guide should perform their own research 
and monitor the law for the most recent modifications to and state-
ments of the law. The Guide is not intended to constitute the rendering 
of legal or other professional advice, and the Guide is not a substitute 
for the advice of an attorney.
“Not recognized” sections. Where the Advisory Committee has noted 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence contain a provision on a particular 
subject and the Committee has not identified any Massachusetts 
authority that recognizes that subject, or where the Supreme Judicial 
Court has declined to follow the Federal rule on that subject, the topic 
is marked “not recognized” to await further development, if any, of the 
law on that topic.
“Nearly verbatim” sections. The notes to some sections state that the 
section’s text  was derived “nearly verbatim” from a specific statute, 
court decision, or court rule. This phrase explains that the Advisory 
Committee made minor modifications to an authority’s original lan-
guage to allow the language to be stated more accurately in the context 
of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Such modifications may in-
clude revised punctuation, gender-neutral terms, minor reorganization, 
and the use of numerals instead of spelling numerals.
Discretion. The term “discretion” appears numerous times in the text 
and the notes throughout this Guide. Unless the context requires a dif-
ferent meaning, the term discretion in this Guide refers to the defini-
tion provided by the Appeals Court  in Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen, 57 
Mass. App. Ct. 746, 748–749, 785 N.E.2d 1285, 1288–1289 (2003):
“The proper exercise of judicial discretion involves 
making a circumstantially fair and reasonable choice 
within a range of permitted options. Discretion ‘implies 
the absence of a hard-and-fast rule’ and may, in some 
settings, encompass taking no action. Long v. George, 
296 Mass. 574, 578 (1937), quoting from Paquette v. 
Fall River, 278 Mass. 172, 174 (1932). Proper exercise 
of judicial discretion requires more than avoiding ‘arbi-
trary  determination, capricious disposition, or whimsi-
cal thinking.’ Davis v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 235 Mass. 
482, 496 (1920). It  imports a willingness, upon proper 
request, to consider all of the lawfully available judicial 
options. ‘Where discretion to grant relief exists, a uni-
form policy  of denying relief is error.’ Berryman v. 
United States, 378 A.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. 1977). ‘It  is 
one thing to consider [a] right [to exclude evidence] and 
exercise it either way, but having been given that right, 
analogous to discretion, it  is the duty of the judge to 
exercise it, and it is error as a matter of law to refuse to 
exercise it.’ Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 13 Mass. App. 
Ct. 562, 571 (1982).” (Footnotes omitted.)
Whether the range of choices that are open to the trial judge with dis-
cretion are narrow or wide will depend on the terms of the governing 
constitutional provision, statute, or common-law principle.
Revisions to the 2011 edition. The contents of the 2011 edition of the 
Massachusetts Guide to Evidence were revised to reflect changes to 
the Massachusetts law of evidence that occurred between January 1, 
2010, and December 31, 2010. The majority of these additions are 
contained in the notes accompanying the sections.
Comments and suggestions. Please send any comments or suggestions 
to the Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law, c/o Jo-
seph Stanton, Reporter, Appeals Court, Clerk’s Office, John Adams 
Courthouse, One Pemberton Square, Room 1200, Boston, MA 02108-
1705, or by email to joseph.stanton@appct.state.ma.us.
CONTENTS
..........................................ARTICLE I.  GENERAL PROVISIONS  1
....................................................................Section 101. Title 1
..................................Section 102. Purpose and Construction 2
Section 103. Rulings on Evidence, Objections, and Offers of Proof 3
........................................Section 104. Preliminary Questions 9
........................................Section 105. Limited Admissibility 13
..................................Section 106. Doctrine of Completeness 14
.................................................ARTICLE II.  JUDICIAL NOTICE 18
................Section 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts 18
.......................................Section 202. Judicial Notice of Law 22
ARTICLE III.  INFERENCES, PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE, AND 
................................................PRESUMPTIONS  24
.........................................................Section 301. Civil Cases 24
...................................................Section 302. Criminal Cases 27
..........................ARTICLE IV.  RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 33
.............................................Section 401. Relevant Evidence 33
Section 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evi-
..........................................dence Inadmissible 35
........Section 403. Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence 37
Section 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; 
...............................Exceptions; Other Crimes 40
xiv 
...........................Section 405. Methods of Proving Character 46
.Section 406. Routine Practice of Business; Individual Habit 48
........................Section 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures 50
Section 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise in Civil Cases 52
Section 409. Expressions of Sympathy in Civil Cases; Payment of 
.......................Medical and Similar Expenses 55
Section 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related 
.......................................................Statements 57
............................................................Section 411. Insurance 59
Section 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
..........................................(Rape-Shield Law) 62
.....................Section 413. First Complaint of Sexual Assault 66
........ARTICLE V.  PRIVILEGES AND DISQUALIFICATIONS 74
...........Section 501. Privileges Recognized Only as Provided 82
...................................Section 502. Attorney-Client Privilege 84
......................Section 503. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 94
Section 504. Spousal Privilege and Disqualification; Parent-
.....................................Child Disqualification 99
Section 505. Domestic Violence Victims’ Counselor Privilege 105
......Section 506. Sexual Assault Counselor–Victim Privilege 107
.........................Section 507. Social Worker–Client Privilege 109
Section 508. Allied Mental Health or Human Services Professional 
........................................................Privilege 113
Section 509. Identity of Informer, Surveillance Location, and Protected 
........................................Witness Privileges 115
.............................................Section 510. Religious Privilege 120
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition xv
.................Section 511. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 122
..............................................Section 512. Jury Deliberations 133
..........................Section 513. Medical Peer Review Privilege 134
............................................Section 514. Mediation Privilege 141
.......................................Section 515. Investigatory Privilege 143
..........................Section 516. Political Voter Disqualification 144
......................................................Section 517. Trade Secrets 145
................Section 518. Executive or Governmental Privilege 146
...........................Section 519. State and Federal Tax Returns 147
...........................................Section 520. Tax Return Preparer 149
......Section 521. Sign Language Interpreter–Client Privilege 150
................................Section 522. Interpreter-Client Privilege 152
............................................Section 523. Waiver of Privilege 154
Section 524. Privileged Matter Disclosed Erroneously or Without Op-
.........................portunity to Claim Privilege 158
Section 525. Comment upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege 159
.....................Section 526. Unemployment Hearing Privilege 162
.........................................................ARTICLE VI.  WITNESSES 163
.......................................................Section 601. Competency 163
.............................Section 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge 166
............................................Section 603. Oath or Affirmation 167
.........................................................Section 604. Interpreters 168
.......................Section 605. Competency of Judge as Witness 169
........................Section 606. Competency of Juror as Witness 170
.............................................Section 607. Who May Impeach 176
xvi 
Section 608. Impeachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct of 
.........................................................Witness 177
Section 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime 180
............................Section 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions 185
Section 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation 186
......Section 612. Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory 193
Section 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility 196
Section 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court or Jurors 
202
................................Section 615. Sequestration of Witnesses 205
..............ARTICLE VII.  OPINION AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 207
...............Section 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses 207
........................................Section 702. Testimony by Experts 211
............Section 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts 222
.................................Section 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue 225
Section 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion 
228
....................................Section 706. Court Appointed Experts 230
...........................................................ARTICLE VIII.  HEARSAY 234
..........................................................Section 801. Definitions 239
......................................................Section 802. Hearsay Rule 252
Section 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial 
254
......Section 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 281
....................................Section 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay 304
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition xvii
Section 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Hearsay Declar-
.................................................................ant 305
ARTICLE IX.  AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 307
Section 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification 307
............................................Section 902. Self-Authentication 315
.Section 903. Subscribing Witness Testimony Not Necessary 323
..ARTICLE X.  CONTENTS OF WRITINGS AND RECORDS 324
........................................................Section 1001. Definitions 324
Section 1002. Requirement of Original (Best Evidence Rule) 326
.............................Section 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates 328
..Section 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents 329
...............................................Section 1005. Official Records 331
........................................................Section 1006. Summaries 333
.......Section 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party 334
.................Section 1008. Functions of Judge and Fact Finder 335
........................ARTICLE XI.  MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS 336
..............Section 1101. Applicability of Evidentiary Sections 336
.............Section 1102. Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence 341
.........Section 1103. Sexually Dangerous Person Proceedings 344
....................Section 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements 350
...........................Section 1105. Third-Party Culprit Evidence 353
..................Section 1106. Abuse Prevention Act Proceedings 356
.......Section 1107. Inadequate Police Investigation Evidence 358
xviii 
Section 1108. Access to Third-Party Records Prior to Trial in Criminal 
................Cases (Lampron-Dwyer Protocol) 360
.................................................................Section 1109. View 368
INDEX 371
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition xix
ARTICLE I.  GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 101. Title
This volume may be referenced as the Massachusetts Guide to 
Evidence.
NOTE
The volume may be cited as Mass. G. Evid. § xxx (2011).
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Section 102. Purpose and Construction
The sections contained in this Guide summarize the law of evi-
dence applied in proceedings in the courts of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts as set forth in the Massachusetts General Laws, com-
mon law, and rules of court, and as required by the Constitutions of the 
United States and Massachusetts.
The provisions contained in this Guide may be cited by lawyers, 
parties, and judges, but  are not to be construed as adopted rules of evi-
dence or as changing the existing law of evidence.
NOTE
The Advisory Committee has made every effort to provide the most accurate 
and clear statement of the law of evidence in Massachusetts as it exists at 
the time of the publication of this Guide. Importantly, these provisions are not 
to be interpreted as a set of formal or adopted rules of evidence, and they do 
not change Massachusetts law. Because Massachusetts has not adopted 
rules of evidence, the development of Massachusetts evidence law continues 
to be based on the common law and legislative processes.
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Section 103. Rulings on Evidence, Objections, 
and Offers of Proof
(a) Admission or Exclusion of Evidence. Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is injuriously affected, and:
(1) As to evidence admitted, a timely  objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) As to evidence excluded, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by  an offer of proof or was apparent 
from the context within which the questions were asked.
(3) A motion in limine, seeking a pretrial evidentiary ruling, is in-
sufficient to preserve appellate rights unless there is an objection 
at the time the evidence is offered.
(4) The denial of a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional 
grounds, however, is reviewable without further objection at trial.
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or fur-
ther statement which clearly shows the character of the evidence, the 
form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may  direct the making of an offer in question-and-answer 
form.
(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted so 
as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being made known to the 
jury.
(d) Substantial Risk of a Miscarriage of Justice in Criminal Cases. 
Nothing in this section precludes taking notice of plain errors in crimi-
nal cases, although not brought to the attention of the trial judge, if 
such error constitutes a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
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NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 231, § 119, which 
states as follows:
“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence 
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or anything done 
or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground 
for modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order 
unless the appeals court or the supreme judicial court deems 
that the error complained of has injuriously affected the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. If either court finds that the error 
complained of affects only one or some of the issues or par-
ties involved it may affirm the judgment as to those issues or 
parties unaffected and may modify or reverse the judgment 
as to those affected.”
See also G. L. c. 231, § 132 (stating that no new trial  in a civil proceeding 
may be granted based upon the improper admission or exclusion of evidence 
unless the error injuriously affected the proponent’s substantial  rights). To 
determine whether a substantial right was injuriously affected by the exclu-
sion of evidence
“the appropriate test is whether the proponent of erroneously 
excluded, relevant evidence has made a plausible showing 
that the trier of fact might have reached a different result if 
the evidence had been before it. Thus the erroneous exclu-
sion of relevant evidence is reversible error unless, on the 
record, the appellate court can say with substantial confi-
dence that the error would not have made a material  differ-
ence.”
DeJesus v. Yogel, 404 Mass. 44, 48–49, 533 N.E.2d 1318, 1321–1322 
(1989).
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Mar-
shall, 434 Mass. 358, 365, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (2001), and Commonwealth 
v. Pickles, 364 Mass. 395, 399, 305 N.E.2d 107, 109 (1973). “[O]bjections to 
evidence, or to any challenged order or ruling of the trial judge, are not pre-
served for appeal unless made in a precise and timely fashion, as soon as 
the claimed error is apparent.” Commonwealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. 
Ct. 187, 192, 770 N.E.2d 1, 5 (2002). “The purpose of requiring an objection 
is to afford the trial judge an opportunity to act promptly to remove from the 
jury’s consideration evidence which has no place in the trial.” Abraham v. 
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Woburn, 383 Mass. 724, 726 n.1, 421 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 n.1 (1981). If a 
timely objection is not made, the evidence is properly admitted, and the fact 
finder is entitled to give it such probative effect as it deems appropriate. Id.
In both jury trials and jury-waived trials, counsel have the obligation to 
make timely objections. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 
563–564, 227 N.E.2d 3, 8–9 (1967) (jury trials); Commonwealth v. Mazzone, 
55 Mass. App. Ct. 345, 348, 770 N.E.2d 547, 550 (2002) (jury-waived trials). 
Counsel have the same duty to make objections to improper questions by a 
judge as they do when the questions are asked by opposing counsel. Com-
monwealth v. Watkins, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 72–73, 823 N.E.2d 404, 406–
407 (2005). Generally, counsel should make an objection to a question be-
fore the answer is given. See Commonwealth v. Baptiste, 372 Mass. 700, 
706, 363 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (1977). Pro se litigants are bound by the same 
rules of procedure as litigants with counsel. Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 
Mass. 30, 35–36, 739 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (2000).
“When objecting, counsel should state the specific  ground of the objec-
tion unless it is apparent from the context.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 
Mass. at 365, 749 N.E.2d at 155, quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evi-
dence § 3.8.3, at 85 (7th ed. 1999). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 46; Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 22. The court may ask the party objecting to the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence to state the precise ground for the objection. See Rule 8 of 
the Rules of the Superior Court. Further argument or discussion of the 
grounds is not allowed unless the court requests it. Id. The need for an ex-
ception has been abolished by Mass. R. Civ. P. 46 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 22.
A motion to strike is used to eliminate an answer that is objectionable 
either on substantive grounds or on the ground that it is nonresponsive. 
Commonwealth v. Pickles, 364 Mass. at 399, 305 N.E.2d at 109–110.
As to the court’s instructions to the jury, an objection is necessary to 
preserve an issue regarding the giving or failure to give an instruction. See 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 51(b); Mass. R. Crim. P. 24(b). See also Harlow v. Chin, 405 
Mass. 697, 703 n.5, 545 N.E.2d 602, 606 n.5 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bar-
bosa, 399 Mass. 841, 844, 507 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1987). Counsel should re-
new any prior objection with specificity following the charge. Fein v. Kahan, 
36 Mass. App. Ct. 967, 968 n.4, 635 N.E.2d 1, 2 n.4 (1994).
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Chase, 
26 Mass. App. Ct. 578, 581, 530 N.E.2d 185, 188 (1988), and Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 43(c). “[A]n offer of proof is required to preserve the right to appellate re-
view of the denial of an offer to introduce evidence through the direct exami-
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nation of a witness.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 581, 530 
N.E.2d at 188.
The offer of proof should state or summarize the testimony or evidence 
and show that the proponent would be prejudiced by the exclusion of the of-
fered evidence. Holmgren v. LaLiberte, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 820, 821, 349 
N.E.2d 379, 380 (1976). The court may consider only so much of the offer of 
proof that is responsive to the excluded question or evidence and apparently 
within the witness’s knowledge. Coral Gables, Inc. v. Beerman, 296 Mass. 
267, 268–269, 5 N.E.2d 554, 555 (1936). An offer of proof that fails to satisfy 
the statutory or common-law requirements for the admissibility of the evi-
dence will lead to the exclusion of the evidence. See Rockport Granite Co. v. 
Plum Island Beach Co., 248 Mass. 290, 295, 142 N.E. 834, 836 (1924).
An offer of proof is not necessary where the context is clear, see Com-
monwealth v. Donovan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 88, 455 N.E.2d 1217, 1220–
1221 (1983), or where there is no doubt what the testimony will  be, see 
Commonwealth v. Caldron, 383 Mass. 86, 89 n.2, 417 N.E.2d 958, 960 n.2 
(1981); Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 429, 40 N.E. 189, 195 
(1895).
If the evidence is excluded on cross-examination, an offer of proof gen-
erally need not be made, Stevens v. William S. Howe Co., 275 Mass. 398, 
402, 176 N.E. 208, 210 (1931), although there is a “relatively rare group of 
cases where, if the purpose or significance of the question is obscure and the 
prejudice to the cross-examiner is not clear . . . the record must disclose the 
cross-examiner’s reason for seeking an answer to an excluded question.” 
Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352, 358, 305 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1973).
Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 25–26, 696 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1998).
Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Martin, 
447 Mass. 274, 279, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560 (2006).
Subsection (b). The first sentence is taken nearly verbatim from Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 43(c). As to the second sentence, if the court sustains an objection to 
a question, the court may permit the witness to answer the question in order 
to satisfy the need for an offer of proof.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived generally from Mass. R. Civ. P. 
43(c), Mass. R. Civ. P. 51(b), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 24(b). See Common-
wealth v. Scullin, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 14, 687 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (1997) (“[I]t 
is essential that [the court] take steps to ensure that the jury is not exposed 
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to the questionable evidence before the issue of admissibility is finally de-
cided. Failing to follow this course places the opponent of the evidence in a 
difficult situation, and may create an unfair advantage for the proponent of the 
testimony, especially in the event the evidence ultimately is excluded.”). See 
also Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 418, 422, 517 N.E.2d 
152, 155 (1988).
The court has the discretion to employ any one of several meth-
ods to determine preliminary questions while insulating the jury from 
inadmissible evidence. These methods range from pretrial motions to 
suppress or motions in limine, to conducting proceedings during trial 
at sidebar, in chambers, or while the jury is absent from the court-
room. The court also has discretion whether to rule on the admissibility of 
evidence in advance of the trial  by a motion in limine or to wait until  the issue 
arises at trial. See Commonwealth v. Olsen, 452 Mass. 284, 292–293, 892 
N.E.2d 739, 745 (2008) (trial  judge properly declined to rule in advance on 
motion in limine to permit defendant to call  twenty-two witnesses to testify to 
the fact that the prosecution’s chief witness had a poor reputation in the 
community for truth-telling, leaving the issue to be decided as it arose with 
particular witnesses).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Alphas, 
430 Mass. 8, 13, 712 N.E.2d 575, 580 (1999); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 
352 Mass. 556, 561–564, 227 N.E.2d 3, 7–9 (1967); and Commonwealth v. 
Watkins, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 72–73, 823 N.E.2d 404, 406–407 (2005). See 
also G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
As stated above, a timely objection at trial is required to preserve 
an issue for appellate review. If an objection was not made, the ap-
pellate court can consider an issue, but does so under a limited stan-
dard of review. For cases other than capital cases on direct appeal, 
the appellate court will apply the so-called Freeman standard to un-
preserved trial errors and analyze whether the error created a sub-
stantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 
Mass. at 13, 712 N.E.2d at 580. The proper standard of review for a 
noncapital offense is as follows:
“An error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
unless we are persuaded that it did not ‘materially influ-
ence[]’ the guilty verdict. In making that determination, we 
consider the strength of the Commonwealth’s case against 
the defendant (without consideration of any evidence erro-
neously admitted), the nature of the error, whether the error 
is ‘sufficiently significant in the context of the trial to make 
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plausible an inference that the jury’s result might have been 
otherwise but for the error,’ and whether it can be inferred 
‘from the record that counsel’s failure to object was not sim-
ply a reasonable tactical decision.’” (Citations and footnotes 
omitted.)
Id. Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in any case in which the defendant was found 
guilty of murder in the first degree, see Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 
132, 137 n.5, 876 N.E.2d 862, 868 n.5 (2007), the Supreme Judicial Court 
has a special duty and plenary authority to review the whole case, on the law 
and the evidence, and may order a new trial or reduce the verdict even in the 
absence of an objection. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
n.1, 584 N.E.2d 621, 624 n.1 (1992).
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Section 104. Preliminary Questions
(a) Determinations Made by the Court. Preliminary questions con-
cerning the qualification or competency of a person to be a witness, the 
existence of a privilege, the admissibility  of evidence, or the determi-
nation of probable cause, e.g., justification for a search and seizure, 
shall be made by  the court, subject to the provisions of Subsection 
104(b). In making its determination, the court is not bound by the laws 
of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact.
(1) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment 
of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it  upon, or subject to, 
the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
condition has been fulfilled.
(2) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the admission 
of other evidence, which has not  yet  been admitted, the court may 
admit such evidence de bene, subject to a later motion to strike if 
the evidence is not forthcoming.
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions 
shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings 
on other preliminary  matters shall be so conducted when the interests 
of justice require.
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a 
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other 
issues in the case. A defendant who testifies at a preliminary hearing is 
nonetheless subject to cross-examination on issues that affect his or 
her credibility.
(e) Weight and Credibility. The principles of law stated in this sec-
tion do not limit the right of any party to introduce before the jury evi-
dence relevant to weight or credibility.
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NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., 
Inc., 405 Mass. 191, 197–198, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (1989), and Com-
monwealth v. Figueroa, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646, 779 N.E.2d 669, 673 
(2002). See also Gorton v. Hadsell, 63 Mass. 508, 511 (1852) (explaining 
that Massachusetts follows the orthodox principle under which “it is the prov-
ince of the judge . . . to decide all  questions on the admissibility of evidence. 
It is also his province to decide any preliminary questions of fact, however 
intricate, the solution of which may be necessary to enable him to determine 
the other question of admissibility.”). The court may consider, in appropriate 
circumstances, representations of counsel and summary testimony. When 
the credibility of witnesses is in dispute on a preliminary question of fact, the 
court’s determination is final. See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 
470, 688 N.E.2d 1350, 1353–1354 (1998); Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 
235 Mass. 482, 502, 126 N.E. 841, 846 (1920). The general rule in all  cases, 
except as to waiver of Miranda rights and the voluntariness of defendants’ 
statements in criminal cases, is that the judge’s findings of preliminary facts 
on which the admissibility of evidence depends need only be by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence. See Care & Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 
792, 610 N.E.2d 934, 937 (1993); Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 
498–499, 193 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1934).
When the preliminary question involves the applicability of a privilege 
and the substance of the proposed testimony or evidence is not known to the 
court, it may be necessary to require that the party or witness asserting the 
privilege make a disclosure in camera of enough of the evidence to enable 
the court to make a preliminary determination. See Commonwealth v. Collett, 
387 Mass. 424, 436, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (1982) (in camera review may 
be appropriate in determining applicability of client–social worker privilege); 
Notes to Section 511(b), Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Privilege of a 
Witness (discussing Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 668 N.E.2d 
825 [1996]). See also Carr v. Howard, 426 Mass. 514, 531, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 
1314 (1998) (medical peer review privilege). An in camera hearing should not 
be used unless the court is not able to determine the existence of the privi-
lege from the record. Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. at 504–505, 668 
N.E.2d at 831–832. See, e.g., Bays v. Theran, 418 Mass. 685, 693, 639 
N.E.2d 720, 725 (1994); Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 
59, 65–66, 354 N.E.2d 872, 878 (1976).
Preliminary questions involving the voluntariness of a defendant’s 
statement, whether there was a valid waiver of the rights required by Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or whether an identification was unneces-
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sarily suggestive, should be raised in advance of trial by a motion to sup-
press. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13(c)(1), (2). When voluntariness is a live issue 
and is challenged by a pretrial motion to suppress or an objection at trial, the 
court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 
389 Mass. 265, 269–270, 450 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1983); Commonwealth v. 
Miller, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 842, 865 N.E.2d 825, 831 (2007); Common-
wealth v. Gonzalez, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 624, 797 N.E.2d 449, 451 (2003); 
Commonwealth v. Florek, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 414, 419, 722 N.E.2d 20, 24 
(2000). However, if a pretrial motion to suppress was heard and determined 
in advance of trial, and the evidence at trial is not materially different, the trial 
judge has no duty to rehear the motion based on an objection made at trial. 
See Commonwealth v. Parker, 412 Mass. 353, 356, 589 N.E.2d 306, 308 
(1992).
In some criminal  cases, there are certain preliminary facts which, after 
being found by the judge, must also be submitted to the jury. In those situa-
tions, the judge must instruct the jury to disregard the evidence if they do not 
believe that those preliminary facts exist. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ta-
vares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1206 (humane practice rule), 
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 22, 
407 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1980) (dying declaration); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 52 
Mass. App. Ct. 590, 598, 755 N.E.2d 767, 773 (2001) (statements by joint 
venturers). See also G. L. c. 233, § 78 (business records).
Cross-Reference: Section 1101(c)(3), Applicability of Evidentiary Sec-
tions: Sections Inapplicable: Miscellaneous Proceedings.
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Perry, 
432 Mass. 214, 234, 733 N.E.2d 83, 101 (2000); Commonwealth v. Leonard, 
428 Mass. 782, 785–786, 705 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1999); and Fauci v. Mul-
ready, 337 Mass. 532, 540, 150 N.E.2d 286, 291 (1958). “Relevancy condi-
tioned on fact” means that the judge is satisfied that a reasonable jury could 
find that the event took place or the condition of fact was fulfilled. Common-
wealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. at 785–786, 705 N.E.2d at 250. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 730, 933 N.E.2d 50, 62 (2010) 
(expert shoe-print evidence was relevant because reasonable jury could 
have found that police seizure of sneaker “from a closet in a bedroom at the 
defendant’s mother’s home—a room where the police also found personal 
papers bearing the defendant’s name and photographs of him”—warranted 
an inference that the sneaker belonged to him, and therefore made it rele-
vant). Contrast Section 104(a) (judge finds facts by preponderance of evi-
dence).
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Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 
60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485 n.4, 803 N.E.2d 735, 740 n.4 (2004). In the event 
that the foundation evidence is not subsequently produced, the court has no 
duty to strike the evidence, admitted de bene, on its own motion. Common-
wealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 595–596, 48 N.E.2d 630, 635 (1943). If 
the objecting party fails to move to strike the evidence, the court’s failure to 
strike it is not error. Muldoon v. West End Chevrolet, Inc., 338 Mass. 91, 98, 
153 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1958). See Commonwealth v. Navarro, 39 Mass. App. 
Ct. 161, 166, 654 N.E.2d 71, 75 (1995). See also Section 611(a), Manner 
and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Control by Court.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 104(c) and 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 104(c) and is consistent with Massachusetts law. 
See Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 418, 422–423, 517 
N.E.2d 152, 155 (1988).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 104(d) and 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 104(d) and is consistent with Massachusetts law. 
See Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 444–446, 650 N.E.2d 1242, 
1250–1251 (1995). It is well  established that a defendant’s testimony in sup-
port of a motion to suppress evidence may not be admitted against him or 
her at trial on the issue of guilt. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
394 (1968). Such testimony may, however, be used for purposes of im-
peachment at trial if the defendant elects to testify. See Commonwealth v. 
Judge, 420 Mass. at 446 n.9, 650 N.E.2d at 1251 n.9 (the fact that defen-
dant’s testimony at suppression hearing may later be used at trial  does not 
mean the scope of cross-examination of defendant at preliminary hearing 
should be limited). See also United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (defendant’s testimony at a pretrial hearing can be used against 
him for impeachment purposes at trial).
Subsection (e). This subsection is based on the long-standing principle that, 
in cases tried to a jury, questions of admissibility are for the court, while the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are questions for the 
jury. See Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 13, 696 N.E.2d 
909, 918 (1998); Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 424–425, 341 
N.E.2d 276, 280 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62, 67 
(1870).
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Section 105. Limited Admissibility
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is 
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 275, 
552 N.E.2d 558, 566 (1990) (“Evidence admissible for one purpose, if offered 
in good faith, is not inadmissible by the fact that it could not be used for an-
other purpose.”). If there is no request for a limiting instruction, the evidence 
is before the trier of fact for all  purposes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rob-
erts, 433 Mass. 45, 48, 740 N.E.2d 176, 179 (2000); Commonwealth v. Hol-
lyer, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 431, 395 N.E.2d 354, 356 (1979).
A party must ask for an instruction limiting the scope of the evidence, if 
one is desired, at the time the evidence is admitted. Commonwealth v. Rob-
erts, 433 Mass. at 48, 740 N.E.2d at 179. “[T]here is no requirement that the 
judge give limiting instructions sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 
Mass. 799, 809, 768 N.E.2d 529, 537 (2002). “A judge may refuse to limit the 
scope of the evidence where the objecting party fails to request limiting in-
structions when the evidence is introduced.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 
Mass. at 48, 740 N.E.2d at 179. “After the close of the evidence it is too late 
to present as of right a request for a ruling that the evidence be stricken.” Id.
The trial judge has discretion in determining how to formulate limiting 
instructions. The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that
“[a] trial  judge may properly bring to the jury’s attention is-
sues of fact and conflicts of testimony. [The judge] may point 
out factors to be considered in weighing particular testimony. 
Nothing . . . precludes, or could properly preclude, such guid-
ance where the judge clearly places the function of ultimate 
appraisal of the testimony upon the jury.”
Barrette v. Hight, 353 Mass. 268, 271, 230 N.E.2d 808, 810 (1967).
13 
Section 106. Doctrine of Completeness
(a) Remainder of Writings or Recorded Statements. When a party 
introduces all or part of a writing or statement, the court may permit 
the adverse party  to introduce or admit any  other part of such writing 
or statement, provided that it is (1) on the same subject, (2) part of the 
same writing or conversation, and (3) necessary  to an understanding of 
the admitted writing or statement.
(b) Curative Admissibility. When the erroneous admission of evi-
dence causes a party to suffer significant prejudice, the court may 
permit incompetent evidence to be introduced to cure or minimize the 
prejudice.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Eugene, 
438 Mass. 343, 350–351, 780 N.E.2d 893, 899 (2003), and Commonwealth 
v. Clark, 432 Mass. 1, 14–15, 730 N.E.2d 872, 885 (2000). See Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 32(a)(4). “When a party introduces a portion of a statement or writing in 
evidence the doctrine of verbal completeness allows admission of other rele-
vant portions of the same statement or writing which serve to ‘clarify the con-
text’ of the admitted portion.” Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 
272, 700 N.E.2d 823, 827 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 
Mass. 62, 69, 666 N.E.2d 497, 502 (1996). “The purpose of the doctrine is to 
prevent one party from presenting a fragmented and misleading version of 
events by requiring the admission of other relevant portions of the same 
statement or writing which serve to clarify the context of the admitted portion” 
(citations and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Eugene, 438 Mass. at 
351, 780 N.E.2d at 899. “The portion of the statement sought to be intro-
duced must qualify or explain the segment previously introduced” (citations 
and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Richardson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 
94, 99, 793 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (2003). The decision as to when the remain-
der of the writing or statement is admitted is left to the discretion of the judge, 
but the “better practice is to require an objection and contemporaneous intro-
duction of the complete statements when the original  statement is offered.” 
McAllister v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 300, 303, 708 N.E.2d 95, 98 
(1999). See Section 611(a), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presen-
tation: Control by Court. The doctrine is not applicable to a defendant’s effort 
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to admit the alibi  portion of his or her statement which has nothing to do with 
the statement offered by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
431 Mass. 108, 115, 725 N.E.2d 556, 563–564, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 
(2000).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 
399 Mass. 811, 813–814, 507 N.E.2d 684, 686 (1987) (“The curative admis-
sibility doctrine allows a party harmed by incompetent evidence to rebut that 
evidence only if the original evidence created significant prejudice.”). See 
also Commonwealth v. Reed, 444 Mass. 803, 810–811, 831 N.E.2d 901, 
907–908 (2005) (court required to admit evidence); Burke v. Memorial Hosp., 
29 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 950, 558 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1990), citing Common-
wealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 576, 120 N.E. 209, 213 (1918).
15
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ARTICLE II.  JUDICIAL NOTICE
Section 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative 
Facts
(a) Scope. This section governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts.
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially  noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to re-
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When Taken. A court may take judicial notice at any stage of the 
proceeding, whether requested or not, except a court shall not take ju-
dicial notice in a criminal trial of any element of an alleged offense.
(d) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party  is entitled upon timely request 
to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial no-
tice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notifi-
cation, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(e) Instructing Jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall 
instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact  judicially noticed. In a 
criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that they  may, but are not 
required to, accept as conclusive any  fact which the court has judi-
cially noticed.
NOTE
Subsection (a). There is a settled distinction between “adjudicative facts” 
and “legislative facts.” See Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. v. Board of State Exam-
iners of Plumbers & Gas Fitters, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 586, 396 N.E.2d 457, 
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464 (1979), and cases cited. Adjudicative facts are “the kind of facts that go 
to a jury in a jury case.” Reid v. Acting Comm’r of the Dep’t of Community 
Affairs, 362 Mass. 136, 142, 284 N.E.2d 245, 249 (1972), quoting Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.02. Legislative facts are those facts, includ-
ing statistics, policy views, and other information, that constitute the reasons 
for legislation or administrative regulations. See Massachusetts Fed’n of 
Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 772, 767 N.E.2d 
549, 558 (2002). Accord United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 
1999).
The Supreme Judicial Court is “not inclined towards a narrow and illib-
eral application of the doctrine of judicial  notice.” Finlay v. Eastern Racing 
Ass’n, Inc., 308 Mass. 20, 27, 30 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1941).
For an extensive list of matters on which a court may take judicial  no-
tice, see W.G. Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide to Massa-
chusetts Evidence § 201 (2009 ed.).
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Nantucket v. Beinecke, 
379 Mass. 345, 352, 398 N.E.2d 458, 462 (1979). See also Commonwealth 
v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1979). Accord Di-
mino v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 427 Mass. 704, 707, 695 N.E.2d 659, 
662 (1998) (“Factual matters which are ‘indisputably true’ are subject to judi-
cial notice” [citations omitted].).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Green, 
408 Mass. 48, 50 n.2, 556 N.E.2d 387, 389 n.2 (1990). See also Common-
wealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1979). Accord 
Commonwealth v. Greco, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 301 & n.11, 921 N.E.2d 
1001, 1006 & n.11 (2010) (“judge did not err in taking judicial notice of the 
single and indisputable fact that, based upon the PDR [Physician’s Desk 
Reference], Seroquel is the brand name for the generic drug quetiapine,” 
while “not suggest[ing] that the PDR may be judicially noticed for other pur-
poses”); Federal  Nat’l  Mtge. Ass’n v. Therrian, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 525, 
678 N.E.2d 193, 195 (1997) (“facts which are . . . verifiably true [e.g., Lynn is 
in Essex County] are susceptible of judicial notice”).
The court may take judicial notice of facts in connection with motions 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c), as well  as the records of the court 
in related actions. Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530, 766 N.E.2d 482, 
487 (2002).
“Judicial notice is not to be extended to personal  observations of the 
judge or juror.” Nantucket v. Beinecke, 379 Mass. 345, 352, 398 N.E.2d 458, 
462 (1979), citing Duarte, petitioner, 331 Mass. 747, 749–750, 122 N.E.2d 
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890, 892 (1954). See also Commonwealth v. Kirk, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 229, 
654 N.E.2d 938, 941–942 (1995) (“judicial  notice . . . cannot be taken of ma-
terial factual issues that can only be decided by the fact finder on competent 
evidence”).
In Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 402 
Mass. 750, 759 n.7, 525 N.E.2d 369, 374 n.7 (1988), the court explained the 
difference between “judicial notice” of facts and “official notice” of facts. The 
latter includes matters that are “indisputably true,” as well  as other factual 
matters that an agency may take notice of due to its special familiarity with 
the subject matter. See G. L. c. 30A, § 6.
Subsection (c). This subsection, which is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 201(f) 
and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 201(f), reflects the Massachusetts practice that 
judicial notice may be taken at any time. See Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 
Mass. App. Ct. 62, 69 n.9, 688 N.E.2d 458, 464 n.9 (1997) (“judicial notice 
can be taken by trial and appellate courts”). While there is no express author-
ity for the proposition that judicial notice is discretionary in connection with 
adjudicative facts, see Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 
922, 699 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (1998), the principle follows logically from the 
settled proposition that when there are no disputed facts, a legal  dispute is 
ripe for a decision by the court. See Jackson v. Longcope, 394 Mass. 577, 
580 n.2, 476 N.E.2d 617, 620 n.2 (1985) (judicial  notice may be taken by the 
court in connection with a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6]); 
Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754–755, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393 
(1979) (“The right of a court to take judicial notice of subjects of common 
knowledge is substantially the same as the right of jurors to rely on their 
common knowledge.”). See also Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 
72, 21 N.E. 228, 229 (1889) (court took judicial notice that cigars were not 
drugs or medicine and properly excluded expert opinions stating the con-
trary). Courts may take judicial notice of their own records. See, e.g., Jarosz 
v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530, 766 N.E.2d 482, 487 (2002).
Criminal Cases. The defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury 
means that the “trier of fact, judge or jury, cannot be compelled to find 
against the defendant as to any element of the crime.” Commonwealth v. 
Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291, 331 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1975). Although the court 
may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact in a criminal  case, see Com-
monwealth v. Green, 408 Mass. 48, 50 & n.2, 556 N.E.2d 387, 389 & n.2 
(1990), “[t]he proper practice in a criminal  trial is to submit all  factual issues 
to the jury, including matters of which the judge may take judicial notice.” 
Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 755, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393–394 
(1979), citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(g).
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Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from the principle, grounded in 
due process considerations, that a party has a right to notice of matters that 
the court will  adjudicate. See Department of Revenue v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 
69, 76 n.15, 731 N.E.2d 501, 507 n.15 (2000), and cases cited.
Subsection (e). The first sentence of this subsection, which is taken verba-
tim from Fed. R. Evid. 201(g) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 201(g), reflects 
Massachusetts practice. It is consistent with and follows from the principle 
set forth in Section 201(c). The second sentence is derived from Common-
wealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754–755, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393–394 
(1979), and Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 923, 699 
N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (1998), where the courts noted that any fact that is the 
subject of judicial  notice in a criminal case must be given to the jury for its 
determination. See generally United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 22–26 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (explaining relationship between Fed. R. Evid. 201[b] and Fed. R. 
Evid. 201[g]).
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Section 202. Judicial Notice of Law
(a) Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice of
(1) the General Laws of the Commonwealth, public acts of the 
Massachusetts Legislature, the common law of Massachusetts, 
rules of court, the contents of the Code of Massachusetts Regula-
tions, and Federal statutes, and
(2) the contents of Federal regulations and the laws of foreign ju-
risdictions that are brought to the court’s attention.
(b) Permissive. A court may take judicial notice of the contents of 
Federal regulations and the laws of foreign jurisdictions not brought 
to its attention, legislative history, municipal charters, and charter 
amendments.
(c) Not Permitted. A court is not  permitted to take judicial notice of 
municipal ordinances, town bylaws, special acts of the Legislature, or 
regulations not published in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations.
NOTE
Subsections (a)(1) and (2). These subsections are derived from 44 U.S.C. 
§ 1507 (contents of the Federal  Register shall be judicially noticed); G. L. c. 
30A, § 6 (regulations published in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations 
shall be judicially noticed); and G. L. c. 233, § 70 (“The courts shall take judi-
cial  notice of the law of the United States or of any state, territory or depend-
ency thereof or of a foreign country whenever the same shall  be material.”). 
See also Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 269, 182 N.E.2d 
138, 139 (1962); Ralston v. Commissioner of Agric., 334 Mass. 51, 53–54, 
133 N.E.2d 589, 591 (1956); Mastrullo v. Ryan, 328 Mass. 621, 622, 105 
N.E.2d 469, 470 (1952); Brodsky v. Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 54, 160 N.E. 335, 
337 (1928).
The party which seeks to have the court notice or apply any foreign law 
has the burden of bringing it to the court’s attention. See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 39(b) (“The court shall upon request take judicial notice of the law of the 
United States or of any state, territory, or dependency thereof or of a foreign 
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country whenever it shall be material.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“A party who 
intends to raise an issue concerning the law of the United States or of any 
state, territory or dependency thereof or of a foreign country shall  give notice 
in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining 
such law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, 
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43. The court’s 
determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 43B, § 12; Blue Hills 
Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration in Embalming & Funeral Directing, 
379 Mass. 368, 375 n.10, 398 N.E.2d 471, 476 n.10 (1979), citing Pereira v. 
New England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 122, 301 N.E.2d 441, 449 (1973) 
(notice of legislative history is permissive); and New England Trust Co. v. 
Wood, 326 Mass. 239, 243, 93 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1950) (notice of charters 
and charter amendments of cities and towns).
Subsection (c). Courts “will  not take judicial  cognizance of municipal  ordi-
nances, or of special acts of the Legislature” (citations omitted). Brodsky v. 
Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 54, 160 N.E. 335, 337 (1928). Furthermore, “[t]he gen-
eral rule in Massachusetts is that courts do not take judicial  notice of regula-
tions [not included in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations]; they must be 
put in evidence” (citations and quotations omitted). Peters v. Haymarket 
Leasing, Inc., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 775 n.11, 835 N.E.2d 628, 635 n.11 
(2005). Printed copies of legislative acts and resolves and attested copies of 
municipal ordinances, bylaws, rules, and regulations are admissible. 
G. L. c. 233, § 75.
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ARTICLE III.  INFERENCES, PRIMA FACIE 
EVIDENCE, AND PRESUMPTIONS
Section 301. Civil Cases
(a) Scope. This section applies to all civil actions and proceedings, 
except as otherwise specifically provided by a statute, the common 
law, a rule, or a regulation.
(b) Inferences. An inference is a step in reasoning that the fact finder 
may make from evidence that has been accepted as believable. A fact 
may  be inferred even though the relationship  between the basic fact 
and the inferred fact is not necessary or inescapable, so long as it is 
reasonable and possible.
(c) Prima Facie Evidence. Where a statute or regulation provides that 
a fact or group of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact at issue, 
the party against  whom the prima facie evidence is directed has the 
burden of production to rebut or meet such prima facie evidence. If 
that party  fails to come forward with evidence to rebut or meet the 
prima facie evidence, the fact at issue is to be taken by  the fact finder 
as established. Where evidence is introduced sufficient to warrant a 
finding contrary to the fact at issue, the fact  finder is permitted to con-
sider the prima facie evidence as bearing on the fact at issue, but it 
must be weighed with all other evidence to determine whether a par-
ticular fact has been proved. Prima facie evidence does not shift the 
burden of persuasion, which remains throughout the trial on the party 
on whom it was originally cast.
(d) Presumptions. A presumption imposes on the party against whom 
it is directed the burden of production to rebut or meet that presump-
tion. The extent of that  burden may be defined by statute, regulation, 
or the common law. If that  party fails to come forward with evidence 
to rebut or meet that presumption, the fact is to be taken by  the fact 
finder as established. If that  party comes forward with evidence to re-
but or meet  the presumption, the presumption shall have no further 
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force or effect. A presumption does not shift the burden of persuasion, 
which remains throughout the trial on the party on whom it was origi-
nally cast.
NOTE
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 
440 Mass. 715, 720–721 & n.8, 802 N.E.2d 76, 82 & n.8 (2004), and DeJoin-
ville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 253 n.13, 408 N.E.2d 1353, 1357 
n.13 (1980). “In this formulation, ‘possible’ is not a lesser alternative to ‘rea-
sonable.’ Rather, the two words function in a synergistic  manner: each raises 
the standard imposed by the other.” Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 440 Mass. at 
721, 802 N.E.2d at 82. “[W]e have permitted, in carefully defined circum-
stances, a jury to make an inference based on an inference to come to a 
conclusion of guilt or innocence. But we require that each inference must be 
a reasonable and logical conclusion from the prior inference; we have made 
clear that a jury may not use conjecture or guesswork to choose between 
alternative inferences.” Commonwealth v. Dostie, 425 Mass. 372, 376, 681 
N.E.2d 282, 284–285 (1997). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass. 
133, 136, 891 N.E.2d 675, 678–679 (2008) (concluding that there was suffi-
cient evidence connecting the defendant to a gun found at the crime scene, 
the court observed that “[w]e do not require that every inference be premised 
on an independently proven fact”). For a lengthy list of inferences, see W.G. 
Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide to Massachusetts Evi-
dence § 301 (2009 ed.). See also Model  Jury Instructions for Use in the Dis-
trict Court § 3.03 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2003).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Burns v. Commonwealth, 
430 Mass. 444, 450–451, 720 N.E.2d 798, 804 (1999); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Barrett, 403 Mass. 240, 242–243, 526 N.E.2d 1284, 1286–1287 (1988); and 
Cook v. Farm Serv. Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 566, 17 N.E.2d 890, 892 
(1938). For a list of statutes that involve prima facie evidence, see W.G. 
Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide to Massachusetts Evi-
dence § 301 (2009 ed.). See also Model  Jury Instructions for Use in the Dis-
trict Court § 3.08 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2003).
Subsection (d). This subsection is based on the predominant approach in 
Massachusetts whereby a presumption shifts the burden of production and 
disappears when the opposing party meets its burden by offering evidence to 
rebut the presumption. However, the disappearance of the presumption does 
not prevent the fact finder from drawing an inference from one or more basic 
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facts that is consistent with the original presumption. See Standerwick v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 34–35, 849 N.E.2d 197, 
209 (2006), quoting Epstein v. Boston Hous. Auth., 317 Mass. 297, 302, 58 
N.E.2d 135, 139 (1944) (in the context of the statutory provision that an abut-
ter is presumed to have standing in cases arising under G. L. c. 40A, the 
court observed that “[a] presumption does not shift the burden of proof; it is a 
rule of evidence that aids the party bearing the burden of proof in sustaining 
that burden by ‘throw[ing] upon his adversary the burden of going forward 
with evidence.’”); Jacobs v. Town Clerk of Arlington, 402 Mass. 824, 826–
827, 525 N.E.2d 658, 660–661 (1988) (rebuttable presumption of death). The 
quantum of evidence required to rebut the presumption may vary. See 
Yazbek v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 41 
Mass. App. Ct. 915, 916, 670 N.E.2d 200, 201 (1996).
In civil cases, presumptions ordinarily require a party against whom the 
presumption is directed to come forward with some evidence to rebut the 
presumption; they ordinarily impose a burden of production, not persuasion, 
on that party. What has been termed an irrebuttable or conclusive presump-
tion is not a rule of evidence, but rather a rule of substantive law designed to 
address a social policy, and cannot be rebutted by evidence. W.G. Young, 
J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide to Massachusetts Evidence 
§ 301(e) (2009 ed.), citing Commonwealth v. Clerk-Magistrate of the 
W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep’t, 439 Mass. 352, 354–356, 787 N.E.2d 
1032, 1035–1036 (2003); Commonwealth v. Dunne, 394 Mass. 10, 18, 474 
N.E.2d 538, 544 (1985). See G. L. c. 152, § 32(e); Carey’s Case, 66 Mass. 
App. Ct. 749, 755–758, 850 N.E.2d 610, 616–617 (2006).
A presumption may give rise to a constitutional question even in civil 
cases. See, e.g., Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571, 823 N.E.2d 
356, 361 (2005) (“[I]n cases that involve severing parental rights, the pre-
sumption that a child, who had been in the care of the department for more 
than one year, would have her best interests served by granting a petition for 
adoption or dispensing with the need for parental consent to adoption, vio-
lates the parents’ due process rights because it shifts the burden to the par-
ent affirmatively to prove fitness and to prove that the best interests of the 
child would be served by maintaining parental  rights.”). For a lengthy list of 
presumptions, see W.G. Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide 
to Massachusetts Evidence § 301 (2009 ed.). See also Model Jury Instruc-
tions for Use in the District Court § 3.07 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2003).
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Section 302. Criminal Cases
(a) Scope. This section governs the operation of inferences, prima fa-
cie evidence, and presumptions in criminal cases.
(b) Inferences. The jury  generally may draw inferences in a criminal 
case in the same manner as in a civil case.
(c) Prima Facie Evidence. Prima facie evidence means that proof of 
the first fact permits, but does not require, the fact finder, in the ab-
sence of competing evidence, to find that the second fact is true be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Where there is contrary evidence, the first 
fact continues to constitute some evidence of the fact to be proved, 
remaining throughout the trial probative on issues to which it is rele-
vant.
(d) Presumptions. The term “presumption” should not be used in 
connection with the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.
(1) The defendant cannot be required to satisfy  the burden of dis-
proving a fact that is essential to a finding or verdict of guilty.
(2) The defendant may be required to satisfy a burden of produc-
tion.
NOTE
Subsection (a). Constitutional principles restrict the manner in which con-
cepts such as inferences, prima facie evidence, and presumptions are per-
mitted to operate in criminal cases. “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to 
shift to a defendant the burden of disproving an element of a crime charged.” 
Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 794, 434 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1982). 
Likewise, “[d]ue process requires that the State disprove beyond a reason-
able doubt those ‘defenses’ that negate essential  elements of the crime 
charged.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 203, 415 N.E.2d 805, 
814 (1981). Therefore, a conclusive or mandatory presumption or inference 
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in any form which has the effect of relieving the jury of the duty of finding a 
fact essential  to proof of the defendant’s guilt on a criminal charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt based on evidence offered at trial, or which imposes on a 
defendant a burden of persuasion as to such a fact, conflicts with the pre-
sumption of innocence and violates due process. See Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–524 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 
210 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 589–590, 374 N.E.2d 
87, 92 (1978).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from DeJoinville v. Common-
wealth, 381 Mass. 246, 253, 408 N.E.2d 1353, 1357 (1980), and Gagne v. 
Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 417, 422–423, 377 N.E.2d 919, 922–923 (1978). 
While a jury generally may draw inferences in a criminal case in the same 
manner as in a civil case, drawing an inference in a criminal  case is not a 
substitute for the separate determination of whether the defendant’s guilt has 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Waite, 
422 Mass. 792, 805–806, 665 N.E.2d 982, 991–992 (1996); Commonwealth 
v. Little, 384 Mass. 262, 267, 424 N.E.2d 504, 507 (1981).
Cross-Reference: Section 301(b), Civil Cases: Inferences.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Maloney, 
447 Mass. 577, 581, 855 N.E.2d 765, 769 (2006). See also Commonwealth 
v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 520, 492 N.E.2d 719, 726 (1986); Common-
wealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291–292, 331 N.E.2d 901, 904–905 (1975).
There are numerous statutes that designate certain evidence as having 
prima facie effect. See, e.g., G. L. c. 22C, § 39, and G. L. c. 111, § 13 (certifi-
cate of chemical  analysis of narcotics); G. L. c. 46, § 19 (birth, marriage, or 
death certificate); G. L. c. 90, § 24(4) (court record of a prior conviction if ac-
companied by other documentation); G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (report of inspector 
in housing court); G. L. c. 233, § 79F (certificate of public  way); G. L. c. 269, 
§ 11C (firearm with obliterated serial number).
“Such provisions serve to identify evidence that the Com-
monwealth may introduce to meet its burden and which, 
while just as probative as other evidence, is less burden-
some to produce. They do not, however, alter the Common-
wealth’s substantive burden of proof, render admissible any 
evidence that previously was inadmissible, or render suffi-
cient any evidence that necessarily was insufficient before-
hand.” (Citation omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. at 581–582, 855 N.E.2d at 769.
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Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Moreira, 
385 Mass. 792, 797, 434 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1982), where the Supreme Judi-
cial  Court stated that “[t]he word ‘presumption’ must be given an explanation 
consistent with the meaning of inference. The safer course, perhaps, is to 
avoid the use of the word ‘presumption,’ in any context which includes the 
burden of proof in criminal cases.” See also Commonwealth v. McInerney, 
373 Mass. 136, 149, 365 N.E.2d 815, 823 (1977) (explaining the problems 
that arise when the terms “presumption” and “inference” are used inter-
changeably). Additionally, in instructing a jury, the judge should explain that 
inferences operate only permissively, and that the jury are not required to 
accept any fact based on prima facie evidence. See Commonwealth v. Nizio-
lek, 380 Mass. 513, 521–522, 404 N.E.2d 643, 648 (1980); Commonwealth 
v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291–292, 331 N.E.2d 901, 904–905 (1975). See 
also Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 340, 486 N.E.2d 29, 43 
(1985).
Subsection (d)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 794–797, 434 N.E.2d 196, 198–200 (1982), and 
Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 363–364, 398 N.E.2d 463, 469 
(1979). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Proc-
ess Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”).
Subsection (d)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Cabral, 
443 Mass. 171, 179, 819 N.E.2d 951, 959 (2005), and cases cited. See id. 
(“[W]here a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, he takes on a burden 
of production, because the Commonwealth has no burden of disproving an 
affirmative defense unless and until  there is evidence supporting such de-
fense” [citation and quotation omitted].). This principle is illustrated by Com-
monwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 541, 854 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (2006), 
where the court explained that
“[t]he Commonwealth’s burden to disprove the affirmative 
defense of honest and reasonable claim arises once the de-
fendant has met his own burden of production. Thus, if any 
view of the evidence would support a factual  finding that the 
defendant was acting as creditor to the victim’s debtor, the 
defendant has met his burden of production and it is incum-
bent on the Commonwealth to disprove the defense.” (Cita-
tion and quotation omitted.)
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In Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. at 541 n.3, 854 N.E.2d at 1244 n.3, 
the court also made it clear that a defendant may be required to carry the 
burden of production as to an affirmative defense that relates directly to an 
element of the crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 
684, 687–688, 352 N.E.2d 203, 205–206 (1976) (in prosecution for assault 
and battery, Commonwealth has no duty to affirmatively disprove that the 
defendant acted in self-defense until  there is some evidence in the case to 
warrant such a finding). Cf. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 
524–526, 729 N.E.2d 252, 266–268 (2000) (Spina, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the idiosyncratic use of the concept of “presumption” in insanity cases in 
Massachusetts and explaining that the “presumption of sanity” survives even 
when the defendant offers evidence that he or she was insane at the time of 
the commission of the crime because insanity is not an element of the of-
fense). See also Model  Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court § 3.07 
(Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2003).
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ARTICLE IV.  RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Section 401. Relevant Evidence
“Relevant evidence” is evidence having any  tendency to make the 
existence of any  fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 
350, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (1990), and is nearly identical to Fed. R. Evid. 
401. See also Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 389 Mass. 308, 310, 450 N.E.2d 
167, 170 (1983) (citing with approval Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 401). Massa-
chusetts law accords relevance a liberal definition. See Commonwealth v. 
Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78, 83, 546 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1989) (“rational ten-
dency to prove an issue in the case”); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 
426, 440, 381 N.E.2d 582, 590 (1978) (“renders the desired inference more 
probable than it would be without the evidence”). The concept of relevancy 
has two components: (1) the evidence must have some tendency (probative 
value) to prove or disprove a particular fact, and (2) that particular fact must 
be material  to an issue (of consequence) in the case. Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 
60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485, 803 N.E.2d 735, 740 (2004). See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 847–852, 920 N.E.2d 845, 852–856 
(2010) (just as evidence of a DNA test resulting in a “match” must be accom-
panied by evidence about the likelihood of a match occurring, evidence that a 
DNA test failed to exclude the defendant “without accompanying evidence 
that properly interprets that result creates a greater risk of misleading the jury 
and unfairly prejudicing the defendant than admission of a ‘match’ without 
accompanying statistics”; court distinguished cases involving admissibility of 
inconclusive DNA test results without accompanying statistics when offered 
to rebut defendant’s challenge to “the integrity of the police investigation,” 
Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 872, 882 N.E.2d 833, 844–845 
(2008), or to show that lack of test results was due to an insufficient amount 
of DNA to test, Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 253, 892 N.E.2d 
299, 312–313 (2008)); Commonwealth v. Cordle, 412 Mass. 172, 177, 587 
N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (1992) (“The failure of the police to conduct certain tests 
is a permissible ground on which to build a defense.”).
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To be admissible, it is not necessary that the evidence be conclusive of 
the issue. Commonwealth v. Ashley, 427 Mass. 620, 624–625, 694 N.E.2d 
862, 866 (1998). It is sufficient if the evidence constitutes a link in the chain 
of proof. Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 144, 810 N.E.2d 1201, 
1210 (2004). “Evidence must go in by piecemeal, and evidence having a 
tendency to prove a proposition is not inadmissible simply because it does 
not wholly prove the proposition. It is enough if in connection with other evi-
dence it helps a little.” Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 467, 76 N.E. 
127, 130 (1905).
“The general  pattern of our cases on the alleged remoteness 
in time or space of particular evidence indicates two general 
principles. If the evidence has some probative value, deci-
sions to admit the evidence and to leave its weight to the jury 
have been sustained. The exclusion on the ground of re-
moteness of relevant evidence has generally not been sus-
tained. The cases have recognized a range of discretion in 
the judge.” (Citations and footnote omitted.)
DeJesus v. Yogel, 404 Mass. 44, 47, 533 N.E.2d 1318, 1320–1321 (1989). 
See also Crowe v. Ward, 363 Mass. 85, 88–89, 292 N.E.2d 716, 718–719 
(1973) (admissibility of weather reports as proof of conditions at some dis-
tance away from the reported observations).
Reliance is placed upon the trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence 
whose probative value is “substantially outweighed” by risk of unfair preju-
dice, confusion, or waste of time. Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 
831, 840 N.E.2d 939, 948 (2006). Although omitted in a number of cases, a 
proper explanation of this balancing test includes the term “substantially.” 
See Note to Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.
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Section 402. Relevant Evidence Generally 
Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence 
Inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise limited by 
constitutional requirements, statute, or other provisions of the Massa-
chusetts common law of evidence. Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. DelValle, 443 Mass. 782, 793, 
824 N.E.2d 830, 840 (2005), and Commonwealth v. Owen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 
538, 547, 784 N.E.2d 660, 666 (2003). Unless relevant, evidence will not be 
admitted because it does not make a fact in dispute more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 
425 Mass. 507, 512 n.7, 681 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 n.7 (1997). But the converse 
is not true, which is to say that not all  relevant evidence will  be admitted. See 
Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 440, 381 N.E.2d 582, 590 (1978) 
(“all relevant evidence is admissible unless barred by an exclusionary rule”); 
Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 210, 372 N.E.2d 212, 218 (1978) 
(same).
Relevant evidence may be excluded for any number of reasons. See, 
e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 20 (evidence of a private conversation between spouses 
is inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 416–417, 734 
N.E.2d 1164, 1176–1177 (2000) (hypnotically aided testimony is not admissi-
ble); Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass. 462, 467–468, 358 N.E.2d 982, 
985–986 (1976) (constitutional mandate forbids admission of a coerced con-
fession regardless of its relevance); Commonwealth v. Kartell, 58 Mass. App. 
Ct. 428, 432, 790 N.E.2d 739, 743 (2003) (relevant evidence excluded on 
grounds it was too remote). “Alleged defects in the chain of custody usually 
go to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.” Commonwealth v. 
Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 230, 588 N.E.2d 643, 648 (1992); Sec-
tion 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence (relevant evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice, confusion, etc.). There may be circumstances where por-
tions of documentary evidence should be excluded or redacted to protect 
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personal privacy. See Matter of the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 436 Mass. 
784, 794, 767 N.E.2d 566, 575–576 (2002).
“The right to call  witnesses and present a defense under the Sixth 
Amendment and art. 12 is not absolute. In the face of ‘legitimate demands of 
the adversarial system,’ this right may be tempered according to the discre-
tion of the trial  judge.” Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 552, 789 
N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 Mass. 
337, 343, 361 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (1977).
Cross-Reference: Note “Address of Witness” to Section 501, Privileges 
Recognized Only as Provided.
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Section 403. Grounds for Excluding Relevant 
Evidence
Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by  the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, misleading the jury, being unnecessarily  time consuming, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
NOTE
This section is derived from Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 
418, 423, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1988) (adopting the principles expressed in 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 403). See Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 
821, 831, 840 N.E.2d 939, 948 (2006); Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 
482, 490–491, 802 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2003); Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 
397 Mass. 206, 217, 490 N.E.2d 788, 795 (1986); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
53 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 407–408, 759 N.E.2d 723, 736 (2001).
While a majority of the cases stand for the proposition that relevant evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is “substantially” outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect—see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. at 831, 
840 N.E.2d at 948; Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 641, 760 
N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (2002); Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 236, 
581 N.E.2d 999, 1009–1010 (1991)—others state that the probative value 
must be merely outweighed by the prejudicial  effect. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 557, 829 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 395, 708 N.E.2d 658, 665 
(1999). These latter cases, however, rely on cases which include the term 
“substantial” when explaining the balancing test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Chalifoux, 362 Mass. 811, 816, 291 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1973) (relied on by 
cases which Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. at 556–557, 829 N.E.2d 
at 1140–1141, relied on); Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. at 236, 581 
N.E.2d at 1009–1010 (relied on by Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. at 
395, 708 N.E.2d at 665).
Guidelines for Certain Categories of Evidence. The Supreme Judicial 
Court and Appeals Court have developed guidelines for the admissibility of 
certain categories of evidence subject to a Section 403 analysis. See, e.g., 
Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 430 Mass. 198, 202–203, 715 N.E.2d 47, 52–53 
(1999) (similar incidents); Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 
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418, 422–423, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1998) (vicarious admissions); Com-
monwealth v. Ramos, 406 Mass. 397, 406–407, 548 N.E.2d 856, 861–862 
(1990) (in a prosecution for murder in the first degree by reason of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, “photographs indicating the 
force applied and portraying the injuries inflicted may properly be admitted”); 
Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 802–806, 374 N.E.2d 1216, 
1220–1222 (1978) (admissibility of opinion polls and surveys); Common-
wealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 193–195, 770 N.E.2d 1, 5–7 
(2002) (admissibility of evidence consisting of courtroom experiments and 
demonstrations).
Unfair Prejudice. “[T]rial judges must take care to avoid exposing the jury 
unnecessarily to inflammatory material that might inflame the jurors’ emotions 
and possibly deprive the defendant of an impartial jury.” Commonwealth v. 
Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 109, 648 N.E.2d 732, 741 (1995). In balancing proba-
tive value against risk of prejudice, the fact that the evidence goes to a cen-
tral  issue in the case weighs in favor of admission. See Gath v. M/A-Com, 
Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 490–491, 802 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2003). Unfair prejudice 
does not mean that the evidence sought to be excluded is particularly proba-
tive evidence harmful  to the opponent of the evidence. An illustrative weigh-
ing of probative value against unfair prejudice arises regarding the admissi-
bility of photographs of the victim (especially autopsy) or the crime scene. 
See generally Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 208–209, 834 
N.E.2d 1159, 1170–1171 (2005); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 444 Mass. 289, 
297–298, 828 N.E.2d 1, 8–9 (2005); Commonwealth v. Prashaw, 57 Mass. 
App. Ct. 19, 24–25, 781 N.E.2d 19, 24 (2003). Evidence of a defendant’s 
prior bad act may be unfairly prejudicial  and therefore inadmissible to prove 
the crime charged, but it may be admissible for other purposes (e.g., com-
mon plan, pattern of conduct, identity, absence of accident, motive). See 
Commonwealth v. Holloway, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 475, 691 N.E.2d 985, 
990 (1998). See also Commonwealth v. Fidalgo, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 133–
134, 904 N.E.2d 474, 478 (2009) (evidence that the defendant had been a 
passenger in three prior automobile accidents over the past nine years in 
which she had claimed injuries and sought damages was not relevant in a 
prosecution of the defendant for filing a false motor vehicle insurance claim 
because it showed nothing about the character of the prior claims and yet 
had the potential for prejudice since the case was essentially a credibility 
contest). The effectiveness of limiting instructions in minimizing the risk of 
unfair prejudice should be considered in the balance. Commonwealth v. 
Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 807, 556 N.E.2d 30, 35–36 (1990). See also Sec-
tion 404(b), Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Excep-
tions; Other Crimes: Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
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Confusion of Issues and Misleading the Jury. The trial judge has discre-
tion to exclude relevant evidence if it has potential for confusing and mislead-
ing the fact finder. Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 25, 661 N.E.2d 56, 
61 (1996); Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206, 217, 490 N.E.2d 
788, 795 (1986); Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 
317, 332, 698 N.E.2d 28, 41 (1998) (admissibility of a test, experiment, or 
reenactment requires consideration of “whether the evidence is relevant, the 
extent to which the test conditions are similar to the circumstances surround-
ing the accident, and whether the [experiment, demonstration, or reenact-
ment] will confuse or mislead the jury” [quotation and citation omitted]).
Unnecessarily Time Consuming. The trial  judge has discretion to exclude 
evidence if it is unduly time consuming. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. 
App. Ct. 393, 407–408, 759 N.E.2d 723, 736 (2001).
Cumulative Evidence. The trial  judge has discretion to exclude evidence if 
it is merely cumulative. Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 831, 840 
N.E.2d 939, 948 (2006). See Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Department 
of Telecommunications & Energy, 440 Mass. 625, 641, 801 N.E.2d 220, 232 
(2004) (no error in excluding testimony that would be “merely cumulative of 
the uncontroverted evidence”); Commonwealth v. Taghizadeh, 28 Mass. App. 
Ct. 52, 60–61, 545 N.E.2d 1195, 1200–1201 (1989) (evidence that is relevant 
to an essential element of a crime, claim, or defense is not cumulative and 
subject to exclusion simply because an opposing party offers to stipulate to 
the fact at issue). See also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
Exclusion as a Sanction. See Section 1102, Spoliation or Destruction of 
Evidence.
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Section 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible 
to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; 
Other Crimes
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person’s character 
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving ac-
tion in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except as fol-
lows:
(1) Character of the Accused. In a criminal proceeding, the ac-
cused may offer evidence of a pertinent trait in reputation form 
only, and the prosecution may rebut the same.
(2) Character of the Victim. In a criminal proceeding, in support 
of a claim of self-defense,
(A) the accused may offer evidence known to the accused 
prior to the incident in question of the victim’s reputation for 
violence, of specific instances of the victim’s violent conduct, 
or of statements made by  the victim that caused reasonable 
apprehension of violence on the part of the accused;
(B) where the identity of the first aggressor is in dispute, the 
accused may offer evidence of specific incidents of violence 
allegedly initiated by the victim, or a third party acting in 
concert with or to assist the victim, whether known or un-
known to the accused, and the prosecution may rebut the 
same in reputation form only.
(3) Character of the Witness. Evidence of the character of a wit-
ness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, as provided in Sections 
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show action in conformity  therewith. It may, however, be ad-
missible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
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tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, nature of relationship, or 
absence of mistake or accident.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Helfant, 
398 Mass. 214, 224, 496 N.E.2d 433, 441 (1986), and Commonwealth v. 
Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 829, 840 N.E.2d 939, 946 (2006). Massachusetts 
follows the universally recognized rule against “propensity” evidence, i.e., 
evidence of a person’s character through reputation or specific acts (see 
Section 404[b]) offered to suggest that the person acted in conformity with 
that character or trait on the occasion in question is inadmissible. See Maillet 
v. ATF-Davidson Co., 407 Mass. 185, 187–188, 552 N.E.2d 95, 97 (1990); 
Commonwealth v. Doherty, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 636–637, 504 N.E.2d 
681, 683–684 (1987). In Figueiredo v. Hamill, 385 Mass. 1003, 1003–1005, 
431 N.E.2d 231, 232 (1982), for example, the Supreme Judicial  Court ex-
plained the difference between evidence of habit (a regular way of doing 
things) and evidence of character (a general description of one’s disposition), 
and held that evidence offered by the defendant that the decedent acted in a 
“habitually reckless manner” was inadmissible evidence of the decedent’s 
character. The prosecution may not offer in its case-in-chief evidence that the 
accused is a violent or dishonest person in order to demonstrate that the ac-
cused has a propensity to commit the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Mul-
lane, 445 Mass. 702, 708–709, 840 N.E.2d 484, 492–493 (2006). But see 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2005), 
discussed in the notes to Section 404(a)(2)(B). As Justice Cardozo stated, 
“the law has set its face against the endeavor to fasten guilt upon him by 
proof of character or experience predisposing to an act of crime.” People v. 
Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930).
While Section 404(a) applies in both civil and criminal  cases, exceptions 
(1) and (2) apply only in criminal cases. Exception (3) applies in both civil and 
criminal cases.
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Nagle, 
157 Mass. 554, 554–555, 32 N.E. 861, 861–862 (1893), and Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 411 Mass. 115, 117–118, 579 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1991). According to 
long-standing practice, the accused may introduce evidence of his or her 
own good character—in reputation form only—to show that he or she is not 
the type of person to commit the crime charged. See Commonwealth v. Bel-
ton, 352 Mass. 263, 267–269, 225 N.E.2d 53, 55–57 (1967). The accused is 
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limited to introducing reputation evidence of traits that are involved in the 
charged crime. Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 229–230, 50 N.E.2d 
14, 25 (1943).
The prosecution has the right to cross-examine for impeachment pur-
poses the defendant’s character witnesses on matters that are inconsistent 
with the character trait to which the witness has testified, including specific 
instances of bad conduct or criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 
74 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 53, 904 N.E.2d 442, 446 (2009) (When, in a prosecu-
tion for assault and battery, the defendant testified to his character for peace-
fulness, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by ruling that the Com-
monwealth was entitled to cross-examine the defendant based on his prior 
convictions for the same offenses involving the same victim to rebut his 
credibility as to his character, even though the Commonwealth’s motion in 
limine to use these prior convictions for impeachment purposes had been 
denied prior to trial.). See also Section 405(a), Methods of Proving Charac-
ter: Reputation. The prosecution may also present rebuttal evidence of the 
defendant’s bad character in reputation form. Commonwealth v. Maddocks, 
207 Mass. 152, 157, 93 N.E. 253, 253–254 (1910).
Subsection (a)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 434–435, 788 N.E.2d 941, 947–948 (2003), and Com-
monwealth v. Fontes, 396 Mass. 733, 735–736, 488 N.E.2d 760, 762–763 
(1986). The evidence may be offered to prove the defendant’s state of mind 
and the reasonableness of his or her actions in claiming to have acted in self-
defense so long as the defendant knew about it prior to the incident in ques-
tion. See Commonwealth v. Edmonds, 365 Mass. 496, 502, 313 N.E.2d 429, 
432–433 (1974).
Subsection (a)(2)(B). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ad-
jutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2005), and Commonwealth v. 
Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 737, 863 N.E.2d 936, 950 (2007). Where a 
claim of self-defense is asserted and the identity of the first aggressor is in 
dispute, trial  courts have discretion to admit a defendant’s evidence of spe-
cific incidents of violence allegedly initiated by the victim even if unknown to 
the defendant. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664, 824 N.E.2d at 
13. If known to the defendant, the specific  act evidence goes to the defen-
dant’s state of mind, Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 577, 750 
N.E.2d 977, 987 (2001); if the defendant was not aware of the violent acts of 
the victim, the evidence goes merely to the propensity of the victim to attack. 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 661–662, 824 N.E.2d at 12. See 
generally id. at 665, 824 N.E.2d at 14 (courts “favor the admission of con-
crete and relevant evidence of specific  acts over more general  evidence of 
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the victim’s reputation for violence”). The rule announced in Commonwealth 
v. Adjutant is a “new common-law rule of evidence” to be applied prospec-
tively only. Id. at 667, 824 N.E.2d at 15. See also Commonwealth v. 
Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 304–305, 893 N.E.2d 19, 31–32 (2008) (declining 
to apply the Adjutant rule retrospectively).
The prosecution may rebut by introducing evidence of the victim’s pro-
pensity for peacefulness. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 666 n.19, 
824 N.E.2d at 14 n.19. See Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 402 Mass. 321, 325, 
522 N.E.2d 937, 939–940 (1988). The Supreme Judicial Court, in dicta, indi-
cated that the common law in Massachusetts may develop to allow the 
prosecution to rebut evidence of the victim’s prior violent incidents by offering 
evidence of specific  instances of the defendant’s violent character. See 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 666 n.19, 824 N.E.2d at 14 n.19.
Cross-Reference: Section 412, Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sex-
ual Reputation (Rape-Shield Law).
Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Daley, 
439 Mass. 558, 563, 789 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (2003). See Notes to Sections 
607, Who May Impeach, 608, Impeachment by Evidence of Character and 
Conduct of Witness, and 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of 
Crime.
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Helfant, 
398 Mass. 214, 224–225, 496 N.E.2d 433, 441 (1986), and G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23F. “[W]hile evidence of other . . . wrongful  behavior may not be admitted 
to prove the character or propensity of the accused as enhancing the prob-
ability that he committed the offence . . . it is admissible for other relevant 
probative purposes.” Commonwealth v. Tobin, 392 Mass. 604, 613, 467 
N.E.2d 826, 833 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. Chalifoux, 362 Mass. 
811, 815–816, 291 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1973). Thus, the prosecution may not 
offer proof of the defendant’s other bank robberies to paint the defendant as 
a “bank robber” or criminal type; but if the modus operandi of a prior bank 
robbery functions as an identifying feature because it is so distinctive as to 
be like a signature, it may be admitted to connect the defendant to the bank 
robbery which shares the same modus operandi. See Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 459–460, 702 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (1998). See also 
Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 208–209, 843 N.E.2d 617, 
633 (2006) (motive); Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 708–710, 
840 N.E.2d 484, 492–494 (2006) (knowledge); Commonwealth v. Walker, 
442 Mass. 185, 201–203, 812 N.E.2d 262, 276–277 (2004) (plan, common 
scheme, or course of conduct); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 
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466, 806 N.E.2d 393, 402 (2004) (motive); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 
Mass. 799, 809, 768 N.E.2d 529, 537 (2002) (intent); Commonwealth v. 
Leonard, 428 Mass. 782, 787–788, 705 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1999) (identity/
modus operandi); Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 744, 537 N.E.2d 
130, 137 (1989) (knowledge and motive); Commonwealth v. Julien, 59 Mass. 
App. Ct. 679, 686–687, 797 N.E.2d 470, 476–477 (2003) (nature of relation-
ship). “Additionally, the prosecution is entitled to present as full a picture as 
possible of the events surrounding the incident itself, as long as the proba-
tive value of the evidence presented is not substantially outweighed by any 
prejudice to the defendant” (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 
450 Mass. 144, 158, 877 N.E.2d 232, 245 (2007). When a defendant is 
charged with sexual assault, evidence of prior, similar sexual misconduct 
between the defendant and the victim, if not too remote in time, is admissible 
to prove the defendant’s inclination to commit the acts charged and to show 
the relationship between the parties. See Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 
Mass. 788, 794–795, 641 N.E.2d 1302, 1307 (1994). See also Dahms v. 
Cognex Corp., 455 Mass. 190, 201, 914 N.E.2d 872, 882 (2009) (trial  judge 
did not err when, after careful consideration, he admitted evidence of female 
employee’s clothing, speech, and conduct, which was admissible in the con-
text of a sexually hostile work environment and not barred as irrelevant char-
acter and propensity evidence).
Evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is not admissible unless, as a mat-
ter of conditional  relevance—see Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: 
Relevancy Conditioned on Fact—the judge is satisfied that a reasonable jury 
could find that the event took place. Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. at 
785–786, 705 N.E.2d at 250. The probative value of the evidence must not 
be (substantially) outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice. See Common-
wealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 834, 840 N.E.2d 939, 950 (2006) (“substan-
tially outweighed by its prejudicial  effect”); Commonwealth v. Martin, 442 
Mass. 1002, 1002, 809 N.E.2d 536, 537 (2004) (“probative value outweighs 
undue prejudice”). See also Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant 
Evidence. The evidence must be probative of a subsidiary fact at issue and 
not be too remote in time. Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 574, 839 
N.E.2d 307, 312 (2005); Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 206–207, 
485 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1985).
The prohibition against propensity evidence in specific  act form stems 
from the belief that not only does such evidence have low probative value 
and carry the distinct risk of undue prejudice, it will  also inevitably lead to 
proliferation of issues and distract the attention of the fact finder from the 
main event. See Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 298, 372 N.E.2d 
1267, 1271 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 
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936 N.E.2d 372 (2010). As the Appeals Court has observed, “all  cases where 
prior bad acts are offered invite consideration of the potency of this type of 
evidence, the risk that it may be misused, and the importance, in jury trials, of 
delivering careful limiting instructions.” Commonwealth v. Gollman, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 839, 845, 748 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (2001), rev’d on other grounds, 
436 Mass. 111, 113–115, 762 N.E.2d 847, 850–851 (2002) (extensive dis-
cussion). See generally Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Guided Discretion in Massachu-
setts Evidence Law: Standards for the Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Against 
the Defendant, 13 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1 (2008).
Cross-Reference: Section 105, Limited Admissibility; Section 403, 
Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence; Section 405, Methods of Proving 
Character; Section 406, Routine Practice of Business; Individual Habit.
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Section 405. Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation. Except as provided in (b) and (c), where evidence of a 
person’s character or a trait of character is admissible, proof may be 
made by testimony  as to reputation only. On cross-examination, in-
quiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct for im-
peachment purposes.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which a person’s char-
acter or a trait  of character is an essential element of a charge, claim, 
or defense, proof may also be made by specific instances of conduct.
(c) Violent Character of the Victim. See Section 404(a)(2), Character 
Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other 
Crimes: Character Evidence Generally: Character of the Victim.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Roberts, 
378 Mass. 116, 129, 389 N.E.2d 989, 997 (1979), and Commonwealth v. 
Piedra, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 155, 160, 478 N.E.2d 1284, 1288–1289 (1985). 
Character may only be introduced through evidence of general reputation, 
except as provided by G. L. c. 233, § 21 (evidence of person’s prior convic-
tion is admissible to impeach his or her credibility); Section 609, Impeach-
ment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime. See Commonwealth v. Binkiewicz, 
342 Mass. 740, 755, 175 N.E.2d 473, 483 (1961). Unlike Federal law, gen-
eral reputation cannot be proven by evidence of personal  opinions or isolated 
acts. Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 198–199, 812 N.E.2d 262, 
274 (2004); Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 430 Mass. 673, 678 n.6, 722 
N.E.2d 953, 958 n.6 (2000). Reputation evidence must be based on one’s 
reputation in the community or at that person’s place of work or business. 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. at 198, 812 N.E.2d at 274. See 
G. L. c. 233, § 21A (work or business); Commonwealth v. Dockham, 405 
Mass. 618, 631, 542 N.E.2d 591, 599 (1989) (community). A witness’s testi-
mony must be based on the witness’s knowledge of the person’s reputation 
in the community, not of the opinions of a limited number of people. Com-
monwealth v. Gomes, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 933, 933–934, 416 N.E.2d 551, 
552–553 (1981); Commonwealth v. LaPierre, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 871, 
408 N.E.2d 883, 883–884 (1980). Contrast Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 46
Mass. at 197–199, 812 N.E.2d at 273–274 (declining to adopt Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 405[a], which would permit character witnesses to testify not 
only about the defendant’s reputation in the community, but also about their 
own opinion of the defendant’s character).
A witness who testifies to a person’s reputation is then subject to cross-
examination for impeachment purposes “as to his awareness of rumors or 
reports of prior acts of misconduct by the [person], including prior arrests or 
convictions, that are inconsistent or conflict with the character trait to which 
the witness has testified.” Commonwealth v. Montanino, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 
130, 136, 535 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1989). The prosecution may also present 
rebuttal evidence of a defendant’s bad reputation. Commonwealth v. Mad-
docks, 207 Mass. 152, 157, 93 N.E. 253, 253–254 (1910).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Care & Protection of Mar-
tha, 407 Mass. 319, 325 n.6, 553 N.E.2d 902, 906 n.6 (1990). Specific  act 
evidence may be admitted in those cases where character is directly at is-
sue, as in child custody and adoption cases on the issue of parental  fitness, 
see Adoption of Irwin, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 43, 545 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 
(1989); negligent entrustment actions, see Leone v. Doran, 363 Mass. 1, 13–
14, 292 N.E.2d 19, 29, modified on other grounds, 363 Mass. 886, 297 
N.E.2d 493 (1973); negligent hiring actions, see Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 26 
Mass. App. Ct. 289, 290–291, 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1310–1311 (1988); and 
when a defendant raises the defense of entrapment, see Commonwealth v. 
Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 652, 282 N.E.2d 394, 400 (1972).
Subsection (c). See Notes to Section 404(a)(2), Character Evidence Not 
Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes: Character Evidence 
Generally: Character of the Victim.
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Section 406. Routine Practice of Business; 
Individual Habit
(a) Routine Practice of Business. Evidence of the routine practice of 
a business or one acting in a business capacity, established through 
sufficient proof, is admissible to prove that the business acted in con-
formity with the routine practice on a particular occasion.
(b) Individual Habit. Evidence of an individual’s personal habit is not 
admissible to prove action in conformity  with the habit on a particular 
occasion.
NOTE
This section is derived from Palinkas v. Bennett, 416 Mass. 273, 276–277, 
620 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1993). “A habit is a regular response to a repeated 
situation with a specific  type of conduct.” Id. at 277, 620 N.E.2d at 777. A trial 
judge has discretion in distinguishing between a routine practice of a busi-
ness and a personal habit. Id.
Subsection (a). Evidence of a routine practice or custom of a business is 
admissible to prove that the business acted in conformity therewith. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Torrealba, 316 Mass. 24, 30, 54 N.E.2d 939, 942 
(1944) (custom of selling goods with receipt); Santarpio v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 301 Mass. 207, 210, 16 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1938) (custom of submitting 
insurance applications); Prudential Trust Co. v. Hayes, 247 Mass. 311, 314–
315, 142 N.E. 73, 73–74 (1924) (custom of sending letters).
“Massachusetts draws a distinction between evidence of 
personal habit and evidence of business habit or custom. 
Evidence of a person’s habits is inadmissible to prove 
whether an act was performed in accordance with the 
habit. . . . [F]or the purpose of proving that one has or has 
not done a particular act, it is not competent to show that he 
has or has not been in the habit of doing other similar acts. 
Despite this rule, evidence of business habits or customs is 
admissible to prove that an act was performed in accordance 
with the habit. . . . The fact that a habit is done by only one 
individual does not bar it from being a business habit.” (Quo-
tation and citations omitted.)
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Palinkas v. Bennett, 416 Mass. 273, 276, 620 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1993). See 
Mumford v. Coghlin, 249 Mass. 184, 188, 144 N.E. 283, 284–285 (1924) (no-
tary’s procedure of protesting notes); Mayberry v. Holbrook, 182 Mass. 463, 
465, 65 N.E. 849, 850 (1903) (physician’s records of rendering services). A 
person is competent to testify about a routine business practice if the person 
is familiar with the practice. O’Connor v. SmithKline Bio-Science Labs., Inc., 
36 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 365, 631 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (1994). Cf. Section 601, 
Competency.
Subsection (b). Unlike Federal  practice, evidence of an individual’s personal 
habit is not admissible to prove action in conformity therewith. See Davidson 
v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 325 Mass. 115, 122, 89 N.E.2d 201, 205 
(1949). See also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 138, 819 N.E.2d 
919, 933 (2004) (owner’s personal, not business, habit of locking door would 
be inadmissible); Figueiredo v. Hamill, 385 Mass. 1003, 1004–1005, 431 
N.E.2d 231, 232–233 (1982) (evidence that pedestrian accident victim ha-
bitually acted in reckless manner properly excluded).
Habit Versus Character. The distinction between habit and character is 
often difficult to make: habit “is the person’s regular practice of meeting a 
particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct,” whereas character 
“is a generalized description of one’s disposition, or of one’s disposition in 
respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness.” 
Figueiredo v. Hamill, 385 Mass. at 1004, 431 N.E.2d at 232, quoting Advisory 
Committee Notes, Fed. R. Evid. 406.
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Section 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
(a) Exclusion of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures. 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, 
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event.
(b) Limited Admissibility. This does not require the exclusion of evi-
dence of subsequent or preceding measures when offered for another 
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, notice, feasibility  of pre-
cautionary measures, or impeachment.
NOTE
This section is derived from doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 780, 
328 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1975), and Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool  Co., 413 
Mass. 205, 214, 596 N.E.2d 318, 324 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by 
Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 20–23, 696 N.E.2d 909, 
922–923 (1998).
Subsection (a). Evidence of the following subsequent remedial measures 
has been excluded: sanding stairs or the street, Barnett v. Lynn, 433 Mass. 
662, 666 n.5, 745 N.E.2d 344, 347 n.5 (2001); National Laundry Co. v. New-
ton, 300 Mass. 126, 127, 14 N.E.2d 108, 109 (1938); installation of a flashing 
light signal at a railroad crossing, Ladd v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 335 
Mass. 117, 120, 138 N.E.2d 346, 347–348 (1956); repositioning a barrier 
across a sidewalk, Manchester v. City of Attleboro, 288 Mass. 492, 493, 193 
N.E. 4, 4 (1934); and precautions taken to avoid another collapse of a trench, 
Shinners v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River, 154 Mass. 
168, 169–171, 28 N.E. 10, 11 (1891). The rule has been extended to exclude 
the results of a defendant’s investigation into the causes of an accident. See 
Martel  v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 403 Mass. 1, 5, 525 N.E.2d 662, 
664 (1988).
Subsection (b). Evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is admissible 
to prove issues other than negligence. See Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 430 
Mass. 198, 207–208, 715 N.E.2d 47, 55–56 (1999) (manufacturer on notice 
of product defect); Schaeffer v. General  Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171, 175–
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176, 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1065–1066 (1977) (feasibility of giving adequate 
warnings); doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. 776, 780–781, 328 N.E.2d 
873, 876 (1975) (feasibility of safety improvements); Reardon v. Country 
Club at Coonamessett, Inc., 353 Mass. 702, 704–705, 234 N.E.2d 881, 883 
(1968) (knowledge of the danger at time of accident); Finn v. Peters, 340 
Mass. 622, 625, 165 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1960) (ownership or control over the 
premises). Evidence of a preaccident remedial measure is also admissible 
for the same purposes. See doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 367 Mass. at 780, 328 
N.E.2d at 876; Torre v. Harris-Seybold Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 676, 404 
N.E.2d 96, 108 (1980).
When a party offers evidence of remedial  measures to prove an issue 
other than negligence, the judge should determine whether it is relevant, see 
Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence 
Inadmissible, and, if so, whether the probative value of the evidence is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, see Section 403, 
Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence. If the judge admits the evidence, 
the judge should, upon request, instruct the jury that the evidence cannot be 
considered as an admission of negligence or fault. See Section 105, Limited 
Admissibility; Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.
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Section 408. Compromise and Offers to 
Compromise in Civil Cases
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or 
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable considera-
tion in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity  or amount is not admissible to prove li-
ability  for, invalidity  of, or amount of the claim or any other claim. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations 
regarding the claim is likewise not admissible. This section does not 
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, 
such as proving bias, prejudice, or state of mind of a witness; rebutting 
a contention of undue delay; or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 408, 
which was adopted in principle in Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. 601, 603–
604, 664 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1996). But see Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 
510, 789 N.E.2d 115, 120 (2003) (“even if we were to adopt the segment of 
[Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 408] pertaining to statements made during 
negotiations . . .”). “This rule is founded in policy, that there may be no dis-
couragement to amicable adjustment of disputes, by a fear, that if not com-
pleted, the party amicably disposed may be injured” (quotation and citation 
omitted). Strauss v. Skurnik, 227 Mass. 173, 175, 116 N.E. 404, 404 (1917).
Evidence that a defendant compromised or offered to compromise a 
claim arising from the same transaction with a third person not a party to the 
action is not admissible to prove the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff. Mur-
ray v. Foster, 343 Mass. 655, 659–660, 180 N.E.2d 311, 313–314 (1962); Ric-
ciutti v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 343 Mass. 347, 349, 178 N.E.2d 857, 859 
(1961). In mitigation of damages, however, a defendant is entitled to the ad-
mission of evidence of a settlement amount between the plaintiff and a joint 
tortfeasor on account of the same injury, but such evidence is for the judge 
only and not the jury to consider. See Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. at 
602–603, 664 N.E.2d at 824.
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Evidence of a compromise or offer to compromise may be admitted 
(with limiting instructions) for a purpose other than to prove liability or the 
invalidity of the claim, such as to impeach the credibility of a witness. See 
Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. at 509–510, 789 N.E.2d at 120–121; Cottam v. 
CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316, 327–328, 764 N.E.2d 814, 824 (2002). For 
example, in an employment discrimination case, statements contained in 
settlement correspondence were properly admitted as probative of the em-
ployer’s state of mind. Dahms v. Cognex Corp., 455 Mass. 190, 199, 914 
N.E.2d 872, 880 (2009).
There can be no offer to compromise a claim unless there is indication 
that there is a potential lawsuit. See Hurwitz v. Bocian, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 
365, 372–373, 670 N.E.2d 408, 413 (1996). Whether a particular conversa-
tion constitutes a settlement offer or admission may require the resolution of 
conflicting testimony and is a preliminary question for the trial judge. Mar-
chand v. Murray, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 615, 541 N.E.2d 371, 374 (1989). 
See Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the 
Court. A unilateral statement that a party will  “take care of” a loss will be 
treated as an admission of liability, not an offer to compromise. See, e.g., 
Cassidy v. Hollingsworth, 324 Mass. 424, 425–426, 86 N.E.2d 663, 663–664 
(1949) (defendant’s statement made after accident that “I guess I owe you a 
fender” held to be admission of liability); Bernasconi v. Bassi, 261 Mass. 26, 
28, 158 N.E. 341, 342 (1927) (defendant’s statement “I fix it up, everything,” 
held to be admission of liability); Dennison v. Swerdlove, 250 Mass. 507, 
508–509, 146 N.E. 27, 27 (1925) (defendant’s statement immediately after 
automobile accident that he would “adjust the damage to your car” was an 
admission of fault). An expression of sympathy does not qualify as either an 
offer to compromise or an admission of liability. See Section 409, Expres-
sions of Sympathy in Civil Cases; Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses.
Admissions made on the face of settlement documents are admissible. 
Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. at 510–511, 789 N.E.2d at 120–121. Where, how-
ever, the parties “understood at [the time of the negotiations] that what was 
said at that time was said without prejudice to either party,” admissions of 
fact will  not be admissible at trial (quotation omitted). Garber v. Levine, 250 
Mass. 485, 490, 146 N.E. 21, 22–23 (1925). However, evidence of conduct 
or statements made during such negotiations on collateral  matters are ad-
missible for their truth. See Wagman v. Ziskind, 234 Mass. 509, 510–511, 
125 N.E. 633, 634 (1920); Harrington v. Lincoln, 70 Mass. 563, 567 (1855); 
Dickinson v. Dickinson, 50 Mass. 471, 474–475 (1845). Cf. G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23D (admissibility of benevolent statements, writings, or gestures relating 
to accident victims); Section 514, Mediation Privilege (under G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23C, any communication made in course of mediation proceedings and in 
53 
presence of mediator are not admissible, except where mediating labor dis-
putes).
Cross-Reference: Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evi-
dence.
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Section 409. Expressions of Sympathy in Civil 
Cases; Payment of Medical and 
Similar Expenses
(a) Expressions of Sympathy in Civil Cases. Statements, writings, or 
benevolent gestures expressing sympathy  or a general sense of be-
nevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person involved 
in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person 
shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability  in a civil 
action.
(b) Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses. Evidence of furnish-
ing, offering, or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar ex-
penses occasioned by an injury  is not admissible to prove liability for 
the injury.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 23D. 
See Gallo v. Veliskakis, 357 Mass. 602, 606, 259 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1970); 
Casper v. Lavoie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 810, 294 N.E.2d 466, 467 (1973). 
See also Denton v. Park Hotel, Inc., 343 Mass. 524, 528, 180 N.E.2d 70, 73 
(1962) (expressions of sympathy have “no probative value as an admission 
of responsibility or liability,” and “[c]ommon decency should not be penalized 
by treating such statements as admissions”).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Gallo v. Veliskakis, 357 
Mass. 602, 606, 259 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1970), and Wilson v. Daniels, 250 
Mass. 359, 364, 145 N.E. 469, 471 (1924). This subsection is based on the 
public policy of encouraging a person to act “as a decent citizen with proper 
humane sensibilities” without having to admit liability (citations omitted). Ly-
ons v. Levine, 352 Mass. 769, 769, 225 N.E.2d 593, 594 (1967). Statements 
that accompany offers of payment are not excluded under this section if oth-
erwise admissible. See Gallo v. Veliskakis, 357 Mass. at 606, 259 N.E.2d at 
570 (defendant’s statements of sympathy and that he would take care of the 
medical bills were inadmissible because they “had no probative value as an 
admission of responsibility or liability” [citations omitted]). Cf. G. L. c. 231, 
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§ 140B (evidence of advanced payments to injured person by insurer is not 
admissible to prove liability).
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Section 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of 
Pleas, and Related Statements
Evidence of a withdrawn or rejected guilty  plea, plea of nolo con-
tendere, or admission to sufficient  facts is not admissible in any  civil 
or criminal proceeding against the person who made the withdrawn 
plea, admission, or offer. Additionally, evidence of statements made in 
connection with and relevant to any of the foregoing withdrawn pleas, 
admissions, or offers is not admissible. Evidence of such statements, 
however, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury if the 
statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in 
the presence of counsel, if any.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) 
bars the use in evidence in any criminal  or civil proceeding of a withdrawn 
guilty plea, a withdrawn plea of nolo contendere, a withdrawn admission of 
sufficient facts, or a withdrawn offer of the same. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f). 
But see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 395 Mass. 737, 747–750, 481 
N.E.2d 1356, 1362–1364 (1985) (guilty plea, not withdrawn, is an admission 
of material facts alleged in complaint or indictment and is admissible as evi-
dence of an admission in subsequent civil  case without having preclusive 
effect); Hopkins v. Medeiros, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 613, 724 N.E.2d 336, 
346 (2000) (“An admission to sufficient facts may be introduced against the 
defendant in a subsequently litigated civil  suit arising out of the same incident 
on the theory that the proceeding was the functional  equivalent of a guilty 
plea, with the same degree of finality” [quotations and citation omitted].); Sec-
tion 801(d)(2)(A), Definitions: Statements which Are Not Hearsay: Admission 
by Party-Opponent. Except in a prosecution for perjury, the bar applies to any 
statement made in the course of the plea negotiations as long as it is rele-
vant to the negotiations. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f).
Unlike Fed. R. Evid. 410, the statements in question need not have 
been made to an attorney for the prosecuting authority to qualify for exclu-
sion. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Mass. 440, 442–443, 720 N.E.2d 
464, 466–467 (1999). Rule 12(f) excludes only statements made during “plea 
negotiations,” not the apparently broader “plea discussions” referred to in 
Fed. R. Evid. 410. Id. at 443, 720 N.E.2d at 467 (while statements to a detec-
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tive could be excluded under Mass. R. Crim. P. 12[f], the statements were 
nonetheless admissible because they were not made during plea negotia-
tions). On the issue of what constitutes plea negotiations, see Common-
wealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 482 n.3, 727 N.E.2d 1182, 1187 n.3 (2000) 
(holding there were no plea negotiations where prosecutor made no prom-
ises, commitments, or offers and defendant did not give his statement only in 
consideration of a benefit offered by prosecutor), and Commonwealth v. 
Luce, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 111–112, 607 N.E.2d 427, 430–431 (1993) 
(meetings between defendant, counsel, and government officers did not con-
stitute plea bargaining).
A refusal to plead guilty is not admissible when offered by the defendant 
to prove consciousness of innocence. See Commonwealth v. DoVale, 57 
Mass. App. Ct. 657, 662–663, 785 N.E.2d 416, 420–421 (2003).
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Section 411. Insurance
(a) Exclusion of Evidence of Insurance. Evidence that a person was 
or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue 
whether the person or entity acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
(b) Limited Admissibility. Evidence that a person or entity was or 
was not insured may be admissible when offered for a purpose other 
than liability, including proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias 
or prejudice of a witness.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 
Mass. 800, 807–814, 309 N.E.2d 196, 202–206 (1974) (extensive discussion 
of principles and authorities), and Leavitt v. Glick Realty Corp., 362 Mass. 
370, 372, 285 N.E.2d 786, 787–788 (1972). The exclusion covers (1) evi-
dence offered by the plaintiff that the defendant is insured, (2) evidence of-
fered by the defendant that the plaintiff has received third-party compensa-
tion for an injury, (3) evidence offered by the defendant that he or she is not 
protected by insurance, and (4) evidence offered by the plaintiff that he or 
she has no resort to insurance or other coverage for the loss. Goldstein v. 
Gontarz, 364 Mass. at 808–810, 309 N.E.2d at 202–203.
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 411 and Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 411 and is consistent with Massachusetts law. Evi-
dence of insurance coverage may be admissible where the issue of control 
over the covered premises is disputed because the jury could properly infer 
“that the defendants would not have deemed it prudent to secure indemnity 
insurance on [an area] not within their control, or for the careless manage-
ment or defective condition of which they could not be held responsible.” 
Perkins v. Rice, 187 Mass. 28, 30, 72 N.E. 323, 324 (1904). A blanket insur-
ance policy covering more than one location is not, however, admissible to 
show control. See Camerlin v. Marshall, 411 Mass. 394, 398, 582 N.E.2d 
539, 542 (1991).
Evidence of insurance coverage or lack thereof may be admissible to 
establish the bias of a witness. Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. 800, 812, 
309 N.E.2d 196, 205 (1974). See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 16–21, 
483 N.E.2d 793, 801–804 (1985); McDaniel  v. Pickens, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 63, 
59 
66–67, 695 N.E.2d 215, 217–218 (1998); Commonwealth v. Danis, 38 Mass. 
App. Ct. 968, 968, 650 N.E.2d 802, 803 (1995). See also Masters v. Khuri, 
62 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 471–472, 817 N.E.2d 811, 815 (2004); Harris-Lewis 
v. Mudge, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 487–488, 803 N.E.2d 735, 741–742 
(2004).
Inadmissibility Due to Prejudicial Effect. Evidence of an insurance 
policy may still be excluded where its prejudicial effect substantially out-
weighs its probative value after contemplating the effectiveness of a limiting 
instruction. See Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. at 812–813, 309 N.E.2d at 
205. See also Shore v. Shore, 385 Mass. 529, 530–532, 432 N.E.2d 526, 
528 (1982) (appropriate instructions could have cured possible prejudice 
from excluded evidence of insurance policy). But see McDaniel  v. Pickens, 
45 Mass. App. Ct. at 70, 695 N.E.2d at 219 (raising but not reaching the is-
sue of “whether jurors have attained to such a level of sophistication that they 
can take insurance and related things in stride when properly instructed” [ci-
tations omitted]).
Collateral Source Rule. Evidence of collateral source payments is 
generally not admissible to reduce the amount of damages recoverable, but 
may be admissible if probative of a relevant issue, such as impeaching the 
plaintiff’s credibility or showing motive. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 
1, 16–21, 483 N.E.2d 793, 801–804 (1985); Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Admiral  Ins. Agency, Inc., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 158, 165–166, 807 N.E.2d 842, 
848–849 (2004), and cases cited; Rolanti v. Boston Edison Corp., 33 Mass. 
App. Ct. 516, 524–525, 603 N.E.2d 211, 218 (1992).
The full  amount of a medical  or hospital bill  is admissible as evidence of 
the reasonable value of the services rendered to the injured person, even 
where the amount actually paid by a private or public insurer is less than that 
amount. The actual  amount paid by insurance is not admissible, but the de-
fendant may offer evidence to establish the range of payments accepted by 
that provider for that particular service. Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 353–
354, 930 N.E.2d 126, 130–131 (2010). See G. L. c. 233, § 79G. The court 
may instruct the jury that any amounts paid by insurance are subject to re-
coupment by the payor. Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 790, 801, 912 N.E.2d 
1000, 1010 (2009). The amounts actually paid to the health providers by the 
health insurer must be redacted on medical bills admitted into evidence. Id.
Unless it is relevant for some other purpose, evidence of a settlement 
with another defendant is not admissible to reduce the amount of damages, 
but the court should make the appropriate deduction after the verdict. Morea 
v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. 601, 603, 664 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1996). In most 
cases, the verdict in a motor vehicle liability case will  be reduced by the 
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amount of any personal injury protection benefits received by the plaintiff. 
G. L. c. 90, § 34M. In a medical malpractice case, the defendant may, at a 
postverdict hearing, offer evidence to the court as to the amount of medical 
bills that have been covered by insurance. The amount of any such bills, less 
the amount of any premiums paid by the plaintiff for one year prior to the ac-
crual of the cause of action, shall  be deducted from the itemized verdict. This 
procedure does not apply to any payor who has subrogation rights based on 
any Federal law. G. L. c. 231, § 60G.
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Section 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged 
Sexual Reputation (Rape-Shield 
Law)
(a) Rape Shield. Except as otherwise provided, evidence of the repu-
tation or specific instances of a victim’s sexual conduct shall not be 
admissible in any criminal or civil proceeding involving alleged sexual 
misconduct.
(b) Exceptions. The following specific act evidence may be admissi-
ble:
(1) evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with the defendant;
(2) evidence of the victim’s recent  conduct alleged to be the cause 
of any physical feature, characteristic, or condition of the victim; 
and
(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant.
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. Evidence under Subsec-
tion (b) is admissible only after an in camera hearing on a written mo-
tion for admission of same and an offer of proof. If, after the hearing, 
the court finds that the weight and relevancy of the evidence is suffi-
cient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the victim, the evidence shall 
be admitted; otherwise the evidence will not be admitted. If the pro-
ceeding is a jury trial, said hearing shall be held in the absence of the 
jury. The court’s finding shall be in writing and filed but shall not be 
made available to the jury.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 21B, and 
Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 397 Mass. 693, 696–700, 493 N.E.2d 841, 
844–846 (1986). Evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct cannot be introduced 
at a trial for any of the crimes on this nonexhaustive list: G. L. c. 265, §§ 13B, 
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13F, 13H, 22, 22A, 23, 24, and 24B, and G. L. c. 272, § 29A. Evidence in the 
form of reputation or opinion is not admissible to prove the complainant’s 
reputation for unchastity. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 227–
228, 415 N.E.2d 181, 185–186 (1981) (the rape-shield statute “reverses the 
common law rule under which evidence of the complainant’s general reputa-
tion for unchastity was admissible” [citation omitted]). Note that the cases use 
the terms “victim” and “complainant” interchangeably.
“The rape-shield statute is principally designed to prevent defense coun-
sel from eliciting evidence of the victim’s promiscuity as part of a general 
credibility attack.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 412 Mass. 516, 523, 590 
N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (1992). “The policy rationale for this law is that evidence 
of the victim’s prior sexual  conduct might divert attention from the alleged 
criminal acts of the defendant, inappropriately putting the victim on trial” (cita-
tions omitted). Commonwealth v. Houston, 430 Mass. 616, 621, 722 N.E.2d 
942, 945 (2000).
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 21B. The complainant’s prior sexual activity with the defen-
dant may be relevant to the issue of consent, particularly to show the com-
plainant’s emotion to that particular defendant. Commonwealth v. Grieco, 386 
Mass. 484, 488, 436 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1982). Cf. Commonwealth v. Fionda, 
33 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 321–322, 599 N.E.2d 635, 638–639 (1992) (provoca-
tive conversation and kissing on prior occasion not probative of consent to 
intercourse on later occasion).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 21B. Prior acts with another person may be relevant to estab-
lishing an alternative cause for the complainant’s physical  condition. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 402 Mass. 517, 521–522, 524 N.E.2d 72, 
74–75 (1988), S.C., 412 Mass. 516, 521–525, 590 N.E.2d 1151, 1154–1156 
(1992) (presence of sperm where defendant underwent a vasectomy); Com-
monwealth v. Cardoza, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 648–649, 563 N.E.2d 1384, 
1386 (1990) (presence of foreign pubic  hair not belonging to defendant 
should have been admitted).
Subsection (b)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Joyce, 
382 Mass. 222, 227–229, 415 N.E.2d 181, 185–186 (1981). The Supreme 
Judicial Court has stated that
“[a] defendant’s constitutional right to put forth his full de-
fense outweighs the interests underlying the rape-shield 
statute, however, only if he shows that the theory under 
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which he proceeds is based on more than vague hope or 
mere speculation, and he may not engage in an unbounded 
and freewheeling cross-examination in which the jury are 
invited to indulge in conjecture and supposition” (quotations 
and citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 588, 592–593, 603 N.E.2d 
222, 226 (1992).
“Where evidence of bias is available by other means, no evidence of the 
complainant’s prior sexual history should be admitted.” Commonwealth v. 
Gagnon, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 589, 699 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (1998). See 
also Commonwealth v. Pyne, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 38, 616 N.E.2d 470, 471 
(1993), citing Commonwealth v. Elder, 389 Mass. 743, 751 nn.11–12, 452 
N.E.2d 1104, 1110 nn.11–12 (1983). Cf. Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 
409 Mass. 867, 875, 570 N.E.2d 992, 998 (1991) (specific act evidence may 
be used to demonstrate the complainant’s bias or motive to fabricate). Evi-
dence may be used to show that the complainant made prior false allega-
tions of rape or abuse. See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94–
95, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978) (evidence admissible where witness was the 
complainant at trial, consent was central  issue, complainant’s testimony was 
inconsistent and confused, and there was independent basis for concluding 
that prior allegations were false). Cf. Commonwealth v. Talbot, 444 Mass. 
586, 590–591, 830 N.E.2d 177, 181 (2005); Commonwealth v. Blair, 21 
Mass. App. Ct. 625, 626–629, 488 N.E.2d 1200, 1201–1203 (1986). A defen-
dant may introduce evidence that a complainant has been subjected to past 
sexual  abuse to explain the complainant’s inappropriate knowledge of sexual 
matters. See Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 399 Mass. 811, 814–817, 507 N.E.2d 
684, 687–688 (1987). See also Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 
580–586, 839 N.E.2d 298, 302–305 (2005). A trial judge has discretion to 
admit evidence of a complainant’s prior conviction for a sexual  offense, but 
must take into consideration the objectives of the rape-shield statute. See 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 723–728, 825 N.E.2d 58, 66–69 
(2005) (harmonizing G. L. c. 233, §§ 21 and 21B). “The judge must deter-
mine whether the weight and relevance of the proffered evidence of bias or 
motive to lie is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the victim” (cita-
tion omitted). Commonwealth v. Noj, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 198–199, 920 
N.E.2d 894, 897–898 (2010) (in a prosecution for rape, trial judge properly 
exercised discretion to exclude victim’s three prior convictions for prostitution 
because the marginal relevance of the evidence to the defendant’s theory of 
fabrication was not sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial  effect on the jury, 
which might misuse the evidence to minimize the effect of a sexual assault 
on a prostitute who also was a drug user and an alcoholic).
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Conversely, “[i]n the exercise of this discretion a trial judge should con-
sider the important policies underlying the rape-shield statute. He should ex-
clude evidence of specific  instances of a complainant’s sexual conduct in so 
far [sic] as that is possible without unduly infringing upon the defendant’s 
right to show bias.” Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. at 231, 415 N.E.2d 
at 188.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 21B, and 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 721, 825 N.E.2d 58, 64–65 (2005). 
See Commonwealth v. Cortez, 438 Mass. 123, 129–130, 777 N.E.2d 1254, 
1259–1260 (2002); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 232–233, 415 
N.E.2d 181, 187 (1981) (Braucher, J., concurring).
Cross-Reference: Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evi-
dence.
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Section 413. First Complaint of Sexual Assault
(a) Admissibility of First Complaint. Testimony by the recipient  of a 
complainant’s first complaint of an alleged sexual assault regarding the 
fact of the first complaint  and the circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of that first complaint, including details of the complaint, is admis-
sible for the limited purpose of assisting the jury in determining 
whether to credit the complainant’s testimony about the alleged sexual 
assault, not to prove the truth of the allegations.
(b) Admissibility of Additional Reports of a Sexual Assault Under 
an Alternative Evidentiary Basis. When otherwise admissible testi-
mony or evidence other than the first  complaint  includes or implies 
that a report of a sexual assault  was made, it  may be admitted only if 
the trial judge determines that (1) it  serves an evidentiary purpose 
other than to corroborate the testimony  of the alleged victim and (2) its 
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This section is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. 
King, 445 Mass. 217, 218–219, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1181 (2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1216 (2006). In Commonwealth v. King, the Supreme Judicial Court 
replaced the doctrine of “fresh complaint” with that of “first complaint.” Id. at 
241–248, 834 N.E.2d at 1196–1201.
“The first complaint doctrine is an evidentiary rule designed 
to give support to a complainant’s testimony of a sexual as-
sault in cases where the credibility of the accusation is a 
contested issue at trial. The doctrine seeks to balance the 
interest of two competing concerns: that a complainant 
(who . . . may be still  a child) has her credibility fairly judged 
on the specific  facts of the case rather than unfairly by mis-
guided stereotypical thinking; and that the defendant receive 
a trial  that is free from irrelevant and potentially prejudicial 
testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 228, 901 N.E.2d 99, 110 (2009).
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“Under the new doctrine . . . the recipient of a complainant’s 
first complaint of an alleged sexual assault may testify about 
the fact of the first complaint and the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of that first complaint. The witness may 
also testify about the details of the complaint. The complain-
ant may likewise testify to the details of the first complaint 
(i.e., what she told the first complaint witness), as well  as 
why the complaint was made at that particular time. Testi-
mony from additional complaint witnesses is not admissible.”
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 218–219, 834 N.E.2d at 1181. The first 
complaint doctrine is not applicable to cases in which neither the fact of a 
sexual  assault nor the consent of the complainant is at issue. Id. at 247, 834 
N.E.2d at 1200.
“First complaint testimony, including the details and circum-
stances of the complaint, will be considered presumptively 
relevant to a complainant’s credibility in most sexual  assault 
cases where the fact of the assault or the issue of consent is 
contested. However, where neither the occurrence of a sex-
ual assault nor the complainant’s consent is at issue [i.e., 
identity of the perpetrator], the evidence will serve no cor-
roborative purpose and will not be admissible under the first 
complaint doctrine.”
Id. at 247, 834 N.E.2d at 1200.
That the complainant’s first report of a sexual assault is abbreviated in 
nature does not change its status as the first complaint. See Commonwealth 
v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 455–456, 879 N.E.2d 105, 112–113 (2008). 
While ordinarily there will be only one first complaint witness, two first com-
plaint witnesses may testify in circumstances “where each witness testifies to 
disclosures years apart concerning different periods of time and escalating 
levels of abuse, which constitute different and more serious criminal  acts 
committed over a lengthy period.” Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 
287, 288–289, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1149–1150 (2009). The fact that the com-
plainant tells someone that he or she is upset, unhappy, or scared is not a 
first complaint. See Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 446, 879 
N.E.2d 99, 103 (2008). “Law enforcement officials, as well as investigatory, 
medical, or social work professionals, may testify to the complaint only where 
they are in fact the first to have heard of the assault, and not where they 
have been told of the alleged crime after previous complaints or after an offi-
cial report.” Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 243, 834 N.E.2d at 1198.
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The first complaint evidence could be in the form of a recorded 911 
emergency telephone call  or letter; a live witness is not required. Common-
wealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. at 455–456, 879 N.E.2d at 112–113.
Limiting Instruction Required. Whenever first complaint evidence is 
admitted, whether through the complainant or the first complaint witness, the 
court must give the jury a limiting instruction. Commonwealth v. King, 445 
Mass. at 219, 247–248, 834 N.E.2d at 1181, 1200–1201. The instruction 
must be given contemporaneously with the first complaint testimony and 
again during the final instruction. Id. at 248, 834 N.E.2d at 1201.
Determination of Who Is the First Complaint Witness. The determi-
nation of who is the first complaint witness is a preliminary question of fact for 
the trial  judge. Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. at 455–456, 879 
N.E.2d at 111–113. See Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determina-
tions Made by the Court.
Scope of the Doctrine. The first complaint doctrine applies only if the 
complainant is available for cross-examination about the first complaint. 
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 247 n.27, 834 N.E.2d at 1200 n.27. 
“The timing by the complainant in making a complaint will not disqualify the 
evidence, but is a factor the jury may consider in deciding whether the first 
complaint testimony supports the complainant’s credibility or reliability.” Id. at 
219, 834 N.E.2d at 1181. The first complaint doctrine applies even to cases 
in which there is a percipient witness (in addition to the victim) to the sexual 
assault. See Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 470, 892 
N.E.2d 805, 810 (2008). An alleged victim’s inability to recall  the details of the 
first complaint goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the testimony by 
the first complaint witness. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 76 Mass. App. 
Ct. 411, 415, 922 N.E.2d 834, 837–838 (2010).
The first complaint witness may “testify to the details of the complaint 
itself. By details, we mean that the witness ‘may testify to the complainant’s 
statements of the facts of the assault.’” Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 
244, 834 N.E.2d at 1198, quoting Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 
859, 874, 753 N.E.2d 781, 795 (2001). The witness
“may testify to the circumstances surrounding the initial 
complaint, [including] his or her observations of the com-
plainant during the complaint; the events or conversations 
that culminated in the complaint; the timing of the complaint; 
and other relevant conditions that might help a jury assess 
the veracity of the complainant’s allegations or assess the 
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specific defense theories as to why the complainant is mak-
ing a false allegation” (citation omitted).
Id. at 246, 834 N.E.2d at 1199–1200.
The alleged victim is permitted to testify to what he or she told the first 
complaint witness and why the complaint was made (1) when the first com-
plaint witness or a court-approved substitute first complaint witness testifies 
at trial to those details, (2) when the first complaint witness is deceased, or 
(3) when the judge decides there is a compelling reason for the absence of 
the first complaint witness that is not the Commonwealth’s fault. Id. at 245 & 
n.24, 834 N.E.2d at 1199 & n.24.
Substitution of a Witness. Where feasible, the first person told of the 
alleged sexual assault should be the initial or first complaint witness to testify. 
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 243–244, 834 N.E.2d at 1198. In 
Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 445–448, 879 N.E.2d 99, 103–
105 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court identified two exceptions to the first 
complaint doctrine. A person other than the first recipient of information from 
the complainant is allowed to testify as the first complaint witness (1) if the 
victim’s disclosure to the “first person does not constitute a complaint,” or (2) 
if the victim complains first to an individual who “has an obvious bias or mo-
tive to . . . distort the victim’s remarks.” Id. at 446, 879 N.E.2d at 103. The 
court explained that in Commonwealth v. King, it had not “set forth an ex-
haustive list of appropriate substitutions.” Id. at 445, 879 N.E.2d at 103. 
“Other exceptions are permissible based on the purpose and limitations of 
the first complaint doctrine.” Id.
Even when the complainant has disclosed information about the sexual 
assault to a person with no obvious bias against the complainant, the trial 
judge has discretion to allow the Commonwealth to substitute another wit-
ness as the first complaint witness in circumstances “where [that person] is 
unavailable, incompetent, or too young to testify meaningfully . . . .” Com-
monwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 243–244, 834 N.E.2d at 1198. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Thibeault, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 421–423, 931 N.E.2d 
1008, 1011–1012 (2010) (child’s mother could be substituted as witness for 
child’s father where father was first person to whom child complained but he 
appeared to have fled the Commonwealth and could not be located at time of 
trial).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dargon, 
457 Mass. 387, 399–400, 930 N.E.2d 707, 719–720 (2010); Commonwealth 
v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 224–229, 901 N.E.2d 99, 107–111 (2009); and 
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Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 457, 879 N.E.2d 105, 113 
(2008).
“Evidence of a subsequent complaint is not admissible sim-
ply because a separate evidentiary rule applies (e.g., the 
statement is not hearsay, or it falls within an exception to the 
hearsay rule). If independently admissible evidence . . . 
serves no purpose other than to repeat the fact of a com-
plaint and therefore corroborate the complainant’s accusa-
tions, it is inadmissible. However, if that evidence does serve 
a purpose separate and apart from the first complaint doc-
trine, the judge may admit it after careful balancing of the 
testimony’s probative and prejudicial value.” (Quotations and 
citations omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. at 399–400, 930 N.E.2d at 719–720. 
See also Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 851, 926 N.E.2d 1143, 
1157–1158 (2010) (admission of mother’s testimony that she and victim had 
conversation about assault, even without details of conversation, was error 
when testimony did not serve “any additional  purpose”); Commonwealth v. 
Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 495, 914 N.E.2d 981, 986 (2009) (admis-
sion of testimony indicating that complainant had made reports of sexual 
abuse to his mother, the Department of Social Services, and the district at-
torney’s office, without any more details, in circumstances where the father 
was the first complaint witness, was error).
The question whether testimony concerning multiple complaints is per-
missible “is fact-specific and requires, in the first analysis, a careful evalua-
tion of the circumstances by the trial  judge.” Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 
Mass. 287, 296, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (2009). In Commonwealth v. Ram-
sey, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 844, 849, 927 N.E.2d 506, 510 (2010), the Appeals 
Court explained that medical records that included statements by the alleged 
victim pointing to the defendant as the perpetrator of the sexual assault and 
statements of hospital personnel  repeating the allegations, conclusory state-
ments of rape, and a diagnosis of incest, which the judge found admissible 
under the hospital  records exception to the hearsay rule, should not have 
been admitted at trial because the judge had not determined that the evi-
dence served a purpose other than to corroborate the victim and had not 
carefully balanced its probative value and prejudicial effect.
“In [Commonwealth v.] Arana, [453 Mass. 214, 227, 901 
N.E.2d 99, 109 (2009)], further evidence of complaint was 
admissible in order to rebut the defendant’s allegation that 
the complainant fabricated the accusations to provide a ba-
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sis for a civil lawsuit. In Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 
Mass. 287, 299, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1156 (2009), such evi-
dence was admissible because the defense exploited dis-
crepancies in the testimony of one of the victims and had 
‘opened the door on cross-examination’; thus ‘the Common-
wealth was entitled to attempt to rehabilitate the witness.’”
Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 850 n.12, 927 N.E.2d at 511 
n.12. See also Commonwealth v. Saunders, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 505, 509, 915 
N.E.2d 229, 232 (2009) (defense counsel  cross-examined victim about re-
ports she allegedly made that someone other than defendant got her preg-
nant; this opened the door to permit the Commonwealth to offer evidence of 
statements made by the victim about the defendant’s conduct to persons 
other than the first complaint witness).
SAIN Evidence. A SANE (sexual abuse nurse examiner) is permitted to 
testify about the SAIN (Sexual Abuse Intervention Network) evidence kit used 
in the examination of a person alleged to be the victim of a sexual assault 
and the sexual assault examination process, provided it is either to provide 
background for the nurse’s testimony about the examination of the alleged 
victim or to lay a foundation for the admission of physical evidence. See 
Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. at 398 n.13, 930 N.E.2d at 719 n.13. 
On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 
493–494, 914 N.E.2d 981, 985 (2009), the Appeals Court found that the in-
clusion of testimony from a police detective who watched a tape of the SAIN 
interview and who described the interview process and indicated that as a 
result he continued with his investigation was error because it suggested that 
the SAIN interviews take place when persons are thought to be victims of 
sexual  assault and implied that the detective found the complainant credible. 
In addition, the printed forms that are filled out by the SAIN interviewer 
(Forms 2 and 3) based on questions put to the alleged victim are not admis-
sible, because the printing suggests that a sexual assault took place. See 
Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. at 398 n.13, 930 N.E.2d at 719 n.13.
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ARTICLE V.  PRIVILEGES AND DISQUALI-
FICATIONS
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
(a) General Duty to Give Evidence. A privilege is an exception to the gen-
eral duty of a witness to offer evidence. Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 
Mass. 1, 5, 438 N.E.2d 805, 808 (1982).
(b) Interpretation of Privileges. “Testimonial privileges are exceptions to the 
general duty imposed on all people to testify, and therefore must be strictly 
construed” (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 
Mass. 325, 330, 780 N.E.2d 453, 457 (2002). See also Matter of a Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 593–594, 597–599, 722 N.E.2d 450, 453, 
455–456 (2000); Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1, 5, 438 N.E.2d 805, 
808 (1982). In criminal  cases, even statutory privileges may be pierced when 
necessary to preserve a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 144, 859 N.E.2d 400, 417 (2006).
(c) Most Privileges Are Not Self-Executing. Most privileges require “some 
action by the patient or client . . . to ‘exercise’ the privilege.” Commonwealth 
v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 331, 780 N.E.2d 453, 458 (2002) 
(psychotherapist-patient privilege). See Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 441 Mass. 
257, 261, 805 N.E.2d 1, 6 (2004) (social  worker–client privilege); District At-
torney for Plymouth Dist. v. Board of Selectmen of Middleborough, 395 Mass. 
629, 633–634, 481 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (1985) (attorney-client privilege); 
Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 780, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982) 
(privilege against self-incrimination). The Legislature can create a privilege 
that is automatic  and that does not require any action on the part of the 
holder of the privilege. See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. at 331 n.7, 
780 N.E.2d at 458 n.7 (“the sexual assault counsellor-victim privilege created 
by G. L. c. 233, § 20J . . . does not suggest that the victim need do anything 
to ‘exercise’ the privilege contained therein, or to ‘refuse’ to disclose the 
communications, or to ‘prevent’ the counsellor from disclosing the communi-
cations.”). See also Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 787, 393 N.E.2d 
847, 856 (1979) (Code of Professional  Responsibility applicable to lawyers is 
self-executing). In the case of a privilege that is not self-executing, it may be 
appropriate for the proponent of the privilege to temporarily assert the privi-
lege pending notice to the party which holds the privilege. See Common-
wealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. at 332 n.8, 780 N.E.2d at 459 n.8.
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(d) Confidentiality Versus Privilege. There is a distinction between a duty 
of confidentiality and an evidentiary privilege. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 
449 Mass. 227, 229 n.7, 866 N.E.2d 892, 894 n.7 (2007), citing Common-
wealth v. Brandwein, 435 Mass. 623, 628 n.7, 760 N.E.2d 724, 729 n.7 
(2002). A duty of confidentiality obligates one, such as a professional, to keep 
certain information, often about a client or patient, confidential. It also may 
impose an obligation on a State agency. See G. L. c. 66A, §§ 1, 2.
“A provider’s obligation to keep matters confidential may stem from a 
statute imposing such an obligation (oftentimes with a host of exceptions to 
that obligation), or may arise as a matter of professional  ethics.” Common-
wealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 335, 780 N.E.2d 453, 461 (2002). When a 
duty of confidentiality is set forth in a statute, there may or may not be an 
accompanying evidentiary privilege. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 
at 233–234, 866 N.E.2d at 896–897 (holding that G. L. c. 112, § 172, im-
poses a duty of confidentiality and creates an evidentiary privilege). Some-
times, the duty of confidentiality and the corresponding evidentiary privilege 
are set forth in separate statutes. See, e.g., G. L. c. 112, §§ 135A and 135B 
(social  workers), and G. L. c. 112, § 129A, and G. L. c. 233, § 20B (psy-
chologists and psychotherapists). In other cases, the duty of confidentiality 
and a privilege exist in the same statute. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 
Mass. at 232, 866 N.E.2d at 896, citing G. L. c. 233, § 20J (sexual assault 
counselors) and G. L. c. 233, § 20K (domestic violence counselors).
In some circumstances, when a provider breaches a duty of confidenti-
ality, the absence of an accompanying evidentiary privilege may permit a 
party in litigation to gain access to the information or to offer it in evidence. 
See Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 435 Mass. at 628–629, 760 N.E.2d at 
728–729 (access to information improperly disclosed by a nurse in violation 
of her professional duty of confidentiality was not otherwise covered by an 
evidentiary privilege); Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 457 n.5, 744 
N.E.2d 614, 618 n.5 (2001) (noting the distinction between the confidentiality 
of medical  and hospital records under G. L. c. 111, § 70, and the absence of 
a physician-patient privilege).
(e) Impounding Versus Sealing. In Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 
827, 906 N.E.2d 320 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the dif-
ference between impounding and sealing:
“The terms ‘impounded’ and ‘sealed’ are closely related and 
often used interchangeably, but are meaningfully different. 
Under the Uniform Rules o[n] Impoundment Procedure 1708 
(LexisNexis 2008), which governs impoundment in civil pro-
ceedings and guides practice in criminal matters as well, 
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‘impoundment’ means ‘the act of keeping some or all of the 
papers, documents, or exhibits, or portions thereof, in a case 
separate and unavailable for public inspection.’ Rule 1 of the 
Uniform Rules o[n] Impoundment Procedure. Consequently, 
an order of impoundment prevents the public, but not the 
parties, from gaining access to impounded material, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court. A document is normally or-
dered ‘sealed’ when it is intended that only the court have 
access to the document, unless the court specifically orders 
limited disclosure. Therefore, we directed in Commonwealth 
v. Martin, [423 Mass. 496, 505, 668 N.E.2d 825, 832 (1996),] 
that the record of the in camera hearing ‘should be kept, un-
der seal.’ Similarly, we ordered that privileged psychological 
or counseling records of an alleged victim of a sexual assault 
be ‘retained in court under seal,’ but permitted defense 
counsel to have access pursuant to a strict protective order. 
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 146, 859 N.E.2d 
400, 419 (2006).”
Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. at 836 n.12, 906 N.E.2d at 328 n.12. 
Martin hearings are discussed in the note to Section 511(b), Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination: Privilege of a Witness. The Lampron-Dwyer protocol  is 
summarized in Section 1108, Access to Third-Party Records Prior to Trial in 
Criminal Cases (Lampron-Dwyer Protocol).
(f) Examples of Relationships in Which There May Be a Duty to Treat 
Information as Confidential Even Though There Is No Testimonial Privi-
lege. Examples include the following:
(1) Patient Medical Information. There is no doctor-patient privilege 
recognized under Massachusetts law. Bratt v. International Business Machs. 
Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 522–523 n.22, 467 N.E.2d 126, 136–137 n.22 (1984). 
See also Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 453, 456–457, 744 N.E.2d 
614, 617 (2001); Tower v. Hirschhorn, 397 Mass. 581, 588, 492 N.E.2d 728, 
733 (1986). However, physicians have a duty not to make out-of-court disclo-
sures of medical information about the patient without the patient’s consent, 
Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 67–68, 479 N.E.2d 113, 119, cert. denied 
sub nom., Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985), unless disclosure is nec-
essary to meet a serious danger to the patient or others. Id. A breach of 
doctor-patient confidentiality does not require exclusion of the evidence, 
Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. at 457 n.5, 744 N.E.2d at 618 n.5, citing 
Schwartz v. Goldstein, 400 Mass. 152, 153, 508 N.E.2d 97, 99 (1987), but 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 76
may subject the offending doctor to an action for damages. Alberts v. Devine, 
395 Mass. at 65–69, 479 N.E.2d at 118–120.
(2) Student Records. “There is no privilege which would prevent the 
introduction of relevant school  records in evidence at a trial.” Commonwealth 
v. Beauchemin, 410 Mass. 181, 185, 571 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1991). However, 
the Legislature has recognized that privacy interests are at stake. School 
records pertaining to specific individuals are not subject to disclosure under 
our public records law if disclosure “may constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy.” G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c). See also G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10. Access to student records is also restricted under regulations promul-
gated by the State board of education pursuant to G. L. c. 71, § 34D. See 
Commonwealth v. Buccella, 434 Mass. 473, 477, 751 N.E.2d 373, 378 
(2001) (third persons may access “student records” only with written consent 
from student or student’s parents unless an exception promulgated by regu-
lation applies).
(3) Special Needs Student Records. Records of the clinical  history 
and evaluations of students with special needs created or maintained in ac-
cordance with G. L. c. 71B “shall be confidential.” G. L. c. 71B, § 3.
(4) News Sources and Nonpublished Information. Before ordering a 
reporter to divulge a source and the information gathered, a judge must 
“consider the effect of compelled disclosure on values underlying the First 
Amendment and art. 16.” Petition for Promulgation of Rules Regarding the 
Protection of Confidential  News Sources & Other Unpublished Info., 395 
Mass. 164, 171, 479 N.E.2d 154, 158 (1985). Accordingly, a judge must bal-
ance the public  interest in the use of every person’s evidence against the 
public interest in protecting the free flow of information. Matter of a John Doe 
Grand Jury Investigation, 410 Mass. 596, 599, 574 N.E.2d 373, 375 (1991). 
See also Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 403 n.33, 822 
N.E.2d 667, 696 n.33 (2005).
(5) Certain Documents, Records, and Reports. A nonexhaustive list 
of confidentiality statutes includes the following:
G. L. c. 4, § 6, Twenty-sixth (documents and records);
G. L. c. 6, § 167 et seq. (Criminal Offender Record Information [C.O.R.I.]);
G. L. c. 41, § 97D (reports of rape and sexual assault);
G. L. c. 66A, §§ 1, 2 (personal data held by Commonwealth agencies);
G. L. c. 111, §§ 70, 70E (hospital records);
G. L. c. 111, § 70F (HIV test results);
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G. L. c. 111, § 70G (genetic testing);
G. L. c. 111B, § 11 (alcohol treatment);
G. L. c. 111E, § 18 (drug treatment);
G. L. c. 112, § 129A (psychologist-patient communications);
G. L. c. 119, § 51E (Department of Children and Families records);
G. L. c. 119, §§ 60–60A (juvenile records);
G. L. c. 123, §§ 36–36A (Department of Mental Health records);
G. L. c. 123B, § 17 (Department of Developmental Services records);
G. L. c. 127, § 29 (Department of Correction records);
G. L. c. 127, § 130 (parole board); and
G. L. c. 148, § 32 (fire insurance).
There are also numerous regulations (Code Mass. Regs.) which contain con-
fidentiality requirements.
(6) Applicability of Federal Law. The Constitution of the United States 
or an act of Congress may govern the applicability of a privilege in Massa-
chusetts State courts. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 409 (protecting from disclosure 
in discovery or at trial and in Federal or State court proceedings information 
“compiled or collected” in connection with certain Federal highway safety 
programs); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146–148 (2003) (23 
U.S.C. § 409 is a valid exercise of congressional power under the commerce 
clause and is binding on the States). Accord Boyd v. National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 783, 795–797, 821 N.E.2d 95, 105–106 (2005). 
Access to records also may be restricted by Federal  law. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Nathaniel N., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 206, 764 N.E.2d 883, 888 
(2002); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (of 1996) (HIPAA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-191 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq.).
(g) Production of Presumptively Privileged Records from Nonparties 
Prior to Trial in Criminal Cases. Whenever a party in a criminal  case seeks 
production of any records (privileged or nonprivileged) from nonparties prior 
to trial, Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) must be satisfied. Commonwealth v. Lam-
pron, 441 Mass. 265, 268, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004). See also Common-
wealth v. Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 187, 915 N.Ed.2d 215, 227 (2009). When 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) has been satisfied and a nonparty has produced 
records to the court, the protocol set forth in Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 
Mass. 122, 139–147, 859 N.E.2d 400, 414–420 (2006), governs review or 
disclosure of presumptively privileged records by defense counsel. To refer-
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ence the forms promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court, see 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/dwyerforms.html.
Cross-Reference: Section 1108, Access to Third-Party Records Prior to 
Trial in Criminal Cases (Lampron-Dwyer Protocol).
(h) Nonevidentiary Privileges. There are certain so-called privileges which 
concern nonevidentiary areas. Basically, they are defenses to suit and in-
clude the following:
(1) Immunity from Liability (Litigation Privilege). Written or oral 
communications made by a party, witness, or attorney prior to, in the institu-
tion of, or during and as a part of a judicial  proceeding involving said party, 
witness, or attorney are absolutely privileged even if uttered maliciously or in 
bad faith. See Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319–321, 572 N.E.2d 7, 
10–12 (1991); Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108, 345 N.E.2d 882, 
883 (1976); Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236, 118 N.E.2d 356, 358 
(1954). The absolute privilege applies to statements made in a letter by an 
employee to a former employer explaining that the reason for his or her res-
ignation was sexual harassment and indicating an intention to pursue the 
matter with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Further, the ab-
solute privilege extends to similar statements made in a subsequent filing 
with the EEOC. Visnick v. Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 812–813, 901 
N.E.2d 1261, 1263–1264 (2009). The absolute privilege is based on the view 
that “it is more important that witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability 
for what they say than that a person who has been defamed by their testi-
mony have a remedy.” Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72, 256 N.E.2d 442, 
443 (1970). Accord Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 196–198 (1841) (same 
point with reference to statements by an attorney at trial). Contrast Kobrin v. 
Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 342 n.17, 821 N.E.2d 60, 71 n.17 (2005) (Anti-
SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, supercedes the common-law immunity 
against allegedly defamatory statements made by an expert witness called 
by the board of registration in medicine to testify against a medical doctor in 
a disciplinary proceeding).
A privilege attaches “[w]here a communication to a prospective defen-
dant relates to a proceeding which is contemplated in good faith and which is 
under serious consideration.” Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. at 109, 345 
N.E.2d at 884.
“[A]n attorney’s statements are privileged where such state-
ments are made by an attorney engaged in his function as 
an attorney whether in the institution or conduct of litigation 
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or in conferences and other communications preliminary to 
litigation. The litigation privilege recognized in our cases, 
however, would not appear to encompass the defendant 
attorneys’ conduct in counselling and assisting their clients 
in business matters generally.” (Citations, quotation, and 
footnote omitted.)
Kurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 192, 689 N.E.2d 833, 838–839 (1998).
(2) Legislative Deliberation Privilege. Conduct or speech by a mem-
ber of the Legislature in the course of exercising the member’s duties as a 
legislator is absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of any criminal or 
civil prosecution. See Article 21 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
(“[t]he freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the leg-
islature, is so essential  to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foun-
dation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other 
court or place whatsoever”). This provision also establishes a privilege appli-
cable to “the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every 
other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office.” Coffin 
v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).
(3) Fair Report Privilege. The fair report privilege is a common-law rule 
that protects from liability the republisher of a newsworthy account of one 
person’s defamation of another so long as it is fair and accurate. See Howell 
v. Enterprise Publ. Co., LLC, 455 Mass. 641, 650–651, 920 N.E.2d 1, 13 
(2010), and cases cited.
“The privilege recognizes that (1) the public has a right to 
know of official government actions that affect the public in-
terest, (2) the only practical  way many citizens can learn of 
these actions is through a report by the news media, and (3) 
the only way news outlets would be willing to make such a 
report is if they are free from liability, provided that their re-
port was fair and accurate.”
ELM Med. Lab, Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 403 Mass. 779, 782, 532 N.E.2d 675, 
678 (1989).
“The privilege is not absolute” and “may be ‘be vitiated by misconduct 
on the newspapers’ part, but that misconduct must amount to more than neg-
ligent, or even knowing, republication of an inaccurate official statement. To 
defeat the privilege, a plaintiff must either show that the publisher does not 
give a fair and accurate report of the official statement [or action], or malice.’” 
Howell  v. Enterprise Publ. Co., LLC, 455 Mass. at 651 n.8, 920 N.E.2d at 13 
n.8, quoting Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2003). Newspapers are 
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on “solid ground” when they report on “formal (as opposed to informal) gov-
ernmental (as opposed to private) proceedings and actions.” Howell v. Enter-
prise Publ. Co., LLC, 455 Mass. at 655–656, 920 N.E.2d at 17. In such 
cases, “the privilege extends to reports of official actions based on informa-
tion provided by nonofficial third-party sources.” Id. at 658, 920 N.E.2d at 18.
“If, however, the source is an unofficial  or anonymous one, a 
report based on that source runs a risk that the underlying 
official action will not be accurately and fairly described by 
the source, and therefore will not be protected by the privi-
lege, or that the information provided will  go beyond the 
bounds of the official  action and into unprivileged territory” 
(footnote omitted).
Id. at 659, 920 N.E.2d at 19. “Whether a report was fair and accurate is a 
matter of law to be determined by a judge unless there is a basis for diver-
gent views” (citation omitted). Id. at 661, 920 N.E.2d at 21.
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Section 501. Privileges Recognized Only 
as Provided
Except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, rules prom-
ulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court, or the common law, no person 
has a privilege to
(a) refuse to be a witness,
(b) refuse to disclose any matter,
(c) refuse to produce any object or writing, or
(d) prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter 
or producing any object or writing.
NOTE
This section, which is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
501, reflects Massachusetts practice. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) follow the 
“longstanding principle that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evi-
dence” (quotations omitted). Matter of Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 633, 411 
N.E.2d 466, 473 (1980). See also G. L. c. 233, § 20 (“[a]ny person of suffi-
cient understanding, although a party, may testify in any proceeding, civil or 
criminal, in court or before a person who has authority to receive evidence”).
“A witness may not decline to respond to a proper question 
on the ground that his answer might embarrass him (or 
another). . . . Nor can fear of harm to the witness generally 
be offered as an excuse for declining testimony. Relief of 
witnesses on this ground would encourage intimidation of 
those in possession of information and proclaim a sorry con-
fession of weakness of the rule of law” (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 543–544, 313 N.E.2d 571, 577 
(1974). Subsection (d) is derived from Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 
Mass. 526, 536, 830 N.E.2d 158, 168 (2005) (“forfeiture by wrongdoing” doc-
trine adopted).
The Supreme Judicial  Court has the power to create privileges under 
the common law. Babets v. Secretary of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 234, 
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526 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (1988). However, the creation of a new privilege or 
the expansion of an existing privilege is usually left to the Legislature, which 
is better equipped to weigh competing social policies or interests. Matter of a 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 597–598, 722 N.E.2d 450, 455–456 
(2000).
Address of Witness. A party seeking to elicit information about the home or 
employment address of a witness must demonstrate that the information is 
relevant in accordance with Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally Ad-
missible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible. However, “the very starting point 
in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth through cross-examination 
must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives” (quota-
tions and citation omitted). Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968). None-
theless, such evidence may be excluded if the trial judge makes a prelimi-
nary finding that any relevance is outweighed by the risks to the safety of the 
witness. See Commonwealth v. McGrath, 364 Mass. 243, 250–252, 303 
N.E.2d 108, 113–114 (1973). In a criminal case, the trial judge must weigh 
the safety concerns of the witness against the defendant’s right to confronta-
tion. See McGrath v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1976). A witness’s 
general concerns for privacy or personal safety, without more, are not suffi-
cient to overcome the defendant’s right to confrontation under Article 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment. See 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 544–547, 313 N.E.2d 571, 577–
579 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 357, 734 
N.E.2d 315, 321 (2000) (In a murder case, Supreme Judicial  Court relied on 
McGrath and upheld trial  judge’s ruling that “defense counsel could ask 
Rodriguez whether he was engaged in an occupation other than selling 
drugs, but not his specific  employment or his employment address, and 
whether he now lived in western Massachusetts or in Connecticut, but not his 
city of residence or residential address. He also prohibited defense counsel 
from investigating these matters.”); Commonwealth v. Righini, 64 Mass. App. 
Ct. 19, 25–26 n.5, 831 N.E.2d 332, 337 n.5 (2005) (relying on reasoning of 
McGrath to explain why criminal defendants are ordinarily not entitled to ob-
tain dates of birth of police witnesses). The existence of valid safety concerns 
on the part of a witness may be inherent in the nature of the criminal 
charges. Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. at 358 n.3, 734 N.E.2d at 322 
n.3.
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Section 502. Attorney-Client Privilege
(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have 
the following meanings:
(1) A “client” is a person, public officer, or corporation, associa-
tion, or other entity, either public or private, who is rendered pro-
fessional legal services by  an attorney, or who consults an attorney 
with a view to obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A “representative of the client” may  include the client’s agent 
or employee.
(3) An “attorney” is a person who is authorized to practice law.
(4) A “representative of the attorney” is one used by  the attorney 
to assist the attorney in providing professional legal services.
(5) A communication is “confidential” if it is not intended to be 
disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is 
made to obtain or provide professional legal services to the client, 
and those reasonably  necessary for the transmission of the com-
munication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent others from disclosing confidential communi-
cations made for the purpose of obtaining or providing professional 
legal services to the client as follows:
(1) between the client  or the client’s representative and the client’s 
attorney or the attorney’s representative,
(2) between the client’s attorney and the attorney’s representative,
(3) between those involved in a joint defense,
(4) between representatives of the client or between the client and 
a representative of the client, or
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(5) among attorneys and their representatives representing the 
same client.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by 
the client, the client’s guardian or conservator, the personal representa-
tive of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar represen-
tative of a corporation, association, or other organization whether or 
not in existence at the time the privilege is claimed. The attorney or the 
attorney’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed 
to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.
(d) Exceptions. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to the 
following:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the attor-
ney were sought or obtained to commit or to plan to commit what 
the client knew or reasonably  should have known was a crime or 
fraud;
(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a commu-
nication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through 
the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by 
testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction;
(3) Breach of Duty or Obligation. As to a communication rele-
vant to an issue of breach of duty between an attorney and client;
(4) Document Attested by an Attorney. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the 
attorney is an attesting witness;
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of 
common interest between or among two or more clients if the 
communication was made by any one of them to an attorney re-
tained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between 
or among any of the clients; or
(6) Public Officer or Agency. [Privilege not recognized]
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NOTE
Introduction. The Supreme Judicial  Court has defined the attorney-client 
privilege as follows:
“The classic  formulation of the attorney-client privilege . . . is 
found in 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961): (1) Where legal  advice of any kind is sought (2) 
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) 
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance perma-
nently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the le-
gal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. The pur-
pose of the privilege is to enable clients to make full disclo-
sure to legal counsel  of all relevant facts . . . so that counsel 
may render fully informed legal advice with the goal of pro-
mot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law 
and administration of justice.” (Quotations and citations omit-
ted.)
Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 303, 901 
N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (2009).
“The existence of the privilege and the applicability of any 
exception to the privilege is a question of fact for the judge. 
The burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies to a communication rests on the party asserting the 
privilege. This burden extends not only to a showing of the 
existence of the attorney-client relationship but to all other 
elements involved in the determination of the existence of the 
privilege, including (1) the communications were received 
from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal 
advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) 
the communications were made in confidence; and (3) the 
privilege as to these communications has not been waived.” 
(Citations omitted.)
Matter of the Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. (Bermuda), 425 
Mass. 419, 421, 681 N.E.2d 838, 840 (1997). This privilege is not self-
executing. See District Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. Board of Selectmen of 
Middleborough, 395 Mass. 629, 633–634, 481 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (1985).
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(1), reflects Massachusetts practice. The 
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term “client” includes more than simply natural  persons. See Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.13 (1998). See also Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 437 Mass. 
340, 351–352, 772 N.E.2d 9, 17–18 (2002); Bays v. Theran, 418 Mass. 685, 
690, 639 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1994).
The attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client. Matter of a 
John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 483, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 
(1990).
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Ellingsgard v. Silver, 352 
Mass. 34, 40, 223 N.E.2d 813, 817 (1967) (“The attorney-client privilege may 
extend to communications from the client’s agent or employee to the attor-
ney.”). The Supreme Judicial  Court has yet to determine the scope of the 
privilege when the client is an organization such as a corporation. See Judge 
Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Mental Retarda-
tion, 424 Mass. 430, 457 n.26, 677 N.E.2d 127, 145 n.26 (1997) (attorney-
client privilege not automatically extended to all  employees of corporation 
who communicate with corporation’s attorney). Cf. Messing, Rudavsky & 
Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 436 Mass. 347, 357, 
764 N.E.2d 825, 833 (2002) (a lawyer is barred from ex parte contact with 
employees of a corporation, under the rule of professional  responsibility pro-
hibiting a lawyer from communicating with a represented party in the ab-
sence of that party’s counsel, only as to employees who exercise managerial 
responsibility with regard to the subject of pending litigation, those alleged to 
have committed wrongful  actions at issue in the litigation, and employees 
with authority to make decisions about the course of litigation or having man-
agement authority sufficient to speak for and bind the corporation).
Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is derived from Barnes v. Harris, 61 
Mass. 576, 576–577 (1851).
Subsection (a)(4). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(4), reflects Massachusetts practice. In Fos-
ter v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89 (1831), the court explained that the attorney-client 
privilege applied to communications to members of the legal  profession, and 
also to those who “facilitate the communication between attorney and client, 
as interpreters, agents, and attorneys’ clerks” (citations omitted). Id. at 94.
Subsection (a)(5). This subsection is derived from Commissioner of Reve-
nue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 901 N.E.2d 1185 (2009), where the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that “information contained within a communi-
cation need not itself be confidential for the communication to be deemed 
privileged; rather the communication must be made in confidence—that is, 
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with the expectation that the communication will not be divulged.” Id. at 305, 
901 N.E.2d at 1196. The communication of an otherwise privileged matter to 
an accountant for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer does 
not destroy the privilege. Id. at 306–307, 901 N.E.2d at 1196–1197, citing 
Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89, 92 (1831), and Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jep-
sen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. 606, 616, 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (2007). 
However, in order for the derivative privilege to apply to the communication to 
an accountant, it must be necessary for effective consultation between client 
and attorney and not merely useful and convenient. Id. at 308, 901 N.E.2d at 
1198 (“We agree with the majority of courts that the Kovel [Kovel v. United 
States, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)] doctrine applies only when the account-
ant’s role is to clarify or facilitate communications between attorney and cli-
ent.”). In Comcast Corp., the Supreme Judicial  Court held that an attorney’s 
communications with an accountant were not privileged because they were 
not intended to help the lawyer understand the client’s communications to 
him, but rather to give the lawyer advice about Massachusetts tax law, even 
though such advice would be helpful  to the lawyer in advising his client. Id. at 
308–309, 901 N.E.2d at 1198. See also Peters v. Wallach, 366 Mass. 622, 
627, 321 N.E.2d 806, 809 (1975) (“Communications between an attorney 
and his client are not privileged, though made privately, if it is understood that 
the information communicated is to be conveyed to others. The client’s grant 
of authority to settle must be communicated to the other party to the settle-
ment and is thus not confidential.” [Citations omitted.]).
Subsection (b). Subsections (b)(1), (2), (4), and (5) are derived from Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 502(b), which was cited with approval in Purcell  v. Dis-
trict Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 424 Mass. 109, 115, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440 
(1997) (“The attorney-client privilege applies only when the client’s communi-
cation was for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services.”). 
Subsection (b)(3) is derived from Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. 
Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. 609, 614–617, 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1110–1112 (2007), 
where the Supreme Judicial  Court recognized the “common interest doctrine” 
and adopted the principle of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 76(1) (2000), which states as follows:
“If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or 
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and 
they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a 
communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as 
privileged . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as 
against third persons. Any such client may invoke the privi-
lege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the 
communication.”
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This principle expresses the component of the doctrine known as “joint de-
fense agreements,” “joint defense privilege,” or “joint prosecution privilege.” 
See also Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(b)(3). In Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & 
Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. at 618, 870 N.E.2d at 1113, the Supreme 
Judicial Court explained that the common-interest doctrine depends on 
communications that are protected by the attorney-client privilege and is 
simply an exception to the waiver of the privilege. Thus, there is no require-
ment of a writing. Id. at 618, 870 N.E.2d at 1113. The court also explained 
that the legal  interests of the parties do not have to be identical in order for 
the common-interest doctrine to apply. Parties will  be deemed to have a 
common interest when they “share a sufficiently similar interest and attempt 
to promote that interest by sharing a privileged communication” (quotation 
and citation omitted). Id. at 619, 870 N.E.2d at 1113. Finally, the Supreme 
Judicial Court also noted that Section 76(2) of the Restatement is consistent 
with Massachusetts law. Id. at 614 n.4, 870 N.E.2d at 1110 n.4. Section 76(2) 
states that “[u]nless the clients have agreed otherwise, a communication de-
scribed in Subsection (1) is not privileged as between clients described in 
Subsection (1) in a subsequent adverse proceeding between them.” Id., 
quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76(2) (2000).
Subsection (c). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 502(c), reflects Massachusetts practice. See District 
Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Magraw, 417 Mass. 169, 172–173, 628 
N.E.2d 24, 26 (1994).
Subsection (d)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 502(d)(1), which the Supreme Judicial Court described as an 
adequate definition of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege. Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 424 Mass. 109, 112, 676 
N.E.2d 436, 439 (1997). See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b)(1) (1998). “Th[e] 
exception applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or assis-
tance in furtherance of criminal  conduct.” Purcell  v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 424 Mass. at 115, 676 N.E.2d at 441. See Matter of a Grand 
Jury Investigation, 453 Mass. 453, 459, 902 N.E.2d 929, 934 (2009) (“a cli-
ent’s communications to his lawyer threatening harm are privileged unless 
the crime-fraud exception applies”).
Subsection (d)(2). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(d)(2), reflects Massachusetts practice. See 
Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 449, 87 N.E. 755, 757–758 (1909).
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Subsection (d)(3). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(d)(3), reflects Massachusetts practice. See 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b) (1998); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 
32, 653 N.E.2d 161, 167–168 (1995) (there are limits to the extent to which 
in-house counsel may disclose client confidences in pursuing a claim of 
wrongful  discharge); Commonwealth v. Brito, 390 Mass. 112, 119, 453 
N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (1983) (“[T]rial  counsel’s obligation may continue to pre-
serve confidences whose disclosure is not relevant to the defense of the 
charge of his ineffectiveness as counsel.”).
Subsection (d)(4). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(d)(4), reflects Massachusetts practice. See 
Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89, 98–99 (1831).
Subsection (d)(5). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(d)(5), reflects Massachusetts practice. See 
Beacon Oil Co. v. Perelis, 263 Mass. 288, 293, 160 N.E. 892, 894 (1928); 
Thompson v. Cashman, 181 Mass. 36, 37, 62 N.E. 976, 977 (1902).
Subsection (d)(6). In Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital  Asset Mgt., 
449 Mass. 444, 450, 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (2007), the Supreme Judicial  Court 
held that “confidential communications between public  officers and employ-
ees and governmental entities and their legal counsel undertaken for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance are protected under the nor-
mal rules of the attorney-client privilege.” Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected the proposed limitation on the attorney-client privilege for public  em-
ployees and governmental  entities found in Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
502(d)(6). Id. at 452 n.12, 870 N.E.2d at 40 n.12. Additionally, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that its decision in General Elec. Co. v. Department of 
Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801–806, 711 N.E.2d 589, 592–595 (1999), 
which states that under the Massachusetts public records statute, G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10, documents held by a State agency are not protected from disclosure 
under the attorney work-product doctrine, but rather enjoy the more limited 
protection of the so-called “deliberative process” exemption found in 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d), did not limit the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege as to written communications between government officials 
and entities and their counsel.
“With the attorney-client privilege, the principal focus is on 
encouraging the client to communicate freely with the attor-
ney; with work-product, it is on encouraging careful and 
thorough preparation by the attorney. As a result, there are 
differences in the scope of the protection. For example, the 
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privilege extends only to client communications, while work 
product encompasses much that has its source outside cli-
ent communications. At the same time, the privilege extends 
to client-attorney communications whenever any sort of legal 
services are being provided, but the work-product protection 
is limited to preparations for litigation.”
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. at 456, 870 
N.E.2d at 43, quoting E.S. Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the 
Work-Product Doctrine 477 (4th ed. 2001).
Work-Product Doctrine. The work-product doctrine is not an eviden-
tiary privilege, but rather a discovery rule which
“protects a client’s nonlawyer representatives, protecting 
from discovery documents prepared by a party’s representa-
tive ‘in anticipation of litigation.’ The protection is qualified, 
and can be overcome if the party seeking discovery demon-
strates ‘substantial need of the materials’ and that it is ‘un-
able without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equiva-
lent of the materials by other means.’ There is a further limi-
tation: the court is to ‘protect against disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation.’ This so-called ‘opinion’ work product is afforded 
greater protection than ‘fact’ work product.”
Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 314, 901 
N.E.2d 1185, 1202 (2009), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
“The work product doctrine, drawn from the well-known case 
of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), is intended to en-
hance the vitality of an adversary system of litigation by insu-
lating counsel’s work from intrusions, inferences, or borrow-
ings by other parties as he prepares for the contest. Origi-
nally developed in connection with civil  litigation, the doctrine 
has been extended to criminal cases. United States v. No-
bles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1974).” (Citations omitted.)
Ward v. Peabody, 380 Mass. 805, 817, 405 N.E.2d 973, 980 (1980). It is 
codified in Massachusetts and applicable in both civil  and criminal cases. 
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(5). The protections 
afforded by the work-product doctrine can be waived by the attorney. Adop-
tion of Sherry, 435 Mass. 331, 336, 757 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (2001). See also 
Matter of the Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. (Bermuda), 425 
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Mass. 419, 423, 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1997) (no waiver when disclosure of 
work-product is due to inadvertence and adequate steps were taken to main-
tain the confidentiality of the information).
Initially, the burden is on the party asserting the work-product doctrine to 
demonstrate that the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation. If 
that burden is met, the burden shifts to the party seeking access to the 
document to prove that it cannot obtain the substantial  equivalent of the 
document without undue hardship. If the material  is opinion work product, the 
party seeking access to it must make, at a minimum, a “far stronger showing 
of necessity and unavailability by other means.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981). See Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 
453 Mass. 293, 315, 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1203 (2009).
In Comcast Corp., the Supreme Judicial Court further explained that the 
phrase “in anticipation of litigation” has been defined by courts in two differ-
ent ways: (1) whether the documents “are prepared ‘primarily or exclusively 
to assist in litigation’—a formulation that would potentially exclude documents 
containing analysis of expected litigation, if their primary, ultimate, or exclu-
sive purpose is to assist in making the business decision,” and (2) whether 
the documents “were prepared ‘because of’ existing or expected litigation—a 
formulation that would include such documents, despite the fact that their 
purpose is not to ‘assist in’ litigation” (citation omitted). Id. at 316, 901 N.E.2d 
at 1203. In Comcast Corp., the Supreme Judicial  Court adopted the second 
of these two formulations as the law in Massachusetts:
“The ‘because of’ test ‘appropriately focuses on both what 
should be eligible for the [r]ule’s protection and what should 
not.’ Thus, a document is within the scope of the rule if, ‘in 
light of the nature of the document and the factual  situation 
in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to 
have been prepared because of the prospect of litigation’” 
(citations omitted).
Id. at 316–317, 901 N.E.2d at 1204 (“a litigation analysis prepared so that a 
party can make an informed business decision is afforded the protections of 
the work-product doctrine”; additionally, memos prepared for counsel by the 
accountant that were not protected by the attorney-client privilege also fall 
within the scope of the opinion work-product doctrine). The formulation of the 
work-product doctrine in the Federal system may be narrower. See United 
States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009). See also 
Christian M. Hoffman & Matthew C. Baltay, Maintaining Client Confidences: 
Developments at the Supreme Judicial  Court and First Circuit in 2009, 53 
Boston B.J. 4, 20–23 (Fall 2009).
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Waiver. For issues relating to waiver, see Section 523, Waiver of Privi-
lege.
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Section 503. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have 
the following meanings:
(1) A “patient” is a person who, during the course of diagnosis or 
treatment, communicates with a psychotherapist.
(2) A “psychotherapist” is (A) a person licensed to practice medi-
cine who devotes a substantial portion of his or her time to the 
practice of psychiatry; (B) a person who is licensed as a psycholo-
gist by the board of registration of psychologists or a graduate of, 
or student enrolled in, a doctoral degree program in psychology at 
a recognized educational institution, who is working under the 
supervision of a licensed psychologist; or (C) a person who is a 
registered nurse licensed by the board of registration in nursing 
whose certificate of registration has been endorsed authorizing the 
practice of professional nursing in an expanded role as a psychiat-
ric nurse mental health clinical specialist.
(3) “Communications” includes conversations, correspondence, 
actions, and occurrences relating to diagnosis or treatment before, 
during, or after institutionalization, regardless of the patient’s 
awareness of such conversations, correspondence, actions, and 
occurrences, and any records, memoranda, or notes of the forego-
ing.
(b) Privilege. Except as hereinafter provided, in any  court proceeding 
and in any proceeding preliminary thereto, and in legislative and ad-
ministrative proceedings, a patient shall have the privilege of refusing 
to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing, any commu-
nication, wherever made, between said patient and a psychotherapist 
relative to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emo-
tional condition. This privilege shall also apply  to patients engaged 
with a psychotherapist in marital therapy, family therapy, or consulta-
tion in contemplation of such therapy. If a patient is incompetent to 
exercise or waive such privilege, a guardian shall be appointed to act 
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in his or her behalf under this section. A previously appointed guardian 
shall be authorized to so act.
(c) Effect of Exercise of Privilege. Upon the exercise of the privilege 
granted by this section, the judge or presiding officer shall instruct the 
jury that no adverse inference may be drawn therefrom.
(d) Exceptions. The privilege granted hereunder shall not apply to any 
of the following communications:
(1) Disclosure to Establish Need for Hospitalization or Immi-
nently Dangerous Activity. A disclosure made by a psychothera-
pist who, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient, 
determines that the patient is in need of treatment in a hospital for 
mental or emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently 
dangerous activity by the patient against himself or herself or an-
other person, and on the basis of such determination discloses 
such communication either for the purpose of placing or retaining 
the patient in such hospital, provided, however, that the provisions 
of this section shall continue in effect after the patient is in said 
hospital, or placing the patient under arrest or under the supervi-
sion of law enforcement authorities;
(2) Court-Ordered Psychiatric Exam. A disclosure made to a 
psychotherapist in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered 
by the court, provided that  such disclosure was made after the pa-
tient was informed that the communication would not be privi-
leged, and provided further that such communications shall be 
admissible only on issues involving the patient’s mental or emo-
tional condition but not as a confession or admission of guilt;
(3) Patient Raises the Issue of Own Mental or Emotional Con-
dition as an Element of Claim or Defense. A disclosure in any 
proceeding, except one involving child custody, adoption, or 
adoption consent, in which the patient introduces the patient’s 
mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim or defense, 
and the judge or presiding officer finds that it is more important  to 
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the interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than 
that the relationship between patient and psychotherapist be pro-
tected;
(4) Party Through Deceased Patient Raises Issue of Decedent’s 
Mental or Emotional Condition as Element of Claim or De-
fense. A disclosure in any proceeding after the death of a patient 
in which the patient’s mental or emotional condition is introduced 
by any party  claiming or defending through, or as a beneficiary 
of, the patient as an element of the claim or defense, and the judge 
or presiding officer finds that it is more important to the interests 
of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the rela-
tionship between patient and psychotherapist be protected;
(5) Child Custody and Adoption Cases. A disclosure in any  case 
involving child custody, adoption, or the dispensing with the need 
for consent to adoption in which, upon a hearing in chambers, the 
judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, determines that  the 
psychotherapist has evidence bearing significantly on the patient’s 
ability  to provide suitable care or custody, and that it is more im-
portant to the welfare of the child that the communication be dis-
closed than that the relationship  between patient and psychothera-
pist be protected; provided, however, that in such cases of adop-
tion or the dispensing with the need for consent to adoption, a 
judge shall first determine that the patient has been informed that 
such communication would not be privileged;
(6) Claim Against Psychotherapist. A disclosure in any proceed-
ing brought by the patient against the psychotherapist, and in any 
malpractice, criminal, or license revocation proceeding, in which 
disclosure is necessary or relevant  to the claim or defense of the 
psychotherapist; or
(7) Child Abuse or Neglect. A report  to the Department of Chil-
dren and Families of reasonable cause to believe that a child under 
the age of eighteen has suffered serious physical or emotional in-
jury resulting from sexual abuse, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A.
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(8) Exception. In criminal actions, such confidential communica-
tions may be subject to discovery and may be admissible as evi-
dence, subject to applicable law.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20B.
Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20B. The psychotherapist-patient privilege recognizes the critical role of 
confidentiality in this medical  speciality. Usen v. Usen, 359 Mass. 453, 457, 
269 N.E.2d 442, 444 (1971). This privilege is not self-executing. Common-
wealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 331, 780 N.E.2d 453, 458 (2002).
Scope of the Privilege. “The privilege gives the patient the right to re-
fuse to disclose and to prevent another witness from disclosing any commu-
nication between patient and psychotherapist concerning diagnosis or treat-
ment of the patient’s mental condition.” Commonwealth v. Clancy, 402 Mass. 
664, 667, 524 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1988). The privilege does not protect the 
facts of the hospitalization or treatment, the dates, or the purpose of the hos-
pitalization or treatment, if such purpose does not implicate communications 
between the witnesses and the psychotherapist. Id. See Commonwealth v. 
Kobrin, 395 Mass. 284, 294, 479 N.E.2d 674, 681 (1985) (holding, in context 
of grand jury investigation into Medicaid fraud, that patient diagnosis is not 
privileged but portions of records that “reflect patients’ thoughts, feelings, and 
impressions, or contain the substance of the psychotherapeutic dialogue are 
protected”).
The privilege is evidentiary and applies only “in any court proceeding 
and in any proceeding preliminary thereto and in legislative and administra-
tive proceedings.” G. L. c. 233, § 20B. See Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 435 
Mass. 623, 628–630, 760 N.E.2d 724, 728–730 (2002) (psychotherapist not 
prohibited by G. L. c. 233, § 20B, from informing police of statements made 
to her in her office by a client who confessed to a robbery and turned over a 
firearm).
Subsection (c). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B.
Subsection (d)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B(a).
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Subsection (d)(2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B(b). See also Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 
270, 311 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1974) (patient’s communications to a psychothera-
pist in a court-ordered evaluation may not be disclosed against the patient’s 
wishes absent a warning that the communications would not be privileged).
Subsection (d)(3). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B(c).
Subsection (d)(4). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B(d).
Subsection (d)(5). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B(e).
Subsection (d)(6). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20B(f).
Subsection (d)(7). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 119, § 51A.
Subsection (d)(8). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006) (establishing 
protocol in criminal cases governing access to and use of material covered 
by statutory privilege). See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and 
Disqualifications.
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Section 504. Spousal Privilege and 
Disqualification; Parent-
Child Disqualification
(a) Spousal Privilege.
(1) General Rule. A spouse shall not be compelled to testify  in 
the trial of an indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding 
brought against the other spouse.
(2) Who May Claim the Privilege. Only the witness-spouse may 
claim the privilege.
(3) Exceptions. This privilege shall not apply  in civil proceedings, 
or in any prosecution for nonsupport, desertion, neglect of paren-
tal duty, or child abuse, including incest.
(b) Spousal Disqualification.
(1) General Rule. In any proceeding, civil or criminal, a witness 
shall not testify  as to private conversations with a spouse occur-
ring during their marriage.
(2) Exceptions. This disqualification shall not apply to
(A) a proceeding arising out of or involving a contract be-
tween spouses;
(B) a proceeding to establish paternity  or to modify or enforce 
a support order;
(C) a prosecution for nonsupport, desertion, or neglect of pa-
rental duty;
(D) child abuse proceedings, including incest;
(E) any  criminal proceeding in which a spouse has been 
charged with a crime against the other spouse;
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(F) a violation of a vacate, restraining, or no-contact order or 
judgment issued by a Massachusetts court or a similar protec-
tion order from another jurisdiction;
(G) a declaration of a deceased spouse if the court finds that it 
was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of 
the declarant; or
(H) a criminal proceeding in which the private conversation 
reveals a bias or motive on the part of a spouse testifying 
against his or her spouse.
(c) Parent-Child Disqualification.
(1) Definitions. As used in this subsection, the following words 
shall have the following meanings:
(A) Minor Child. A “minor child” is any person under eight-
een years of age.
(B) Parent. A “parent” is the natural or adoptive mother or 
father of the minor child referred to in Subsection (c)(1)(A).
(2) Disqualification. An unemancipated, minor child, living with 
a parent, shall not testify  before a grand jury or at the trial of an 
indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding against said 
parent where the victim in such proceeding is not a member of 
said parent’s family and does not reside in the said parent’s house-
hold.
NOTE
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20, Second.
The existence of the privilege depends on whether the spouse who as-
serts it is then married. The privilege applies even if the spouse was not mar-
ried at the time of the events that are the subject of the criminal  trial, and 
even if the spouse who asserts the privilege had testified in an earlier pro-
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ceeding or trial. See Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 382, 367 
N.E.2d 811, 819 (1977). There is no common-law privilege, similar to the 
spousal privilege, applicable to unmarried cohabitants. Commonwealth v. 
Diaz, 422 Mass. 269, 274, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (1996).
The privilege not to testify against a spouse applies regardless of 
whether the proposed testimony would be favorable or unfavorable to the 
other spouse. Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 578, 511 N.E.2d 
529, 533 (1987). The privilege is broad and it applies even though a spouse 
is called to give testimony concerning “persons other than the spouse.” Mat-
ter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 97, 849 N.E.2d 797, 804 
(2006).
The privilege applies to testimony at trial and not to testimony before a 
grand jury. See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 99, 849 
N.E.2d at 805 (court finds it unnecessary to “decide whether, or to what ex-
tent, the spousal privilege may be invoked in pretrial  [or posttrial] proceed-
ings”). But see Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 864, 933 N.E.2d 
633, 641 (2010) (spousal privilege applied at pretrial  hearing on motion in 
limine). The court should conduct a voir dire, outside the presence of the jury, 
and may inquire of the witness whether he or she will  assert the privilege or 
otherwise refuse to testify. Id. at 864 n.10, 933 N.E.2d at 642 n.10, citing 
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 350, 742 N.E.2d 61, 70 (2001). 
However, a “spouse cannot be forced to testify regarding [his or] her reasons 
for doing so.” Id.
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 451, 99 N.E. 266, 271 (1912). See also Common-
wealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 595, 374 N.E.2d 87, 96 (1978).
A spouse may testify against the other spouse if he or she is willing to 
do so. Commonwealth v. Saltzman, 258 Mass. 109, 110, 154 N.E. 562, 562 
(1927). The defendant-spouse has no standing to object to his or her 
spouse’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. at 595, 374 N.E.2d 
at 95–96. When a spouse decides to waive the privilege and testify against 
his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding, the judge should be satisfied, out-
side the presence of the jury, that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 
595 n.9, 374 N.E.2d at 96 n.9.
Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, Sec-
ond, and G. L. c. 273, § 7. See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 
Mass. 357, 361, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (1983) (privilege inapplicable in civil 
proceedings), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
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Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.
The disqualification, unlike the privilege, bars either spouse from testify-
ing to private conversations with the other, even where both spouses wish 
the communication to be revealed. Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. 457, 
459, 524 N.E.2d 53, 54 (1988). “The contents of private conversations are 
absolutely excluded, but the statute does not bar evidence as to the fact that 
a conversation took place” (citations omitted). Id. The disqualification sur-
vives the death of a spouse, see Dexter v. Booth, 84 Mass. 559, 561 (1861), 
except in civil  cases subject to G. L. c. 233, § 65 (“In any action or other civil 
judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall  not be inadmis-
sible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband 
and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds that it was made in good faith 
and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.”). See Sec-
tion 504(b)(2)(G), Spousal Privilege and Disqualification; Parent-Child Dis-
qualification: Spousal Disqualification: Exceptions.
Whether a conversation was “private” is a question of preliminary fact 
for the trial  judge. See Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 161–162, 130 
N.E. 220, 222 (1921).
In the absence of an objection, evidence of private conversations is ad-
missible and may be given its full probative value. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
374 Mass. 583, 595 n.8, 374 N.E.2d 87, 95 n.8 (1978). However, if there is 
an objection, the conversation is excluded even if neither spouse objects to 
the conversation being admitted. Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. at 461, 
524 N.E.2d at 55.
The disqualification applies only to conversations, not to other types of 
communications. For example, written communications are not included. 
Commonwealth v. Szczuka, 391 Mass. 666, 678 n.14, 464 N.E.2d 38, 46 
n.14 (1984). A spouse is not barred from testifying that a conversation took 
place, and, as a result, that he or she did something. See Sampson v. Samp-
son, 223 Mass. 451, 458–459, 112 N.E. 84, 87 (1916). The disqualification 
does not bar a third person who overheard the “private conversation” from 
testifying to its contents. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 377 Mass. 772, 774–
775, 388 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1979). See also Martin v. Martin, 267 Mass. 157, 
159, 166 N.E. 820, 820 (1929).
“[W]ords constituting or accompanying abuse, threats, or assaults of 
which the other spouse is the victim” are not regarded as private conversa-
tion for the purpose of the disqualification. Commonwealth v. Gillis, 358 
Mass. 215, 218, 263 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1970). Complaints and exclamations 
of pain and suffering are also not private conversations for the purpose of the 
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disqualification. Commonwealth v. Jardine, 143 Mass. 567, 567–568, 10 N.E. 
250, 250–251 (1887).
The disqualification depends upon the existence of the marriage at the 
time of the communication; it does not prohibit testimony by a spouse as to 
communications made prior to the marriage. Commonwealth v. Azar, 32 
Mass. App. Ct. 290, 304, 588 N.E.2d 1352, 1361 (1992), remanded for new 
trial on other grounds, 435 Mass. 675, 760 N.E.2d 1224 (2002). See also 
Commonwealth v. Barronian, 235 Mass. 364, 366, 126 N.E. 833, 834 (1920).
The Supreme Judicial Court has left open whether the disqualification 
would bar testimony of a spouse when husband and wife are jointly engaged 
in criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 254 n.4, 780 
N.E.2d 26, 33 n.4 (2002).
The defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses may trump the 
statutory disqualification. “To determine whether the [marital] disqualification 
should yield to the invoked constitutional rights [in a criminal case the court] 
look[s] to whether the evidence at issue if admitted might have had a signifi-
cant impact on the result of the trial” (quotations and citations omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Perl, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 445, 453, 737 N.E.2d 937, 944 
(2000) (upholding exclusion of private conversations which would have been 
cumulative of other evidence).
“Where [G. L. c. 233, § 20] confers a testimonial  privilege, the language 
of the statute is to be strictly construed.” Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 
447 Mass. 88, 90, 849 N.E.2d 797, 800 (2006).
Subsection (b)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
First.
Subsection (b)(2)(B). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
First. Spousal  disqualification does not apply in any Chapter 209C action. 
See G. L. c. 209C, § 16(c). It also does not apply to any action to establish 
paternity, support, or both under the Massachusetts Uniform Interstate Fam-
ily Support Act (Chapter 209D), or to enforce a child support or alimony or-
der. See G. L. c. 209D, § 3316(h).
Subsection (b)(2)(C). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
First.
Subsection (b)(2)(D). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
First. See Commonwealth v. Burnham, 451 Mass. 517, 521–522, 887 N.E.2d 
222, 225–226 (2008) (the statutory exception to the applicability of the mari-
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tal disqualification in child abuse cases applies to both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings).
Subsection (b)(2)(E). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
First.
Subsection (b)(2)(F). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
First.
Subsection (b)(2)(G). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 65.
Subsection (b)(2)(H). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Su-
grue, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 175–178, 607 N.E.2d 1045, 1047–1049 (1993), 
where the Appeals Court explained that the criminal  defendant’s constitu-
tional  right to confrontation and to a fair trial outweighed the public  policy be-
hind the spousal disqualification.
Subsection (c)(1)(A). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-
eighth.
Subsection (c)(1)(B). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
Fourth.
Subsection (c)(2). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.
The Supreme Judicial Court has declined to recognize a testimonial 
privilege that parents could exercise to avoid being compelled to testify in 
criminal proceedings about confidential communications with their children. 
See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 590–591, 722 N.E.2d 
450, 451 (2000) (“the Legislature, in the first instance, is the more appropri-
ate body to weigh the relative social  policies and address whether and how 
such a privilege should be created”).
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Section 505. Domestic Violence Victims’ 
Counselor Privilege
(a) Definitions. The definitions that follow apply to this section unless 
the context clearly requires otherwise.
(1) Abuse. “Abuse” means causing or attempting to cause physi-
cal harm; placing another in fear of imminent physical harm; or 
causing another to engage in sexual relations against his or her 
will by force, threat of force, or coercion.
(2) Confidential Communication. A “confidential communica-
tion” is information transmitted in confidence by and between a 
victim and a domestic violence victims’ counselor by a means 
which do not disclose the information to a person other than a per-
son present for the benefit of the victim, or to those to whom dis-
closure of such information is reasonably necessary to the coun-
seling and assisting of such victim. The term “information” in-
cludes, but is not limited to, reports, records, working papers, or 
memoranda.
(3) Domestic Violence Victims’ Counselor. A “domestic violence 
victims’ counselor” is a person who is employed or volunteers in a 
domestic violence victim’s program; who has undergone a mini-
mum of twenty-five hours of training; who reports to and is under 
the direct control and supervision of a direct  service supervisor of 
a domestic violence victims’ program; and whose primary purpose 
is the rendering of advice, counseling, or assistance to victims 
of abuse.
(4) Domestic Violence Victims’ Program. A “domestic violence 
victims’ program” is any refuge, shelter, office, safe home, institu-
tion or center established for the purpose of offering assistance to 
victims of abuse through crisis intervention, medical, legal, or 
support counseling.
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(5) Victim. A “victim” is a person who has suffered abuse and 
who consults a domestic violence victims’ counselor for the pur-
pose of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a 
mental, physical, or emotional condition caused by such abuse.
(b) Privilege. A domestic violence victims’ counselor shall not  dis-
close confidential communications between the counselor and the vic-
tim of domestic violence without the prior written consent  of the vic-
tim. Such confidential communication shall not be subject  to discovery 
in any civil, legislative, or administrative proceeding without the prior 
written consent of the victim to whom such confidential communica-
tion relates, except as provided in Subsection (c).
(c) Exception. In criminal actions, such confidential communications 
may be subject to discovery  and may be admissible as evidence, sub-
ject to applicable law.
NOTE
This section is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20K; Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122, 143 n.25, 859 N.E.2d 400, 416 n.25 (2006) (characterizing 
records prepared by domestic  violence victims’ counselor as privileged); and 
Commonwealth v. Tripolone, 425 Mass. 487, 489, 681 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 
(1997) (same). The specific provision in G. L. c. 233, § 20K, for in camera 
judicial review prior to an order allowing any discovery of material  covered by 
the domestic violence victims’ counselor privilege is different from the proce-
dure recently established by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 145–146, 859 N.E.2d at 418–419. See Introductory 
Note to Article V, Privileges and Disqualifications.
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Section 506. Sexual Assault Counselor–Victim 
Privilege
(a) Definitions. The definitions that follow apply to this section unless 
the context clearly requires otherwise.
(1) Rape Crisis Center. A “rape crisis center” is any office, insti-
tution, or center offering assistance to victims of sexual assault 
and the families of such victims through crisis intervention, medi-
cal, and legal counseling.
(2) Sexual Assault Counselor. A “sexual assault counselor” is a 
person who (A) is employed by  or is a volunteer in a rape crisis 
center; (B) has undergone thirty-five hours of training; (C) reports 
to and is under the direct control and supervision of a licensed so-
cial worker, nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychotherapist; 
and (D) has the primary purpose of rendering advice, counseling, 
or assistance to victims of sexual assault.
(3) Victim. A “victim” is a person who has suffered a sexual as-
sault and who consults a sexual assault counselor for the purpose 
of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a mental, 
physical, or emotional condition caused by such sexual assault.
(4) Confidential Communication. A “confidential communica-
tion” is information transmitted in confidence by and between a 
victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor by a means 
which does not disclose the information to a person other than a 
person present for the benefit of the victim, or to those to whom 
disclosure of such information is reasonably necessary to the 
counseling and assisting of such victim. The term includes all in-
formation received by the sexual assault counselor which arises 
out of and in the course of such counseling and assisting, includ-
ing, but  not limited to, reports, records, working papers, or memo-
randa.
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(b) Privilege. A confidential communication as defined in Subsection 
(a)(4) shall not be disclosed by a sexual assault counselor, is not sub-
ject to discovery, and is inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceed-
ing without the prior written consent of the victim to whom the report, 
record, working paper, or memorandum relates. Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to limit  the defendant’s right of cross-examination 
of such counselor in a civil or criminal proceeding if such counselor 
testifies with such written consent.
(c) Exception. In criminal actions, such confidential communications 
may be subject to discovery  and may be admissible as evidence, sub-
ject to applicable law.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20J.
Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20J. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 143 n.25, 859 N.E.2d 
400, 416 n.25 (2006) (characterizing records prepared by sexual assault vic-
tims’ counselor as privileged).
This privilege protects only confidential communications between the 
victim and the counselor and does not extend to the date, time, or fact of the 
communication. Commonwealth v. Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 29, 731 N.E.2d 
1053, 1058 (2000). The victim’s testimony to the content of a privileged 
communication under this section does not constitute a waiver of the privi-
lege unless the testimony is given with knowledge of the privilege and an 
intent to waive it. Id. at 35–36, 731 N.E.2d at 1062. See Section 523(b), 
Waiver of Privilege: Conduct Constituting Waiver.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006) (establishing pro-
tocol in criminal cases governing access to and use of material covered by 
privilege). See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and Disqualifications.
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Section 507. Social Worker–Client Privilege
(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have 
the following meanings:
(1) Client. A “client” is a person with whom a social worker has 
established a social worker–client relationship.
(2) Communications. “Communications” includes conversations, 
correspondence, actions, and occurrences regardless of the client’s 
awareness of such conversations, correspondence, actions, and 
occurrences and any records, memoranda, or notes of the forego-
ing.
(3) Reasonable Precautions. “Reasonable precautions” are rea-
sonable efforts to take one or more of the following actions as 
would be taken by a reasonably prudent social worker under the 
same or similar circumstances:
(A) communicates a threat of death or serious bodily injury to 
any reasonably identified victim or victims;
(B) notifies an appropriate law enforcement agency in the vi-
cinity where the client or any potential victim resides;
(C) arranges for the client to be hospitalized voluntarily; or
(D) takes appropriate steps, within the legal scope of social 
work practice, to initiate proceedings for involuntary hospi-
talization.
(4) Social Worker. As used in this section, a “social worker” is a 
social worker licensed pursuant to the provisions of G. L. c. 112, 
§ 132, or a social worker employed in a State, county, or munici-
pal governmental agency.
(b) Privilege. A client shall have the privilege of refusing to disclose 
and of preventing a witness from disclosing any communication, 
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wherever made, between said client and a social worker relative to the 
diagnosis or treatment of the client’s mental or emotional condition. 
If a client is incompetent to exercise or waive such privilege, a guard-
ian shall be appointed to act in the client’s behalf under this section. A 
previously appointed guardian shall be authorized to so act.
(c) Exceptions. The privilege in Subsection (b) shall not apply to any 
of the following communications:
(1) if a social worker, in the course of making a diagnosis or treat-
ing the client, determines that the client is in need of treatment in 
a hospital for mental or emotional illness or that there is a threat of 
imminently dangerous activity by the client against himself or 
herself, or another person, and on the basis of such determination 
discloses such communication either for the purpose of placing or 
retaining the client in such hospital; provided, however, that the 
provisions of this section shall continue in effect after the client is 
in said hospital, or placing the client under arrest or under the su-
pervision of law enforcement authorities;
(2) if a judge finds that the client, after having been informed that 
the communications would not be privileged, has made communi-
cations to a social worker in the course of a psychiatric examina-
tion ordered by the court; provided, however, that such communi-
cations shall be admissible only on issues involving the client’s 
mental or emotional condition but not  as a confession or admis-
sion of guilt;
(3) in any proceeding, except one involving child custody, adop-
tion, or adoption consent, in which the client introduces his or her 
mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim or defense, 
and the judge or presiding officer finds that it is more important  to 
the interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than 
that the relationship between the client  and the social worker be 
protected;
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(4) in any proceeding after the death of a client in which the cli-
ent’s mental or emotional condition is introduced by  any party 
claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary  of the client as 
an element of the claim or defense, and the judge or presiding of-
ficer finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that 
the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between 
client and social worker be protected;
(5) in the initiation of proceedings under G. L. c. 119, §§ 23(C) 
and 24, or G. L. c. 210, § 3, or to give testimony in connection 
therewith;
(6) in any proceeding whereby the social worker has acquired the 
information while conducting an investigation pursuant to G. L. c. 
119, § 51B;
(7) in any other case involving child custody, adoption, or the dis-
pensing with the need for consent to adoption in which, upon a 
hearing in chambers, the judge, in the exercise of his or her discre-
tion, determines that the social worker has evidence bearing sig-
nificantly on the client’s ability  to provide suitable care or cus-
tody, and that it  is more important to the welfare of the child that 
the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between 
client and social worker be protected; provided, however, that in 
such case of adoption or the dispensing with the need for consent 
to adoption, a judge shall determine that the client has been in-
formed that such communication would not be privileged;
(8) in any proceeding brought by the client against  the social 
worker and in any malpractice, criminal, or license revocation 
proceeding in which disclosure is necessary or relevant to the 
claim or defense of the social worker; or
(9) in criminal actions, such privileged communications may be 
subject to discovery and may be admissible as evidence, subject to 
applicable law.
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NOTE
Subsections (a)(1)–(3). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 112, § 135.
Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 112, §§ 135A and 135B. See Bernard v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 
32, 35, 673 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (1996) (State police trooper employed as a 
peer counselor qualified as a social worker for purposes of this section).
Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, 
§ 135B. See Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 441 Mass. 257, 261 n.6, 805 N.E.2d 
1, 5 n.6 (2004) (characterizing records prepared by clients’ social worker as 
privileged; privilege is not self-executing).
Subsections (c)(1)–(8). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 112, § 135B.
The social worker–client privilege is set forth in G. L. c. 112, § 135B. 
General Laws c. 112, § 135A, addresses the general duty of confidentiality of 
certain social  workers. See Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 441 Mass. 257, 261 
n.6, 805 N.E.2d 1, 5 n.6 (2004). The privilege is not self-executing. See 
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 331, 780 N.E.2d 453, 458 (2002).
Subsection (c)(9). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006) (establishing 
protocol in criminal cases governing access to and use of material covered 
by statutory privilege). See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and 
Disqualifications.
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Section 508. Allied Mental Health or Human 
Services Professional Privilege
(a) Definitions. As used in this section, an “allied mental health and 
human services professional” is a licensed marriage and family thera-
pist, a licensed rehabilitation counselor, a licensed mental health coun-
selor, or a licensed educational psychologist.
(b) Privilege. Any communication between an allied mental health or 
human services professional and a client shall be deemed to be confi-
dential and privileged.
(c) Waiver. This privilege shall be subject to waiver only in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
(1) where the allied mental health and human services profes-
sional is a party defendant to a civil, criminal, or disciplinary ac-
tion arising from such practice in which case the waiver shall be 
limited to that action;
(2) where the client is a defendant in a criminal proceeding and 
the use of the privilege would violate the defendant’s right to 
compulsory  process and right to present testimony and witnesses 
in his or her own behalf;
(3) when the communication reveals the contemplation or com-
mission of a crime or a harmful act; and
(4) where a client  agrees to the waiver, or in circumstances where 
more than one person in a family is receiving therapy, where each 
such family member agrees to the waiver.
(d) Exception. In criminal actions, such privileged communications 
may be subject to discovery  and may be admissible as evidence, sub-
ject to applicable law.
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NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, 
§ 163. General Laws c. 112, § 165, outlines license eligibility. A licensed edu-
cational psychologist must also be certified as a school psychologist by the 
Massachusetts Department of Education. G. L. c. 112, § 163.
Subsections (b) and (c). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 112, § 172. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 231, 866 
N.E.2d 892, 895 (2007) (the statute creates an evidentiary privilege as well 
as a confidentiality rule).
These subsections do not prohibit a third-party reimburser from inspect-
ing and copying any records relating to diagnosis, treatment, or other serv-
ices provided to any person for which coverage, benefit, or reimbursement is 
claimed, so long as access occurs in the ordinary course of business and the 
policy or certificate under which the claim is made provides that such access 
is permitted. G. L. c. 112, § 172. Further, this section does not apply to ac-
cess to such records pursuant to any peer review or utilization review proce-
dures applied and implemented in good faith. G. L. c. 112, § 172.
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006) (establishing pro-
tocol in criminal cases governing access to and use of material covered by 
statutory privilege). See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and Dis-
qualifications.
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Section 509. Identity of Informer, Surveillance 
Location, and Protected Witness 
Privileges
(a) Identity of Informer. The identity of persons supplying the gov-
ernment with information concerning the commission of a crime is 
privileged in both civil and criminal cases, except there is no privilege 
under this subsection when
(1) the identity  of the informer has been disclosed by the govern-
ment or by the informer, or is otherwise known, or
(2) the identity of the informer is relevant and helpful to the de-
fense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a 
criminal or civil case in which the government is a party. Before 
the identity of the informer is disclosed, the court  must balance 
the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the 
individual’s right to prepare a defense.
(b) Surveillance Location. The exact location, such as the location of 
a police observation post, used for surveillance is privileged, except 
there is no privilege under this subsection when a defendant shows that 
revealing the exact surveillance location would provide evidence 
needed to fairly present the defendant’s case to the jury.
(c) Protected Witness. The identity and location of a protected wit-
ness and any  other matter concerning a protected witness or the Com-
monwealth’s witness protection program is privileged in both civil and 
criminal cases, except there is no privilege as to the identity and loca-
tion of the protected witness under this subsection when
(1) the prosecuting officer agrees to a disclosure after balancing 
the danger posed to the protected witness, the detriment it may 
cause to the program, and the benefit it  may afford to the public or 
the person seeking discovery, or
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(2) disclosure is at the request of a local, State, or Federal law en-
forcement officer or is in compliance with a court order in circum-
stances in which the protected witness is under criminal investiga-
tion for, arrested for, or charged with a felony.
(d) Who May Claim. These privileges may be claimed by the 
government.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Roviaro v. United States, 
353 U.S. 53, 59–62 (1957); Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 490–491, 
132 N.E. 322, 326–327 (1921); and Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 
488–489 (1872). Although the privilege remains intact, it may expire. The 
public records statute, G. L. c. 66, § 10, provides an independent right of ac-
cess to records and documents that were covered by the privilege if the rea-
son for the privilege no longer exists. See, e.g., District Attorney for the Nor-
folk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 511–512, 646 N.E.2d 127, 130 (1995) 
(discussing Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 66, 354 
N.E.2d 872, 878 [1976], and WBZ-TV4 v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 408 Mass. 595, 602–604, 562 N.E.2d 817, 821–822 [1990]).
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of 
a search warrant, the court’s review “begins and ends with the ‘four corners 
of the affidavit.’” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297, 798 N.E.2d 
275, 277 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 
428, 657 N.E.2d 237, 238 (1995). The defendant has the burden of establish-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit contains false 
statements. See Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred & Ninety-two Dollars, 383 
Mass. 764, 767, 769, 422 N.E.2d 767, 770, 771 (1981). Intentionally or reck-
lessly omitted material may satisfy the defendant’s burden. See Common-
wealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 552, 911 N.E.2d 174, 182 (2009). A negligent 
misrepresentation by the affiant is not a basis for relief. See Commonwealth 
v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 520, 554 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (1990); Commonwealth 
v. Nine Hundred & Ninety-two Dollars, 383 Mass. at 771–772, 422 N.E.2d at 
772–773. If the affidavit contains false statements, the court must simply as-
sess whether it establishes probable cause without reliance on the false 
statements. See Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. at 519, 554 N.E.2d at 
1195. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred & Ninety-two Dollars, 383 Mass. 
at 768, 422 N.E.2d at 770–771 (leaving open whether suppression of evi-
dence should be ordered under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
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of Rights when there has been a deliberately false, though nonmaterial, mis-
statement by the affiant).
Amral Hearing. In keeping with the “four corners rule,” the court should 
not take any action simply based on an allegation that the affidavit contains 
false information. Only if the defendant makes an initial showing that “cast[s] 
a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material  representations made by the 
affiant concerning a confidential informant” is the court required to act (cita-
tions omitted). See Commonwealth v. Youngworth, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 38, 
769 N.E.2d 299, 307 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1064 (2003). The first 
step is to conduct an in camera hearing. See Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 
416 Mass. 41, 53–54, 617 N.E.2d 983, 989–990 (1993). The informant may 
be ordered to appear and submit to questions by the court at this “Amral 
hearing”; however, the identity of the informant is not revealed. The court has 
discretion to permit the prosecutor to attend this hearing. Neither the defen-
dant nor defense counsel is permitted to attend. See Commonwealth v. Am-
ral, 407 Mass. at 525, 554 N.E.2d at 1198. If the court is satisfied that the 
informant exists and that the defendant’s allegations of false statements are 
not substantiated, there is no further inquiry. On the other hand, if the defen-
dant makes “a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement know-
ingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included 
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,” the court must take the next step (cita-
tion omitted). See Commonwealth v. Youngworth, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 37–
38, 769 N.E.2d at 306–307. In this situation, the defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing and to the disclosure of the identity of the informant. The 
burden of proof at this hearing rests with the defendant to establish that the 
affiant presented the magistrate with false information purposely or with reck-
less disregard for its truth. If it is shown that an affidavit in support of a war-
rant contains false information that was material to the determination of 
probable cause, suppression of the evidence is required. See Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–156 (1978); Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 
Mass. at 519–520, 554 N.E.2d at 1195.
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Cong-
don, 265 Mass. 166, 175, 165 N.E. 467, 470 (1928), and Pihl v. Morris, 319 
Mass. 577, 579, 66 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1946).
Subsection (a)(2). The first sentence of this subsection is quoted nearly ver-
batim from Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 544–545, 313 N.E.2d 
571, 578 (1974), quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 
(1957). The last sentence of this subsection is derived from Commonwealth 
v. Nelson, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 794, 797, 536 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (1989). See 
also Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. 463, 469, 886 N.E.2d 713, 718 
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(2008) (“Part of the balance involves weighing the potential danger to the 
informant.”). “Cases which have considered the subject have maintained the 
distinction between a demand for disclosure at a pretrial  hearing, where the 
issue is probable cause for arrest or a search, and a demand for disclosure 
at trial, where the issue is the defendant’s ultimate guilt or innocence.” Com-
monwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 571, 548 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (1990). “[T]
he government is not required to disclose the identity of an informant who is 
a mere tipster and not an active participant in the offense charged.” Com-
monwealth v. Brzezinski, 405 Mass. 401, 408, 540 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 
(1989), quoting United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384, 1387 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978). Accord McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308–
309 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 362 Mass. 243, 245, 285 
N.E.2d 124, 126 (1972) (trial judge “reasonably refused to permit inquiry 
about an informant who seems merely to have told the police where the de-
fendants were living together”); Commonwealth v. McKay, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 
966, 967, 503 N.E.2d 48, 49 (1987) (trial judge was not required to order dis-
closure of the identity of two inmates who informed on the defendant, al-
though their statements were disclosed and they were not called as wit-
nesses at trial by the Commonwealth). When the informant “is an active par-
ticipant in the alleged crime or the only nongovernment witness, disclosure 
[of the identity of the informant] usually has been ordered.” Commonwealth v. 
Lugo, 406 Mass. at 572, 548 N.E.2d at 1266.
Where a defendant seeks disclosure of otherwise privileged information 
to support an entrapment defense, the question is whether the defense has 
been “appropriately raised . . . by the introduction of some evidence of in-
ducement by a government agent or one acting at his direction.” Common-
wealth v. Madigan, 449 Mass. 702, 707, 871 N.E.2d 478, 483 (2007), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 651–652, 282 N.E.2d 394, 400 
(1972). “The types of conduct that possess the indicia of inducement include 
‘aggressive persuasion, coercive encouragement, lengthy negotiations, 
pleading or arguing with the defendant, repeated or persistent solicitation, 
persuasion, importuning, and playing on sympathy or other emotion.’” Id. at 
708, 871 N.E.2d at 483, quoting Commonwealth v. Tracy, 416 Mass. 528, 
536, 624 N.E.2d 84, 89 (1993). See Commonwealth v. Mello, 453 Mass. 760, 
765, 905 N.E.2d 562, 566 (2009) (reversing trial judge’s order that Com-
monwealth must disclose the identity of an unnamed informant because the 
defendant’s proffer showed no more than a solicitation; duty to disclose iden-
tity of an undercover police officer or unnamed informant does not carry over 
to a second unnamed informant unless the second informant participated in 
the first informant’s inducement).
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Unless the relevancy and materiality of the information sought is readily 
apparent, the party seeking access to the information has the burden to pro-
vide the trial judge with the basis for ordering the disclosure. Commonwealth 
v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268, 276, 331 N.E.2d 893, 898–899 (1975). When it 
is not clear from the record whether disclosure of the informant’s identity is 
required, the court has discretion to hold an in camera hearing to assist in 
making that determination. Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. at 472 n.15, 
866 N.E.2d at 721 n.15 (“The nature of the in camera hearing is left to the 
judge.”). In exceptional  circumstances, a motion for the disclosure of the 
identity of an informant may be based on an ex parte affidavit in order to 
safeguard the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. However, in 
such a case, before any order of disclosure is made, the Commonwealth 
must be given a summary or redacted version of the defendant’s affidavit and 
an opportunity to oppose the defendant’s motion. Commonwealth v. Shaugh-
essy, 455 Mass. 346, 357–358, 916 N.E.2d 980, 989 (2009).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Lugo, 
406 Mass. 565, 570–574, 548 N.E.2d 1263, 1265–1267 (1990), and Com-
monwealth v. Rios, 412 Mass. 208, 210–213, 588 N.E.2d 6, 7–9 (1992). It 
would be a violation of the defendant’s right to confrontation to preserve the 
confidentiality of a surveillance site by permitting the trier of fact to hear tes-
timony from a witness outside of a defendant’s presence. Commonwealth v. 
Rios, 412 Mass. at 212–213, 588 N.E.2d at 8–9.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from St. 2006, c. 48, § 1, insert-
ing G. L. c. 263A, entitled “Witness Protection in Criminal  Matters.” As for the 
right of the defense to have access to a Commonwealth witness, see Com-
monwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 515–518, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314–316 
(1965).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
365 Mass. 534, 544, 313 N.E.2d 571, 577 (1974).
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Section 510. Religious Privilege
(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have 
the following meanings:
(1) A “clergyman” includes a priest, a rabbi, an ordained or li-
censed minister of any church, or an accredited Christian Science 
practitioner.
(2) A “communication” is not limited to conversations, and in-
cludes other acts by which ideas may be transmitted from one per-
son to another.
(3) “In his professional character” means in the course of disci-
pline enjoined by  the rules or practice of the religious body to 
which the clergyman belongs.
(b) Privilege. A clergyman shall not disclose a confession made to him 
in his professional character without the consent of the person making 
the confession. Nor shall a clergyman testify as to any communication 
made to him by  any person seeking religious or spiritual advice or 
comfort, or as to his advice given thereon in the course of his profes-
sional duties or in his professional character, without the consent of 
such person.
(c) Child Abuse. Any clergyman shall report all cases of child abuse, 
but need not report information solely gained in a confession or simi-
larly confidential communication in other religious faiths. Nothing 
shall modify or limit  the duty of a clergyman to report a reasonable 
cause that a child is being injured when the clergyman is acting in 
some other capacity that would otherwise make him a reporter.
NOTE
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20A. In Commonwealth v. Marrero, 436 Mass. 488, 495, 766 
N.E.2d 461, 467–468 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court declined to include 
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the manager of a “Christian rehabilitation center” for drug addicts and alco-
holics, who was not an ordained or licensed minister, within the definition of 
“clergyman.” The court also noted it was not an appropriate case to consider 
adopting the more expansive definition of “clergyman” found in Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 505(a)(1). Id.
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Zezima, 365 Mass. 238, 241, 310 N.E.2d 590, 592 (1974), rev’d on 
other grounds, 387 Mass. 748, 443 N.E.2d 1282 (1982).
Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 20A.
Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 20A. It is a preliminary question of fact for the trial  judge whether a com-
munication to a clergyman is within the scope of the privilege. Common-
wealth v. Zezima, 365 Mass. 238, 242 n.4, 310 N.E.2d 590, 592 n.4 (1974), 
rev’d on other grounds, 387 Mass. 748, 443 N.E.2d 1282 (1982).
Subsection (c). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 119, 
§ 51A.
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Section 511. Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
(a) Privilege of Defendant in Criminal Proceeding.
(1) Custodial Interrogation. A person has a right to refuse to an-
swer any questions during a custodial interrogation.
(2) Refusal Evidence.
(A) No Court Order or Warrant. In the absence of a court 
order or warrant, evidence of a person’s refusal to provide 
real or physical evidence, or to cooperate in an investigation 
ordered by  State officials, is not admissible in any criminal 
proceeding.
(B) Court Order or Warrant. When State officials have ob-
tained a court order or warrant for physical or real evidence, a 
person’s refusal to provide the real or physical evidence is 
admissible in any criminal proceeding.
(3) Compelled Examination. A defendant has a right to refuse 
to answer any questions during a court-ordered examination for 
criminal responsibility.
(4) At a Hearing or Trial. A defendant has a right to refuse to tes-
tify at any criminal proceeding.
(b) Privilege of a Witness. Every  witness has a right, in any proceed-
ing, civil or criminal, to refuse to answer a question unless it  is per-
fectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances, that 
the testimony cannot possibly  have a tendency  to incriminate the wit-
ness.
(c) Exceptions.
(1) Waiver by Defendant’s Testimony. When a defendant volun-
tarily testifies in a criminal case, the defendant waives his or her 
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privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that the defendant 
may be cross-examined on all relevant and material facts regard-
ing that case.
(2) Waiver by Witness’s Testimony. When a witness voluntarily 
testifies regarding an incriminating fact, the witness may thereby 
waive the privilege against  self-incrimination as to subsequent 
questions seeking related facts in the same proceeding.
(3) Limitation. A waiver by testimony under Subsection (1) or (2) 
is limited to the proceeding in which it is given and does not ex-
tend to subsequent proceedings.
(4) Required Records. A witness may be required to produce re-
quired records because the witness is deemed to have waived his 
or her privilege against self-incrimination in such records. Re-
quired records, as used in this subsection, are those records re-
quired by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable infor-
mation of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of gov-
ernmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly 
established.
(5) Immunity. In any investigation or proceeding, a witness shall 
not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, 
or other evidence on the ground that the testimony  or evidence 
required may tend to incriminate the witness or subject him or her 
to a penalty or forfeiture if the witness has been granted immunity 
with respect to the transactions, matters, or things concerning 
which the witness is compelled, after having claimed his or her 
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify  or produce evidence 
by a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, Appeals Court, or Su-
perior Court.
NOTE
Subsection   (a). The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal  case 
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to be a witness against himself.” Similarly, Article 12 of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution provides that “[n]o subject 
shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself.” These 
provisions protect a person from the compelled production of testimonial 
communications. See Blaisdell  v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 758–759, 
364 N.E.2d 191, 196 (1977). See also Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 
Mass. 772, 776, 438 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1982). When the privilege is applicable, 
it may be overcome only by an adequate grant of immunity or a valid waiver. 
Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. at 761, 364 N.E.2d at 198. Under 
both Article 12 and the Fifth Amendment, the privilege does not apply to a 
corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906); Matter of a John 
Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 418 Mass. 549, 552, 637 N.E.2d 858, 860 
(1994). Whether the privilege exists, its scope, and whether it has been 
waived are preliminary questions for the court to decide under Sec-
tion 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966). The Miranda doctrine, including its accompanying exclusionary rule, 
has been developed and explained in numerous decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of Massachusetts. See K.B. 
Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 6.12 et seq. (3d ed. 2007).
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. De-
laney, 442 Mass. 604, 609–611, 814 N.E.2d 346, 351–353 (2004). The privi-
lege against self-incrimination, under both Federal  and State law, protects 
only against the compelled production of communications or testimony by the 
government. See Bellin v. Kelley, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 581 n.13, 724 
N.E.2d 319, 325 n.13 (2000), and cases cited. It does not prevent the gov-
ernment from forcing a person to produce real or physical  evidence, such as 
fingerprints, photographs, lineups, blood samples, handwriting, and voice 
exemplars. Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 776–777, 783, 438 
N.E.2d 60, 63–64, 67 (1982) (standard field sobriety tests do not implicate 
the privilege). The privilege against self-incrimination does not forbid the 
compelled production of certain statements that are necessarily incidental to 
the production of real or physical  evidence. See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 
426 Mass. 206, 220, 688 N.E.2d 439, 449 (1997). On the other hand, testi-
monial evidence which reveals a person’s knowledge or thoughts concerning 
some fact is protected. Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. at 778, 438 
N.E.2d at 64–65. In some respects, Article 12 provides greater protections 
than the Fifth Amendment. See Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 
796, 444 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 
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595, 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (1980). Compare Braswell  v. United States, 487 
U.S. 99, 109, 117–118 (1988) (Fifth Amendment privilege not applicable to 
order requiring custodian of corporate records to produce them even though 
the records would tend to incriminate the custodian because he is only acting 
as a representative of the corporation when he responds to the order), with 
Commonwealth v. Doe, 405 Mass. 676, 678–680, 544 N.E.2d 860, 861–862 
(1989) (describing result in Braswell  v. United States as a “fiction” and hold-
ing that the privilege under Article 12 is fully applicable to protect custodian of 
corporate records from duty to produce them in circumstances in which act of 
production would incriminate the custodian as well as the corporation).
In Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1208, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 
1077 (1992), the Supreme Judicial  Court opined that legislation permitting 
the Commonwealth to offer evidence of a person’s refusal  to take a breatha-
lyzer test would violate the privilege against self-incrimination under Arti-
cle 12 because such evidence reveals the person’s thought processes, i.e., it 
indicates the person has doubts or concerns about the outcome of the test, 
and thus constitutes testimonial evidence, the admission of which into evi-
dence would violate the privilege under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Dec-
laration of Rights. Federal law and the law of most other States is to the con-
trary. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560–561 (1983). See also 
Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 142, 714 N.E.2d 343, 348 (1999) 
(“evidence admitted to show consciousness of guilt is always testimonial be-
cause it tends to demonstrate that the defendant knew he was guilty”). The 
reasoning employed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 412 Mass. at 1208–1211, 591 N.E.2d at 1077–1078, has been ex-
tended to other circumstances in which a person refuses to take a test, or to 
supply the police with real or physical  evidence in the absence of a court or-
der or warrant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. at 141–143, 
714 N.E.2d at 347–348 (evidence of a defendant’s failure to appear at a po-
lice station for fingerprinting); Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 422 Mass. 261, 
264–265, 661 N.E.2d 1317, 1319–1320 (1996) (evidence of a defendant’s 
refusal  to turn over sneakers for comparison with prints at a crime scene is 
not admissible); Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774, 779–780, 647 
N.E.2d 712, 715 (1995) (evidence of refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is 
not admissible); Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677, 683, 639 N.E.2d 
1076, 1079 (1994) (evidence of refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test un-
der G. L. c. 90, § 24, is not admissible); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 
309, 313–315, 597 N.E.2d 36, 39–40 (1992) (evidence of a defendant’s re-
fusal to let his hands be swabbed for the presence of gunpowder residue is 
not admissible). See also Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209, 214–
216, 571 N.E.2d 609, 612–613 (1991) (a suspect may be compelled to pro-
vide a handwriting exemplar); Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 534–
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535, 159 N.E.2d 856, 864 (1959) (defendant may be required to go to the 
courtroom floor and strike a pose for identification purposes). Contrast Com-
monwealth v. Delaney, 442 Mass. 604, 607–612 & n.8, 814 N.E.2d 346, 350–
353 & n.8 (2004) (explaining that although a warrant involves an element of 
compulsion, it leaves the individual  with no choice other than to comply un-
like the compulsion that accompanies a police request for information or evi-
dence during the investigative stage; therefore, the Commonwealth may offer 
evidence of a defendant’s resistance to a warrant or court order without vio-
lating Article 12).
Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution; Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights; G. L. c. 233, § 23B; and Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 
364 N.E.2d 191 (1977). At any stage of the proceeding, the trial  judge may 
order a defendant to submit to an examination by one or more qualified phy-
sicians or psychologists under G. L. c. 123, § 15(a), on the issue of compe-
tency or criminal responsibility.
Competency Examinations. A competency examination does not gen-
erally implicate a person’s privilege against self-incrimination because it is 
concerned with whether the defendant is able to confer intelligently with 
counsel and to competently participate in the trial of his or her case, and not 
whether he or she is guilty or innocent. See Seng v. Commonwealth, 445 
Mass. 536, 545, 839 N.E.2d 283, 290–291 (2005). If the competency exami-
nation ordered by the court under G. L. c. 123, § 15(a), results in an opinion 
by the qualified physician or psychologist that the defendant is not compe-
tent, the court may order an additional examination by an expert selected by 
the Commonwealth. G. L. c. 123, § 15(a). “In the circumstances of a compe-
tency examination, G. L. c. 233, § 23B, together with the judge-imposed stric-
tures of [Mass. R. Crim. P.] 14(b)(2)(B), protects the defendant’s privilege 
against self-incrimination.” Seng v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. at 548, 839 
N.E.2d at 292.
Criminal Responsibility Examination. If a defendant voluntarily sub-
mits to an examination on the issue of criminal responsibility by a psychiatrist 
or a psychologist selected by the defense and decides to offer evidence at 
trial based on statements made during such an examination, the defendant 
must give advance notice to the Commonwealth and may be required to 
submit to an examination and answer questions by an expert selected by the 
Commonwealth under a special procedure devised by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Blaisdell  v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 364 N.E.2d 191 (1977), 
and codified in Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2), whereby the defendant’s state-
ments to the court-ordered examiner are not disclosed to the Commonwealth 
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until the defendant offers evidence at trial  based on those statements. In 
Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. at 766–769, 364 N.E.2d at 200–202, 
the Supreme Judicial  Court held that this procedure was adequate to safe-
guard the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.
Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution; Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights; and G. L. c. 233, § 20, Third. Generally, in determining the existence 
of the privilege, the judge is not permitted to pierce the privilege. See Sec-
tion 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. This 
privilege is not self-executing. See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 
772, 780, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution; Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights; Wansong v. Wansong, 395 Mass. 154, 157–158, 478 N.E.2d 1270, 
1272 (1985) (civil proceeding); and Commonwealth v. Baker, 348 Mass. 60, 
62–63, 201 N.E.2d 829, 831–832 (1964) (criminal proceeding). See also 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (“The [Fifth] Amendment not only 
protects the individual  against being involuntarily called as a witness against 
himself in a criminal  prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official 
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or in-
formal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal  proceed-
ings.”). The test used to determine whether an answer might incriminate the 
witness is the same under both Federal  and State law. See Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). See also Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 
665, 801 N.E.2d 247, 254 (2004); Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 
283, 289, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (1979). Also, under both Federal  and State 
law, a public employee cannot be discharged or disciplined solely because 
the employee asserts his or her privilege against self-incrimination in re-
sponse to questions by the public employer. Furtado v. Plymouth, 451 Mass. 
529, 530 n.2, 888 N.E.2d 357, 358 n.2 (2008). In Furtado, the Supreme Judi-
cial  Court interpreted the “criminal investigations” exception to G. L. c. 149, 
§ 19B, which forbids the use of lie detector tests in the employment context 
except in very limited circumstances, as permitting a police chief to require a 
police officer under departmental  investigation to submit to a lie detector test 
as a condition of his continued employment on grounds that there was an 
investigation of possible criminal activity, even though the police officer had 
been granted transactional immunity and could not be prosecuted criminally 
for that conduct. Id. at 532–538, 888 N.E.2d at 359–364. Unlike other testi-
monial privileges, the privilege against self-incrimination should be liberally 
construed in favor of the person claiming it. Commonwealth v. Koonce, 418 
127 
Mass. 367, 378, 636 N.E.2d 1305, 1311 (1994). This privilege is not self-
executing. See Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 780, 438 N.E.2d 
60, 65 (1982).
Martin Hearing. Whenever a witness or the attorney for a witness as-
serts the privilege against self-incrimination, the judge “has a duty to satisfy 
himself that invocation of the privilege is proper in the circumstances.” Com-
monwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 503, 668 N.E.2d 825, 831 (1996). The 
mere assertion of the privilege is not sufficient. The witness or counsel  must 
show “a real risk” that answers to the questions will tend to indicate “involve-
ment in illegal  activity,” as opposed to “a mere imaginary, remote or specula-
tive possibility of prosecution.” Id. at 502, 668 N.E.2d at 830. If the court is 
unable to make the required finding that a basis exists for the assertion of the 
privilege, it may conduct an in camera hearing (hereafter “Martin hearing”) 
and require the witness to “open the door a crack.” Id. at 504–505, 668 
N.E.2d at 832, quoting In re Brogna, 589 F.2d 24, 28 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978). “A 
witness also is not entitled to make a blanket assertion of the privilege. The 
privilege must be asserted with respect to particular questions, and the pos-
sible incriminatory potential of each proposed question, or area which the 
prosecution might wish to explore, must be considered.” Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 502, 668 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1996). If, however, it is 
apparent that most, if not all, of the questions will expose the witness to self-
incrimination, and there is no objection, it is not necessary for the witness to 
assert the privilege as to each and every question. Commonwealth v. Suei-
ras, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 445–446, 892 N.E.2d 768, 774–775 (2008).
Regarding the appropriate use of a Martin hearing, the Supreme Judicial 
Court has stated as follows:
“We emphasize that a Martin hearing should be conducted 
only as an exception to the general rule that the judge’s veri-
fication of the validity of the privilege be based on informa-
tion provided in open court. Indeed, before a Martin hearing 
is conducted, the judge should invite the parties to provide 
the court with information that may shed light on whether the 
witness’s testimony, both on direct and cross-examination, 
could possibly tend to incriminate him. Only in those rare 
circumstances where this information is inadequate to allow 
the judge to make an informed determination should the 
judge conduct an in camera Martin hearing with the witness 
to verify the claim of privilege.” (Citation omitted.)
Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 833, 906 N.E.2d 320, 326 (2009).
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 128
“A defendant has no right to be part of the process in which a witness’s 
claim of a Fifth Amendment privilege is considered. The hearing is held for 
reasons totally independent of the proceeding against the defendant, and the 
privilege is that of the witness.” Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 
318, 893 N.E.2d 19, 40 (2008). “[A] defendant has no constitutional right to 
the testimony of a defense witness who invokes his privilege against self-
incrimination.” Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. at 834, 906 N.E.2d at 
326 (“[A] witness’s valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination trumps a defendant’s right to call the witness.”).
“A person may not seek to obtain a benefit or to turn the legal process to 
his advantage while claiming the privilege as a way of escaping from obliga-
tions and conditions that are normally incident to the claim he makes.” Mello 
v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 421 Mass. 333, 338, 656 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 
(1995) (party seeking to recover insurance benefits as a result of a fire loss 
properly had summary judgment entered against him for refusing to submit to 
an examination required by his policy on grounds that his answers to ques-
tions would tend to incriminate him). See also Department of Revenue v. 
B.P., 412 Mass. 1015, 1016, 593 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (1992) (in paternity 
case, court may draw adverse inference against party who asserts the privi-
lege and refuses to submit to blood and genetic  marker testing); Wansong v. 
Wansong, 395 Mass. at 157–158, 478 N.E.2d at 1272–1273 (discovery sanc-
tion). In addition, the court has discretion to reject claims by parties that they 
are entitled to continuances of administrative proceedings or civil  trials until 
after a criminal trial because they will  not testify for fear of self-incrimination. 
See Oznemoc, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control  Comm’n, 412 Mass. 100, 
105, 587 N.E.2d 751, 754–755 (1992); Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 
305–306, 249 N.E.2d 583, 586 (1969). Whenever a court faces a decision 
about the consequence of a party’s assertion of the privilege in a civil case, 
“the judge’s task is to balance any prejudice to the other civil litigants which 
might result . . . against the potential  harm to the party claiming the privilege 
if he is compelled to choose between defending the civil  action and protect-
ing himself from criminal prosecution” (citations and quotations omitted). 
Wansong v. Wansong, 395 Mass. at 157, 478 N.E.2d at 1272.
The existence of the privilege against self-incrimination does not shield 
a witness, other than a defendant in a criminal  case, from being called before 
the jury to give testimony. See Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. at 305, 249 
N.E.2d at 586. The trial judge has discretion to deny a defense request for 
process to bring an out-of-State witness back for trial  based on evidence that 
there is a factual basis for the witness to assert his or her privilege against 
self-incrimination and a representation by the witness’s attorney that the wit-
ness will  invoke his or her privilege if called to testify. Commonwealth v. 
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Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 294–295, 885 N.E.2d 105, 111–112 (2008). The 
assertion of the privilege by a party or a witness in a civil  case may be the 
subject of comment by counsel, and the jury may be permitted to draw an 
adverse inference against a party as a result. See Section 525(a), Comment 
upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege: Civil Case.
Subsection (c)(1). This subsection is derived from Jones v. Commonwealth, 
327 Mass. 491, 493, 99 N.E.2d 456, 457 (1951). In such a case, the cross-
examination is not limited to the scope of direct examination and may include 
inquiry about any matters that may be made the subject of impeachment. 
See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 21; Commonwealth v. Seymour, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 
672, 675, 660 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1996).
Subsection (c)(2). This subsection is derived from Taylor v. Commonwealth, 
369 Mass. 183, 189–191, 338 N.E.2d 823, 827–828 (1975). Though a wit-
ness may waive the privilege against self-incrimination as to subsequent 
questions by voluntarily testifying regarding an “incriminating fact,” if a ques-
tion put to the witness poses “a real danger of legal detriment,” i.e., the an-
swer might provide another link in the chain of evidence leading to a convic-
tion, the witness may still  have a basis for asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination. See Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 290–291 & 
nn.8–10, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 & nn.8–10 (1979). In Commonwealth v. 
King, 436 Mass. 252, 258 n.6, 763 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 n.6 (2002), the Su-
preme Judicial Court explained the scope of this doctrine by stating that “[t]he 
waiver, once made, waives the privilege only with respect to the same pro-
ceeding; the witness may once again invoke the privilege in any subsequent 
proceeding.” See Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 500–501, 668 
N.E.2d 825, 829–830 (1996) (waiver of privilege before grand jury does not 
waive privilege at trial); Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 457–458, 
446 N.E.2d 703, 705–706 (1983) (same). A voir dire hearing, held on the day 
of trial, is the same proceeding as the trial for purposes of the doctrine of 
waiver by testimony. Luna v. Superior Court, 407 Mass. 747, 750–751, 533 
N.E.2d 881, 883, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990) (privilege could not be 
claimed at trial where witness had submitted incriminating affidavit in connec-
tion with pretrial  motion and testified at pretrial hearing); Commonwealth v. 
Penta, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 45–46, 586 N.E.2d 996, 1002 (1992) (witness 
who testified at motion to suppress, recanted that testimony in an affidavit, 
and testified at hearing on motion to reconsider could not invoke the privilege 
at trial). See also Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 445 n.8, 650 
N.E.2d 1242, 1250 n.8 (1995) (hearing on motion to suppress is same pro-
ceeding as trial for purposes of waiver by testimony).
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The trial  judge may be required to caution a witness exhibiting “igno-
rance, confusion, or panic . . . or other peculiar circumstances” in order for a 
voluntary waiver to be established. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. at 
192, 338 N.E.2d at 829. The proper exercise of this judicial  discretion “in-
volves making a circumstantially fair and reasonable choice within a range of 
permitted options.” Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 748–
749, 785 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (2003). Ultimately, whether a voluntary waiver 
has occurred is a question of fact for the trial judge. See Commonwealth v. 
King, 436 Mass. at 258–259, 763 N.E.2d at 1078.
Subsection (c)(3). This subsection is derived from Taylor v. Commonwealth, 
369 Mass. 183, 190–191, 338 N.E.2d 823, 828 (1975). See also Common-
wealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 500, 668 N.E.2d 825, 829 (1996) (grand 
jury proceedings and the defendant’s subsequent indictment are separate 
proceedings); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 175 Mass. 152, 153, 55 N.E. 804, 
804 (1900); Commonwealth v. Mandile, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 662, 461 
N.E.2d 838, 841 (1984).
Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is derived from Stornanti v. Common-
wealth, 389 Mass. 518, 521–522, 451 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1983) (“The required 
records exception applies when three requirements are met: First, the pur-
poses of the State’s inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, informa-
tion is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which 
the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves 
must have assumed ‘public aspects’ which render them at least analogous to 
public documents” [quotations and citation omitted].). See also Matter of 
Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 438–441, 504 N.E.2d 652, 656–658 (1987) (court 
notes that if the records in question are required to be kept by lawyers there 
is nothing incriminating about the fact that they exist and are in the posses-
sion of the lawyer required to produce them).
Subsection (c)(5). This subsection is derived from Article 12 of the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights; G. L. c. 233, § 20C; and Attorney Gen. v. 
Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796–801, 444 N.E.2d 915, 919–921 (1982), quoting 
and citing Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. 172, 185 (1871) (Article 12 requires 
transactional and not merely use or derivative use immunity to overcome the 
privilege against self-incrimination). See also G. L. c. 233, §§ 20D–20I (stat-
utes governing the granting of immunity); Commonwealth v. Austin A., 450 
Mass. 665, 669–670, 881 N.E.2d 117, 121–122 (2008) (grant of immunity in 
Superior Court applicable to testimony in Juvenile Court). The Federal  Con-
stitution only requires use immunity to overcome the privilege against self-
incrimination. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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Section 512. Jury Deliberations
See Section 606(b), Competency of Juror as Witness: Inquiry into 
Validity of Verdict or Indictment.
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Section 513. Medical Peer Review Privilege
(a) Definitions.
(1) As used in this section, “medical peer review committee” is a 
committee of a State or local professional society  of health care 
providers, including doctors of chiropractic, or of a medical staff 
of a public hospital or licensed hospital or nursing home or health 
maintenance organization organized under G. L. c. 176G, pro-
vided the medical staff operates pursuant to written bylaws that 
have been approved by  the governing board of the hospital or 
nursing home or health maintenance organization or a committee 
of physicians established pursuant  to Section 12 of G. L. c. 111C 
for the purposes set forth in G. L. c. 111, § 203(f), which commit-
tee has as its function the evaluation or improvement of the qual-
ity  of health care rendered by providers of health care services, the 
determination whether health care services were performed in 
compliance with the applicable standards of care, the determina-
tion whether the cost  of health care services were performed in 
compliance with the applicable standards of care, determination 
whether the cost of the health care services rendered was consid-
ered reasonable by  the providers of health services in the area, the 
determination of whether a health care provider’s actions call into 
question such health care provider’s fitness to provide health care 
services, or the evaluation and assistance of health care providers 
impaired or allegedly impaired by  reason of alcohol, drugs, physi-
cal disability, mental instability, or otherwise; provided, however, 
that for purposes of Sections 203 and 204 of G. L. c. 111, a non-
profit corporation, the sole voting member of which is a profes-
sional society having as members persons who are licensed to 
practice medicine, shall be considered a medical peer review 
committee; provided, further, that its primary purpose is the 
evaluation and assistance of health care providers impaired or al-
legedly impaired by  reason of alcohol, drugs, physical disability, 
mental instability, or otherwise.
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(2) “Medical peer review committee” also includes a committee of 
a pharmacy  society  or association that is authorized to evaluate 
the quality of pharmacy services or the competence of pharmacists 
and suggest improvements in pharmacy  systems to enhance pa-
tient care, or a pharmacy peer review committee established by a 
person or entity that owns a licensed pharmacy or employs phar-
macists that  is authorized to evaluate the quality of pharmacy 
services or the competence of pharmacists and suggest improve-
ments in pharmacy systems to enhance patient care.
(b) Privilege.
(1) Proceedings, Reports, and Records of Medical Peer Review 
Committee. The proceedings, reports, and records of a medical 
peer review committee shall be confidential and shall be exempt 
from the disclosure of public records under Section 10 of 
G. L. c. 66, shall not be subject  to subpoena or discovery prior to 
the initiation of a formal administrative proceeding pursuant to 
G. L. c. 30A, and shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery, or 
introduced into evidence, in any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, except proceedings held by the boards of registration in 
medicine, social work, or psychology or by  the Department of 
Public Health pursuant to G. L. c. 111C, and no person who was 
in attendance at a meeting of a medical peer review committee 
shall be permitted or required to testify in any such judicial or 
administrative proceeding, except proceedings held by the boards 
of registration in medicine, social work, or psychology or by  the 
Department of Public Health pursuant to G. L. c. 111C, as to the 
proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommen-
dations, evaluations, opinions, deliberations, or other actions of 
such committee or any members thereof.
(2) Work Product of Medical Peer Review Committee. Infor-
mation and records which are necessary to comply with risk man-
agement and quality  assurance programs established by the board 
of registration in medicine and which are necessary to the work 
product of medical peer review committees designated by the pa-
135 
tient care assessment coordinator are subject  to the protections 
afforded to materials subject to Subsection (b)(1), except that such 
information and records may be inspected, maintained, and util-
ized by the board of registration in medicine, including but not 
limited to its data repository and disciplinary unit. Such informa-
tion and records inspected, maintained, or utilized by the board of 
registration in medicine shall remain confidential, and not subject 
to subpoena, discovery, or introduction into evidence, consistent 
with Subsection (b)(1), except that  such records may not remain 
confidential if disclosed in an adjudicatory  proceeding of the 
board of registration in medicine.
(c) Exceptions. There is no restriction on access to or use of the fol-
lowing, as indicated:
(1) Documents, incident reports, or records otherwise available 
from original sources shall not  be immune from subpoena, dis-
covery, or use in any  such judicial or administrative proceeding 
merely because they  were presented to such committee in connec-
tion with its proceedings.
(2) The proceedings, reports, findings, and records of a medical 
peer review committee shall not be immune from subpoena, dis-
covery, or use as evidence in any proceeding against a member of 
such committee who did not act in good faith and in a reasonable 
belief that based on all of the facts the action or inaction on his or 
her part was warranted. However, the identity of any person fur-
nishing information or opinions to the committee shall not be dis-
closed without the permission of such person.
(3) An investigation or administrative proceeding conducted by 
the boards of registration in medicine, social work, or psychology 
or by the Department of Public Health pursuant to G. L. c. 111C.
(d) Testimony Before Medical Peer Review Committee. A person 
who testifies before a medical peer review committee or who is a 
member of such committee shall not be prevented from testifying as to 
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matters known to such person independent of the committee’s pro-
ceedings, provided that, except in a proceeding against a witness in 
Subsection (c)(2), neither the witness nor members of the committee 
may be questioned regarding the witness’s testimony before such 
committee, and further provided that committee members may not be 
questioned in any  proceeding about the identity  of any person furnish-
ing information or opinions to the committee, opinions formed by 
them as a result of such committee proceedings, or about the delibera-
tions of such committee.
(e) Non–Peer Review Records and Testimony. Records of treatment 
maintained pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 70, or incident reports or records 
or information which are not necessary to comply with risk manage-
ment and quality  assurance programs established by the board of regis-
tration in medicine shall not be deemed to be proceedings, reports, or 
records of a medical peer review committee; nor shall any person be 
prevented from testifying as to matters known by such person inde-
pendent of risk management and quality assurance programs estab-
lished by the board of registration in medicine.
NOTE
Introduction. The medical  peer review privilege, unlike so many other privi-
leges, is not based on the importance of maintaining the confidentiality be-
tween a professional  and a client, but rather was established to promote rig-
orous and candid evaluation of professional performance by a provider’s 
peers. See Beth Israel  Hosp. Ass’n v. Board of Registration in Med., 401 
Mass. 172, 182–183, 515 N.E.2d 574, 579–580 (1987). This is accomplished 
by requiring hospitals and medical  staffs to establish procedures for medical 
peer review proceedings, see G. L. c. 111, § 203(a), and by legal safeguards 
against the disclosure of the identity of physicians who participate in peer 
review and immunity to prevent such physicians from civil  liability. See Ayash 
v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 396, 822 N.E.2d 667, 691, cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005).
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 111, § 1.
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Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 111, § 1. A licensed pharmacy is permitted to establish a pharmacy 
peer review committee:
“A licensed pharmacy may establish a pharmacy peer review 
committee to evaluate the quality of pharmacy services or 
the competence of pharmacists and suggest improvements 
in pharmacy systems to enhance patient care. The commit-
tee may review documentation of quality-related activities in 
a pharmacy, assess system failures and personnel deficien-
cies, determine facts, and make recommendations or issue 
decisions in a written report that can be used for contiguous 
quality improvement purposes. A pharmacy peer review 
committee shall include the members, employees, and 
agents of the committee, including assistants, investigators, 
attorneys, and any other agents that serve the committee in 
any capacity.”
G. L. c. 111, § 203(g).
Subsection (b). Both Subsection (b)(1), which is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 111, § 204(a), and Subsection (b)(2), which is taken nearly verbatim 
from G. L. c. 111, § 205(b), “shield information from the general public and 
other third parties to the same extent, [but] only information protected by 
§ 204(a) [Subsection (b)(1)] is shielded from the board [of registration in 
medicine] prior to the commencement of a G. L. c. 30A proceeding.” Board of 
Registration in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 454 Mass. 498, 508, 910 
N.E.2d 898, 906 (2009). “Determining whether the medical  peer review privi-
lege applies turns on the way in which a document was created and the pur-
pose for which it was used, not on its content. Examining that content in 
camera will therefore do little to aid a judge . . . .” Carr v. Howard, 426 Mass. 
514, 531, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1314 (1998). However, the peer review privilege 
does not prevent discovery into the process by which a given record or report 
was created in order to determine whether the information sought falls within 
the privilege. Id.
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection applies to “proceedings, reports and re-
cords of a medical peer review committee.” G. L. c. 111, § 204(a). Material 
qualifies for protection under this subsection if it was created “by, for, or oth-
erwise as a result of a ‘medical peer review committee.’” Board of Registra-
tion in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 454 Mass. 498, 509, 910 N.E.2d 898, 
907 (2009), quoting Miller v. Milton Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 
495, 499, 766 N.E.2d 107, 111 (2002). See Carr v. Howard, 426 Mass. 514, 
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522 n.7, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1309 n.7 (1998) (asserting privilege of 
G. L. c. 111, § 204(a), [Subsection (b)(1)] requires evidence that materials 
sought “were not merely ‘presented to [a] committee in connection with its 
proceedings,’ . . . but were, instead, themselves, ‘proceedings, reports and 
records’ of a peer review committee under § 204(a)”).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection applies to materials that, while not nec-
essarily “proceedings, reports and records” of a peer review committee, are 
nonetheless “necessary to comply with risk management and quality assur-
ance programs established by the board and which are necessary to the 
work product of medical peer review committees.” G. L. c. 111, § 205(b). 
Such materials include “incident reports required to be furnished to the 
[board] or any information collected or compiled by a physician credentialing 
verification service operated by a society or organization of medical  profes-
sionals for the purpose of providing credentialing information to health care 
entities.” Id. The protections afforded to materials covered by Subsec-
tion (b)(2) differ from those afforded by Subsection (b)(1) in that documents 
protected by Subsection (b)(2) “may be inspected, maintained and utilized by 
the board of registration in medicine, including but not limited to its data re-
pository and disciplinary unit,” and this subsection does not require that such 
access be conditioned on the commencement of a formal adjudicatory pro-
ceeding. G. L. c. 111, § 205(b).
Subsection (c). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, 
§ 204(b), and Pardo v. General Hosp. Corp., 446 Mass. 1, 11–12, 841 N.E.2d 
692, 700–701 (2006), where the Supreme Judicial Court observed that
“the privilege can only be invaded on some threshold show-
ing that a member of a medical peer review committee did 
not act in good faith in connection with his activities as a 
member of the committee, for example did not provide the 
medical peer review committee with a full  and honest disclo-
sure of all  of the relevant circumstances, but sought to mis-
lead the committee in some manner.”
In Pardo, the court held that the privilege was not overcome by the allegation 
that a member of the committee initiated an action for a discriminatory rea-
son. Id. See also Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 448 Mass. 425, 447, 862 
N.E.2d 11, 21 (2007).
Subsection (d). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, 
§ 204(c).
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Subsection (e). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, 
§ 205.
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Section 514. Mediation Privilege
(a) Definition. For the purposes of this section, a “mediator” shall 
mean a person not a party to a dispute who enters into a written 
agreement with the parties to assist them in resolving their disputes 
and has completed at least thirty hours of training in mediation, and 
who either (1) has four years of professional experience as a mediator, 
(2) is accountable to a dispute resolution organization which has been 
in existence for at least three years, or (3) has been appointed to medi-
ate by a judicial or governmental body.
(b) Privilege Applicable to Mediator Work Product. All memoranda 
and other work product  prepared by  a mediator and a mediator’s case 
files shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure in any judicial 
or administrative proceeding involving any of the parties to any  media-
tion to which such materials apply.
(c) Privilege Applicable to Parties’ Communications. Any commu-
nication made in the course of and relating to the subject matter of any 
mediation and which is made in the presence of such mediator by any 
participant, mediator, or other person shall be a confidential communi-
cation and not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative 
proceeding.
(d) Privilege Applicable in Labor Disputes. Any person acting as a 
mediator in a labor dispute who receives information as a mediator 
relating to the labor dispute shall not be required to reveal such infor-
mation received by  him or her in the course of mediation in any ad-
ministrative, civil, or arbitration proceeding. This provision does not 
apply to criminal proceedings.
NOTE
Subsections (a), (b), and (c). These subsections are derived from 
G. L. c. 233, § 23C. Although there are no express exceptions to the privilege 
set forth in Subsections (a), (b), and (c), the Supreme Judicial  Court has rec-
ognized that the mediation privilege is subject to the doctrine of “at issue” 
141 
waiver. See Bobick v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 439 Mass. 652, 658 
n.11, 790 N.E.2d 653, 658 n.11 (2003), citing Darius v. City of Boston, 433 
Mass. 274, 277–278, 741 N.E.2d 52, 54–55 (2001), and cases cited. See 
also Section 523(b)(2), Waiver of Privilege: Conduct Constituting Waiver.
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 150, § 10A.
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Section 515. Investigatory Privilege
Unless otherwise required by law, information given to govern-
mental authorities in order to secure the enforcement of law is subject 
to disclosure only within the discretion of the governmental authority.
NOTE
This section is derived from Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488–
489 (1872), and Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 490–491, 132 N.E. 
322, 327 (1921). See also District Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 
Mass. 507, 510–511, 646 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1995).
Although this privilege is described as “absolute,” it is qualified by the 
duty of the prosecutor to provide discovery to a person charged with a crime. 
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14. Moreover, as to certain kinds of information, the 
privilege is also qualified by the Massachusetts public  records law. See 
G. L. c. 66, § 10. General Laws c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f), provides that in-
vestigatory materials, including information covered by this privilege, are re-
garded as a public  record and thus subject to disclosure even though the 
material is compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other inves-
tigatory officials, provided that the disclosure of the investigatory materials 
would not “so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such 
disclosure would not be in the public interest.” Rafuse v. Stryker, 61 Mass. 
App. Ct. 595, 597, 813 N.E.2d 558, 561 (2004), quoting Bougas v. Chief of 
Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62, 354 N.E.2d 872, 876 (1976). See 
Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 
Mass. 378, 383, 764 N.E.2d 847, 852–853 (2002) (describing the process for 
determining whether material is exempt from disclosure as a public record).
Cross-Reference: Section 509, Identity of Informer, Surveillance Loca-
tion, and Protected Witness Privileges.
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Section 516. Political Voter Disqualification
A voter who casts a ballot may not be asked and may  not disclose 
his or her vote in any proceeding unless the court finds fraud or inten-
tional wrongdoing.
NOTE
This section is derived from McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 385 Mass. 833, 
848–849, 434 N.E.2d 620, 630–631 (1982), in which the court held “that the 
right to a secret ballot is not an individual right which may be waived by a 
good faith voter.” Id. at 849, 434 N.E.2d at 631.
Cross-Reference: Section 511, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
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Section 517. Trade Secrets
[Privilege not recognized]
NOTE
In Gossman v. Rosenberg, 237 Mass. 122, 124, 129 N.E. 424, 425–426 
(1921), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a witness could not claim a 
privilege as to trade secrets. Cf. Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 507. However, 
public access to information about trade secrets in a public  agency’s posses-
sion may be limited. See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (g) (excluding from the 
definition of “public  records” any “trade secrets or commercial or financial 
information voluntarily provided to an agency for use in developing govern-
mental  policy and upon a promise of confidentiality”). The confidentiality of 
trade secrets also may be maintained by means of a protective order 
whereby a court may protect from disclosure during discovery “a trade secret 
or other confidential research, development, or commercial information.” 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(5). The court may 
issue such a protective order on motion by a party or by the person from 
whom discovery is sought and if good cause is shown. Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
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Section 518. Executive or Governmental 
Privilege
[Privilege not recognized]
NOTE
Unlike the Federal system, neither the Massachusetts courts nor the Legisla-
ture has established a “deliberative process privilege” that prevents a party 
from obtaining documents from a public  officer or agency that record the de-
liberative process leading up to a decision by the officer or agency. See Dis-
trict Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Flatley, 419 Mass. 507, 509–510, 646 
N.E.2d 127, 128–129 (1995). Likewise, there is no “executive privilege” un-
der the Massachusetts Constitution similar to the privilege which exists under 
the Federal Constitution. Compare Babets v. Secretary of Human Servs., 403 
Mass. 230, 231, 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1262 (1988) (doctrine of separation of 
powers does not require recognition of “executive privilege”), with United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (recognizing that separation of 
powers under Federal  Constitution implies a qualified privilege for presiden-
tial communications in performance of president’s responsibilities).
Access to inter-agency or intra-agency reports, papers, and letters relat-
ing to the development of policy is governed by G. L. c. 66, § 10, the public 
records statute. This law creates a presumption that all  records are public, 
G. L. c. 66, § 10(c), and places on the custodian of the record the burden of 
establishing that a record is exempt from disclosure because it falls within 
one of a series of specifically enumerated exemptions set forth in G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth. Id. Under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d), the following 
material is exempt from public  disclosure: “inter-agency or intra-agency 
memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the 
agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual 
studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has 
been or may be based.” Id. “The Legislature has . . . chosen to insulate the 
deliberative process from scrutiny only until it is completed, at which time the 
documents thereby generated become publicly available.” Babets v. Secre-
tary of Human Servs., 403 Mass. at 237 n.8, 526 N.E.2d at 1265 n.8.
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Section 519. State and Federal Tax Returns
(a) State Tax Returns.
(1) Disclosure by Commissioner of Revenue. The disclosure by 
the commissioner, or by any deputy, assistant, clerk or assessor, or 
other employee of the Commonwealth or of any city  or town 
therein, to any person but the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s represen-
tative, of any information contained in or set forth by any return or 
document filed with the commissioner is prohibited.
(2) Production by Taxpayer. Massachusetts State tax returns are 
privileged, and a taxpayer cannot be compelled to produce them in 
discovery.
(3) Exceptions. Subsection (a)(1) does not  apply in proceedings 
to determine or collect the tax, or to certain criminal prosecutions.
(b) Federal Tax Returns.
(1) General Rule. Federal tax returns are subject to a qualified 
privilege. The taxpayer is entitled to a presumption that the returns 
are privileged and are not subject to discovery.
(2) Exceptions. A taxpayer who is a party to litigation can be 
compelled to produce Federal tax returns upon a showing of sub-
stantial need by the party seeking to compel production.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 62C, 
§ 21(a). General  Laws c. 62C, § 21(b), sets forth twenty-three exceptions, 
most of which pertain to limited disclosures of tax information to other gov-
ernment agencies or officials.
The commissioner also has authority to disclose tax information to the 
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and certain tax officials in 
other jurisdictions. See G. L. c. 62C, § 22.
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A violation of G. L. c. 62C, § 21, may be punishable as a misdemeanor. 
G. L. c. 62C, § 21(c).
The privilege applicable to State tax returns in the hands of the taxpayer 
is set forth in Finance Comm’n of Boston v. Commissioner of Revenue, 383 
Mass. 63, 67–72, 417 N.E.2d 945, 948–950 (1981). See also Leave v. Bos-
ton Elevated Ry. Co., 306 Mass. 391, 402–403, 28 N.E.2d 483, 489 (1940).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Finance Comm’n of Boston 
v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 766–768, 180 N.E.2d 808, 816–817 (1962).
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Section 520. Tax Return Preparer
(a) Definition. For the purposes of this section, a person is engaged in 
the business of preparing tax returns if the person advertises, or gives 
publicity  to the effect that the person prepares or assists others in the 
preparation of tax returns, or if he or she prepares or assists others in 
the preparation of tax returns for compensation.
(b) Privilege. No person engaged in the business of preparing tax re-
turns shall disclose any information obtained in the conduct of such 
business, unless such disclosure is consented to in writing by the tax-
payer in a separate document, or is expressly  authorized by State or 
Federal law, or is necessary to the preparation of the return, or is made 
pursuant to court order.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 62C, § 74. A violation of 
this statute may be punishable as a misdemeanor.
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Section 521. Sign Language Interpreter–Client 
Privilege
(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the following words 
shall have the following meanings:
(1) Client. A “client” is a person rendered interpreting services by 
a qualified interpreter.
(2) Qualified Interpreter. A “qualified interpreter” is a person 
skilled in sign language or oral interpretation and transliteration, 
has the ability to communicate accurately with a deaf or hearing-
impaired person, and is able to translate information to and from 
such hearing-impaired person.
(3) Confidential Communication. A communication is confiden-
tial if a client has a reasonable expectation or intent that it not be 
disclosed to persons other than those to whom such disclosure is 
made.
(b) Privilege. A client has a privilege to prevent a qualified interpreter 
from disclosing a confidential communication between one or more 
persons where the communication was facilitated by the interpreter.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221, 
§ 92A. The statute’s definition of a “qualified interpreter” states that “[a]n in-
terpreter shall be deemed qualified or intermediary as determined by the Of-
fice of Deafness, based upon the recommendations of the Massachusetts 
Registry of the Deaf, the Massachusetts State Association of the Deaf and 
other appropriate agencies.” G. L. c. 221, § 92A.
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221, 
§ 92A. The portion of G. L. c. 221, § 92A, that establishes the privilege refer-
ences “a certified sign language interpreter,” but the statute does not specifi-
cally define that term. Accordingly, to be consistent with the terms actually 
defined in G. L. c. 221, § 92A, this subsection uses the term “qualified inter-
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preter.” There is no case law in Massachusetts which defines the scope of 
this privilege.
Appointment of Interpreter. The interpreter must be appointed by the 
court as part of a court proceeding. See G. L. c. 221, § 92A (“In any proceed-
ing in any court in which a deaf or hearing-impaired person is a party or a 
witness . . . such court . . . shall  appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret the 
proceedings”). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 41 (“The judge may appoint an 
interpreter or expert if justice so requires and may determine the reasonable 
compensation for such services and direct payment therefor.”); Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 43(f) (“The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may 
fix his reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of 
funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may di-
rect, and may be taxed ultimately as costs, in the discretion of the court.”).
Cross-Reference: Section 604, Interpreters; “Standards and Procedures 
of the Office of Court Interpreter Services,” 1143 Mass. Reg. 15 (Nov. 13, 
2 0 0 9 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/ocis-standards-procedures.pdf.
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Section 522. Interpreter-Client Privilege
(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the following words 
shall have the following meanings:
(1) Interpreter. An “interpreter” is a person who is readily  able to 
interpret written and spoken language simultaneously and con-
secutively  from English to the language of the non-English 
speaker or from said language to English.
(2) Non-English Speaker. A “non-English speaker” is a person 
who cannot speak or understand, or has difficulty  in speaking or 
understanding, the English language, because he or she uses only 
or primarily a spoken language other than English.
(b) Privilege. Disclosures made out of court by communications of a 
non-English speaker through an interpreter to another person shall be a 
privileged communication, and the interpreter shall not disclose such 
communication without permission of the non-English speaker.
(c) Scope. The privilege applies when the non-English speaker had a 
reasonable expectation or intent that the communication would not be 
disclosed.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 221C, § 1.
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 221C, § 4(c). See Section 4.06 of the “Standards and Procedures of 
the Office of Court Interpreter Services,” 1143 Mass. Reg. 15 (Nov. 13, 
2 0 0 9 ) , w h i c h i s a v a i l a b l e a t 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/ocis-standards-procedures.pdf (“Court interpret-
ers shall  protect the confidentiality of all  privileged and other confidential in-
formation.”).
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Subsection (c). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 221C, § 4(c). There is no case law in Massachusetts that defines the 
scope of this privilege.
Right to Assistance of an Interpreter. General Laws c. 221C, § 2, states as 
follows:
“A non-English speaker, throughout a legal proceeding, shall 
have a right to the assistance of a qualified interpreter who 
shall be appointed by the judge, unless the judge finds that 
no qualified interpreter of the non-English speaker’s lan-
guage is reasonably available, in which event the non-
English speaker shall have the right to a certified interpreter, 
who shall be appointed by the judge.”
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 41 (“The judge may appoint an interpreter or expert if 
justice so requires and may determine the reasonable compensation for such 
services and direct payment therefor.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(f) (“The court 
may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix his reasonable 
compensation. The compensation shall  be paid out of funds provided by law 
or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed 
ultimately as costs, in the discretion of the court.”). See also G. L. c. 221C, 
§ 3 (waiver of right to interpreter).
Procedural Issues. The statute requires the interpreter to swear or affirm to 
“make true and impartial interpretation using [the interpreter’s] best skill  and 
judgment in accordance with the standards prescribed by law and the ethics 
of the interpreter profession.” G. L. c. 221C, § 4(a). The statute also states 
that “[i]n any proceeding, the judge may order all of the testimony of a non-
English speaker and its interpretation to be electronically recorded for use in 
audio or visual verification of the official transcript of the proceedings.” 
G. L. c. 221C, § 4(b).
Cross-Reference: Section 604, Interpreters; “Standards and Procedures 
of the Office of Court Interpreter Services,” 1143 Mass. Reg. 15 (Nov. 13, 
2 0 0 9 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/ocis-standards-procedures.pdf.
153 
Section 523. Waiver of Privilege
(a) Who Can Waive. A privilege holder or his or her legally  appointed 
guardian, administrator, executor, or heirs can waive the privilege.
(b) Conduct Constituting Waiver. Except as provided in Section 524, 
Privileged Matter Disclosed Erroneously  or Without Opportunity to 
Claim Privilege, a privilege is waived if the person upon whom this 
Article confers a privilege against disclosure
(1) voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any signifi-
cant part of the privileged matter or
(2) introduces privileged communications as an element of a claim 
or defense.
(c) Conduct Not Constituting Waiver. A person upon whom this Ar-
ticle confers a privilege against disclosure does not waive the privilege 
if
(1) the person merely  testifies as to events which were a topic of a 
privileged communication, or
(2) there is an unintentional disclosure of a privileged communi-
cation and reasonable precautions were taken to prevent the dis-
closure.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 
444, 449, 87 N.E. 755, 757–758 (1909), and District Attorney for the Norfolk 
Dist. v. Magraw, 417 Mass. 169, 173–174, 628 N.E.2d 24, 26–27 (1994).
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Matter of the Reorganiza-
tion of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. (Bermuda), 425 Mass. 419, 423 n.4, 681 
N.E.2d 838, 841 n.4 (1997), where the Supreme Judicial Court noted that 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 510 was consistent with the views of the court.
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Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from the concept of an “at is-
sue” waiver which the Supreme Judicial Court recognized in Darius v. City of 
Boston, 433 Mass. 274, 284, 741 N.E.2d 52, 59 (2001). An “at issue” waiver 
is not a blanket waiver of the privilege, but rather “a limited waiver of the 
privilege with respect to what has been put ‘at issue.’” Id. at 283, 741 N.E.2d 
at 58. See, e.g., Global Investors Agent Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of 
Hartford, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 818–820, 927 N.E.2d 480, 488–490 (2010) 
(determining that a limited at-issue waiver of the plaintiff’s attorney-client 
privilege occurred because its claim for consequential damages was based 
in part on the advice it received from its attorney in the underlying action). 
Accord Commonwealth v. Brito, 390 Mass. 112, 119, 453 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 
(1983) (“Once such a charge [of ineffectiveness of counsel] is made, the 
attorney-client privilege may be treated as waived at least in part, but trial 
counsel’s obligation may continue to preserve confidences whose disclosure 
is not relevant to the defense of the charge of his ineffectiveness as coun-
sel.”). In addition, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of an “at issue” 
waiver must establish that the privileged information is not available from any 
other source. Darius v. City of Boston, 433 Mass. at 284, 741 N.E.2d at 59.
Subsection (c)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Gold-
man, 395 Mass. 495, 499–500, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1027, cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 906 (1985). Though a witness does not waive the privilege merely by 
testifying as to events which were a topic  of a privileged communication, a 
waiver occurs when the witness testifies as to the specific  content of an iden-
tified privileged communication. Id. In Commonwealth v. Goldman, the Su-
preme Judicial  Court specifically left open the question whether in a criminal 
case the rule embodied in this subsection would have to yield to the defen-
dant’s constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 502 n.8, 480 N.E.2d at 1028 
n.8. See also Commonwealth v. Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 29, 731 N.E.2d 
1053, 1058 (2000) (waiver of sexual assault counselor privilege); Common-
wealth v. Clancy, 402 Mass. 664, 668–669, 524 N.E.2d 395, 397–398 (1988) 
(waiver of patient-psychotherapist privilege).
Subsection (c)(2). This subsection is derived from Matter of the Reorganiza-
tion of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. (Bermuda), 425 Mass. 419, 422–423, 681 
N.E.2d 838, 841–842 (1997). See also Adoption of Sherry, 435 Mass. 331, 
336, 757 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (2001).
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Waivers in Federal Pro-
ceedings. On September 19, 2008, Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence was enacted. See Pub. L. 110-322, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. The rule is 
appl icable “ in al l  proceedings commenced after the date of 
enactment . . . and, insofar as is just and practicable, in all proceedings 
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pending” on that date. The rule was developed in response to concerns 
about the rising cost of discovery, especially electronic discovery, in Federal 
proceedings in which among the thousands or hundreds of thousands of 
documents that are produced by a party in response to a discovery request, 
the producing party may inadvertently include one or a handful of documents 
that are covered by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protec-
tion. Prior to the adoption of this rule, there was no uniform national standard 
governing the determination of when such a mistake would lead to a ruling 
that the privilege or protection had been waived. As a result, a party was 
forced to examine each and every document produced in discovery in order 
to avoid the risk of an inadvertent waiver.
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not alter the law that 
governs whether a document is subject to the attorney-client privilege or the 
work-product protection in the first instance. Under Fed. R. Evid. 501, unless 
State law, the Federal Constitution, or a Federal statute controls, the exis-
tence of a privilege in federal  proceedings “shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law.” However, Fed. R. Evid. 502 does establish a single 
national standard that protects parties against a determination by a Federal 
court, a Federal  agency, a State court, or a State agency that an inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged or protected material constitutes a wholesale waiver 
of the privilege or protection as to other material that has not been disclosed.
Rule 502(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses when a waiver 
of either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection extends 
to undisclosed material. It provides that a waiver of the privilege or protection 
does not extend to undisclosed material unless (1) the waiver is intentional, 
(2) the disclosed and undisclosed material concern the same subject matter, 
and (3) both the disclosed and undisclosed material should in fairness be 
considered together. Rule 502(b) of the Federal  Rules of Evidence ad-
dresses inadvertent disclosures. It is similar to Section 523(c)(2), Waiver of 
Privilege: Conduct Not Constituting Waiver, except that the Federal rule re-
quires that to avoid a waiver the holder of the privilege must promptly take 
reasonable steps to rectify the erroneous disclosure. Fed. R. Evid. 502(b)(3). 
Rule 502(c) of the Federal  Rules of Evidence provides that disclosures made 
in State court proceedings will  not operate as a waiver in Federal proceed-
ings so long as the disclosure is not regarded as a waiver under either Fed. 
R. Evid. 502(a) or 502(b), or the law of the State where the disclosure oc-
curred. Rule 502(d) of the Federal  Rules of Evidence provides that a Federal 
court order that the privilege or the protection is not waived by a disclosure is 
binding on both Federal  and State courts. Rule 502(e) of the Federal  Rules 
of Evidence provides that an agreement on the effect of the disclosure be-
tween the parties in a Federal  proceeding is binding only on the parties to the 
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agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order. Rule 502(f) of the 
Federal  Rules of Evidence expressly makes the rule applicable to State and 
Federal  proceedings, “even if State law provides the rule of decision.” 
Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains definitions of the 
terms “attorney-client privilege” and “work-product protection.”
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Section 524. Privileged Matter Disclosed 
Erroneously or Without 
Opportunity to Claim Privilege
A claim of privilege is not defeated by a disclosure erroneously 
made without an opportunity to claim the privilege.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 35–
36, 731 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (2000) (no waiver where record holder unaware 
of probable cause hearing and victim “was hardly in a position to be aware of 
her rights”). See also Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 
859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006).
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Section 525. Comment upon or Inference 
from Claim of Privilege
(a) Civil Case. Comment may be made and an adverse inference may 
be drawn against a party when that party, or in certain circumstances a 
witness, invokes a privilege.
(b) Criminal Case.
(1) No comment may be made and no adverse inference may be 
drawn against the defendant or a witness who invokes a privilege.
(2) In a case tried to a jury, the assertion of a privilege should be 
made outside the presence of the jury whenever reasonably possi-
ble.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from the long-standing rule in 
Massachusetts that an adverse inference may be drawn against a party who 
invokes a testimonial privilege in a civil case. Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 
444, 450, 87 N.E. 755, 758 (1909) (attorney-client privilege). Drawing the 
adverse inference in a civil  case does not infringe on the party’s privilege 
against self-incrimination under either Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights 
of the Massachusetts Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 305–306, 249 N.E.2d 
583, 586 (1969) (attorney-client privilege). It makes no difference that crimi-
nal matters are pending at the time. Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 596, 
651 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (1995) (privilege against self-incrimination).
In Labor Relations Comm’n v. Fall  River Educators’ Ass’n, 382 Mass. 
465, 471–472, 416 N.E.2d 1340, 1344–1345 (1981), the Supreme Judicial 
Court expanded the rule to allow an adverse inference to be drawn against 
an organizational party as a result of a claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination by its officers who had specific  knowledge of actions taken on 
behalf of the organization in connection with the underlying claim. In Lentz v. 
Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 23, 26–32, 768 N.E.2d 538, 
541–545 (2002), the Supreme Judicial  Court expanded the principle even 
further to include circumstances in which the court finds, as a preliminary 
question of fact, that the witness who invokes the privilege against self-
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incrimination is acting on behalf of or to further the interests of one of the par-
ties. The Supreme Judicial Court also noted that the potential for prejudice 
can be reduced by limiting the number of questions that may be put to the 
witness who invokes the privilege, and by a limiting instruction. Id. at 30–31, 
768 N.E.2d at 544.
Counsel has the right to comment on an opposing party’s failure to tes-
tify in a civil case. See Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. at 305, 249 N.E.2d at 
586; Silveira v. Kegerreis, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 906–907, 422 N.E.2d 789, 
789 (1981).
When a nonparty witness is closely aligned with a party in a civil  case, 
and the nonparty witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
jury should be instructed that the witness may invoke the privilege for rea-
sons unrelated to the case on trial, and that they are permitted, but not re-
quired, to draw an inference adverse to the party from the witness’s invoca-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The jury is permitted to draw 
an inference adverse to a party from the witness’s invocation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Lentz v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 437 
Mass. at 26–32, 768 N.E.2d at 541–545.
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Article 12 of the Declara-
tion of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, as well  as from G. L. c. 233, § 20, 
Third, and G. L. c. 278, § 23. See Commonwealth v. Goulet, 374 Mass. 404, 
412, 372 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 
457 Mass. 858, 869–870 n.13, 933 N.E.2d 633, 644 n.13 (2010). In Com-
monwealth v. Vallejo, 455 Mass. 72, 78–81, 914 N.E.2d 22, 28–30 (2009), 
the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the reasoning of Commonwealth v. 
Russo, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 731 N.E.2d 108 (2000), and held that a de-
fendant’s privilege against self-incrimination may be violated by comments 
made by a codefendant’s counsel on the defendant’s pretrial silence or the 
defendant’s decision not to testify. For a discussion of the numerous cases 
dealing with the issue of whether a remark by a judge, a prosecutor, or a co-
counsel constitutes improper comment on the defendant’s silence, see M.S. 
Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 5.14.8 (8th ed. 2007). A de-
fendant may have the right to simply exhibit a person before the jury without 
questioning the person. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 
557–559, 829 N.E.2d 1135, 1141 (2005). When there is a timely request 
made by the defense, the trial  judge must instruct the jury that no adverse 
inference may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did not testify. See 
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 376 
Mass. 867, 871–872, 383 N.E.2d 843, 845–846 (1978). See also Common-
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wealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 371 n.9, 805 N.E.2d 942, 953 n.9 (2004) 
(“We remain of the view that judges should not give the instruction when 
asked not to do so. We are merely saying that it is not per se reversible error 
to do so.”).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Martin, 
372 Mass. 412, 413, 421 n.17, 362 N.E.2d 507, 508, 512 n.17 (1977) (privi-
lege against self-incrimination), and Commonwealth v. Labbe, 6 Mass. App. 
Ct. 73, 79–80, 373 N.E.2d 227, 232 (1978) (spousal privilege). “Where there 
is some advance warning that a witness might refuse to testify, the trial judge 
should conduct a voir dire of the witness, outside the presence of the jury, to 
ascertain whether the witness will  assert some privilege or otherwise refuse 
to answer questions.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 350, 742 
N.E.2d 61, 70 (2001). If the witness asserts the privilege or refuses to testify 
before the jury when it was not anticipated, the judge should give a forceful 
cautionary instruction to the jury. Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 
157–159, 434 N.E.2d 1238, 1241–1243 (1982).
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Section 526. Unemployment Hearing Privilege
(a) Statutory Bar on the Use of Information from Unemployment 
Hearing. Subject to the exceptions listed in Subsection (b), informa-
tion secured during an unemployment hearing is absolutely privileged, 
is not public record, and is not admissible in any action or proceeding.
(b) Exceptions. Such information may be admissible only in the fol-
lowing actions or proceedings:
(1) criminal or civil cases brought pursuant to G. L. c. 151A where 
the department or Commonwealth is a necessary party,
(2) civil cases relating to the enforcement of child support obli-
gations,
(3) criminal prosecutions for homicide, and
(4) criminal prosecutions for violation of Federal law.
NOTE
This section is derived from G. L. c. 151A, § 46, and Tuper v. North Adams 
Ambulance Service, Inc., 428 Mass. 132, 137, 697 N.E.2d 983, 986 (2008) 
(“Information secured pursuant to [G. L. c. 151A] is confidential, is for the 
exclusive use and information of the department in the discharge of its du-
ties, is not a public  record, and may not be used in any action or proceed-
ing.”). A violation of this statute may be punishable as a misdemeanor.
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ARTICLE VI.  WITNESSES
Section 601. Competency
(a) Generally. Every person is competent to be a witness, except as 
otherwise provided by statute or other provisions of the Massachusetts 
common law of evidence.
(b) Rulings. A person is competent to be a witness if he or she has
(1) the general ability  or capacity to observe, remember, and give 
expression to that  which he or she has seen, heard, or experienced, 
and
(2) an understanding sufficient to comprehend the difference be-
tween truth and falsehood, the wickedness of the latter, and the 
obligation and duty to tell the truth, and, in a general way, belief 
that failure to perform the obligation will result in punishment.
(c) Preliminary Questions. While the competency of a witness is a 
preliminary question of fact for the judge, questions of witness credi-
bility are to be resolved by the trier of fact.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20. See 
Commonwealth v. Monzon, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 245, 248–249, 744 N.E.2d 
1131, 1135 (2001). A person otherwise competent to be a witness may still 
be disqualified from testifying. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 20 (with certain ex-
ceptions, “neither husband nor wife shall testify as to private conversations 
with the other”; “neither husband nor wife shall  be compelled to testify in the 
trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against the 
other”; “defendant in the trial  of an indictment, complaint or other criminal 
proceeding shall, at his own request . . . be allowed to testify”; and “an une-
mancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall  not testify before a grand 
jury, trial  of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against 
said parent”). See also Section 504, Spousal Privilege and Disqualification; 
Parent-Child Disqualification; Section 511, Privilege Against Self-
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Incrimination. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (witness testimony, and assessment 
of the competency of a witness, must be done orally in open court).
Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 461, 665 N.E.2d 105, 107–108 
(1996). This test applies to all potential  witnesses. Commonwealth v. Brusgu-
lis, 398 Mass. 325, 329, 496 N.E.2d 652, 655 (1986). Neither the inability of a 
witness to remember specific  details of events nor inconsistencies in the tes-
timony render the witness incompetent to testify, so long as the witness 
demonstrates “the general ability to observe, remember and recount.” Com-
monwealth v. Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 750, 755, 647 N.E.2d 413, 418 (1995); 
Commonwealth v. Thibeault, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 424–428, 931 N.E.2d 
1008, 1013–1015 (2010) (six year old permitted to testify about incidents that 
occurred when she was five despite inconsistencies in her ability to observe, 
remember, and recount facts and her initial  difficulty with concept of a prom-
ise in connection with duty to tell  the truth). See Commonwealth v. Gamache, 
35 Mass. App. Ct. 805, 806–809, 626 N.E.2d 616, 618–620 (1994) (five year 
old permitted to testify about incidents that allegedly took place when the 
child was twenty-one and thirty-three months old despite inconsistencies and 
her inability to recall every detail in her testimony). “The tendency, moreover, 
except in quite clear cases of incompetency, is to let the witness testify and 
have the triers make any proper discount for the quality of her understanding” 
(quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 379 Mass. 640, 656, 400 
N.E.2d 821, 833–834 (1980). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 
Mass. at 329, 496 N.E.2d at 655 (child); Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 
541, 546, 350 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1976) (alcoholic); Commonwealth v. Aitah-
medlamara, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 78, 823 N.E.2d 408, 410 (2005) (devel-
opmentally disabled); Commonwealth v. Hiotes, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 255, 256, 
789 N.E.2d 179, 180 (2003) (mental illness).
Subsection (c). The initial segment of this subsection is derived from De-
moulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 562–563, 703 N.E.2d 1149, 1158 
(1998); the remainder of the subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 466, 702 N.E.2d 1158, 1165–1166 (1998). The 
question of the competency of a potential witness is within the discretion of 
the trial judge, who has “wide discretion . . . to tailor the competency inquiry 
to the particular circumstances and intellect of the witness.” Commonwealth 
v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass. 325, 329–330, 496 N.E.2d 652, 655 (1986). When 
competency is challenged, a judge usually conducts a voir dire examination 
of the potential  witness, but may require a physician or other expert to exam-
ine the potential witness’s mental condition where appropriate. Demoulas v. 
Demoulas, 428 Mass. at 563, 703 N.E.2d at 1158. See G. L. c. 123, § 19; 
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G. L. c. 233, § 23E. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (witness testimony, and as-
sessment of the competency of a witness, must be done orally in open 
court). “Although competency must of course be determined before a witness 
testifies, the judge may reconsider his decision, either sua sponte or on mo-
tion, if he entertains doubts about the correctness of the earlier ruling.” 
Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass. at 331, 496 N.E.2d at 656.
Competency of Criminal Defendant. A defendant in a criminal  case is 
competent so long as the defendant has a “sufficient present ability to consult 
with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding 
and . . . a rational as well  as factual  understanding of the proceedings.” 
Commonwealth v. Hung Tan Vo, 427 Mass. 464, 468–469, 693 N.E.2d 1374, 
1378 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 Mass. 522, 524, 275 
N.E.2d 893, 895 (1971), quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 
(1960). The trial judge has a duty to act sua sponte whenever there is “a 
substantial  question of possible doubt” as to the defendant’s competency to 
stand trial. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 62, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 
1174–1175 (1978).
It is not necessary to suspend all pretrial proceedings because a defen-
dant is not competent. See Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 33, 
933 N.E.2d 936, 945 (2010) (concluding it is not a per se violation of due 
process for the Commonwealth to proceed against incompetent person at 
bail hearing or dangerousness hearing). Contra Commonwealth v. Torres, 
441 Mass. 499, 505–507, 806 N.E.2d 895, 900–901 (2004) (stating due 
process may be violated if defense counsel is unable to communicate at all 
with client during bail hearing or hearing on rendition).
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Section 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge 
of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need 
not, consist of the testimony of the witness. This section is subject to 
the provisions of Section 703 relating to opinion testimony by a person 
qualified by the court as an expert witness.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 602 and Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 602 and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See Com-
monwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 521, 759 N.E.2d 700, 711 (2001); Mal-
chanoff v. Truehart, 354 Mass. 118, 121–122, 236 N.E.2d 89, 92–93 (1968); 
Commonwealth v. Wolcott, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 207, 548 N.E.2d 1271, 
1275 (1990).
Cross-Reference: Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy 
Conditioned on Fact; Section 601, Competency; Section 703, Bases of Opin-
ion Testimony by Experts. Cf. Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally 
Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible; Section 403, Grounds for Ex-
cluding Relevant Evidence; Section 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Wit-
nesses.
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Section 603. Oath or Affirmation
Before testifying, every  witness shall be required to declare that 
the witness will testify  truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered 
in a form calculated to awaken the witness’s conscience and impress 
the witness’s mind with the duty to do so.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 603 and Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 603 and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See 
G. L. c. 233, §§ 15–19. See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(d) (“Whenever under 
these rules an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation under the 
penalties of perjury may be accepted in lieu thereof.”). “Although taking [the 
traditional] oath is the customary method for signifying one’s recognition that 
consequences attend purposeful falsehood, it is not the only method for do-
ing so. The law requires some affirmative representation that the witness 
recognizes his or her obligation to tell the truth. See G. L. c. 233, §§ 17–19.” 
Adoption of Fran, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 467, 766 N.E.2d 91, 101 (2002).
“A child witness does not have to understand fully the obligation of an 
oath, but must show a general awareness of the duty to be truthful  and the 
difference between a lie and the truth.” Commonwealth v. Ike I., 53 Mass. 
App. Ct. 907, 909, 760 N.E.2d 781, 783 (2002). “With children, recognition of 
that obligation [to tell the truth] sometimes is more effectively obtained 
through careful questioning of the child than through recitation of what to the 
child may be a meaningless oath or affirmation.” Adoption of Fran, 54 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 467 n.17, 766 N.E.2d at 101 n.17. A judge’s exchanges with a 
child and his or her discretionary conclusion that the child understands the 
difference between the truth and lying and the importance of testifying truth-
fully “effectively serve[s] the underlying purpose of the oath, and no more 
[can] be reasonably required of an infant deemed competent to testify, but 
manifestly lacking in theological understanding.” Commonwealth v. McCaf-
frey, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 590, 633 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (1994).
167 
Section 604. Interpreters
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these sections relat-
ing to competency, qualification as an expert, and the administration of 
an oath or affirmation that he or she will make a true translation.
NOTE
This section is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 604 and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
604 and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See Commonwealth v. Festa, 
369 Mass. 419, 429–430, 341 N.E.2d 276, 283–284 (1976) (establishing 
guidelines for when witnesses testify through an interpreter). See 
G. L. c. 221C, § 2 (a non-English speaker has the right to an interpreter 
throughout the proceedings, whether criminal or civil); Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(f); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 41. The trial judge has discretion to appoint an interpreter. 
Commonwealth v. Esteves, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 345, 705 N.E.2d 1158, 
1162, reversed and remanded on other grounds, 429 Mass. 636, 710 N.E.2d 
963 (1999). “[W]hen a witness testifies in a foreign language, the English 
translation is the only evidence, not the testimony in the original  language.” 
Id. All  spoken-language court interpreters and court interpreters who provide 
services to the Trial Court for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are governed 
by the “Standards and Procedures of the Office of Court Interpreter Serv-
ices,” 1143 Mass. Reg. 15 (Nov. 13, 2009), which include a Code of Profes-
sional Conduct that includes the subjects of conflict of interest, confidentiality, 
a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g p r o t o c o l s . S e e 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/ocis-standards-procedures.pdf.
Cross-Reference: Section 521, Sign Language Interpreter–Client Privi-
lege; Section 522, Interpreter-Client Privilege; “Standards and Procedures of 
the Office of Court Interpreter Services,” 1143 Mass. Reg. 15 (Nov. 13, 
2 0 0 9 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/ocis-standards-procedures.pdf.
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Section 605. Competency of Judge as Witness
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a 
witness.
NOTE
This section states the first sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 605 and Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 605. While there are no Massachusetts statutes or cases on 
point, the proposition appears so clear as to be beyond question. See gener-
ally Supreme Judicial  Court Rule 3:09, Canon 3(E) (judicial  disqualification); 
Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699, 703, 569 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1991) (“calling a 
judge as a witness to opine on what ruling he might have made on a particu-
lar hypothesis” is disfavored). Cf. Guardianship of Pollard, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 
318, 322–323, 764 N.E.2d 935, 939 (2002) (judge who served as guardian 
ad litem prior to becoming judge not disqualified from testifying in guardian-
ship proceeding before a different judge and from being cross-examined on 
her guardian ad litem report).
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Section 606. Competency of Juror as Witness
(a) At the Trial. A member of the jury may not testify  as a witness be-
fore that  jury  in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the 
juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an op-
portunity to object out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry 
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to 
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s delib-
erations or to the effect of anything upon that or any  other juror’s mind 
or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in 
connection therewith, except that a juror may  testify on the question 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to 
the jury’s attention or whether any  outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence 
of any statement by  the juror concerning a matter about which the ju-
ror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection, which is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 
606(a) and is nearly identical to Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 606(a), reflects 
Massachusetts practice.
Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 606(b) and is derived from Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 
Mass. 140, 153–157, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1207–1208, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1137 (1982), and Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 196–198, 385 
N.E.2d 513, 516–517 (1979). In Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. at 
155 n.25, 430 N.E.2d at 1208 n.25, the court stated that Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 606(b) “is the federal rule, and is in accord with the current Massachu-
setts rule admitting evidence of extraneous information and excluding evi-
dence of mental  processes” (quotation and citations omitted). See also 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 379 Mass. 297, 304, 397 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 
(1979); Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 466–467 (1871); Common-
wealth v. Hanlon, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 810, 816, 694 N.E.2d 358, 364 (1998).
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The Doctrine of “Extraneous Matter.” In Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 
Mass. at 200, 385 N.E.2d at 518, the court held that “if specific  facts not 
mentioned at trial concerning one of the parties or the matter in litigation 
were brought to the attention of the deliberating jury by a juror . . . such mis-
conduct may be proved by juror testimony.” The court cautioned, however, 
that “evidence concerning the subjective mental  processes of jurors” is not 
admissible to impeach their verdict. Id. at 198, 385 N.E.2d at 517. The chal-
lenge for courts is to make the distinction between “overt factors and matters 
resting in a juror’s consciousness.” Id. In Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 
245, 747 N.E.2d 673 (2001), the court offered further guidance by defining 
the concept of an “extraneous matter.” “An extraneous matter is one that in-
volves information not part of the evidence at trial and raises a serious ques-
tion of possible prejudice” (citations and quotation omitted). Id. at 251, 747 
N.E.2d at 679. Some illustrations of this concept include “(1) unauthorized 
views of sites by jurors; (2) improper communications to the jurors by third 
persons; or (3) improper consideration of documents not in evidence” (cita-
tions omitted). Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. at 197, 385 N.E.2d at 
517.
Procedure for Determining Whether Jury Was Influenced by an 
“Extraneous Matter.” A party alleging that a jury was exposed to a signifi-
cant extraneous influence “bears the burden of demonstrating that the jury 
were in fact exposed to the extraneous matter. To meet this burden he may 
rely on juror testimony.” Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. at 201, 385 
N.E.2d at 519. However, lawyers must observe Rule 3.5(d) of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional  Conduct, Supreme Judicial  Court Rule 3:07, 
which forbids lawyers from initiating contact with a member of the jury after 
discharge of the jury “without leave of court granted for good cause shown.” 
Rule 3.5(d) provides further that
“[i]f a juror initiates a communication with such a lawyer, di-
rectly or indirectly, the lawyer may respond provided that the 
lawyer shall  not ask questions of or make comments to a 
member of that jury that are intended only to harass or em-
barrass the juror or to influence his or her actions in future 
jury service. In no circumstances shall  such a lawyer inquire 
of a juror concerning the jury’s deliberation processes.”
Id. Further inquiry by the court is not required where “there has been no 
showing that specific  facts not mentioned at trial concerning one of the par-
ties or the matter in litigation were brought to the attention of the deliberating 
jury” (emphasis and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 
Mass. 230, 261, 668 N.E.2d 300, 320 (1996). See Commonwealth v. 
McQuade, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 827, 833, 710 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (1999). “The 
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question whether the party seeking an inquiry has made such a showing is 
properly addressed to the discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. 
Dixon, 395 Mass. 149, 152, 479 N.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). Because there is 
always a danger that when questioned about the existence of an extraneous 
matter a jury will respond
“with an answer that inappropriately reveals aspects of the 
deliberations[, g]iving cautionary instructions to each juror at 
the outset of the inquiry and, if necessary, again during the 
inquiry will  reduce the likelihood of answers that stray into 
revelation of the jury’s thought process. The jurors can be 
instructed to respond about any information that was not 
mentioned during the trial (appropriate), but not to describe 
how the jurors used that information or the effect of that in-
formation on the thinking of any one or more jurors (inappro-
priate). Once any juror has established that extraneous in-
formation was mentioned, by whom, and whether anyone 
said anything else about the extraneous information (not 
what they thought about it or did with it), the inquiry of that 
juror is complete. As soon as the judge determines that the 
defendant has satisfied his burden of establishing the exis-
tence of an extraneous influence, the questioning of all jurors 
should cease.”
Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 391–392, 828 N.E.2d 45, 53 
(2005).
Ethnic or Racial Bias. When the defendant files an affidavit from one 
or more jurors stating that another juror made a statement “that reasonably 
demonstrates racial or ethnic bias” and the jury’s credibility is at issue, the 
judge must first determine whether the defendant has proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the juror made the biased statement. Com-
monwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 494 (2010). Second, if the answer 
to the first question is “yes,” the judge must determine whether the defendant 
has proved by a preponderance of the evidence
“that the juror who made the statements was actually biased 
because of the race or ethnicity of a defendant, victim, de-
fense attorney, or witness. A juror is actually biased where 
her racial  or ethnic prejudice, had it been revealed or de-
tected at voir dire, would have required as a matter of law 
that the juror be excused from the panel  for cause.” (Cita-
tions omitted.)
Id. at 495.
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 172
“In some instances, the statement made by the juror may 
establish so strong an inference of a juror’s actual bias that 
proof of the statement alone may suffice. Generally, though, 
the judge must determine the precise content and context of 
the statement to determine whether it reflects the juror’s ac-
tual racial or ethnic bias, or whether it was said in jest or 
otherwise bore a meaning that would fail to establish racial 
bias. Because actual juror bias affects the essential fairness 
of the trial, a defendant who has established a juror’s actual 
bias is entitled to a new trial without needing to show that the 
juror’s bias affected the jury’s verdict.” (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 496. Third, even if the defendant fails to prove that the juror was actu-
ally biased, if the answer to the first question is “yes,” the judge must deter-
mine “whether the statements so infected the deliberative process with ra-
cially or ethnically charged language or stereotypes that it prejudiced the de-
fendant’s right to have his guilt decided by an impartial  jury on the evidence 
admitted at trial” (citations omitted). Id. at 496–497. Even though racial or 
ethnic  bias is not an extraneous matter, see Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 
Mass. 89, 97, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (1991), this third question is subject to 
the same analysis used to evaluate extraneous influences on the jury. If the 
defendant meets his or her burden of establishing that the statement was 
made, “the burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to show beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced by the jury’s exposure 
to these statements.” Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. at 497. In 
making this determination, the judge must not receive any evidence concern-
ing the effect of the statement on the thought processes of the jurors, but 
instead must focus on its “probable effect” on a “hypothetical average jury.” 
Id.
Discharge of a Juror During Empanelment. Even prior to trial, a po-
tential juror who may not be impartial due to the effect of an extraneous mat-
ter such as bias or prejudice may be excused by the court. See G. L. c. 234, 
§ 28; G. L. c. 234A, § 39; Mass. R. Crim. P. 20(b)(2). If the jury has not been 
sworn, the judge has discretion to excuse a juror without a hearing or a 
showing of extreme hardship based on information that the juror may not be 
indifferent. See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 731–732 , 933 
N.E.2d 50, 62–63 (2010) (juror dismissed based on report by court officer 
that she was observed in the hallway during a break speaking to persons 
who then joined a group which included members of the defendant’s family); 
Commonwealth v. Duddie Ford Inc., 409 Mass. 387, 392, 566 N.E.2d 1119, 
1122 (1991). “It is generally within the judge’s discretion . . . to determine 
when there exists a substantial risk that extraneous issues would influence 
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the jury such that an individual voir dire of potential jurors is warranted.” 
Commonwealth v. Holloway, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 472, 691 N.E.2d 985, 
988 (1998). Although there is a presumption that a peremptory challenge of a 
prospective juror is proper, the Supreme Judicial  Court has established 
guidelines that must be followed when it is shown that the peremptory chal-
lenge constitutes a pattern of excluding members of a discrete community 
group solely because of their membership in that group. See Commonwealth 
v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218–226, 892 N.E.2d 314, 319–326 (2008) (mur-
der conviction reversed because peremptory challenge of a single African-
American juror who happened to be the only such person in the venire con-
stituted a pattern of group discrimination and because judge’s finding that 
“there are race neutral reasons which the Commonwealth has articulated 
which justify the challenge” was not sufficient).
Discharge of a Juror During Trial. “When a judge determines that the 
jury may have been exposed during the course of trial  to material that ‘goes 
beyond the record and raises a serious question of possible prejudice,’ [the 
judge] should conduct a voir dire of jurors to ascertain the extent of their ex-
posure to the extraneous material  and to assess its prejudicial effect.” Com-
monwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 369–370, 734 N.E.2d 315, 330 (2000), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 800, 383 N.E.2d 835, 
841 (1978). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. John, 442 Mass. 329, 339–340, 812 
N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (2004) (no error in declining to discharge a juror who ex-
pressed personal fear due to the nature of the case); Commonwealth v. Mal-
donado, 429 Mass. 502, 506–507, 709 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1999) (judge did not 
abuse her discretion in removing one juror who expressed fear for her per-
sonal  safety as a result of evidence of the defendant’s association with a 
gang).
“The initial  questioning concerning whether any juror saw or 
heard the potentially prejudicial  material may be carried on 
collectively, but if any juror indicates that he or she has seen 
or heard the material, there must be individual questioning of 
that juror, outside of the presence of any other juror, to de-
termine the extent of the juror’s exposure to the material and 
its effects on the juror’s ability to render an impartial verdict.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. at 800–801, 383 N.E.2d at 841–842. 
See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 Mass. 25, 39, 875 N.E.2d 846, 859 
(2007) (trial judge acted properly in asking jury collectively whether anyone 
had seen anything while coming into or exiting the courtroom based on a 
court officer’s report that the door to the lockup had been left open while the 
defendant was inside a cell). The trial judge must, however, determine the 
nature of the extraneous matter before exercising discretion as to whether to 
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discharge a juror. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. at 800–801, 
383 N.E.2d at 841–842 (individualized questioning of juror appropriate given 
concerns of exposure to prejudicial media publicity during the trial); Com-
monwealth v. Fredette, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 259, 776 N.E.2d 464, 469–
470 (2002) (judge erred in accepting a juror’s note about a matter of extra-
neous influence without making inquiry of the juror). A judge has a duty to 
intervene promptly whenever he or she observes or receives a reliable report 
that a juror is asleep. Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 77–79, 933 
N.E.2d 951, 966 (2010). The judge has discretion as to the nature of the in-
tervention and is not required to conduct a voir dire in every complaint re-
garding jury attentiveness. Id. at 78, 933 N.E.2d at 966.
Discharge of a Deliberating Juror. The problems associated with the 
effect of an extraneous matter on the jury also may arise before the jury re-
turns a verdict. General Laws c. 234, § 26B, provides that if, at any time after 
a case has been submitted to the jury and before the jury have agreed on a 
verdict, a juror “dies, or becomes ill, or is unable to perform his duty for any 
other good cause shown to the court,” the judge may discharge the juror, 
substitute an alternate selected by lot, and permit the jury to renew their de-
liberations. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 20(d)(3). “[G]ood cause includes only rea-
sons personal  to a juror, that is, reasons unrelated to the issues of the case, 
the juror’s views on the case, or his relationship with his fellow jurors” (quota-
tions omitted). Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. at 368, 734 N.E.2d at 
328. The judge must conduct a voir dire of the affected juror with counsel and 
the defendant or the parties in a civil case. Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 
Mass. 838, 845, 467 N.E.2d 1340, 1346 (1984). See Commonwealth v. 
McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 488–489 (2010) (after jury reported it was dead-
locked, judge was warranted in removing deliberating juror based on a find-
ing that a “palpable conflict” existed due to the arrest of the father of the ju-
ror’s son, who was being prosecuted by the same district attorney’s office 
that was prosecuting the case on trial). Great care must be taken in such 
cases that a dissenting juror is not allowed to avoid the responsibility of jury 
service. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 
675–676, 828 N.E.2d 556, 566 (2005) (holding that discharge of deliberating 
juror was error).
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Section 607. Who May Impeach
The credibility of any witness may be impeached by any  party. 
However, a party who calls a witness is not permitted to impeach that 
witness by evidence of bad character, including reputation for untruth-
fulness or prior convictions.
NOTE
This section is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 23, and Walter v. Bonito, 367 
Mass. 117, 121–123, 324 N.E.2d 624, 626–627 (1975). In Walter, the Su-
preme Judicial Court recognized that Labrie v. Midwood, 273 Mass. 578, 
581–582, 174 N.E. 214, 216 (1931), held that G. L. c. 233, § 22 (party’s right 
to call and cross-examine adverse witness) does not override G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23. See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
“[A] party cannot rely on this statutory right [G. L. c. 233, § 23] to call a 
witness whom he knows beforehand will  offer no testimony relevant to an 
issue at trial solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness with prior in-
consistent statements that would otherwise be inadmissible.” Commonwealth 
v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 489–490, 722 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1999).
When impeaching one’s own witness through a prior inconsistent state-
ment, the proponent must bring the statement to the attention of the witness 
with sufficient circumstances to alert the witness to the particular occasion 
the prior statement was made and allow the witness an opportunity to ex-
plain the statement. See Section 613, Prior Statements of Witnesses, Lim-
ited Admissibility.
This Guide includes specific sections dealing with impeachment by evi-
dence of character (Sections 608 and 609), impeachment by prior inconsis-
tent statements (Section 613), impeachment by reference to bias or prejudice 
(Section 611[b]), and evidence of religious beliefs (Section 610). Other meth-
ods of impeachment—e.g., improper motive, impairment of testimonial facul-
ties, and contradiction—remain available and fall within the scope of Sections 
102, Purpose and Construction, 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, 
and Related Statements, 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence, 
and 611, Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation.
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Section 608. Impeachment by Evidence of 
Character and Conduct of Witness
(a) Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence as to reputation, subject to 
the following limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only  after the char-
acter of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputa-
tion evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In general, specific instances of 
misconduct showing the witness to be untruthful are not admissible for 
the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s credibility.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dock-
ham, 405 Mass. 618, 631, 542 N.E.2d 591, 599 (1989), and Commonwealth 
v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 563, 789 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (2003). Cf. Common-
wealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. at 562–563, 789 N.E.2d at 1075 (evidence of 
person’s bad character generally inadmissible to prove action in conformity 
therewith); Section 404, Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Con-
duct; Exceptions; Other Crimes.
Unlike under Federal  law, character for truthfulness cannot be proven by 
evidence of personal  opinions or isolated acts. See Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 197–198, 812 N.E.2d 262, 273–274 (2004) (declin-
ing to adopt original Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 405[a]); Commonwealth v. 
Benjamin, 430 Mass. 673, 678 n.6, 722 N.E.2d 953, 958 n.6 (2000). Reputa-
tion evidence must be based on one’s reputation in the community or at the 
person’s place of work or business. Commonwealth v. Walker, 442 Mass. at 
198, 812 N.E.2d at 274. See G. L. c. 233, § 21A (work or business); Com-
monwealth v. Dockham, 405 Mass. at 631, 542 N.E.2d at 599 (community). A 
witness’s testimony must be based on the witness’s knowledge of the per-
son’s reputation in the community, not of the opinions of a limited number of 
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people. Commonwealth v. LaPierre, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 871, 408 N.E.2d 
883, 883–884 (1980). See Commonwealth v. Phachansiri, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 
100, 109, 645 N.E.2d 60, 66 (1995); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 11 Mass. 
App. Ct. 933, 933–934, 416 N.E.2d 551, 552–553 (1981).
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Fa-
vorito, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 140, 399 N.E.2d 1101, 1101 (1980). “Evidence 
irrelevant to the issue at trial  or to the witness’s reputation for truth and ve-
racity is inadmissible to impeach a witness.” Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 
Mass. 567, 572, 476 N.E.2d 610, 615 (1985).
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. She-
line, 391 Mass. 279, 288, 461 N.E.2d 1197, 1204 (1984), and Common-
wealth v. Grammo, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 447, 455, 395 N.E.2d 476, 482–483 
(1979). This limitation does not restrict the right of a defendant in a criminal 
case to offer evidence of his or her reputation for a character trait that would 
suggest he or she is not the type of person who would commit the crime 
charged. See Section 404(a)(1), Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove 
Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes: Character Evidence Generally: Charac-
ter of the Accused. Neither “the offering of testimony that contradicts the tes-
timony of a witness” nor “the introduction of prior out-of-court statements of a 
witness constitute[s] an attack on the witness’s character for truthfulness,” 
because “[t]he purpose and only direct effect of the evidence are to show that 
the witness is not to be believed in [that] instance.” Commonwealth v. She-
line, 391 Mass. at 288–289, 461 N.E.2d at 1204.
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 
414 Mass. 146, 151, 605 N.E.2d 852, 855 (1993), and Commonwealth v. 
Bregoli, 431 Mass. 265, 275, 727 N.E.2d 59, 69 (2000). See Commonwealth 
v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 563 n.2, 789 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 n.2 (2003) (noting 
that the Supreme Judicial Court has not yet adopted Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 608[b]). This applies whether or not the witness is a party, Common-
wealth v. Binkiewicz, 342 Mass. 740, 755, 175 N.E.2d 473, 483 (1961), and 
whether the witness is impeached by cross-examination, Commonwealth v. 
Turner, 371 Mass. 803, 810, 359 N.E.2d 626, 630 (1977), or by the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence, Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 151, 605 
N.E.2d at 855.
The Supreme Judicial  Court has “chiseled” a narrow exception to the 
rule that the testimony of a witness may not be impeached with specific acts 
of prior misconduct, recognizing that in special  circumstances (to date, only 
rape and sexual  assault cases) the interest of justice would forbid its strict 
application. Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 151–152, 605 N.E.2d at 
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855–856. In Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94–96, 378 N.E.2d 
987, 990–992 (1978), the special circumstances warranting evidence of the 
prior accusations were that (1) the witness was the victim in the case on trial; 
(2) the victim/witness’s consent was the central issue at trial; (3) the victim/
witness was the only Commonwealth witness on the issue of consent; (4) the 
victim/witness’s testimony was inconsistent and confused; and (5) there was 
a basis in independent third-party records for concluding that the victim/
witness’s prior accusation of the same type of crime had been made and was 
false. Not all  of the Bohannon circumstances must be present for the excep-
tion to apply. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 337, 639 
N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1994).
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Section 609. Impeachment by Evidence 
of Conviction of Crime
(a) Generally. A party may seek to impeach the credibility of a wit-
ness by means of the court record of the witness’s conviction or a cer-
tified copy, but may  not make reference to the sentence that was im-
posed, subject to Section 403 and the following requirements:
(1) Misdemeanor. A misdemeanor conviction cannot be used af-
ter five years from the date on which sentence was imposed, un-
less the witness has subsequently  been convicted of a crime within 
five years of the time he or she testifies.
(2) Felony Conviction Not Resulting in Committed State 
Prison Sentence. A felony conviction where no sentence was im-
posed, a sentence was imposed and suspended, a fine was im-
posed, or a sentence to a jail or house of correction was imposed 
cannot be used after ten years from the date of conviction (where 
no sentence was imposed) or from the date of sentencing, unless 
the witness has subsequently been convicted of a crime within ten 
years of the time he or she testifies. For the purpose of this para-
graph, a plea of guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall consti-
tute a conviction within the meaning of this section.
(3) Felony with State Prison Sentence Imposed. A felony con-
viction where a sentence to a State prison was imposed cannot be 
used after ten years from the date of expiration of the minimum 
term of imprisonment, unless the witness has subsequently been 
convicted of a crime within ten years of the time he or she testi-
fies.
(4) Traffic Violation. A traffic violation conviction where only a 
fine was imposed cannot be used unless the witness has been con-
victed of another crime or crimes within five years of the time he 
or she testifies.
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(5) Juvenile Adjudications of Delinquency or Youthful Of-
fender. Adjudications of delinquency  or youthful offender may be 
used in subsequent delinquency or criminal proceedings in the 
same manner and to the same extent as prior criminal convictions.
(b) Effect of Being a Fugitive. For the purpose of this section, any 
period during which the defendant was a fugitive from justice shall be 
excluded in determining time limitations under the provisions of this 
section.
NOTE
This section is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 21, except for Section 609(a)(5), 
which is derived from G. L. c. 119, § 60.
Definition of Conviction. For the purpose of impeachment, a conviction 
“means a judgment that conclusively establishes guilt after a finding, verdict, 
or plea of guilty.” Forcier v. Hopkins, 329 Mass. 668, 670, 110 N.E.2d 126, 
127 (1953), and cases cited. Thus, a case that is continued without a finding, 
with or without an admission, is not a conviction and may not be used for 
impeachment under this section. See Wilson v. Honeywell, Inc., 409 Mass. 
803, 808–809, 569 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (1991).
Misdemeanors/Probation. A misdemeanor conviction for which a defendant 
was placed on probation cannot be used for impeachment, because straight 
probation does not constitute a “sentence” for purposes of the statute. Com-
monwealth v. Stewart, 422 Mass. 385, 387, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257 (1996).
Probation Violation. The proper use of probation violations is as follows:
“Although convictions within the time frames established by 
G. L. c. 233, § 21 . . . , may be used to impeach a witness’s 
character for truthfulness, probation violations may not be so 
used. Nevertheless, probation violations may be used ‘to 
show bias on the part of the witness who might want to give 
false testimony to curry favor with the prosecution with re-
spect to his case.’ Commonwealth v. DiMuro, 28 Mass. App. 
Ct. 223, 228 (1990).” (Citation omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 423 Mass. 17, 20–21, 666 N.E.2d 475, 478 
(1996).
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Suspended Sentence. A suspended sentence constitutes a sentence. For-
cier v. Hopkins, 329 Mass. 668, 670–671, 110 N.E.2d 126, 127–128 (1953).
Fine. A fine constitutes a sentence. Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 47 Mass. App. 
Ct. 777, 781, 716 N.E.2d 659, 663–664 (1999).
Scope. “[C]onvictions relevant to credibility are not limited to crimes involving 
dishonesty or false statements.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 
407, 879 N.E.2d 87, 97 (2008).
Discretion. The judge must exercise discretion before deciding whether to 
admit prior convictions for impeachment. Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 400 Mass. 
214, 215, 508 N.E.2d 607, 608 (1987). The factors that are relevant to the 
exercise of discretion include “whether the prior conviction is substantially 
similar to the crime charged, whether the prior conviction involves a crime 
implicating truthfulness, whether there were other prior convictions that the 
Commonwealth could have used to impeach the defendant, and whether the 
judge conducted the required balancing test.” Commonwealth v. Little, 453 
Mass. 766, 773, 906 N.E.2d 286, 293 (2009). The balancing test is the one 
set forth in Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 608, 496 N.E.2d 166, 
169 (1986) (reversing conviction in drug case based on improper admission 
of prior criminal convictions for drug offenses). A judge is not required to ex-
ercise discretion in the absence of an objection or motion in limine. Com-
monwealth v. Bly, 444 Mass. 640, 653, 830 N.E.2d 1048, 1059 (2005). The 
discretion to exclude prior convictions applies equally to the testimony of par-
ties and other witnesses. Commonwealth v. Manning, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 
923, 714 N.E.2d 843, 844 (1999). “The defendant may challenge the judge’s 
ruling even if he never testifies.” Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. at 773, 
906 N.E.2d at 292. But see Section 103(a)(3), Rulings on Evidence, Objec-
tions, and Offers of Proof: Admission or Exclusion of Evidence. “Generally, in 
order for the prejudicial  effect to outweigh the probative value of prior convic-
tion evidence, the ‘prior conviction must be substantially similar to the 
charged offense’” (emphasis omitted). Commonwealth v. Leftwich, 430 Mass. 
865, 869, 724 N.E.2d 691, 696 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 
423 Mass. 230, 250, 668 N.E.2d 300, 314 (1996). However, “[a]lthough simi-
larity of an offense weighs in favor of exclusion, there is no per se rule of ex-
clusion of prior conviction of a similar crime for which the defendant is on 
trial.” Commonwealth v. Bly, 444 Mass. at 654, 830 N.E.2d at 1059. A trial 
judge has discretion to permit impeachment of a sexual assault complaining 
witness by prior convictions of sexual offenses (which would otherwise be 
inadmissible under the rape-shield statute, G. L. c. 233, § 21B), but in exer-
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cising that discretion, the judge must consider the purposes of the rape-
shield statute. Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 726–728, 825 
N.E.2d 58, 68–69 (2005). See Section 412, Past Sexual Conduct and Al-
leged Sexual Reputation (Rape-Shield Law).
Proof of Conviction. The conviction must be proven by production of a court 
record or a certified copy. Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 Mass. 101, 104, 474 
N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (1985). It is presumed that the defendant was repre-
sented by counsel in the underlying conviction, and the Commonwealth does 
not have to prove representation unless the defendant makes a showing that 
the conviction was obtained without counsel or a waiver of counsel. Com-
monwealth v. Saunders, 435 Mass. 691, 695–696, 761 N.E.2d 490, 493–494 
(2002).
Evidence of Conviction. When a record of a witness’s criminal conviction is 
introduced for impeachment purposes, the conviction must be left unex-
plained; but when “cross-examination goes beyond simply establishing that 
the witness is the person named in the record of conviction, the proponent of 
the witness may, in the judge’s discretion, properly inquire on redirect exami-
nation about those collateral matters raised during the cross-examination.” 
Commonwealth v. McGeoghean, 412 Mass. 839, 843, 593 N.E.2d 229, 232 
(1992). See Commonwealth v. Kalhauser, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 343–345, 
754 N.E.2d 76, 80–81 (2001). Any reference to the length of the sentenced 
imposed should be excluded. Commonwealth v. Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 
352–353, 780 N.E.2d 893, 900–901 (2003).
A witness may testify about his or her prior convictions for criminal con-
duct on direct examination in order to blunt the anticipated use of such evi-
dence on cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 558, 563, 
789 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (2003). See Commonwealth v. Blodgett, 377 Mass. 
494, 502, 386 N.E.2d 1042, 1046–1047 (1979). Despite an earlier in limine 
order excluding evidence of a prior conviction, a witness who testifies un-
truthfully opens the door to admission of previously excluded evidence to 
rebut the false testimony. Commonwealth v. Roderick, 429 Mass. 271, 273–
275, 707 N.E.2d 1065, 1068–1069 (1999). Evidence of a stale prior convic-
tion, although inadmissible under G. L. c. 233, § 21, may still be admissible 
for probative nonimpeachment purposes. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 6 Mass. 
App. Ct. 867, 868, 374 N.E.2d 354, 356 (1978). See Commonwealth v. La-
voie, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 4 n.7, 710 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 n.7 (1999).
Redaction. Upon request, the judge has discretion to redact the nature of 
the prior offense and restrict impeachment to the fact of a conviction of “a 
felony.” Commonwealth v. Kalhauser, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 342, 754 
183 
N.E.2d 76, 79 (2001). Any extraneous entries included in the record of crimi-
nal conviction should not be shown to the jury, and if, in the judge’s opinion, 
masking the extraneous material  risks inducing the jury to speculate about 
the missing portions of the record, the judge should refuse to mark the re-
cords as exhibits. Commonwealth v. Ford, 397 Mass. 298, 300, 490 N.E.2d 
1166, 1168 (1986). See Commonwealth v. Ioannides, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 
905–906, 668 N.E.2d 845, 846 (1996).
Pardons, Sealing of Record, Expungement, Commutation of Sentence, 
Appeal Pending. It appears that pardons and the sealing or expungement of 
one’s criminal record cannot be used for impeachment purposes under this 
section. See Commonwealth v. Childs, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 33, 35, 499 N.E.2d 
299, 300 (1986), aff’d, 400 Mass. 1006, 511 N.E.2d 336 (1987). Cf. G. L. c. 
127, § 152 (pardon); G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A–100C (sealing); G. L. c. 94C, 
§§ 34–35 (sealing). Conversely, it appears that the commutation of a sen-
tence may be used. Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343, 347, 101 N.E. 989, 
990 (1913) (“The commutation of the sentence did not do away with the con-
viction. Only a full  pardon could do that.”). It also appears that the pendency 
of an appeal does not prevent the use of a conviction for impeachment pur-
poses. The fact that a defendant’s prior conviction was vacated after the trial 
in which it was used to impeach him did not affect its status as a “final judg-
ment” for purposes of G. L. c. 233, § 21. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 
59 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 199, 794 N.E.2d 1229, 1236 (2003), judgment rev’d 
on other grounds, 442 Mass. 423, 813 N.E.2d 516 (2004). See Fed. R. Evid. 
609(e); Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 609(f). The term conviction means “a judg-
ment that conclusively establishes guilt after a finding, verdict, or plea of 
guilty. . . . In a criminal case the sentence is the judgment.” Forcier v. Hop-
kins, 329 Mass. 668, 670–671, 110 N.E.2d 126, 127 (1953). “The sentence[,] 
until reversed in some way provided by the law, stands as the final judgment 
binding upon everybody.” Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 20, 
140 N.E. 470, 474 (1923).
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Section 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of re-
ligion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of 
the witness’s nature his or her credibility is impaired or enhanced.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Dahl, 430 Mass. 813, 822–
823, 724 N.E.2d 300, 307–308 (2000) (citing with approval Proposed Mass. 
R. Evid. 610), and G. L. c. 233, § 19 (“evidence of [a person’s] disbelief in the 
existence of God may not be received to affect his credibility as a witness”). 
Though not admissible as to credibility, evidence that relates to a person’s 
religious beliefs is not per se inadmissible. See Commonwealth v. Kartell, 58 
Mass. App. Ct. 428, 436–437, 790 N.E.2d 739, 746–747 (2003) (evidence of 
defendant’s religious beliefs admissible for relevant purpose of showing de-
fendant was jealous of victim); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 
143, 145, 718 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1999) (to establish that a child witness is 
competent to testify, “a question whether the child believes in God and a 
question whether the child recognizes the witness’s oath as a promise to 
God are within tolerable limits to test whether the witness’s oath meant any-
thing to the child witness”).
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Section 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation 
and Presentation
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over 
the manner and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evi-
dence on direct and cross-examination so as to (1) make the interroga-
tion and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) 
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment. The court has discretion to admit 
evidence conditionally upon the representation that its relevancy will 
be established by evidence subsequently offered.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination.
(1) In General. A witness is subject to reasonable cross-
examination on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, in-
cluding credibility and matters not elicited during direct examina-
tion. The trial judge may restrict the scope of cross-examination in 
the exercise of judicial discretion.
(2) Bias and Prejudice. Reasonable cross-examination to show 
bias and prejudice is a matter of right which cannot be unreasona-
bly restricted.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on the 
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop 
his or her testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted 
on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse 
party, or an officer or agent of an adverse corporate party, interrogation 
may be by leading questions.
(d) Rebuttal Evidence. The trial judge generally has discretion to 
permit the introduction of rebuttal evidence in civil and criminal cases. 
In certain limited circumstances, a party  may introduce rebuttal evi-
dence as a matter of right. There is no right to present rebuttal evi-
dence that only supports a party’s affirmative case.
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(e) Scope of Subsequent Examination. The scope of redirect and 
recross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge.
(f) Reopening. The court has discretion to allow a party to reopen its 
case.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Rooney, 
365 Mass. 484, 496, 313 N.E.2d 105, 112–113 (1974); Goldman v. Ashkins, 
266 Mass. 374, 380, 165 N.E. 513, 516 (1929); Chandler v. FMC Corp., 35 
Mass. App. Ct. 332, 338, 619 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1993); and Albano v. Jordan 
Marsh Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 311, 311 N.E.2d 568, 573 (1974). See 
Commonwealth v. Edward, 75 Mass. App. Ct.162, 171 n.12, 912 N.E.2d 515, 
522 n.12 (2009) (closing courtroom to the public  during any portion of a trial 
implicates defendant’s constitutional  rights and must be preceded by a hear-
ing and adequate findings of fact). The judge’s discretion to impose reason-
able limits on the length of the direct and cross-examination of witnesses 
does not permit the judge to impose arbitrary time limits that prevent a party 
from presenting its case. Chandler v. FMC Corp., 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 338, 
619 N.E.2d at 629. See also Commonwealth v. Conley, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 50, 
59–60 & n.4, 606 N.E.2d 940, 946 & n.4 (1993) (improper for court to sys-
tematically screen a party’s direct evidence at sidebar before witnesses are 
permitted to be called).
Evidence may be conditionally admitted (admitted de bene) upon the 
representation of counsel that additional  evidence will  be produced providing 
the foundation for the evidence offered. Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 60 Mass. 
App. Ct. 480, 485 n.4, 803 N.E.2d 735, 740 n.4 (2004). See Commonwealth 
v. Perry, 432 Mass. 214, 234–235, 733 N.E.2d 83, 101–102 (2000). In the 
event that the foundation evidence is not subsequently produced, the court 
has no duty to strike the evidence admitted de bene on its own motion. 
Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 595–596, 48 N.E.2d 630, 635 
(1943). If the objecting party fails to move to strike the evidence, the court’s 
failure to strike it is not error. Muldoon v. West End Chevrolet, Inc., 338 Mass. 
91, 98, 153 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1958). See Commonwealth v. Navarro, 39 
Mass. App. Ct. 161, 166, 654 N.E.2d 71, 75 (1995). See Section 104(b)(2), 
Preliminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact.
One appearing pro se is bound by the same rules as those that guide 
attorneys. International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 847, 443 
N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (1983). However, “[w]hether a party is represented by 
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counsel at a trial or represents himself, the judge’s role remains the same. 
The judge’s function at any trial is to be ‘the directing and controlling mind at 
the trial, and not a mere functionary to preserve order and lend ceremonial 
dignity to the proceedings’” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Sapoznik, 
28 Mass. App. Ct. 236, 241–242 n.4, 549 N.E.2d 116, 120 n.4 (1990), quot-
ing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 381 Mass. 90, 118, 407 N.E.2d 1229, 1247 
(1980). See also Judicial Guidelines for Civil  Hearings Involving Self-
Represented Litigants, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Administrative 
Office of the Trial Court (2006).
Subsection (b)(1).
Civil Cases. This subsection as it applies to civil cases is derived from 
Beal v. Nichols, 68 Mass. 262, 264 (1854), and Davis v. Hotels Statler Co., 
327 Mass. 28, 29–30, 97 N.E.2d 187, 188 (1951). This subsection reflects 
the Massachusetts practice of permitting cross-examination on matters be-
yond the subject matter of the direct examination. See Nuger v. Robinson, 32 
Mass. App. Ct. 959, 959–960, 591 N.E.2d 1116, 1116–1117 (1992). Thus, a 
party can put its own case before the jury by the cross-examination of wit-
nesses called by the opposing party. See Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. 490, 
499 (1835).
Criminal Cases. “There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the Su-
preme] Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in 
their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair 
trial which is this country’s constitutional goal” (citation omitted). Common-
wealth v. Tanso, 411 Mass. 640, 650, 583 N.E.2d 1247, 1253 (1992). See 
also Commonwealth v. Farley, 443 Mass. 740, 748, 824 N.E.2d 797, 805 
(2005); Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 449–451, 780 N.E.2d 
1278, 1284–1286 (2003). In determining what is reasonable, the trial judge 
has discretion. “[T]he scope of cross-examination, including to what extent 
the accuracy, veracity, and credibility of a witness may be tested, rests 
largely in the sound discretion of the judge, not subject to revision unless 
prejudice is shown to a party by reason of too narrow restriction or too great 
breadth of inquiry” (citations and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. 
Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 192, 557 N.E.2d 728, 733–734 (1990). Unreason-
able restrictions on the defendant’s right to cross-examination in a criminal 
case require a new trial  unless the error is shown to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 71–73, 648 
N.E.2d 719, 724–725 (1995). See also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 
Mass. 388, 391–392, 708 N.E.2d 658, 662–663 (1999) (conviction reversed 
because scope of cross-examination of police officers too limited; “[i]t is well 
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settled that a defendant has a right to expose inadequacies of police investi-
gation”), and cases cited. The trial judge also has the right to limit cross-
examination when necessary to protect the safety of the witness. See Com-
monwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 357–358, 734 N.E.2d 315, 321–322 
(2000). See also Note “Address of Witness” to Section 501, Privileges Rec-
ognized Only as Provided. The Appeals Court has observed as follows:
“Where there is no opportunity to cross-examine a witness, 
because, for example, he is uncooperative, fails to appear, 
or invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, the striking 
of any direct testimony by that witness may be constitution-
ally required. Generally, a witness’s inability to answer ques-
tions on cross-examination due to lapse of memory, how-
ever, does not require striking his direct testimony.” (Citations 
omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 207, 221, 567 N.E.2d 943, 
952 (1991). The defendant’s right to confrontation is not denied when, on 
cross-examination, a witness refuses to answer questions relating exclu-
sively to collateral matters. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 
707, 713, 412 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1980). Compare Commonwealth v. Almeida, 
452 Mass. 601, 607, 897 N.E.2d 14, 22 (2008) (defendant was not denied his 
right to confront a key identification witness who was unable to recall numer-
ous details; “[i]t was entirely reasonable for the witness to have no memory of 
some of the information sought by many of the questions”), and Common-
wealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 234–235, 535 N.E.2d 193, 202 (1989) 
(lapse of memory by witness on cross-examination did not deny defendant 
right to confrontation), with Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 292, 
397 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (1979) (trial judge was required to strike witness’s 
direct testimony when witness asserted privilege against self-incrimination 
during cross-examination), and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 
543–544, 313 N.E.2d 571, 576–577 (1974) (defendant denied right to con-
frontation when judge, concerned for safety of witness, ordered witness to 
not answer questions on cross-examination).
Fairness to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth has a common-
law right to reasonable cross-examination of witnesses called by the defen-
dant. See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 408 Mass. 185, 192, 557 N.E.2d 728, 
733 (1990).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Marti-
nez, 384 Mass. 377, 380–381, 425 N.E.2d 300, 302–303 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. 454, 459, 327 N.E.2d 720, 723–724 (1975); and 
Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 79, 122 N.E. 176, 184 (1919). “This 
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right of cross-examination may assume constitutional dimensions under the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. at 459, 327 N.E.2d at 
724. This right applies with special  force whenever there is evidence that the 
testimony of a witness is given in exchange for some anticipated considera-
tion or reward by the government, see Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass. 
385, 392, 504 N.E.2d 624, 629 (1987); Commonwealth v. O’Neil, 51 Mass. 
App. Ct. 170, 178–181, 744 N.E.2d 86, 92–94 (2001), or when it concerns 
the subject of identification. See Commonwealth v. Vardinski, 438 Mass. 444, 
450, 780 N.E.2d 1278, 1285 (2003). However, the trial judge has consider-
able discretion to limit such cross-examination when it becomes redundant or 
touches on matters of tangential  materiality. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 
439 Mass. 47, 55, 785 N.E.2d 368, 375 (2003); Commonwealth v. Noj, 76 
Mass. App. Ct. 194, 198–199, 920 N.E.2d 894, 897–898 (2010).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 22; Carney v. 
Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 510, 204 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1965); and Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 43(b). “[T]he decision whether to allow leading questions should be 
left for the most part to the wisdom and discretion of the trial  judge instead of 
being restricted by the mechanical  operation of inflexible rules” (citations and 
quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 467, 287 N.E.2d 
420, 430 (1972). See Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139, 162–163, 
207 N.E.2d 29, 43 (1965) (rulings on whether witness is hostile and whether 
cross-examination of the witness by his or her proponent are permitted are 
within discretion of trial  judge). Some judges in Massachusetts require that 
when the subject of the cross-examination enters material not covered on 
direct, the attorney should no longer use leading questions.
Although as a general rule leading questions should not be used on di-
rect examination, there are many instances where they are permitted in the 
discretion of the judge. See, e.g., DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 
510, 512, 306 N.E.2d 432, 433 (1974) (refresh memory); Commonwealth v. 
Aronson, 330 Mass. 453, 460, 115 N.E.2d 362, 367 (1953) (witness under 
stress); Gray v. Kelley, 190 Mass. 184, 187, 76 N.E. 724, 726 (1906) (elderly 
witness); Commonwealth v. Lamontagne, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 213, 217–218, 
675 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (1997) (child witness).
The use of leading questions on direct examination of an adverse party 
is authorized by statute. See G. L. c. 233, § 22 (“A party who calls the ad-
verse party as a witness shall  be allowed to cross-examine him. In case the 
adverse party is a corporation, an officer or agent thereof, so called as a wit-
ness, shall be deemed such an adverse party for the purposes of this sec-
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tion.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(b) (“A party may call  an adverse party or an officer, 
director, or managing agent of a public  or private corporation or of a partner-
ship or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading 
questions and contradict and impeach him in all  respects as if he had been 
called by the adverse party.”). When a party calls an adverse witness, that 
party may inquire by means of leading questions. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(b). 
Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 22. However, such examination is limited by G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23, concerning impeachment of one’s own witness. See Walter v. Bonito, 
367 Mass. 117, 122, 324 N.E.2d 624, 627 (1975). If a party is called as an 
adverse witness by opposing counsel, the trial  judge may, in his or her dis-
cretion, permit leading questions on cross-examination. See Westland Hous. 
Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 383–384, 44 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1942).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Roberts, 
433 Mass. 45, 51, 740 N.E.2d 176, 181 (2000), and Commonwealth v. 
Guidry, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 909, 491 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1986). A party may 
not present rebuttal  evidence that only “supports a party’s affirmative case.” 
Drake v. Goodman, 386 Mass. 88, 92, 434 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (1982). In 
other words, a party may not “present one theory of causation in his case-in-
chief and, as a matter of right, present a different theory of causation in re-
buttal.” Id. at 93, 434 N.E.2d at 1213. This is especially true when a party is 
aware of the evidence prior to trial and could have presented it as part of the 
case-in-chief. Id.
Subsection (e). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Maltais, 
387 Mass. 79, 92, 438 N.E.2d 847, 854 (1982) (redirect examination), and 
Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 476, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 
(1995) (recross-examination). Cf. Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 43(b).
Subsection (f). This subsection is derived from Kerr v. Palmieri, 325 Mass. 
554, 557, 91 N.E.2d 754, 756 (1950) (“As a general  proposition, the granting 
of a motion to permit additional  evidence to be introduced after the trial has 
been closed rests in the discretion of the trial  judge.”). See also Common-
wealth v. Moore, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 126–127, 751 N.E.2d 901, 905–907 
(2001) (“We also add that the decision whether to reopen a case is one that 
cannot be made in an arbitrary or capricious manner. It would be a wise prac-
tice in the future for trial judges to place on the record their reasons for exer-
cising their discretion either for or against reopening the case.”).
Criminal Cases. The constitutional  rights of the defendant in a criminal 
case limit the discretion of the court to allow the Commonwealth to reopen. It 
is only within the court’s discretion
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“to permit reopening when mere inadvertence or some other 
compelling circumstance . . . justifies a reopening and no 
substantial  prejudice will occur. If the court in the exercise of 
cautious discretion allows the prosecution to reopen its case 
before the defendant begins its defense, that reopening does 
not violate either the rules of criminal procedure or the de-
fendant’s right not to be put twice in jeopardy.”
Commonwealth v. Cote, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 241, 444 N.E.2d 1282, 1290 
(1983), quoting United States v. Hinderman, 625 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 
1980). Compare Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 68, 913 N.E.2d 
850, 863 (2009) (where police officer had gestured at and nodded to the de-
fendant during his testimony, but had not formally identified the defendant on 
the record, trial judge did not err in permitting the Commonwealth to reopen 
its case to offer this minimal identification evidence), with Commonwealth v. 
Zavala, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 770, 779, 756 N.E.2d 29, 36–37 (2001) (trial judge 
committed prejudicial error in allowing the Commonwealth to reopen its case 
to prove an essential  element of the offense, previously neglected, where the 
burden of proving that element was clearly the Commonwealth’s and the 
omission was identified by the defendant’s motion). See also Commonwealth 
v. Hurley, 455 Mass. at 68, 913 N.E.2d at 863, for a survey of cases.
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 192
Section 612. Writing or Object Used to Refresh 
Memory
(a) While Testifying.
(1) General Rule. When a testifying witness’s memory  is ex-
hausted as to a matter about which he or she once had knowledge, 
the witness’s memory may be refreshed, in the presence of the 
jury, with any writing or other object that permits the witness to 
further testify from his or her own memory. The writing or object 
should not be shown to the jury.
(2) Production and Use.
(A) When a testifying witness uses a writing or object to re-
fresh his or her memory, an adverse party  is entitled to the 
production of the writing or object after it is shown to the 
witness and before cross-examination, even if it  contains in-
formation subject to work-product protection.
(B) A party entitled to the production of a writing or object 
under this section is entitled to examine the writing or so 
much of it as relates to the case on trial, may cross-examine 
about it, and may introduce it in evidence to show that it 
could not or did not aid the witness in any legitimate way.
(b) Before Testifying.
(1) Production. If, before testifying, a witness uses a writing or 
object to refresh his or her memory for the purpose of testifying, 
an adverse party has no absolute right to the production and in-
spection of the writing or object. The trial judge, however, in his 
or her discretion, may, at the request of the adverse party, order 
production of the writing or object at the trial, hearing, or deposi-
tion in which the witness is testifying if it is practicable and the 
interests of justice so require.
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(2) Admissibility. Where the adverse party at  trial calls for a writ-
ing or other object from his or her opponent that was used to re-
fresh the witness’s memory prior to trial, does so in front of the 
jury, and receives and examines it, the writing or other object may 
be offered in evidence by the producing party when necessary to 
prevent the impression of evasion or concealment, even though it 
would have been incompetent if it had not been called for and ex-
amined.
NOTE
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
O’Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 478–479, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (1995) (citing with 
approval Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 612), and Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 
59, 63, 52 N.E.2d 2, 5 (1943). A witness may use a writing or other object to 
refresh a failing memory. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 419 Mass. at 478, 645 
N.E.2d at 1175. The witness’s testimony, however, must be the product of 
present recollection. See Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 376, 377 
N.E.2d 685, 691 (1978). This subsection should not be confused with the 
doctrine of past recollection recorded.
Cross-Reference: Section 803(5), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of 
Declarant Immaterial: Past Recollection Recorded.
Subsection (a)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
O’Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 478–480, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1174–1176 (1995). “[W]
hen materials protected by the work product doctrine are used by the exam-
iner to refresh a witness’s recollection on the stand, the protection afforded 
by the work product doctrine is waived and the opponent’s attorney is entitled 
to inspect the writing.” Id. at 478, 645 N.E.2d at 1175. The Supreme Judicial 
Court observed in dicta that
“[t]he few State courts that have addressed the issue of the 
conflict between the rule and protected documents used 
while the witness is on the stand have reached conclusions 
similar to the Federal courts, i.e., that use of protected mate-
rial to refresh a witness’s recollection on the stand consti-
tutes waiver of that protection.”
Id. at 479, 645 N.E.2d at 1176.
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Subsection (a)(2)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Bendett 
v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 62–63, 52 N.E.2d 2, 5 (1943) (allowing adverse 
party to show that writing or object did not or could not have refreshed the 
memory of the witness).
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Leonard v. Taylor, 315 
Mass. 580, 583–584, 53 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1944), citing Goldman v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942). This rule has been the subject of consid-
erable criticism. See Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 479 n.5, 645 
N.E.2d 1170, 1175 n.5 (1995) (“Presently, the more controversial  issue, and 
the one on which courts are still somewhat unclear, is whether an adverse 
party has a right under [Fed. R. Evid.] 612 to inspect protected and privileged 
documents used by the witness to refresh her recollection prior to testify-
ing.”); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 354 Mass. 713, 721–722, 242 N.E.2d 545, 
551 (1968) (“It is an artificial distinction to allow inspection of notes used on 
the stand to refresh recollection and to decline it where the witness inspects 
his notes just before being called to the stand.”).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Leonard v. Taylor, 315 
Mass. 580, 581–584, 53 N.E.2d 705, 706–707 (1944). The purpose of this 
rule is to protect the opposing party from the impression of evasion and con-
cealment from a “bold and dramatic  demand” by the adverse party—not to 
make otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible—and should therefore be 
used sparingly. See id. at 582–583, 53 N.E.2d at 706–707.
Cross-Reference: Section 106(b), Doctrine of Completeness: Curative 
Admissibility.
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Section 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses, 
Limited Admissibility
(a) Prior Inconsistent Statements.
(1) Examining Own Witness. A party who produces a witness 
may prove that the witness made prior statements inconsistent 
with his or her present testimony; but before proof of such incon-
sistent statements is given, the party must lay a foundation by ask-
ing the witness if the prior statements were in fact made and by 
giving the witness an opportunity to explain.
(2) Examining Other Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior in-
consistent statement by a witness, other than a witness covered 
under Section 613(a)(1), is admissible whether or not the witness 
was afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency.
(3) Disclosure of Extrinsic Evidence. In examining a witness, 
other than a witness covered under Section 613(a)(1), concerning 
a prior statement made by such witness, whether written or not, 
the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the 
witness at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or 
disclosed to opposing counsel.
(4) Collateral Matter. Extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on 
a collateral matter is not admissible as of right, but only in the ex-
ercise of sound discretion by the trial judge.
(b) Prior Consistent Statements.
(1) Generally Inadmissible. A prior consistent statement by a 
witness is generally inadmissible.
(2) Exception. If the court makes a preliminary finding that there 
is a claim that the witness’s in-court testimony is the result of re-
cent contrivance or a bias, and the prior consistent statement was 
made before the witness had a motive to fabricate or the occur-
rence of the event indicating a bias, the evidence may be admitted 
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for the limited purpose of rebutting the claim of recent contriv-
ance or bias.
NOTE
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 23, and 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. 811, 824 n.14, 564 N.E.2d 370, 379 n.14 
(1990). See Sherman v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 345 Mass. 777, 778, 189 
N.E.2d 526, 527 (1963); Commonwealth v. Anselmo, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 602, 
609, 603 N.E.2d 227, 232 (1992). If the witness denies making the prior 
statement, he or she need not be given the opportunity to explain it. Com-
monwealth v. Scott, 408 Mass. at 824 n.14, 564 N.E.2d at 379 n.14. See 
Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 425–426, 341 N.E.2d 276, 281 
(1976).
Cross-Reference: Section 607, Who May Impeach.
Subsections (a)(2) and (3). These subsections are derived from Hubley v. 
Lilley, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 472, 473 n.7, 552 N.E.2d 573, 575–576, 576 
n.7 (1990). Opposing counsel has a right to examine the statement before 
conducting any further inquiry of the witness to prevent selective quotation of 
the prior statement by the questioner and to insure that the witness has an 
opportunity to explain or elaborate on the alleged inconsistencies. Id. This 
right arises after the examination of the witness under Subsection (a)(1) or 
(a)(2) and does not permit counsel  to make a demand for a document before 
the jury during opposing counsel’s cross-examination. See Section 103(c), 
Rulings on Evidence, Objections, and Offers of Proof: Hearing of Jury. Such 
conduct may warrant the court admitting extrinsic  evidence of the prior in-
consistent statement. See Section 612(b)(2), Writing or Object Used to Re-
fresh Memory: Before Testifying: Admissibility.
A prior inconsistent statement offered to impeach one’s own witness, 
Subsection (a)(1), or an opposing party’s witness, Subsection (a)(2), is not 
admissible for its truth unless (1) there is no objection or (2) it falls within the 
exception set forth in Section 801(d)(1)(A), Definitions: Statements Which 
Are Not Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness: Prior Inconsistent Statement 
Before a Grand Jury, at a Trial, at a Probable Cause Hearing, or at a Deposi-
tion, or another hearsay exception. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 439 Mass. 
249, 261–262, 786 N.E.2d 1197, 1208 (2003); Commonwealth v. Keevan, 
400 Mass. 557, 562, 511 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1987); Commonwealth v. 
Balukonis, 357 Mass. 721, 726 n.6, 260 N.E.2d 167, 171 n.6 (1970).
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Use of Certain Prior Inconsistent Statements of Defendant in 
Criminal Case. Trial  judges must proceed with caution when the Common-
wealth seeks to impeach the defendant with his or her pretrial silence. See 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611, 617, 618 (1976) (use of defendant’s 
postarrest silence violates Federal due process); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 
454 Mass. 808, 828, 913 N.E.2d 356, 373 (2009) (same). In Massachusetts, 
even use of the defendant’s prearrest silence may violate Article 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971); 
Commonwealth v. Ly, 454 Mass. 223, 228, 908 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (2009); 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 364 Mass. 236, 240–241, 303 N.E.2d 115, 118 
(1973); Commonwealth v. Sazama, 339 Mass. 154, 157–158, 158 N.E.2d 
313, 316 (1959). See also Section 511(a)(2), Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: Privilege of Defendant in Criminal Proceeding: Refusal Evi-
dence. Although a statement obtained in violation of a person’s rights under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States may be used for impeachment purposes, see United States v. Ha-
vens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–628 (1980), Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights 
forbids the use of evidence in the case of electronic eavesdropping in or 
about a private home. Compare Commonwealth v. Fini, 403 Mass. 567, 573–
574, 531 N.E.2d 570, 574 (1988) (excluding statements), with Common-
wealth v. Eason, 427 Mass. 595, 600-601, 694 N.E.2d 1264, 1267-1268 
(1998) (admitting statements).
Cross-Reference: Section 525(b), Comment upon or Inference from 
Claim of Privilege: Criminal Case; Section 104(d), Preliminary Questions: 
Testimony by Accused.
Prior Statements That Qualify as Inconsistent. “It is not necessary 
that the prior statement contradict in plain terms the testimony of the wit-
ness.” Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 386 Mass. 234, 242, 434 N.E.2d 1270, 
1276 (1982). “It is enough if the proffered testimony, taken as a whole, either 
by what it says or by what it omits to say, affords some indication that the fact 
was different from the testimony of the witness whom it is sought to contra-
dict.” Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 161, 434 N.E.2d 1238, 
1244 (1982). An omission in a prior statement may render that statement 
inconsistent “when it would have been natural  to include the fact in the initial 
statement.” Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 72, 653 N.E.2d 
1119, 1120 (1995). See also Langan v. Pignowski, 307 Mass. 149, 29 N.E.2d 
700 (1940). It follows that a witness who denies making an earlier statement 
may be impeached with it, while a witness who is unable to remember the 
earlier statement, but does not deny making it, may have his or her recollec-
tion refreshed. See Section 612(a)(1), Writing or Object Used to Refresh 
Memory: While Testifying: General Rule. Ordinarily, “[t]here is no inconsis-
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tency between a present failure of memory on the witness stand and a past 
existence of memory” (citation and quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 417 Mass. 187, 197, 629 N.E.2d 297, 303 (1994). However, if the trial 
judge makes a preliminary determination (see Section 104(a), Preliminary 
Questions: Determinations Made by the Court) that the witness’s present 
failure of memory is fabricated, the witness’s prior detailed statement is ad-
missible for impeachment purposes. See Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 
Mass. 735, 742–743 & n.7, 740 N.E.2d 602, 608 & n.7 (2000). Cf. Note 
“Feigning Lack of Memory” to Section 801(d)(1)(A), Definitions: Statements 
Which Are Not Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness: Prior Inconsistent 
Statement Before a Grand Jury, at a Trial, at a Probable Cause Hearing, or at 
a Deposition (feigning lack of memory may result in the admission of a prior 
statement, not simply for impeachment purposes, but also for its truth). A wit-
ness who gives a detailed account of an incident at trial but who indicated at 
some earlier point in time only limited or no memory of the details of the inci-
dent may be impeached with that earlier failure of memory. Commonwealth v. 
Granito, 326 Mass. 494, 500, 95 N.E.2d 539, 543 (1950).
If a witness previously remained “silent in circumstances in which he 
naturally would have been expected to deny some asserted fact . . . the jury 
may consider the failure to respond in assessing the veracity of the witness 
in testifying contrary to the fact that was adoptively admitted by his silence.” 
Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 57, 434 N.E.2d 992, 994 (1982). 
In circumstances where it “would not be natural  for a witness to provide the 
police before trial with exculpatory information,” this omission is admissible to 
impeach the witness at trial only after first establishing “[1] that the witness 
knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he possessed 
exculpatory information, [2] that the witness had reason to make the informa-
tion available, [and] [3] that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to 
the proper authorities . . . .” Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 238–
239, 914 N.E.2d 904, 911 (2009). See id. at 239–240, 914 N.E.2d at 912 
(abolishing requirement that prosecutor needs to “elicit from the witness that 
she was not asked by the defendant or the defense attorney to refrain from 
disclosing her exculpatory information to law enforcement authorities”). The 
Supreme Judicial Court has observed that
“[t]here are some circumstances, though, in which it would 
not be natural for a witness to provide the police before trial 
with exculpatory information, such as when the witness does 
not realize she possesses exculpatory information, when she 
thinks that her information will  not affect the decision to 
prosecute, or when she does not know how to furnish such 
information to law enforcement.”
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Id. at 238, 914 N.E.2d at 911.
Although there is discretion involved in determining whether to admit or 
exclude evidence offered for impeachment, when the impeaching evidence is 
directly related to testimony on a central  issue in the case, there is no discre-
tion to exclude it. See Commonwealth v. McGowan, 400 Mass. 385, 390–
391, 510 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1987). See Section 611(d), Manner and Order of 
Interrogation and Presentation: Rebuttal Evidence.
Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Farley, 
443 Mass. 740, 751, 824 N.E.2d 797, 807 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 747, 363 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (1977), citing Common-
wealth v. Doherty, 353 Mass. 197, 213–214, 229 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1967), 
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 982 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Zezima, 365 
Mass. 238, 242 n.5, 310 N.E.2d 590, 593 n.5 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 
387 Mass. 748, 443 N.E.2d 1282 (1982); Leone v. Doran, 363 Mass. 1, 15–
16, 292 N.E.2d 19, 30 (1973), modified on other grounds, 363 Mass. 886, 
297 N.E.2d 493 (1973); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 308 Mass. 481, 495, 33 
N.E.2d 303, 311 (1941). This principle is based on the practical need to keep 
a case from getting out of control. See Abramian v. President & Fellows of 
Harvard Coll., 432 Mass. 107, 120, 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1087 (2000). The bet-
ter practice is to exclude such evidence in a criminal case when it bears on a 
defendant’s character. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 425 Mass. 349, 355–356 
n.6, 680 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 n.6 (1997).
When the extrinsic  evidence relates exclusively to a collateral matter, 
the discretion of the trial judge has been described as “nearly unreversible.” 
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 51, 740 N.E.2d 176, 181 (2000), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 89, 669 N.E.2d 
212, 217 (1996).
“Because bias, prejudice, and motive to lie are not considered collateral 
matters, they may be demonstrated by extrinsic proof as well  as on cross-
examination. There is no requirement that the opponent cross-examine on 
the matter as a foundation prior to offering extrinsic  evidence.” (Citations 
omitted.) Commonwealth v. Hall, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 213 n.7, 736 N.E.2d 
425, 430 n.7 (2000), quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence § 6.9, at 
299–300 (7th ed. 1999).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Novo, 
449 Mass. 84, 93, 865 N.E.2d 777, 785 (2007), and Commonwealth v. Kin-
dell, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 202, 689 N.E.2d 845, 847 (1998). “The reason 
for the rule is that the testimony of a witness in court should not need—and 
ought not—to be ‘pumped up’ by evidence that the witness said the same 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 200
thing on some prior occasion.” Commonwealth v. Kindell, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 202–203, 689 N.E.2d at 847–848. “The trial  judge has a range of discre-
tion in determining whether a suggestion of recent contrivance exists in the 
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 27, 345 N.E.2d 
690, 693 (1976). However, “the impeachment of a witness by prior inconsis-
tent statements or omissions does not, standing alone, entitle the adverse 
party to introduce other prior statements made by the witness that are con-
sistent with his trial  testimony.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 
474, 482, 811 N.E.2d 1003, 1009 (2004), citing Commonwealth v. Retkovitz, 
222 Mass. 245, 249–250, 110 N.E. 293, 294 (1915). Such statements 
“should be allowed only with caution, and where the probative value for the 
proper purpose is clear.” Commonwealth v. Lareau, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 
683, 642 N.E.2d 308, 311 (1994), quoting Commonwealth v. Darden, 5 Mass. 
App. Ct. 522, 528, 364 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (1977).
The judge may admit a prior consistent statement on direct examination, 
prior to any impeachment, if it is obvious that a claim of recent contrivance 
will  be made (e.g., when a party makes a statement in his or her opening 
statement that he or she will  attack the credibility of the witness on cross-
examination on the basis of recent contrivance). See Commonwealth v. Bar-
bosa, 457 Mass. 773, 797–798, 933 N.E.2d 93, 114–115 (2010) (opponent’s 
opening statement suggested recent contrivance).
A prior consistent statement that does not meet the requirements of this 
subsection nonetheless may be admissible on other grounds. See Com-
monwealth v. Tennison, 440 Mass. 553, 562–564, 800 N.E.2d 285, 294–296 
(2003) (verbal completeness).
Cross-Reference: Section 413, First Complaint of Sexual Assault; Sec-
tion 611(a), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Control  by 
Court; Note to Section 801(d)(1)(B), Definitions: Statements Which Are Not 
Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness; Section 801(d)(1)(C), Definitions: 
Statements Which Are Not Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness: Identifica-
tion; Section 1104, Witness Cooperation Agreements.
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Section 614. Calling and Interrogation of 
Witnesses by Court or Jurors
(a) Calling by Court. When necessary in the interest of justice, the 
court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call wit-
nesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus 
called.
(b) Interrogation by Court. The court may question a witness in or-
der to clarify  an issue, to prevent perjury, or to develop trustworthy 
testimony, provided that the judge remains impartial.
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling or questioning of witnesses 
by the court may be made outside the presence of the jury.
(d) Interrogation by Jurors. The court, in its discretion, may allow 
questions posed by the jury, subject to the following procedures:
(1) The judge should instruct the jury  that  they  will be given the 
opportunity to pose questions to witnesses.
(2) Jurors’ questions need not be limited to important matters, but 
may also seek clarification of a witness’s testimony.
(3) The judge should emphasize to jurors that, although they are 
not expected to understand the technical rules of evidence, their 
questions must comply with those rules, and so the judge may 
have to alter or to refuse a particular question.
(4) The judge should emphasize that, if a particular question is 
altered or refused, the juror who poses the question must  not be 
offended or hold that against either party.
(5) The judge should tell the jurors that they should not give the 
answers to their own questions or questions by other jurors a dis-
proportionate weight.
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(6) These instructions should be given before the testimony begins 
and repeated during the final charge to the jury before they begin 
deliberations.
(7) All questions should be submitted in writing to the judge, with 
the juror’s identification number included on each question.
(8) On submission of questions, counsel should have an opportu-
nity, outside the hearing of the jury, to examine the questions with 
the judge, make any suggestions, or register objections.
(9) Counsel should be given an opportunity to reexamine a wit-
ness after juror interrogation with respect to the subject matter of 
the juror questions.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Quincy Trust Co. v. Taylor, 
317 Mass. 195, 198, 57 N.E.2d 573, 575 (1944). See also Henry T. Lummus, 
The Trial Judge 19–21 (Chicago, The Foundation Press 1937).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Lucien, 
440 Mass. 658, 664, 801 N.E.2d 247, 254 (2004), and Commonwealth v. 
Fitzgerald, 380 Mass. 840, 846–847, 406 N.E.2d 389, 395–396 (1980). See 
Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 422, 341 N.E.2d 276, 279 (1976) 
(“There is no doubt that a judge can properly question a witness, albeit some 
of the answers may tend to reinforce the Commonwealth’s case, so long as 
the examination is not partisan in nature, biased, or a display of belief in the 
defendant’s guilt.”); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819, 826–827, 308 
N.E.2d 902, 908 (1974) (“The judge has a right, and it is perhaps sometimes 
a duty, to intervene on occasion in the examination of a witness. . . . Here a 
discrepancy appeared between the proffered testimony and earlier testimony 
of the same witnesses. A likely possibility existed that each witness would 
perjure himself or admit to perjury in his prior statement. As this became evi-
dent to the judge, he indulged in no transgression when for the benefit of the 
witness and to aid in developing the most trustworthy evidence he took a 
hand in indicating to the witness the extent of the inconsistencies. In this 
case the questioning by the judge was not clearly biased or coercive.” [Cita-
tions omitted.]). See also Commonwealth v. Hanscomb, 367 Mass. 726, 732, 
388 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1975) (Hennessey, J., concurring) (“The judge need 
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not be mute; he is more than a referee. Justice may require that he ask ques-
tions at times. However, the primary principle in jury trials is that he must use 
this power with restraint.”). Compare Commonwealth v. Watkins, 63 Mass. 
App. Ct. 69, 74, 823 N.E.2d 404, 407 (2005) (trial judge’s questions were 
appropriate because they helped to clarify the testimony), with Common-
wealth v. Hassey, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 810–811, 668 N.E.2d 357, 359–361 
(1996) (judge’s cross-examination of defense witnesses “too partisan” and 
lacked appropriate foundation).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Fitzger-
ald, 380 Mass. 840, 846, 406 N.E.2d 389, 395 (1980). Despite “the natural 
reluctance of trial  counsel to object to questions or comments coming from a 
judge, sometimes trial counsel’s duty to protect his client’s rights requires him 
to object, preferably at the bench out of the jury’s hearing.” Id. Where a party 
fails to object at trial to questions by the judge, any error by the trial  judge is 
reviewed for a substantial  risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5, 763 N.E.2d 83, 85 (2002).
Subsection (d). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 613–614, 744 N.E.2d 1089, 1105–1106 
(2001). See also Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692, 701–703, 632 
N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (1994). In addition to the procedures outlined in Subsec-
tion (d), the judge should instruct the jury “not to let themselves become 
aligned with any party, and that their questions should not be directed at 
helping or responding to any party”; the judge should also instruct the jurors 
“not to discuss the questions among themselves but, rather each juror must 
decide independently any questions he or she may have for a witness.” 
Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. at 613–614, 744 N.E.2d at 1105. Upon 
counsels’ review of the submitted questions, “[t]he judge should rule on any 
objections at [that] time, including any objection that the question touches on 
a matter that counsel purposefully avoided as a matter of litigation strategy, 
and that, if asked, will cause particular prejudice to the party.” Id. at 614, 744 
N.E.2d at 1105–1106. Finally, the scope of the reexamination of the witness 
after juror interrogation “should ordinarily be limited to the subject matter 
raised by the juror question and the witness’s answer. The purpose of reex-
amination is two fold. First, it cures the admission of any prejudicial questions 
or answers; and second, it prevents the jury from becoming adversary in its 
interrogation.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at 614, 744 N.E.2d at 1106.
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Section 615. Sequestration of Witnesses
At the request of a party, or sua sponte, the court may order wit-
nesses excluded so that they  cannot hear the testimony of other wit-
nesses. The court may not exclude any parties to the action in a civil 
proceeding, or the defendant in a criminal proceeding.
NOTE
This section is derived from Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 
350 Mass. 485, 487, 215 N.E.2d 652, 653 (1966), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 21 
(“Upon his own motion or the motion of either party, the judge may, prior to or 
during the examination of a witness, order any witness or witnesses other 
than the defendant to be excluded from the courtroom.”). See Common-
wealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 508, 269 N.E.2d 687, 693 (1971) (court 
may except from general  sequestration order a witness deemed “essential to 
the management of the case”).
“Sequestration of witnesses lies in the discretion of the trial judge.” 
Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 350 Mass. at 487, 215 N.E.2d 
at 653. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 405 Mass. 339, 343, 540 N.E.2d 681, 
683 (1989) (court has discretion to exempt a police officer in charge of the 
investigation from a sequestration order). Upon a violation of a sequestration 
order, a trial judge has discretion in taking remedial action. See, e.g., Cus-
tody of a Minor (No. 2), 392 Mass. 719, 726, 467 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (1984) 
(trial judge may exclude testimony of person who violates sequestration or-
der); Commonwealth v. Navarro, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 223, 310 N.E.2d 372, 
378 (1974) (“but even in a case where a violation of sequestration order is 
wilful a trial judge might for good reason prefer to invoke contempt proceed-
ings rather than declare a mistrial”).
The second sentence of this section is derived from the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. See also Common-
wealth v. Nwachukwu, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 112, 117–120, 837 N.E.2d 301, 
306–308 (2005). Civil litigants also have a right to be present during the trial. 
See White v. White, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 141–142, 662 N.E.2d 230, 236–
237 (1996).
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ARTICLE VII.  OPINION AND EXPERT EVI-
DENCE
Section 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay 
Witnesses
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testi-
mony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions 
or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness;
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or 
the determination of a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge within the scope of Section 702.
NOTE
This section, which is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 701, reflects 
Massachusetts practice. See Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 129, 112 N.E. 
850, 851 (1916); Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 133, 137 
(1875); Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 390–391, 670 
N.E.2d 207, 210 (1996). “The rule that witnesses in describing conduct 
should tell  what they saw and heard does not foreclose the use of words of 
summary description.” Kane v. Fields Corner Grille, Inc., 341 Mass. 640, 647, 
171 N.E.2d 287, 292 (1961) (judge had the discretion to permit witnesses to 
use the words “boisterous” and “in an arrogant manner” in describing the ac-
tions of a person they observed). Accord Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 
Mass. 327, 339, 140 N.E.2d 140, 151 (1957) (condition of nervousness or 
happiness). See also Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 830, 840 
N.E.2d 939, 947 (2006); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 91, 
845 N.E.2d 434, 440 (2006).
A witness may not express an opinion about the credibility of another 
witness. See Commonwealth v. Triplett, 398 Mass. 561, 567, 500 N.E.2d 
262, 265 (1986).
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Illustrations. When due to the complexity of expressing the observation 
such evidence might otherwise not be available, witnesses are permitted, out 
of necessity, to use “shorthand expressions” to describe observed facts such 
as the identity, size, distance, and speed of objects; the length of the pas-
sage of time; and the age, identity, and conduct of persons. See Common-
wealth v. Tracy, 349 Mass. 87, 95–96, 207 N.E.2d 16, 20–21 (1965); Noyes 
v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 129–130, 112 N.E. 850, 851 (1916); Ross v. John 
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 Mass. 560, 562, 111 N.E. 390, 391 (1916). 
An experienced police officer, or possibly even a lay witness, could opine on 
whether a scene was suggestive of a struggle. Commonwealth v. Burgess, 
450 Mass. 422, 436 n.8, 879 N.E.2d 63, 76 n.8 (2008).
A police officer or lay witness may provide an opinion, in summary form, 
about another person’s sobriety, provided there exists a basis for that opin-
ion. Commonwealth v. Orben, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 700, 704, 761 N.E.2d 991, 
995–996 (2002). As a lay witness, a police officer may testify to the admini-
stration and results of field sobriety tests that measure a person’s balance, 
coordination, and acuity of mind in understanding and performing simple in-
structions, as a juror understands from common experience and knowledge 
that “intoxication leads to diminished balance, coordination, and mental acu-
ity.” Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 187, 675 N.E.2d 370, 372 
(1997) (contrasting the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, which requires ex-
pert testimony, from “ordinary” field sobriety tests such as a nine-step walk 
and turn and recitation of the alphabet); Id. at 186, 675 N.E.2d at 371 (“Ex-
pert testimony on the scientific theory is needed if the subject of expert testi-
mony is beyond the common knowledge or understanding of the lay juror.”).
In Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 133 (1875), the Su-
preme Judicial Court stated that a witness “may state his opinion in regard to 
sounds, their character, from what they proceed, and the direction from which 
they seem to come.” See also McGrath v. Fash, 244 Mass. 327, 329, 139 
N.E. 303, 304 (1923) (witness permitted to testify that “all of a sudden this 
truck came around the corner on two wheels, and zigzagging across the 
street and appeared to be out of the control of the driver”); Commonwealth v. 
Rodziewicz, 213 Mass. 68, 69, 99 N.E. 574, 575 (1912) (it was error to per-
mit a police investigator to identify points of origin of a fire based simply on 
observations about condition of the burned structure).
A lay opinion as to sanity or mental capacity is permitted only by an at-
testing witness to a will  and only as to the testator’s mental  condition at the 
time of its execution. See Holbrook v. Seagrave, 228 Mass. 26, 29, 116 N.E. 
889, 890–891 (1917); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 447, 99 
N.E. 266, 269–270 (1912).
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This section does not permit a witness to express an opinion about what 
someone was intending or planning to do based on an observation of the 
person. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 319 Mass. 228, 230, 65 N.E.2d 422, 
423–424 (1946).
In some circumstances, lay witnesses are permitted to identify a person 
in a photograph or on videotape. Compare Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 
Mass. 426, 459–460 & n.29, 381 N.E.2d 582, 600–601 & n.29 (1978) (allow-
ing police officer to testify that a photograph selected by a witness depicted 
the defendant because his appearance had changed since the date of the 
offense), and Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 323–329, 729 
N.E.2d 642, 644–648 (2000) (allowing police officer to testify that man de-
picted in a surveillance videotape who was holding the victim was the defen-
dant “because [1] the image in the videotape and the prints made from it 
were of poor quality . . . [2] [the officer] had long familiarity with the defendant 
that enabled him to identify an indistinct picture of the defendant; [3] there 
was some change in the appearance of the defendant at trial and as he gen-
erally presented in everyday life outdoors; and [4] the acquaintanceship of 
[the officer] with the defendant, as it was presented to the jury, was social 
rather than tied to [the officer’s] duties as a police officer”), with Common-
wealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 365–366, 657 N.E.2d 458, 463–464 (1995) 
(excluding testimony of police officer identifying person in a surveillance 
videotape as the defendant because the jury was equally capable of making 
the determination), and Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37, 41–42, 218 
N.E.2d 72, 76–77 (1966) (because a sketch and a photograph of the defen-
dant were in evidence the jury did not require any assistance from a witness 
who was asked whether they were a likeness of the defendant).
Depending on the circumstances, opinion testimony about the value of 
real or personal property may be given by lay witnesses or expert witnesses. 
With regard to lay witnesses,
“[t]he rule which permits the owner of real  or personal prop-
erty to testify as to its value does not rest upon the fact that 
he holds the legal title. The mere holding of the title to prop-
erty by one who knows nothing about it and perhaps has 
never even seen it does not rationally and logically give him 
any qualification to express an opinion as to its value. Ordi-
narily an owner of property is actually familiar with its charac-
teristics, has some acquaintance with its uses actual and 
potential  and has had experience in dealing with it. It is this 
familiarity, knowledge and experience, not the holding of the 
title, which qualify him to testify as to its value.”
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Menici  v. Orton Crane & Shovel Co., 285 Mass. 499, 503, 189 N.E. 839, 841 
(1934). Accord von Henneberg v. Generazio, 403 Mass. 519, 524, 531 
N.E.2d 563, 566 (1988) (same rule applied to landowner’s opinion as to 
damages to his property caused by filling of drainage ditch by abutter); 
Turner v. Leonard, Inc., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 909, 910–911, 455 N.E.2d 1215, 
1217 (1983) (owner was not so familiar with his automobile to permit him to 
offer an opinion as to its value). A lay witness also may testify to the value of 
his or her own services. Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 273, 770 N.E.2d 
961, 979 (2002).
Ultimately, the admission of summary descriptions of observed facts is 
left to the discretion of the trial judge. Kane v. Fields Corner Grille, Inc., 341 
Mass. 640, 647, 171 N.E.2d 287, 292 (1961) (“Trials are not to be delayed 
and witnesses made inarticulate by too nice objections or rulings as to the 
use of such descriptive words”).
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Section 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify  thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise if
(a) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(b) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and
(c) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.
NOTE
Introduction. This section, which is based upon Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 702, reflects Massachusetts law. There are two meth-
ods by which the judge may satisfy his or her duty as the gatekeeper to en-
sure that expert witness testimony is reliable: (1) the “Frye” test, i.e., general 
acceptance in the relevant scientific community, or (2) a Daubert-Lanigan 
analysis. Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 238, 877 N.E.2d 589, 
595–596 (2007). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
585–595 (1993), and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24–26, 641 
N.E.2d 1342, 1348–1349 (1994).
It is important to distinguish between the words used to express the 
principle of Massachusetts law set forth in this section and the application of 
the principle in specific  cases. As the following notes indicate, the framework 
used under the Federal  rules and in Massachusetts is the same, and each 
approach is specifically described as flexible. The principal  difference is that 
in Massachusetts, the trial judge satisfies his or her gatekeeper responsibili-
ties under Section 702(b) and (c) once the proponent of the evidence estab-
lishes that it is generally accepted by the relevant scientific  community. See 
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640–641, 840 N.E.2d 12, 23–24 
(2005); Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185–186, 675 N.E.2d 370, 
371–372 (1997). Compare Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 
N.E.2d at 1349 (“We accept the basic reasoning of the Daubert opinion be-
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cause it is consistent with our test of demonstrated reliability. We suspect 
that general  acceptance in the relevant scientific  community will continue to 
be the significant, and often the only, issue.”), and Canavan’s Case, 432 
Mass. 304, 314 n.5, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.5 (2000) (“Application of the 
Lanigan test requires flexibility. Differing types of methodology may require 
judges to apply differing evaluative criteria to determine whether scientific 
methodology is reliable. In the Lanigan case, we established various guide-
posts for determining admissibility including general acceptance, peer review, 
and testing.”), with Daubert v. Merrell  Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594–
595 (“The inquiry envisioned by [Fed. R. Evid.] 702 is, we emphasize, a flexi-
ble one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the eviden-
tiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed 
submission.”), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) 
(“[T]he test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific  factors nei-
ther necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”). See 
also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 150 (“Daubert makes clear 
that the factors it mentions do not constitute a ‘definitive checklist or test.’ 
[Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.] at 593. And Daubert adds 
that the gatekeeping inquiry must be ‘tied to the facts’ of a particular ‘case.’ 
Id. at 591.” [Quotation and citation omitted.]); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594 (“Widespread acceptance can be an important 
factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and a known technique which 
has been able to attract only minimal support within the community[] may 
properly be viewed with skepticism” [quotation and citation omitted].).
Hearing. An evidentiary hearing is not always necessary to comply with 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994). See 
Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111, 842 N.E.2d 916, 925 (2006); Vas-
sallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 1–13, 696 N.E.2d 909, 909–
918 (1998) (trial  judge properly relied on affidavits and transcripts of testi-
mony from other cases). However, as the Supreme Judicial Court noted, “we 
have not ‘grandfathered’ any particular theories or methods for all time, es-
pecially in areas where knowledge is evolving and new understandings may 
be expected as more studies and tests are conducted.” Commonwealth v. 
Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 763 n.15, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1264 n.15 (2010) (court 
acknowledged it was prudent for trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
in connection with expert testimony about dissociative amnesia because of 
“the evolving nature of scientific  and clinical studies of the brain and mem-
ory”). To preserve an objection to expert testimony on grounds it is not reli-
able, a defendant must file a pretrial  motion and request a hearing on the 
subject. See Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 659, 746 N.E.2d 
133, 137 (2001). A trial  judge’s decision on whether expert witness evidence 
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meets the Lanigan standard of reliability is reviewed on appeal under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
141–143 (1997); Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 311–312, 733 N.E.2d 
1042, 1048–1049 (2000).
Five Foundation Requirements. The proponent of expert witness testimony 
has the burden of establishing the five foundation requirements for the ad-
mission of such testimony under this section. See Commonwealth v. Bar-
bosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783, 933 N.E.2d 93, 105 (2010) (explaining the five 
foundation requirements). First, the proponent must establish that the expert 
witness testimony will  assist the trier of fact. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 
390 Mass. 89, 98, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1208–1209 (1983); Commonwealth v. 
Rodziewicz, 213 Mass. 68, 69–70, 99 N.E. 574, 575 (1912). Second, the 
proponent must demonstrate that the witness is qualified as an expert in the 
relevant area of inquiry. See Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 
535–536, 744 N.E.2d 25, 31–32 (2001); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass. 
169, 182, 326 N.E.2d 320, 328–329 (1975). Third, the proponent must dem-
onstrate that the facts or data in the record are sufficient to enable the wit-
ness to give an opinion that is not merely speculation. See Sevigny’s Case, 
337 Mass. 747, 751, 151 N.E.2d 258, 261 (1958). Fourth, the expert opinion 
must be based on a body of knowledge, a principle, or a method that is reli-
able. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 
(1994). Fifth, the proponent must demonstrate that the expert has applied the 
body of knowledge, the principle, or the method in a reliable manner to the 
particular facts of the case. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 
645–648, 840 N.E.2d 12, 26–28 (2005); Commonwealth v. McNickles, 434 
Mass. 839, 850, 753 N.E.2d 131, 140 (2001).
Each of these five foundation requirements is a preliminary question of 
fact for the trial judge to determine under Section 104(a), Preliminary Ques-
tions: Determinations Made by the Court. The trial judge has “broad dis-
cretion” in making these determinations. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 
Mass. 1, 5, 864 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (2007). In making these preliminary de-
terminations, the trial  judge may be required to resolve disputes as to the 
credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. at 647–648, 
840 N.E.2d at 28. Expert witness testimony should not be deemed unreliable 
simply because there is a disagreement of opinion or in terms of the level of 
confidence among the experts. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 
554, 581, 813 N.E.2d 1261, 1282 (2004).
The judge has no authority to exclude the evidence because he or she 
disagrees with the expert’s opinion or finds the testimony unpersuasive. See 
Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 281, 700 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1998) 
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(“Once the expert’s qualifications were established and assuming the ex-
pert’s testimony met the standard of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 
15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994), the issue of credibility was for a jury, not the 
judge.”). When an expert’s opinion is based on the analysis of complex facts, 
the failure of the expert to account for all  the variables goes to its weight and 
not its admissibility. Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 359–
360, 893 N.E.2d 1187, 1206 (2008). See id. at 351–360 (expert witness with 
doctorate in psychology and mathematics used statistical methods to evalu-
ate large body of employee records to account for missing records and to 
opine that employer had wrongfully deprived employees of compensation).
First Foundation Requirement: Assistance to the Trier of Fact. “The role 
of an expert witness is to help jurors interpret evidence that lies outside of 
common experience.” Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581, 
700 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1998). Thus, expert testimony may be excluded when 
it will not assist the jury. See Commonwealth v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 648, 
904 N.E.2d 397, 410 (2009) (trial  judge has discretion “to preclude expert 
testimony on commonly understood interrogation methods”); Commonwealth 
v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 496, 862 N.E.2d 341, 360 (2007) (trial  judge did not 
abuse his discretion in excluding expert witness testimony on the subject of 
cross-racial identification). Expert witness testimony also may be excluded 
because it is cumulative. See Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 
Mass. 451, 482, 583 N.E.2d 806, 825 (1991). Expert witness testimony may 
be excluded because it does not fit the facts of the case. See Ready, peti-
tioner, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 179, 824 N.E.2d 474, 480 (2005) (concluding 
that a diagnostic test known as the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest 
[AASI] was of no value to the fact issues facing the jury). See generally Sec-
tion 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence. Finally, expert witness 
testimony may be excluded as not probative of a material fact in dispute and 
thus of no assistance to the jury when it amounts to a mere guess or conjec-
ture. See Kennedy v. U-Haul Co., 360 Mass. 71, 73–74, 271 N.E.2d 346, 
348–349 (1971). See also Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally Admis-
sible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible. There are circumstances, however, in 
which an expert witness’s opinion as to a possibility will  have probative value. 
See Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 852, 683 N.E.2d 1035, 
1040–1041 (1997). The trial judge has discretion to determine whether ex-
pert witness testimony will  assist the trier of fact. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 95–102, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1207–1211 (1983) (expert 
witness testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence).
Second Foundation Requirement: Qualifications of the Expert. “The cru-
cial  issue in determining whether a witness is qualified to give an expert opin-
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ion is whether the witness has sufficient education, training, experience and 
familiarity with the subject matter of the testimony” (quotations and citation 
omitted). Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 183, 667 N.E.2d 
257, 260 (1996). Qualification of a witness as an expert in accordance with 
Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the 
Court, does not always require an explicit ruling on the record by the judge. 
However, if a formal ruling is made, it should be made outside the hearing of 
the jury. Id. at 184, 667 N.E.2d at 261.
“Whether an expert determined to be qualified in one subject 
is also qualified to testify in another, related subject will  de-
pend on the circumstances of each case, and, where an ex-
pert has been determined to be qualified, questions or criti-
cisms as to whether the basis of the expert’s opinion is reli-
able go to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the testi-
mony.”
Commonwealth v. Crouse, 447 Mass. 558, 569, 855 N.E.2d 391, 401 (2006) 
(noting that there must always be a first time for every expert witness). How-
ever, the trial  judge, acting as the gatekeeper, must enforce boundaries be-
tween areas of expertise within which the expert is qualified and areas that 
require different training, education, and experience and within which the ex-
pert is not qualified. See Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 535, 
744 N.E.2d 25, 31 (2001) (social worker qualified to testify as an expert wit-
ness that abused children may experience dissociative memory loss and re-
covered memory, but was not qualified to testify about how trauma victims 
store and retrieve or dissociate memories).
Third Foundation Requirement: Knowledge of Sufficient Facts or Data 
in the Record. The basis of expert opinion may include the factors set forth 
in Section 703, namely: (a) facts observed by the witness or otherwise in the 
witness’s direct personal knowledge; (b) evidence already in the record or 
which the parties represent will  be presented during the course of the pro-
ceedings, which facts may be assumed to be true in questions put to the wit-
ness; and (c) facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independ-
ently admissible in evidence and are a permissible basis for an expert to 
consider in formulating an opinion. See Section 703, Bases of Opinion Testi-
mony by Experts; LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 32, 393 
N.E.2d 867, 874 (1979). See also Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 
398 Mass. 516, 531, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (1986). This requirement means 
the expert witness
“must have sufficient familiarity with the particular facts to 
reach a meaningful expert opinion. The relevant distinction is 
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between an opinion based upon speculation and one ade-
quately grounded in facts. Although a trial judge has some 
discretion in making that distinction, it may be an abuse of 
discretion to disallow expert testimony which is based upon 
reasonably adequate familiarity with the facts.” (Citations 
omitted.)
Fourth St. Pub, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 
161, 547 N.E.2d 935, 937–938 (1989). Contrast Commonwealth v. Talbot, 
444 Mass. 586, 589, 830 N.E.2d 177, 180 (2005) (no error in excluding de-
fense expert who was proffered to testify about the effects of hypoglycemic 
shock in view of the absence of any evidence that the defendant experienced 
such a condition at the time of the offense); Commonwealth v. Laliberty, 373 
Mass. 238, 241, 366 N.E.2d 736, 739–740 (1977) (opinion concerning de-
fense of lack of criminal responsibility not admissible absent evidence that 
defendant suffered from mental disease or defect at time of crime).
Fourth Foundation Requirement: Reliability of Principle or Method Used 
by the Expert. Both the United States Supreme Court, applying Fed. R. 
Evid. 702 in Daubert v. Merrell  Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and 
the Supreme Judicial  Court applying the common law in Commonwealth v. 
Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994), agree on the fundamental 
requirement that “[i]f the process or theory underlying [an] . . . expert’s opin-
ion lacks reliability, that opinion should not reach the trier of fact.” Common-
wealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349. Both the Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Judicial  Court require the trial  judge to act as a gate-
keeper to ensure that the expert witness testimony that is considered by the 
jury meets minimum standards of reliability. The variation between the two 
approaches is that Massachusetts law makes general acceptance the default 
position and a Daubert analysis an alternative method of establishing reliabil-
ity. Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, Federal courts must consider five nonexclusive 
factors in assessing reliability, one of which is the traditional test that looked 
at whether the principle or method was generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
“[G]eneral acceptance in the relevant community of the theory and process 
on which an expert’s testimony is based, on its own, continues to be suffi-
cient to establish the requisite reliability for admission in Massachusetts 
courts regardless of other Daubert factors.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 
Mass. 626, 640, 840 N.E.2d 12, 23 (2005) (latent fingerprint identification 
theory). See Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 538, 744 N.E.2d 
25, 33 (2001) (Lanigan hearing not necessary where qualified expert testi-
mony has been accepted as reliable in the past in Massachusetts appellate 
cases). “Where general acceptance is not established by the party offering 
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the expert testimony, a full  Daubert analysis provides an alternate method of 
establishing reliability.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. at 641, 840 
N.E.2d at 23. These alternative, Daubert considerations include the ability to 
test the theory, existence of peer-reviewed publications supporting it, exis-
tence of standards for controlling or maintaining it, and known or potential 
error rates. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 593–594. 
“A judge may also look to his own common sense, as well as the depth and 
quality of the proffered expert’s education, training, experience, and appear-
ance in other courts to determine reliability” (quotation and citation omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Pasteur, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 826, 850 N.E.2d 1118, 
1132 (2006). See also Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 239, 877 
N.E.2d 589, 596 (2007) (holding a court may consider an appellate decision 
from a different jurisdiction).
In making the reliability determination it is also important that
“[a] relevant scientific community must be defined broadly 
enough to include a sufficiently broad sample of scientists so 
that the possibility of disagreement exists, . . . and . . . trial 
judges [must] not . . . define the relevant scientific  commu-
nity so narrowly that the expert’s opinion will  inevitably be 
considered generally accepted. In the context of technical 
forensic evidence, the community must be sufficiently broad 
to permit the potential for dissent.”
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. at 643, 840 N.E.2d at 25, quoting 
from Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 314 n.6, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.6 
(2000). See id. at 313–316, 733 N.E.2d at 1049–1052 (holding that the re-
quirement of reliability under Lanigan extends to expert opinions based on 
personal observations and clinical experience, including medical  expert tes-
timony concerning diagnosis and causation). The requirements of Lanigan, 
as amplified in Canavan’s Case, do not apply fully as to the standard of care 
in a medical  negligence case. Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 108–109, 
842 N.E.2d 916, 923 (2006) (“How physicians practice medicine is a fact, not 
an opinion derived from data or other scientific inquiry by employing a recog-
nized methodology. However, when the proponent of expert testimony incor-
porates scientific fact into a statement concerning the standard of care, that 
science may be the subject of a Daubert-Lanigan inquiry.” [Quotation and 
citation omitted.]).
The application of the Daubert-Lanigan factors in cases involving the 
“hard” sciences may not apply in the same way in cases involving the “soft” 
sciences. See Daubert v. Merrell  Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 593–594; 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25–26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349. See 
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also Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: 
Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 867 (2005). The Supreme Judicial 
Court has stated as follows:
“Observation informed by experience is but one scientific 
technique that is no less susceptible to Lanigan analysis 
than other types of scientific methodology. The gatekeeping 
function pursuant to Lanigan is the same regardless of the 
nature of the methodology used: to determine whether ‘the 
process or theory underlying a scientific expert’s opinion 
lacks reliability [such] that [the] opinion should not reach the 
trier of fact.’ Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 
(1994). Of course, even though personal observations are 
not excepted from Lanigan analysis, in many cases personal 
observation will  be a reliable methodology to justify an ex-
pert’s conclusion. If the proponent can show that the method 
of personal  observation is either generally accepted by the 
relevant scientific community or otherwise reliable to support 
a scientific conclusion relevant to the case, such expert tes-
timony is admissible.”
Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. at 313–314, 733 N.E.2d at 1050. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 766, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1266 
(2010) (“[T]he judge’s finding that the lack of scientific testing did not make 
unreliable the theory that an individual may experience dissociative amnesia 
was supported in the record, not only by expert testimony but by a wide col-
lection of clinical observations and a survey of academic literature.”).
In several cases, the Supreme Judicial Court has relied on the discus-
sion of forensic  methods contained in a 2009 report by the National  Re-
search Council entitled Strengthening Forensic  Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward 134–135 (2009) (NAS Report). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137, 149 n.17, 934 N.E.2d 810, 820 n.17 (2010) (cit-
ing NAS Report that the “near universal” laboratory test for drug identity is 
the “gas chromatography-mass spectrometry” test); Commonwealth v. Bar-
bosa, 457 Mass. 773, 788 n.13, 933 N.E.2d 93, 108 n.13 (2010) (citing NAS 
Report for proposition that nuclear DNA analysis is the standard against 
which many other forensic individualization techniques are judged). In Com-
monwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724–727, 933 N.E.2d 50, 57–60 
(2010), the defendant challenged the scientific basis of the latent fingerprint 
identification methodology known as ACE-V, which was criticized in the NAS 
Report. The Supreme Judicial  Court observed that “[t]he NAS Report does 
not conclude that fingerprint evidence is so unreliable that courts should no 
longer admit it. The Report does, however, stress the subjective nature of the 
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judgments that must be made by the fingerprint examiner at every step of the 
ACE-V process . . . .”
The Supreme Judicial Court has not addressed the standard to apply to 
evidence that meets the general acceptance test but is opposed on grounds 
that it is nonetheless unreliable. “Given that knowledge is constantly expand-
ing, and that scientific  principles are frequently modified in light of new dis-
coveries or theories, it is inconsistent with the reliability requirement to permit 
any theories or methods to be ‘grandfathered’ as admissible evidence.” M.S. 
Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 7.5.1, at 419 (8th ed. 2007).
Fifth Foundation Requirement: Reliability of the Application of the Prin-
ciple or Method to the Specific Facts of the Case. See Commonwealth v. 
Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 815–817, 864 N.E.2d 498, 503–504 (2007) (results 
of otherwise valid breathalyzer test is admissible to establish blood alcohol 
level at the time of the offense without expert witness testimony on the theory 
of retrograde extrapolation so long as the test was administered within three 
hours of the offense); Commonwealth v. McNickles, 434 Mass. 839, 847–
850, 753 N.E.2d 131, 138–140 (2001) (disagreement among experts regard-
ing the reliability of the application of a statistical  method known as “likeli-
hood ratios” to mixed samples of DNA evidence went to the weight, but not 
the admissibility, of the expert witness evidence); Smith v. Bell Atlantic, 63 
Mass. App. Ct. 702, 718–719, 829 N.E.2d 228, 242–243 (2005) (even though 
expert witness was qualified and employed a reliable diagnostic  method, her 
lack of knowledge of the details of the patient’s life called into question the 
reliability of her opinion and justified its exclusion in judge’s discretion).
Illustrations.
Abused Children. See Commonwealth v. Federico, 425 Mass. 844, 
847–848, 683 N.E.2d 1035, 1037–1038 (1997).
Battered Woman Syndrome. The Legislature has concluded that bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence is of a kind appropriately presented to the 
fact finder by expert testimony. General Laws c. 233, § 23F, inserted by St. 
1996, c. 450, § 248, which replaced G. L. c. 233, § 23E, repealed by St. 
1996, c. 450, § 247, on the same subject, states that
“[i]n the trial  of criminal cases charging the use of force 
against another where the issue of defense of self or an-
other, defense of duress or coercion, or accidental harm is 
a s s e r t e d , a d e f e n d a n t s h a l l  b e p e r m i t t e d t o 
introduce . . . evidence by expert testimony regarding the 
common pattern in abusive relationships; . . . the relevant 
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facts and circumstances which form the basis for such opin-
ion; and evidence whether the defendant displayed charac-
teristics common to victims of abuse. Nothing in this section 
shall be interpreted to preclude the introduction of evidence 
or expert testimony . . . where such evidence or expert tes-
timony is otherwise now admissible.”
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 429 Mass. 60, 67 n.15, 706 N.E.2d 289, 294 
n.15 (1999).
Bloodstain Analysis. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 
237–241, 877 N.E.2d 589, 595–597 (2007).
Cause and Origin of Fire. See Commonwealth v. Goodman, 54 Mass. 
App. Ct. 385, 389–393, 765 N.E.2d 792, 794–797 (2002).
Computer Simulations. Evidence consisting of computer-generated 
models or simulations is treated like other scientific  tests; admissibility is 
conditioned “on a sufficient showing that: (1) the computer is functioning 
properly; (2) the input and underlying equations are sufficiently complete and 
accurate (and disclosed to the opposing party, so that they may challenge 
them); and (3) the program is generally accepted by the appropriate commu-
nity of scientists.” Commercial  Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 412 
Mass. 545, 549–550, 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1992).
Contribution of Alcohol to Personal Injury. See Baudanza v. Com-
cast of Mass. I, Inc., 454 Mass. 622, 631–633, 912 N.E.2d 458, 466–468 
(2009).
Dissociative Memory Loss. See Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 
Mass. 752, 761–766, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1263–1266 (2010); Commonwealth 
v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 531–536, 744 N.E.2d 25, 29–32 (2001).
Dissociative Trance Disorder. See Commonwealth v. Montanez, 55 
Mass. App. Ct. 132, 144–146, 769 N.E.2d 784, 795–796 (2002).
Distributing Heroin. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 441 Mass. 783, 
792–795, 809 N.E.2d 487, 495–497 (2004).
DNA. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26–27, 641 N.E.2d 
1342, 1349–1350 (1994).
Fingerprints. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 641–
655, 840 N.E.2d 12, 24–33 (2005). Cf. Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 
Mass. 715, 724–725, 933 N.E.2d 50, 58–59 (2010) (considering report by 
National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward 102–104, 136–145 (2009)).
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Personality Testing. See Ready, petitioner, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 
172–179, 824 N.E.2d 474, 476–480 (2005).
Retrograde Extrapolation. See Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 
453, 458–462, 744 N.E.2d 614, 618–621 (2001).
Susceptibility to Suggestiveness. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 51 
Mass. App. Ct. 273, 280–282, 745 N.E.2d 362, 368–370 (2001).
Valuation of Real Estate. See Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment 
Auth., 375 Mass. 360, 362–367, 377 N.E.2d 909, 911–914 (1978) (expert 
witness may use the depreciated reproduction cost method to form an opin-
ion as to the value of real  estate when the judge finds that there is a justifica-
tion for the use of this disfavored approach).
For examples of cases applying this section, see M.S. Brodin & M. 
Avery, Massachusetts Evidence §§ 7.4–7.6 (8th ed. 2007); 3 M.G. Perlin & 
D. Cooper, Mottla’s Proof of Cases in Massachusetts §§ 83:6–83:25 (3d ed. 
1995 & Supp. 2007); W.G. Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated 
Guide to Massachusetts Evidence § 702 (2009 ed.).
Jury Instructions. See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 450 Mass. 1, 12 n.7, 875 
N.E.2d 488, 496 n.7 (2007).
Cross-Reference: Section 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
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Section 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony 
by Experts
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert wit-
ness bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to the witness at  or before the hearing. These include (a) facts 
observed by  the witness or otherwise in the witness’s direct personal 
knowledge; (b) evidence already in the record or which the parties rep-
resent will be presented during the course of the proceedings, which 
facts may be assumed to be true in questions put to the witness; and (c) 
facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independently ad-
missible in evidence and are a permissible basis for an expert to con-
sider in formulating an opinion.
NOTE
This section is derived from Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 
Mass. 516, 531, 499 N.E.2d 812, 820–821 (1986); LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. 
Co., 379 Mass. 21, 32, 393 N.E.2d 867, 874 (1979); and Commonwealth v. 
Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 73, 122 N.E. 176, 182 (1919). Massachusetts has not 
fully adopted Fed. R. Evid. 703, or Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 703, which 
would permit opinions based on inadmissible evidence if it is of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the relevant field.
“When an expert provides the jury with an opinion regarding 
the facts of the case, that opinion must rest on a proper ba-
sis, else inadmissible evidence might enter in the guise of 
expert opinion. The expert must have knowledge of the par-
ticular facts from firsthand observation, or from a proper hy-
pothetical  question posed by counsel, or from unadmitted 
evidence that would nevertheless be admissible.”
Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 803, 665 N.E.2d 982, 990 (1996). 
See id. at 803–804, 665 N.E.2d at 990–991 (psychologist called by the de-
fense in a murder trial could opine on the defendant’s mental  impairment at 
the time of the offense based on the witness’s interview with the defendant 
five weeks after the killings, and the contents of police and medical records, 
but not on the basis of a psychiatrist’s earlier “preliminary diagnosis” that was 
not shown to be reliable and independently admissible). Accord Vassallo v. 
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Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 15–16, 696 N.E.2d 909, 919 (1998) 
(“The judge properly prevented the defendants’ experts [as well as the plain-
tiffs’ experts] from testifying on direct examination to the out-of-court opinions 
of other scientists in the absence of some specific exception to the hearsay 
rule [none was shown].”).
Regarding Section 703(b), unless the evidence is capable of only one 
interpretation, the question to the expert witness must refer to specific por-
tions of the record. See Connor v. O’Donnell, 230 Mass. 39, 42, 119 N.E. 
446, 447 (1918).
Regarding Section 703(c), in determining whether facts or data are in-
dependently admissible, it is not whether the forms in which such facts or 
data exist satisfy evidentiary requirements. Rather, the court will determine 
whether the underlying facts or data would potentially be admissible through 
appropriate witnesses. Such witnesses need not be immediately available in 
court to testify. See Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 337–338, 
771 N.E.2d 778, 783 (2002), citing Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 
398 Mass. at 531, 499 N.E.2d at 820–821.
Risk of Inaccurate Forensic Analysis. In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 
Mass. 773, 933 N.E.2d 93 (2010), the Supreme Judicial  Court addressed the 
risk of inaccurate forensic analysis as follows:
“Our common-law rules of evidence protect a defendant in 
various ways from the risk of inaccurate forensic analysis. 
Where there is reason to believe that evidence has been 
mislabeled or mishandled or that data have been fabricated 
or manipulated, a defendant may challenge the admissibility 
of an expert opinion relying on such evidence or data in a 
Daubert-Lanigan hearing, because an opinion must rest on 
evidence or data that provide ‘a permissible basis’ for an ex-
pert to formulate an opinion. A defendant may also challenge 
the admissibility of an opinion where an expert relies solely 
on the conclusions of the testing analyst, without knowledge 
of the procedures employed by the testing analyst or the un-
derlying data and evidence that are generally contained in 
worksheets, because a conclusory opinion alone may not be 
a permissible basis on which an expert may rest an opinion. 
Where an expert opinion survives a Daubert-Lanigan chal-
lenge or where . . . the defendant does not challenge the 
admissibility of the expert’s opinion, the defendant may 
still . . . cross-examine the testifying expert as to the risk of 
evidence being mishandled or mislabeled or of data being 
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fabricated or manipulated, and as to whether the expert’s 
opinion is vulnerable to these risks.” (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 790–791, 933 N.E.2d at110.
This section does not alter the rule that limits the scope of the direct ex-
amination of an expert witness. “It is settled that an expert witness may not, 
under the guise of stating the reasons for his opinion, testify to matters of 
hearsay in the course of his direct examination unless such matters are ad-
missible under some statutory or other recognized exception to the hearsay 
rule.” Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 392, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1232 
(2008), quoting Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. 269, 273, 557 N.E.2d 
1136, 1138–1139 (1990), quoting Kelly Realty Co. v. Commonwealth, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 54, 55–56, 323 N.E.2d 350, 351–352 (1975).
Cross-Reference: Section 702, Testimony by Experts; Section 705, Dis-
closure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion; Article VIII, Introductory 
Note.
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Section 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise ad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to 
be decided by the trier of fact.
NOTE
This section, which is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) and 
Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 704, reflects Massachusetts law and follows Fed. 
R. Evid. 704(a). The critical question is not whether the opinion touches on 
the ultimate issue, but whether it satisfies Sections 403, Grounds for Exclud-
ing Relevant Evidence, 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses, 702, Tes-
timony by Experts, and any other applicable sections. See Martel  v. Massa-
chusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 403 Mass. 1, 3–4, 525 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1988); 
Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 705, 369 N.E.2d 1006, 1010 
(1977); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902–903, 605 
N.E.2d 1251, 1252–1253 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 25 Mass. App. 
Ct. 988, 990, 521 N.E.2d 1038, 1040–1041 (1988), citing Commonwealth v. 
Sendele, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 760, 470 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1984). Accord 
M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 7.3.2 (8th ed. 2007).
Improper Vouching. Despite the abolition of the common-law doctrine that 
prohibited expert opinion testimony on the ultimate issue, the admissibility of 
such testimony in Massachusetts still depends on whether it explains evi-
dence that is beyond the common understanding of the jury. Commonwealth 
v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581, 700 N.E.2d 282, 286–287 (1998). See 
Section 702, Testimony by Experts. Thus, expert witness testimony which 
simply amounts to an opinion on the credibility of a witness (improper vouch-
ing), on whether the defendant was “negligent,” or on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant is prohibited. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 
Mass. 422, 436, 879 N.E.2d 63, 76 (2008) (“the prosecutor [improperly] 
asked [the Commonwealth’s expert] to comment on the credibility of the 
Commonwealth’s theory of the case by asking whether its theory was ‘con-
sistent’ with [the expert’s] observations”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 
Mass. 356, 368, 813 N.E.2d 452, 462 (2004) (“in the absence of special cir-
cumstances, an expert may not be asked whether a rape or sexual assault 
has occurred”); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 185–186, 667 
N.E.2d 257, 262 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 
750, 759, 647 N.E.2d 413, 420 (1995) (“[a]lthough expert testimony on the 
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general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children is permissible, 
an expert may not refer or compare the child to those general characteris-
tics”); Birch v. Strout, 303 Mass. 28, 32, 20 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1939) (defen-
dant could not be asked to “pass upon the question of his own negligence”); 
Commonwealth v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 498, 671 N.E.2d 984, 
986 (1996) (“Dr. Gelinas went beyond the description of general principles of 
social or behavioral science that might assist the jury in their deliberations 
concerning credibility and gave testimony concerning family dynamics that 
evolved into profile testimony that signaled the jury that the child complain-
ants were sexually abused.”).
At least four different, but related, reasons are given for the exclusion of 
such evidence. First, such opinions offer no assistance to the fact finders 
“because the jury are capable of making that assessment without an expert’s 
aid.” Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 60, 643 N.E.2d 19, 22 
(1994). See Commonwealth v. Andujar, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 529, 531, 784 
N.E.2d 646, 647–648 (2003). Second, “[o]n such questions, the influence of 
an expert’s opinion may threaten the independence of the jury’s decision.” 
Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 105, 431 N.E.2d 556, 566 (1982). Third, 
such questions call  for opinions on matters of law or mixed questions of law 
and fact, and the jury must be allowed to draw their own conclusions from the 
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 161–162, 434 
N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (1982); Birch v. Strout, 303 Mass. at 32, 20 N.E.2d at 
431. Fourth, expert opinion in the form of conclusions about the credibility of 
a witness or a party are beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise and in 
the realm of speculation and conjecture. See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 350 
Mass. 664, 666, 216 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1966). Cf. Commonwealth v. Colon, 
64 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 312, 832 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (2005) (“while an expert 
may not opine as to whether a particular child has been raped or sexually 
abused, an expert may opine, after a physical  examination of the victim, that 
a child’s vaginal injuries are ‘consistent with’ penetration”).
Illustrations. For examples of cases applying this section, see M.S. Brodin & 
M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 7.3 (8th ed. 2007); 3 M.G. Perlin & 
D. Cooper, Mottla’s Proof of Cases in Massachusetts § 83.4 (3d ed. 1995).
Legal questions, as to which testimony is not permitted, should be dis-
tinguished from factual conclusions, as to which testimony is proper. The line 
between a “conclusion of law” and an “ultimate factual  issue” is sometimes 
blurred. Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 769, 906 N.E.2d 286, 290 
(2009) (“Narcotics investigators may testify as experts to describe how drug 
transactions occur on the street . . . [such as] testimony on the use of look-
outs in drug transactions, and the significance of the purity of seized drugs. 
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We have also repeatedly held that there is no error in allowing a police de-
tective to testify that in his opinion the amount of drugs possessed by the 
defendant was not consistent with personal  use but was consistent with an 
intent to distribute.” [Citations and quotations omitted.]). See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Brady, 370 Mass. 630, 635, 351 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1976) (insurance 
agent may not testify to applicability of insurance coverage); Perry v. Medei-
ros, 369 Mass. 836, 842, 343 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1976) (building inspector 
cannot give opinion interpreting building code); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 
366 Mass. 705, 711, 322 N.E.2d 407, 411 (1975) (medical  examiner not 
permitted to testify that death was “homicide”); DeCanio v. School  Comm. of 
Boston, 358 Mass. 116, 125–126, 260 N.E.2d 676, 682–683 (1970) (expert 
could not testify that “suspension and dismissal  of probationary teachers 
without a hearing ‘would have no legitimate educational  purpose’”); Com-
monwealth v. Gardner, 350 Mass. 664, 666–667, 216 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1966) 
(doctor in rape prosecution cannot testify to “forcible entry”); S.D. Shaw & 
Sons v. Joseph Rugo, Inc., 343 Mass. 635, 639, 180 N.E.2d 446, 448 (1962) 
(witness may not give opinion as to whether certain work was included in 
contract specification); Commonwealth v. Ross, 339 Mass. 428, 435, 159 
N.E.2d 330, 335 (1959) (guilt); Foley v. Hotel Touraine Co., 326 Mass. 742, 
745, 96 N.E.2d 698, 699 (1951) (treasurer of corporation could not testify on 
question whether assistant manager had “ostensible authority” on day of ac-
cident); Birch v. Strout, 303 Mass. 28, 32, 20 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1939) (opinion 
as to negligence).
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Section 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data 
Underlying Expert Opinion
The expert may  testify  in terms of opinion or inference and give 
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or 
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may  in any event 
be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 705, 
which the Supreme Judicial Court adopted in Department of Youth Servs. v. 
A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 532, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (1986).
“The rule is aimed principally at the abuse of the hypothetical 
question. It does not eliminate the availability of the hypo-
thetical question, but only the requirement of its use. . . . The 
thrust of the rule is to leave inquiry regarding the basis of 
expert testimony to cross-examination, which is considered 
an adequate safeguard.”
Id., quoting Advisory Committee’s Note on Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 705. See 
Commonwealth v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 577–578, 745 N.E.2d 320, 322 
(2001) (“Taking the rule and its rationale into consideration, permitting the 
expert to offer the contested hearsay testimony on direct examination consti-
tuted error. The judge should have sustained the defendant’s objection and 
precluded the admission of hearsay statements irrespective of whether they 
formed the basis of the expert’s opinion. If he had sought to, of course, de-
fense counsel  could have cross-examined [the expert] about the facts under-
lying his opinion.”). Accord Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 387–
395, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1228–1234 (2008). In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 
457 Mass. 773, 785–787, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106–108 (2010), the Supreme Ju-
dicial  Court stated the direct examination of an expert on facts not in evi-
dence
“is limited to the expert’s opinion and matters of which the 
expert had personal knowledge, such as her training and 
experience, and the protocols generally accepted in her field 
of expertise. Only the defendant can open the door on cross-
examination to testimony regarding the basis for the expert’s 
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opinion, which may invite the expert witness to testify to facts 
or data that may be admissible in evidence but have not yet 
been admitted in evidence.”
Accord Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 936 N.E.2d 372, 394 
(2010); Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 387–395, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 
1228–1234 (2008).
Cross-Reference: Article VIII, Introductory Note.
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Section 706. Court Appointed Experts
(a) Appointment. If legally  permissible, the court, on its own or at the 
request of a party, may appoint an expert. Unless mandated by  law to 
accept the assignment, the expert shall have the right to refuse such 
appointment. The court, after providing an opportunity to the parties to 
participate, shall inform the expert of his or her duties. The expert may 
be required to testify.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to rea-
sonable compensation, as set by the court, unless controlled by statute 
or rule. Except as otherwise provided by  law, the compensation shall 
be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court 
directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. The fact that  the court appointed the 
expert witness shall not be disclosed to the jury.
(d) Parties’ Experts of Own Selection. Nothing in this section limits 
the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 423 Mass. 841, 855 
n.24, 673 N.E.2d 552, 562 n.24 (1996); Fed. R. Evid. 706; and Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 706, and reflects the Massachusetts practice of making wide-
spread use of court appointed experts. See, e.g., G. L. c. 119, §§ 21, 24 
(court appointed expert to assist in determination of cases involving children 
in need of services); G. L. c. 123, § 15(a)–(c) (court appointed expert to as-
sess criminal  defendant’s competency to stand trial or criminal responsibility); 
G. L. c. 123, § 15(e) (court appointed expert to render opinion to assist court 
in sentencing defendant); G. L. c. 201, § 6 (court appointed expert to assess 
mental  health of a person who may be in need of guardianship); G. L. c. 215, 
§ 56A (guardian ad litem to investigate facts for the Probate and Family Court 
relating to care, custody, and maintenance of children); Brodie v. Jordan, 447 
Mass. 866, 867, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (2006) (expert witness appointed by 
court to render opinion on the value of corporation’s net assets); Common-
wealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 103, 648 N.E.2d 732, 737 (1995) (judge war-
ranted in relying upon opinion of court appointed expert); Commonwealth v. 
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Aponte, 391 Mass. 494, 497–498, 462 N.E.2d 284, 287–288 (1984) (court 
appointed expert in statistical  analysis in social sciences to assist in resolu-
tion of challenge to method of grand jury selection in Essex County); Gilmore 
v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 598, 604–605, 341 N.E.2d 655, 659–660 (1976) (use 
of court appointed guardian ad litem for investigation in child custody cases); 
Munshani v. Signal Lake Venture Fund II, LP, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 717, 
805 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (2004) (court appointed expert to assess authenticity 
of an electronic communication).
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ARTICLE VIII.  HEARSAY
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
(a) Confrontation Clause and Hearsay in Criminal Cases. In considering 
the following sections, it is necessary to recognize the distinction between 
hearsay rules and the requirements of the confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights. 
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004), the United States 
Supreme Court explained that the Sixth Amendment expressed the common-
law right of the defendant in a criminal case to confrontation, and that it was 
subject only to those exceptions that existed at the time of the amendment’s 
framing in 1791. As a result, the Supreme Court held that “testimonial state-
ments” of a witness who is not present at trial and subject to cross-
examination are not admissible unless the witness is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 53–54. 
Therefore, regardless of whether an out-of-court statement that is testimonial 
in nature satisfies the criteria for admissibility as an exception to the hearsay 
rule, it will not satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment if the witness 
is not present at trial, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. Accord Common-
wealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 14, 833 N.E.2d 549, 559 (2005), cert. de-
nied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006) (“constitutional provision of the confrontation 
clause trumps [our own] rules of evidence”).
(1) Testimonial Versus Nontestimonial. The United States Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Judicial Court have provided additional guidance for 
determining whether out-of-court statements are testimonial. See Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 
Mass. 773, 786–792, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106–111 (2010) (confrontation clause 
violated by testimony of supervising analyst relating the opinion and factual 
findings of nontestifying analyst); Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 
387–395, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1228–1234 (2008) (concluding that the opinions 
and conclusions of a medical examiner who performed an autopsy and wrote 
a report which formed the basis of the opinion of a second medical  examiner 
who testified at trial were testimonial statements); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 
452 Mass. 236, 242–252, 892 N.E.2d 299, 305–312 (2008) (statements 
made to 911 operator by victim of multiple stab wounds were primarily di-
rected to obtaining help and thus were nontestimonial; additional  statements 
made shortly thereafter by victim to her neighbor were nontestimonial); 
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Commonwealth v. Burton, 450 Mass. 55, 63–64, 876 N.E.2d 411, 418 (2007) 
(coconspirator statements); Commonwealth v. Galicia, 447 Mass. 737, 739, 
857 N.E.2d 463, 466 (2006) (statements made to 911 dispatcher were non-
testimonial  and therefore admissible, but statements made to responding 
officers were testimonial and therefore inadmissible, but not reversible error), 
adopting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Commonwealth v. 
DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 63–67, 849 N.E.2d 218, 224–227 (2006) (child 
abuse victim statements); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 17–18, 
833 N.E.2d at 561–562 (statements made to mother). See also Common-
wealth v. Dyer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 853 n.5, 934 N.E.2d 293, 297 n.5 
(2010) (medical records of blood alcohol  level); Commonwealth v. Tang, 66 
Mass. App. Ct. 53, 57–61, 845 N.E.2d 407, 411–414 (2006) (child witness 
statement to responding police officers); Commonwealth v. Crapps, 64 Mass. 
App. Ct. 915, 915–916, 835 N.E.2d 275, 276 (2005) (record of prior convic-
tion). See generally David A. Lowy & Katherine Bowles Dudich, After Craw-
ford: Using the Confrontation Clause in Massachusetts Courts, 12 Suffolk J. 
Trial & App. Advoc. 1 (2007).
In Commonwealth v. Galicia, 447 Mass. 737, 857 N.E.2d 463 (2006), 
adopting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the Supreme Judicial 
Court enumerated four factors for determining whether statements to an offi-
cer or 911 dispatcher, which would otherwise be testimonial per se, satisfy 
the emergency exception and are therefore nontestimonial. These factors are 
as follows:
“(1) whether the 911 caller was speaking about events as 
they were actually happening rather than describ[ing] past 
events; (2) whether any reasonable listener would recognize 
that the caller was facing an ‘ongoing emergency’; (3) 
whether what was asked and answered was, viewed objec-
tively, ‘necessary to be able to resolve the present emer-
gency, rather than simply to learn . . . what had happened in 
the past,’ including whether it was necessary for the dis-
patcher to know the identify of the alleged perpetrator; and 
(4) the ‘level of formality’ of the interview” (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Galicia, 447 Mass. at 741–744, 857 N.E.2d at 466. “To the 
extent the [emergency] exception applies, the statements are not testimonial 
per se and they will  not become testimonial  in fact under any circumstances.” 
Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 297–300, 923 N.E.2d 58, 73–75 
(2010) (most statements severely injured victim made to 911 dispatcher were 
nontestimonial, but some statements were testimonial  per se because, 
viewed objectively, they would not have helped resolve the ongoing emer-
gency or secure the crime scene). See also Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 
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Mass. 236, 242–252, 892 N.E.2d 299, 305–312 (2008); Commonwealth v. 
Tang, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 57–61, 845 N.E.2d 407, 411–414 (2006).
(2) Certificates of Analysis. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 
S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that the reasoning 
of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), applied to certain certificates 
of analysis frequently used in criminal  trials to establish a substance is a 
“controlled substance” under G. L. c. 94C. The Supreme Court held that a 
drug certificate in the form of an affidavit by the analyst was a testimonial 
statement because it was prepared with the knowledge that it would be used 
at trial, and thus its admission into evidence over the defendant’s objection 
violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, because the technician or scientist 
who made the findings set forth in the certificate was not made available for 
questioning by the defense. As a result, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Appeals Court in Commonwealth v. Melendez-
Diaz, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114, 870 N.E.2d 676 (2007) (unpublished), and ef-
fectively overruled the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court and Appeals 
Court in cases such as Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 283–285, 
827 N.E.2d 701, 705–706 (2005); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 
452, 461–463, 253 N.E.2d 346, 351–352 (1969); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 
245 Mass. 405, 417–418, 140 N.E. 465, 469 (1923); and Commonwealth v. 
Morales, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 588, 884 N.E.2d 546, 548 (2008). Analytical 
certificates made under oath by chemists or ballisticians that a substance is a 
drug, is of a specific  weight, or both, or that a thing is a working firearm, “are 
functionally identical  to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a wit-
ness does on direct examination’” (emphasis deleted). Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 830 (2006). See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 923 
N.E.2d 524 (2010) (applying holding of Melendez-Diaz).
(3) Expert Testimony. In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 
785–787, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106–108 (2010), the Supreme Judicial  Court con-
firmed that Melendez-Diaz does not “purport to alter the rules governing ex-
pert testimony” and does not, therefore, forbid one expert from testifying and 
offering an opinion on the basis of an examination of tests performed and 
data collected by others, so long as the witness does not testify to the details 
of the hearsay on direct-examination. The court noted that experts have been 
able to rely on “facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are inde-
pendently admissible and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in 
formulating an opinion” since Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 
Mass. 516, 532, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (1986), but that where the Common-
wealth calls an expert witness,
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“direct examination is limited to the expert’s opinion and mat-
ters of which the expert had personal knowledge, such as 
her training and experience, and the protocols generally ac-
cepted in her field of expertise. Only the defendant can open 
the door on cross-examination to testimony regarding the 
basis for the expert’s opinion, which may invite the expert 
witness to testify to facts or data that may be admissible in 
evidence but have not yet been admitted in evidence, and 
that may be testimonial  in nature. A defendant, however, 
cannot reasonably claim that his right to confront the wit-
nesses against him is violated by the admission of evidence 
that he elicits on cross-examination.”
Id. See also Commonwealth v. Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 237, 936 N.E.2d 
372, 395 (2010); Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 584, 931 N.E.2d 
950, 960 (2010); Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 Mass. 530, 541, 931 
N.E.2d 457, 466–467 (2010).
(b) Confrontation Clause Inapplicable. Under certain conditions, the con-
frontation clause of the Federal  and State Constitutions does not bar the ad-
mission of testimonial  statements, introduced for purposes other than estab-
lishing the truth of the matter asserted, in criminal cases even though the 
declarant is not available for cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Hurley, 
455 Mass. 53, 65 n.12, 913 N.E.2d 850, 861 n.12 (2009). See Common-
wealth v. Pelletier, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 69–72, 879 N.E.2d 125, 128–130 
(2008) (wife’s statement was properly admitted for a limited purpose other 
than its truth even though she did not testify at the defendant’s trial).
(c) Massachusetts Law Versus Federal Law. Based on differences in the 
language of the Sixth Amendment (defendant’s right to be “confronted with 
the witnesses against him”) and Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights (de-
fendant’s right to “meet the witnesses against him face to face”), the State 
Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court to provide a 
criminal defendant more protection than the Sixth Amendment in certain re-
spects. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844–850 (1990) (confron-
tation clause does not guarantee criminal defendants an absolute right to a 
face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against them at trial; upholding con-
stitutionality of a procedure whereby a young child alleged to have been the 
victim of a sexual assault testified at trial  outside the courtroom but was visi-
ble to defendant and jury on a monitor), with Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 
Mass. 618, 631–632, 677 N.E.2d 652, 662 (1997) (Article 12 requires that 
the jury be allowed to assess the encounter between the witness and the 
accused with the witness testifying in the face of the accused; in certain cir-
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cumstances, however, the encounter between the defendant and the child 
witness may take place outside the courtroom and be presented at trial by 
videotape; see G. L. c. 278, § 16D). See also Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 
402 Mass. 534, 541–542, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371–372 (1988). However, when 
the question involves the relationship between the hearsay rule and its ex-
ceptions, on the one hand, and the right to confrontation, on the other hand, 
“the protection provided by art. 12 is coextensive with the guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. 
DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57 n.1, 849 N.E.2d 218, 221 n.1 (2006), citing 
Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 28, 696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1998), 
and Commonwealth v. Childs, 413 Mass. 252, 260, 596 N.E.2d 351, 356 
(1992).
(d) Waiver of Right to Confrontation. The right to confrontation may be 
waived. See Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 860–861, 933 
N.E.2d 633, 637–639 (2010) (doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing extin-
guishes right to confrontation); Commonwealth v. Chubbuck, 384 Mass. 746, 
751, 429 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1981) (defendant waived right to be present at 
trial based on persistent disruptive behavior in the courtroom); Common-
wealth v. Flemmi, 360 Mass. 693, 694, 277 N.E.2d 523, 524 (1971) (if defen-
dant is voluntarily absent after trial begins, “the court may proceed without 
the defendant”). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 18(a)(1) (“If a defendant is pre-
sent at the beginning of a trial  and thereafter absents himself without cause 
or without leave of court, the trial  may proceed to a conclusion in all respects 
except the imposition of sentence as though the defendant were still pre-
sent.”). A defendant must be competent to plead guilty in order to waive his 
or her presence at trial. Commonwealth v. L’Abbe, 421 Mass. 262, 268–269, 
656 N.E.2d 1242, 1245–1246 (1995).
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Section 801. Definitions
The following definitions apply under this Article:
(a) Statement. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written assertion or 
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person 
as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A “declarant” is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by  the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. The following state-
ments are not hearsay and are admissible for the truth of the mat-
ter asserted:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness.
(A) Prior Inconsistent Statement Before a Grand 
Jury, at a Trial, at a Probable Cause Hearing, or at a 
Deposition. The declarant  testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment which is (i) inconsistent with the declarant’s testi-
mony; (ii) made under oath before a grand jury, or at  an 
earlier trial, a probable cause hearing, or a deposition; 
(iii) not  coerced; and (iv) more than a mere confirmation 
or denial of an allegation by the interrogator.
(B) [For a discussion of prior consistent statements, 
which are not admissible substantively under Massachu-
setts law, see Section 613(b), Prior Statements of Wit-
nesses, Limited Admissibility: Prior Consistent State-
ments.]
(C) Identification. A statement of identification made 
after perceiving the person if the declarant testifies at the 
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trial or hearing and is subject  to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement.
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The following state-
ments offered against a party are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule:
(A) The party’s own statement.
(B) A statement of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth.
(C) A statement by a party’s agent or servant admitted 
against the principal to prove the truth of facts asserted in 
it as though made by the principal, if the agent was 
authorized to make the statement or was authorized to 
make, on the principal’s behalf, true statements concern-
ing the subject matter.
(D) A statement by  a party’s agent or servant concerning 
a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship.
(E) A statement of a coconspirator or joint venturer made 
during the pendency of the cooperative effort and in fur-
therance of its goal when the existence of the conspiracy 
or joint venture is shown by evidence independent of the 
statement.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Baker, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 928 n.3, 479 N.E.2d 193, 195 n.3 
(1985), quoting with approval the definition of a “statement” contained in Fed. 
R. Evid. 801(a) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(a).
To be hearsay, the statement, whether verbal or nonverbal, must be in-
tended as an assertion. See Bacon v. Charlton, 61 Mass. 581, 586 (1851) 
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(distinguishing between groans and exclamations of pain, which are not 
hearsay, and anything in the nature of narration or statement).
“[C]onduct can serve as a substitute for words, and to the extent it 
communicates a message, hearsay considerations apply.” Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 803, 824 N.E.2d 843, 848 (2005). “[O]ut-of-court 
conduct, which by intent or inference expresses an assertion, has been re-
garded as a statement and therefore hearsay if offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. See Bartlett v. Emerson, [73 Mass. 174, 175–176] 
(1856) (act of pointing out boundary marker inadmissible hearsay).” Opinion 
of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1209, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1992) (legis-
lation that would permit the Commonwealth to admit evidence of a person’s 
refusal  to take a breathalyzer test violates the privilege against self-
incrimination because it reveals the person’s thought process and is thus 
tantamount to an assertion).
Subsection (b). This subsection is identical  to Fed. R. Evid. 801(b). While no 
Massachusetts case has defined “declarant,” the term has been commonly 
used in Massachusetts case law to mean a person who makes a statement. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57–58, 849 N.E.2d 
218, 221 (2006); Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 408 Mass. 278, 285, 558 
N.E.2d 933, 938 (1990). See also Webster’s Third New International  Diction-
ary 586 (2002), which defines “declarant” as a person “who makes a declara-
tion” and “declaration” as “a statement made or testimony given by a wit-
ness.”
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Cohen, 
412 Mass. 375, 393, 589 N.E.2d 289, 301 (1992), quoting McCormick, Evi-
dence § 246, at 729 (3d ed. 1984), and Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). See Common-
wealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 743, 537 N.E.2d 130, 136 (1989); Com-
monwealth v. Randall, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 26, 27, 733 N.E.2d 579, 581 (2000). 
See also Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 693, 746 N.E.2d 445, 
460 (2001) (“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted”); G.E.B. v. S.R.W., 422 Mass. 158, 168, 661 N.E.2d 
646, 654 (1996) (“Hearsay is an ‘extrajudicial  statement offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted’”), quoting Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 
264, 269 n.4, 385 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 n.4 (1979); Commonwealth v. DelValle, 
351 Mass. 489, 491, 221 N.E.2d 922, 923 (1966) (“The broad rule on hear-
say evidence interdicts the admission of a statement made out of court which 
is offered to prove the truth of what it asserted”). If a witness at trial affirms 
the truth of a statement made out-of-court, the witness adopts it and it is not 
hearsay. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 302 n.8, 885 N.E.2d 
105, 117 n.8 (2008). Whether the witness has adopted his or her out-of-court 
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statement is a question of fact for the jury and not a preliminary question for 
the judge. Id. at 302, 885 N.E.2d at 117.
“The theory which underlies exclusion is that with the declarant absent 
the trier of fact is forced to rely upon the declarant’s memory, truthfulness, 
perception, and use of language not subject to cross-examination.” Com-
monwealth v. DelValle, 351 Mass. at 491, 221 N.E.2d at 923.
Evidence Admitted for Nonhearsay Purpose. “The hearsay rule for-
bids only the testimonial use of reported statements.” Commonwealth v. 
Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 659, 282 N.E.2d 394, 404 (1972). Accord Common-
wealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819, 824, 308 N.E.2d 902, 907 (1974), quoting 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1766 (3d ed. 1940) (out-of-court utterances are hear-
say only when offered “for a special purpose, namely, as assertions to evi-
dence the truth of the matter asserted”). Thus, when out-of-court statements 
are offered for a reason other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
or when they have independent legal significance, they are not hearsay. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Montanez, 439 Mass. 441, 447–448, 788 N.E.2d 954, 
960–961 (2003) (evidence of victim’s statement to her friend was properly 
admitted to establish victim’s state of mind [fear of defendant], which helped 
explain her delay in reporting an episode of sexual abuse and thus was not 
hearsay; “[s]tatements may be offered as evidence of state of mind without 
implicating the hearsay rule if the statements either do not contain assertions 
or are offered without regard to whether the assertions are true”); Common-
wealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 246, 726 N.E.2d 959, 964 (2000) (“[e]
vidence of the terms of that oral agreement was not offered for the truth of 
the matters asserted, but as proof of an ‘operative’ statement, i.e., existence 
of a conspiracy”); Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. at 659, 282 N.E.2d at 
403–404 (out-of-court statements are admissible when offered to explain why 
the police approached the defendant to avoid the misimpression that the po-
lice acted arbitrarily in singling out the defendant for investigation); Charette 
v. Burke, 300 Mass. 278, 280–281, 15 N.E.2d 194, 195–196 (1938) (father’s 
remark to a child before leaving the child to go into the house [“Wait where 
you are while I go inside to get you a cookie”] was a “verbal  act” and not 
hearsay); Weeks v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 190 Mass. 563, 564–565, 77 
N.E. 654, 654–655 (1906) (witness permitted to testify that decedent re-
marked that the “carriage never rode so hard before”; utterance about a pre-
sent condition is not hearsay because it is not an assertion, unlike a narra-
tion, about past pain); Shimer v. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, LLP, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 
302, 310, 795 N.E.2d 599, 605–606 (2003) (evidence of the terms of a con-
tract used to establish lost profits is not hearsay because it is not an asser-
tion); Mailhiot v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 529 n.5, 
510 N.E.2d 773, 778 n.5 (1987) (instructions given to the plaintiff by bank 
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examiners about how to handle a problem were not assertions and thus not 
hearsay). Cf. Commonwealth v. Daley, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 94 n.9, 769 
N.E.2d 322, 328 n.9 (2002) (a passerby’s remark [“Hey, are you all  right?”], if 
offered as an assertion that the victim was in distress, would be hearsay, but 
if offered to explain why the defendant fled, and thus not as an assertion, 
would not be hearsay), S.C., 439 Mass. 558, 789 N.E.2d 1070 (2003). Con-
trast Commonwealth v. Todd, 394 Mass. 791, 797, 477 N.E.2d 999, 1004 
(1985) (explaining that the destruction of her marriage license could be con-
sidered “an extrajudicial, nonverbal assertion of the victim’s intent which, if 
introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, would be, on its face, objec-
tionable as hearsay”); Bartlett v. Emerson, 73 Mass. 174, 175–176 (1856) 
(testimony about another person’s act of pointing out a boundary marker was 
an assertion of a fact and thus inadmissible as hearsay); Commonwealth v. 
Ramirez, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 227, 770 N.E.2d 30, 33–34 (2002) (a busi-
ness card offered to establish a connection between the defendant and a 
New York address on the card was hearsay because it was used as an as-
sertion of a fact); Commonwealth v. Kirk, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 229–230, 
654 N.E.2d 938, 942 (1995) (conduct of a police officer who served a re-
straining order on the defendant offered to establish the identity of that per-
son as the perpetrator was hearsay because its probative value depended on 
the truth of an assertion made in the papers by the victim that the defendant 
was the same person named in the complaint).
Cross-Reference: Section 105, Limited Admissibility; Section 
803(3)(B)(ii), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Then 
Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.
Subsection (d). This subsection addresses out-of-court statements that are 
admissible for their truth. Section 613, Prior Statements of Witnesses, Lim-
ited Admissibility, addresses prior statements for the limited purposes only of 
impeachment and rehabilitation.
Subsection (d)(1)(A). Massachusetts generally adheres to the orthodox rule 
that prior inconsistent statements are admissible only for the limited purpose 
of impeaching the credibility of a witness’s testimony at trial  and are inadmis-
sible hearsay when offered to establish the truth of the matters asserted. See 
Section 613(a)(1), Prior Inconsistent Statements: Examining Own Witness, 
and Section 613(a)(2), Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility: 
Prior Inconsistent Statements: Examining Other Witness. However, in Com-
monwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 66, 469 N.E.2d 483, 490–491 (1984), the 
Supreme Judicial  Court adopted the principles of Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(A) allowing prior inconsistent statements made before a grand jury 
to be admitted substantively. The Daye rule has been extended to cover prior 
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inconsistent statements made in other proceedings as well. See Common-
wealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 740 N.E.2d 602 (2000) (probable cause 
hearings); Commonwealth v. Newman, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 868 N.E.2d 
946 (2007) (testimony given at an accomplice’s trial). Commonwealth v. Rag-
land, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 823 n.9, 894 N.E.2d 1147, 1154 n.9 (2008), 
made it clear in dicta that the same principles would apply to admission of 
prior inconsistent deposition evidence given under oath. See also Common-
wealth v. Belmer, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 64, 935 N.E.2d 327, 329 (2010) 
(prior inconsistent statement may be admissible for its full  probative value 
where the witness has signed a written affidavit under penalties of perjury in 
support of an application for a restraining order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A and 
that witness is subject to cross-examination).
Two general requirements for the substantive use of such statements 
are (1) that there is an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and (2) 
that the prior testimony was in the declarant’s own words and was not co-
erced. In addition, if the prior inconsistent statement is relied on to establish 
an essential element of a crime, the Commonwealth must offer at least some 
additional  evidence on that element in order to support a conclusion of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. at 73–75, 
469 N.E.2d at 494–496. However, the additional evidence need not be suffi-
cient in itself to establish the element. Commonwealth v. Noble, 417 Mass. 
341, 345 & n.3, 629 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 & n.3 (1994). The corroboration re-
quirement thus concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, not its admissibility. 
Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193, 763 N.E.2d 55, 58 (2002); 
Commonwealth v. Ragland, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 823, 894 N.E.2d 1147, 
1154 (2008).
Feigning Lack of Memory. Upon a determination by the judge that a 
witness is feigning lack of memory, a prior statement may be admitted sub-
stantively as inconsistent with the claimed lack of memory, subject to the re-
quirements of this subsection, Subsection 801(d)(1)(A). Commonwealth v. 
Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 745, 740 N.E.2d 602, 607–608 (2000). Before the 
prior statement may be admitted substantively, the judge must make a pre-
liminary finding of fact under Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: De-
terminations Made by the Court, that the witness is feigning an inability to 
remember. Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 190, 786 N.E.2d 375, 
383 (2003). If supported by evidence, this finding is conclusive. Id. At a 
party’s request, the judge may conduct a voir dire to make such a finding. 
Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 739, 740 N.E.2d at 606. A judge’s 
finding of witness feigning is often based on a careful  examination of the wit-
ness’s demeanor and testimony in light of the judge’s experience. See Id. at 
740, 740 N.E.2d at 606; Commonwealth v. Newman, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 
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497, 868 N.E.2d 946, 948 (2007). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 
Mass. 566, 573–574, 576–577, 887 N.E.2d 1040, 1046, 1048 (2008) (judge 
concluded that witness was feigning when he was able to recall many spe-
cific events of the evening in question but was unable to recall the portion of 
his grand jury testimony in which he said the defendant admitted to shooting 
someone, and a transcript failed to refresh his memory); Commonwealth v. 
Tiexeira, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 204, 559 N.E.2d 408, 411 (1990) (judge ob-
served how the witness’s detailed account of the evening was conspicuously 
vague regarding the defendant’s encounter with the victim). Regardless of 
the judge’s conclusion at voir dire, the jury shall not be told of the judge’s pre-
liminary determination that the witness is feigning. Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 
432 Mass. at 742 n.6, 740 N.E.2d at 608 n.6.
Cross-Reference: Section 613, Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited 
Admissibility.
Subsection (d)(1)(B). In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 401 
& n.10, 759 N.E.2d 723, 731–732 & n.10 (2001), the Appeals Court noted 
that the Supreme Judicial  Court has not adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(B) as to the admission of prior consistent statements as substan-
tive evidence, rather than merely for the purpose of rehabilitating the credibil-
ity of a witness-declarant who has been impeached on the ground that his or 
her trial  testimony is of recent contrivance. See also Commonwealth v. Tho-
mas, 429 Mass. 146, 161–162, 706 N.E.2d 669, 680 (1999) (prior consistent 
statement admissible to rebut suggestion of recent contrivance); Common-
wealth v. Kater, 409 Mass. 433, 448, 567 N.E.2d 885, 894 (1991) (“prior con-
sistent statements of a witness may be admitted where the opponent has 
raised a claim or inference of recent contrivance, undue influence, or bias”); 
Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 26–27, 345 N.E.2d 690, 693 
(1976) (“a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible where a claim is 
made that the witness’s in-court statement is of recent contrivance or is the 
product of particular inducements or bias. . . . Unless admissible on some 
other ground to prove the truth of the facts asserted, such a prior consistent 
statement is admissible only to show that the witness’s in-court testimony is 
not the product of the asserted inducement or bias or is not recently con-
trived as claimed”).
Cross-Reference: Section 413, First Complaint of Sexual Assault.
Subsection (d)(1)(C). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431, 432, 436–437, 828 N.E.2d 501, 503, 506 
(2005), where the Supreme Judicial Court “adopt[ed] the modern interpreta-
tion of the rule” expressed in Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), which, 
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like its Federal counterpart, states that “[a] statement is not hearsay . . . if ‘[t]
he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . one of identi-
fication of a person [made] after perceiving [the person].’” It is not necessary 
that the declarant make an in-court identification. See Commonwealth v. Ma-
chorro, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379–380, 892 N.E.2d 349, 351–352 (2008) 
(police officer allowed to testify to extrajudicial identification of the assailant 
by two victims who were present at trial  and subject to cross-examination 
even though one victim could not identify the assailant [although she recalled 
being present at his arrest and was certain that the person arrested was the 
assailant] and the other victim was not asked to make an identification at 
trial).
Under this subsection, whether and to what extent third-party testimony 
about a witness’s out-of-court identification may be admitted in evidence no 
longer turns on whether the identifying witness acknowledges or denies the 
extrajudicial  identification at trial. See Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 
Mass. at 439–440, 828 N.E.2d at 507–509. The third-party testimony will be 
admitted for substantive purposes, as long as the cross-examination re-
quirement is satisfied. Id. As the court explained, it is for the jury to “deter-
mine whose version to believe—the witness who claims not to remember or 
disavows the prior identification (including that witness’s version of what 
transpired during the identification procedure), or the observer who testifies 
that the witness made a particular prior identification.” Id. at 440, 828 N.E.2d 
at 508. The court concluded that
“evidence of the prior identification will  be considered along 
with all the other evidence that bears on the issue of the 
perpetrator’s identity. The mere fact that the prior identifica-
tion is disputed in some manner does not make it unhelpful 
to the jury in evaluating the over-all evidence as to whether 
the defendant on trial  was the one who committed the 
charged offense.”
Id.
Subsection (d)(2). This subsection defines admissions by a party-opponent 
as not hearsay, consistent with recent Supreme Judicial Court decisions, the 
Federal  Rules of Evidence, and the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evi-
dence. See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 467, 806 N.E.2d 
393, 402 (2004); Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 676 n.5, 751 
N.E.2d 868, 880 n.5 (2001); Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 243, 
692 N.E.2d 45, 52 (1998), citing Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2); Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). In some cases, the court 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 246
has ruled that out-of-court statements by a party-opponent are admissible as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. See Commonwealth v. DeBrosky, 363 
Mass. 718, 724, 297 N.E.2d 496, 501 (1973); Commonwealth v. McKay, 67 
Mass. App. Ct. 396, 403 n.13, 853 N.E.2d 1098, 1103 n.13 (2006).
Subsection (d)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 365–366, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (2001), quoting P.J. 
Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence § 8.8.1 (7th ed. 1999). See also Care & 
Protection of Sophie, 449 Mass. 100, 110 n.14, 865 N.E.2d 789, 798 n.14 
(2007) (no requirement that the statement of a party-opponent be contradic-
tory or against the party-opponent’s interest); Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 
Mass. 327, 347, 140 N.E.2d 140, 156 (1957) (“An admission in a criminal 
case is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the 
issue, which although insufficient in itself to warrant a conviction tends in 
connection with proof of other facts to establish his guilt”); Hopkins v. Medei-
ros, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 613, 724 N.E.2d 336, 346 (2000) (“The evidence 
of [the defendant’s] admission to sufficient facts was admissible as an ad-
mission of a party opponent.”); Section 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of 
Pleas, and Related Statements. Compare Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 
Mass. 1, 4, 474 N.E.2d 545, 549 (1985) (The “longstanding rule [is] that if a 
defendant is charged with a crime and unequivocally denies it, that denial is 
not admissible in evidence.”), with Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 410 Mass. 
641, 649, 574 N.E.2d 1000, 1006 (1991) (“It is well-settled that false state-
ments made by a defendant are admissible to show consciousness of guilt.”). 
In Lavalley, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the Commonwealth could 
show that a defendant’s failure to include certain facts in his pretrial  state-
ment to the police that the defendant included in his testimony at trial  was 
evidence of his consciousness of guilt and did not amount to an impermissi-
ble comment on his denial or failure to deny the offense. Id. at 649–650, 574 
N.E.2d at 1005–1006.
Under this subsection, deposition answers by an opposing party, 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2), interrogatory answers by an opposing party, 
G. L. c. 231, § 89, and responses to requests for admission of facts, 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 36(b), are not subject to a hearsay objection. See Federico 
v. Ford Motor Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 460–461, 854 N.E.2d 448, 454–455 
(2006); Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 484 n.8, 
738 N.E.2d 753, 759 n.8 (2000).
Criminal Cases. The principle that the admission of a party-opponent, 
without more, is admissible is superceded by the requirements of the con-
frontation clause:
247 
“[W]here a nontestifying codefendant’s statement expressly 
implicates the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would 
prove to be powerfully incriminating, the confrontation clause 
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
has been offended, notwithstanding any limiting instruction 
by the judge that the jury may consider the statement only 
against the codefendant.”
Commonwealth v. Vallejo, 455 Mass. 72, 83, 914 N.E.2d 22, 31 (2009) (dis-
cussing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)). See also Common-
wealth v. Bacigalupo, 455 Mass. 485, 492–496, 918 N.E.2d 51, 57–60 
(2009).
Subsection (d)(2)(B). This subsection is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(B) and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See also Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). “Where a party is confronted with an accusatory 
statement which, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would chal-
lenge, and the party remains silent or responds equivocally, the accusation 
and the reply may be admissible on the theory that the party’s response 
amounts to an admission of the truth of the accusation.” Commonwealth v. 
MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 506, 597 N.E.2d 1037, 1043 (1992). Accord 
Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 320–321, 867 N.E.2d 743, 749–
750 (2007); Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 507–508, 789 N.E.2d 115, 118–
119 (2003); Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 694, 746 N.E.2d 
445, 461 (2001). This is commonly referred to as an “adoptive admission.”
Admission by Silence. For an admission by silence to be admissible it 
must be apparent that the party has heard and understood the statement, 
had an opportunity to respond, and the context was one in which the party 
would have been expected to respond. Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 
Mass. 707, 719, 625 N.E.2d 529, 537 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 
(1994). See Leone v. Doran, 363 Mass. 1, 16, 292 N.E.2d 19, 31, modified 
on other grounds, 363 Mass. 886, 297 N.E.2d 493 (1973). “Because silence 
may mean something other than agreement or acknowledgment of guilt (it 
may mean inattention or perplexity, for instance), evidence of adoptive ad-
missions by silence must be received and applied with caution.” Common-
wealth v. Babbitt, 430 Mass. 700, 705, 723 N.E.2d 17, 22 (2000). See gener-
ally Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 61 n.6, 434 N.E.2d 992, 996 
n.6 (1982) (cautioning against the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence to 
show consciousness of guilt and indicating such evidence is admissible only 
in “unusual circumstances”). Accordingly, adoption by silence can be imputed 
to a defendant only for statements that “clearly would have produced a reply 
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or denial on the part of an innocent person.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 394 
Mass. 510, 515, 476 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1985).
“No admission by silence may be inferred, however, if the 
statement is made after the accused has been placed under 
arrest[, see Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. 235, 238 
(1847); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 
634, 305 N.E.2d 518, 520 (1973); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 
6 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 657, 382 N.E.2d 1105, 1108–1109 
(1978)], after the police have read him his Miranda rights[, 
see Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 363 Mass. 311, 316, 
293 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1973)], or after he has been so signifi-
cantly deprived of his freedom that he is, in effect, in police 
custody[, see Commonwealth v. Corridori, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 
469, 480, 417 N.E.2d 969, 977 (1981)].”
Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 506, 510, 707 N.E.2d 385, 
388 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 652, 
852 N.E.2d 961, 964 (1991).
Admission by Conduct. “An admission may be implied from conduct 
as well  as from words.” Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 348, 140 
N.E.2d 140, 156 (1957). For instance,
“[a]ctions and statements that indicate consciousness of guilt 
on the part of the defendant are admissible and together with 
other evidence, may be sufficient to prove guilt. . . . [T]his 
theory usually has been applied to cases where a defendant 
runs away . . . or makes intentionally false and misleading 
statements to police . . . or makes threats against key wit-
nesses for the prosecution . . . .”
Commonwealth v. Montecalvo, 367 Mass. 46, 52, 323 N.E.2d 888, 892 
(1975). See also Olofson v. Kilgallon, 362 Mass. 803, 806, 291 N.E.2d 600, 
602–603 (1973), citing Hall v. Shain, 291 Mass. 506, 512–513, 197 N.E. 
437, 440 (1935). For a thorough discussion of the evidentiary and constitu-
tional  issues surrounding the use of a defendant’s prearrest silence or con-
duct to establish consciousness of guilt, see Commonwealth v. Irwin, 72 
Mass. App. Ct. 643, 648–656, 893 N.E.2d 414, 419–424 (2008). “[A] judge 
should instruct the jury [1] that they are not to convict a defendant on the ba-
sis of evidence of [conduct] alone, and [2] that they may, but need not, con-
sider such evidence as one of the factors tending to prove the guilt of the 
defendant” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 585, 
433 N.E.2d 425, 432 (1982).
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Subsection (d)(2)(C). This subsection is derived from Sacks v. Martin Equip. 
Co., 333 Mass. 274, 279–280, 130 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1955).
This subsection covers the admissibility of statements by an agent who 
has been authorized by the principal  to speak on his behalf. See Simonoko v. 
Stop & Shop, Inc., 376 Mass. 929, 929, 383 N.E.2d 505, 506 (1978) (conclud-
ing there was no showing of the manager’s authority to speak for the defen-
dant). Contrast Section 801(d)(2)(D), Definitions: Statements Which Are Not 
Hearsay: Admission by Party-Opponent, which deals with statements of 
agents.
Subsection (d)(2)(D). This subsection is derived from Ruszcyk v. Secretary 
of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 418, 420–423, 517 N.E.2d 152, 154–156 (1988), 
in which the Supreme Judicial  Court adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(D).
To determine whether a statement qualifies as a vicarious admission, 
the judge first must decide as a preliminary question of fact whether the de-
clarant was authorized to act on the matters about which he or she spoke. 
See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 791, 667 
N.E.2d 907, 916 (1996). If the judge finds that the declarant was so author-
ized, the judge must then decide whether the probative value of the state-
ment was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Id. In 
so doing,
“the judge should consider the credibility of the witness; the 
proponent’s need for the evidence, e.g., whether the declar-
ant is available to testify; and the reliability of the evidence 
offered, including consideration of whether the statement 
was made on firsthand knowledge and of any other circum-
stances bearing on the credibility of the declarant. Ruszcyk 
v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, [401 Mass.] at 422–423, 517 
N.E.2d 152, [155]” (footnote and quotation omitted).
Thorell v. ADAP, Inc., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 339–340, 789 N.E.2d 1086, 
1091 (2003).
Subsection (d)(2)(E). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 340, 455 N.E.2d 1183, 1192 (1983), which re-
lied on Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) and the identical  Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(2)(E). See also Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 319–321, 
867 N.E.2d 743, 749–750 (2007).
“This exception to the rule against hearsay is premised on a 
belief that ‘[t]he community of activities and interests which 
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exists among the coventurers during the enterprise tends in 
some degree to assure that their statements about one an-
other will be minimally reliable.’ Commonwealth v. White, 
370 Mass. [703], 712, 352 N.E.2d 904 [(1976)].”
Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 340, 455 N.E.2d at 1192.
The judge must be satisfied by a preponderance of admissible evidence 
other than the extrajudicial statement that a criminal joint venture existed be-
tween the declarant and the defendant. Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 
Mass. 678, 692–693, 746 N.E.2d 445, 460 (2001), citing Commonwealth v. 
Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 844, 724 N.E.2d 683, 689–690 (2000). See also 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 246, 726 N.E.2d 959, 963–
964 (2000). The judge is not required to make a preliminary finding that a 
joint criminal enterprise existed and may admit the evidence “subject to a 
later motion to strike if the prosecution fails to show that the defendant was 
part of a joint enterprise.” Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 
543–544, 562 N.E.2d 797, 806 (1990). The judge must also instruct the jury 
that they can only consider evidence of the hearsay statements if they find, 
on the basis of all the other evidence, not including the hearsay statements, 
that a joint venture existed. Commonwealth v. Boyer, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 
598, 755 N.E.2d 767, 773 (2001).
This exception extends to situations where “the joint venturers are act-
ing to conceal the crime that formed the basis of the criminal  enterprise[,]” 
Commonwealth v. Ali, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 561, 684 N.E.2d 1200, 1208 
(1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 519, 615 N.E.2d 
155, 166 (1993), but it “does not apply after the criminal  enterprise has 
ended, as where a joint venturer has been apprehended and imprisoned.” 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 543, 562 N.E.2d at 806. Thus, a 
confession or admission of a coconspirator or joint venturer made after the 
termination of the conspiracy or joint venture is not admissible as a vicarious 
statement of another member of the conspiracy or joint venture. Common-
wealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 340 n.11, 455 N.E.2d at 1192 n.11, citing 
Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. at 708–712, 352 N.E.2d at 908–910. Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Leach, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 766, 901 N.E.2d 708, 715–
716 (2009) (although statements made by codefendants occurred after they 
were in custody, statements were made shortly after the crime and for the 
purpose of concealing the crime and thus became admissible against each 
defendant).
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Section 802. Hearsay Rule
Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule as provided by case law, statute, or rule pre-
scribed by the Supreme Judicial Court.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 305, 
805 N.E.2d 26, 39 (2004) (hearsay “is generally inadmissible unless it falls 
within an exception to the hearsay rule”). See Commonwealth v. Markvart, 
437 Mass. 331, 335, 771 N.E.2d 778, 782 (2002) (“hearsay not otherwise 
admissible under the rules of evidence is inadmissible at the trial . . . unless 
specifically made admissible by statute”). There is no “innominate” or catchall 
exception to the hearsay rule in Massachusetts whereby hearsay may be 
admitted on an ad hoc basis provided that there are circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. See Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 281–
282, 491 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1986); Commonwealth v. Meech, 380 Mass. 490, 
497, 403 N.E.2d 1174, 1179 (1980); Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 
703, 713, 352 N.E.2d 904, 911 (1976). Contrast Fed. R. Evid. 807.
In addition to exceptions established by case law, several  Massachu-
setts statutes and rules provide exceptions to the rule against hearsay, in-
cluding, but not limited to the following:
G. L. c. 79, § 35 (assessed valuation of real estate);
G. L. c. 111, § 195 (certain lead inspection reports);
G. L. c. 119, § 24 (court investigation reports);
G. L. c. 119, §§ 51A, 51B (Department of Children and Families re-
ports);
G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 9 (sexually dangerous person statute);
G. L. c. 152, §§ 20A, 20B (medical reports);
G. L. c. 175, § 4(7) (report of Commissioner of Insurance);
G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (housing inspection report);
G. L. c. 233, § 65 (declaration of deceased person);
G. L. c. 233, § 65A (answers to interrogatories of deceased party);
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G. L. c. 233, § 66 (declarations of testator);
G. L. c. 233, § 69 (records of other courts);
G. L. c. 233, § 70 (judicial notice of law);
G. L. c. 233, § 79B (publicly issued compilations of fact);
G. L. c. 233, § 79C (treatises in malpractice actions);
G. L. c. 233, § 79F (certificate of public way);
G. L. c. 233, § 79G (medical and hospital bills);
G. L. c. 233, § 79H (medical reports of deceased physicians);
G. L. c. 239, § 8A, ¶ 3 (board of health inspection report if certified by 
inspector who conducted the inspection);
Mass. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) (depositions); and
Mass. R. Crim. P. 35(g) (depositions).
If no objection to the hearsay statement is made and it has been admit-
ted, it “may be weighed with the other evidence, and given any evidentiary 
value which it may possess.” Mahoney v. Harley Private Hosp., Inc., 279 
Mass. 96, 100, 180 N.E. 723, 725 (1932). In a criminal case, the admission 
of such a statement will be reviewed to determine whether its admission cre-
ated a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. 
Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 562, 511 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1987).
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Section 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability 
of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay  rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. [Exception not recognized]
(2) Excited Utterance (Spontaneous Utterance). A spontaneous 
utterance if (A) there is an occurrence or event sufficiently  star-
tling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes 
of the observer, and (B) the declarant’s statement was a spontane-
ous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result  of reflec-
tive thought.
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.
(A) Expressions of present  physical condition such as pain 
and physical health.
(B) (i) Statements of a person as to his or her present friend-
liness, hostility, intent, knowledge, or other mental condi-
tion are admissible to prove such mental condition.
(ii) Statements, not too remote in time, which indicate an 
intention to engage in particular conduct, are admissible 
to prove that the conduct was, in fact, put in effect. 
Statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remem-
bered or believed do not fall within this exception.
(iii) Declarations of a testator cannot be received to prove 
the execution of a will, but may be shown to show the 
state of mind or feelings of the testator.
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treat-
ment. Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or 
treatment describing medical history, pain, symptoms, condition, 
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or cause, but not as to the identity of the person responsible or le-
gal significance of such symptoms or injury.
(5) Past Recollection Recorded.
(A) A past recorded statement may be admissible if (i) the 
witness has insufficient memory to testify fully  and accu-
rately, (ii) the witness had firsthand knowledge of the facts 
recorded, (iii) the witness can testify that the statement was 
truthful when made, and (iv) the witness made or adopted the 
recording when the events were fresh in the witness’s mem-
ory.
(B) The recorded statement itself may be admitted in evi-
dence, although the original of the statement must be pro-
duced if procurable.
(6) Business and Hospital Records.
(A) Entry, Writing, or Record Made in Regular Course of 
Business. A business record shall not be inadmissible because 
it is hearsay or self-serving if the court finds that (i) the entry, 
writing, or record was made in good faith; (ii) it was made in 
the regular course of business; (iii) it was made before the 
beginning of the civil or criminal proceeding in which it is 
offered; and (iv) it was the regular course of such business to 
make such memorandum or record at  the time of such act, 
transaction, occurrence, or event, or within a reasonable time 
thereafter.
(B) Hospital Records. Records kept by  hospitals pursuant to 
G. L. c. 111, § 70, shall be admissible as evidence so far as 
such records relate to the treatment and medical history  of 
such cases, but nothing contained therein shall be admissible 
as evidence which has reference to the question of liability. 
Records required to be kept by hospitals under the law of any 
other United States jurisdiction may be admissible.
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(C) Medical and Hospital Services.
(i) Definitions.
(a) Itemized Bills, Records, and Reports. As used 
in this section, “itemized bills, records, and reports” 
means itemized hospital or medical bills; physician 
or dentist reports; hospital medical records relating 
to medical, dental, hospital services, prescriptions, or 
orthopedic appliances rendered to or prescribed for a 
person injured; or any report of any examination of 
said injured person including, but not limited to, 
hospital medical records.
(b) Physician or Dentist. As used in this section, 
“physician or dentist” means a physician, dentist, or 
any person who is licensed to practice as such under 
the laws of the jurisdiction within which such serv-
ices were rendered, as well as chiropodists, chiro-
practors, optometrists, osteopaths, physical thera-
pists, podiatrists, psychologists, and other medical 
personnel licensed to practice under the laws of the 
jurisdiction within which such services were ren-
dered.
(c) Hospital. As used in this section, “hospital” 
means any hospital required to keep records under 
G. L. c. 111, § 70, or which is in any way licensed or 
regulated by the laws of any other State, or by the 
laws and regulations of the United States of Amer-
ica, including hospitals of the Veterans Administra-
tion or similar type institutions, whether incorpo-
rated or not.
(d) Health Maintenance Organization. As used in 
this section, “health maintenance organization” shall 
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have the same meaning as defined in G. L. c. 176G, 
§ 1.
(ii) Admissibility of Itemized Bills, Records, and Re-
ports. In any civil or criminal proceeding, itemized bills, 
records, and reports of an examination of or for services 
rendered to an injured person are admissible as evidence 
of the fair and reasonable charge for such services, the 
necessity of such services or treatments, the diagnosis, 
prognosis, opinion as to the proximate cause of the con-
dition so diagnosed, or the opinion as to disability or in-
capacity, if any, proximately  resulting from the condition 
so diagnosed, provided that
(a) the party  offering the evidence gives the oppos-
ing party written notice of the intention to offer the 
evidence, along with a copy of the evidence, by 
mailing it  by  certified mail, return receipt requested, 
not less than ten days before the introduction of the 
evidence;
(b) the party offering the evidence files an affidavit 
of such notice and the return receipt is filed with the 
clerk of the court after said receipt has been re-
turned; and
(c) the itemized bill, record, or report is subscribed 
and sworn to under the penalties of perjury by the 
physician, dentist, authorized agent of a hospital or 
health maintenance organization rendering such 
services, or by the pharmacist or retailer of orthope-
dic appliances.
(iii) Calling the Physician or Dentist as a Witness. 
Nothing contained in this subsection limits the right of a 
party  to call the physician or dentist, or any other person, 
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as a witness to testify about the contents of the itemized 
bill, record, or report in question.
(7) Absence of Entry in Records Kept in Accordance with 
Provisions of Section 803(6). The absence of an entry  in records 
of regularly  conducted activity, or testimony of a witness that he or 
she has examined records and not found a particular entry or en-
tries, is admissible for purposes of proving the nonoccurrence of 
the event.
(8) Official/Public Records and Reports.
(A) Record of Primary Fact. A record of a primary fact, 
made by a public officer in the performance of an official 
duty, is competent evidence as to the existence of that fact.
(B) Prima Facie Evidence. Certain statutes provide that the 
admission of facts contained in certain public records consti-
tute prima facie evidence of the existence of those facts.
(C) Record of Investigations. Record of investigations and 
inquiries conducted, either voluntarily or pursuant to re-
quirement of law, by public officers concerning causes and 
effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, ex-
pressions of opinion, and making conclusions are not admis-
sible in evidence as public records, unless specifically author-
ized by statute.
(9) Records of Vital Statistics. The record of the town clerk rela-
tive to a birth, marriage, or death shall be prima facie evidence of 
the facts recorded, but nothing contained in the record of a death 
which has reference to the question of liability for causing the 
death shall be admissible in evidence.
(10) Absence of Public Record or Entry. To prove the absence 
of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or 
the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, 
report, statement, or data compilation, in any  form, was regularly 
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made and preserved by  a public office or agency, evidence in the 
form of a certification in accordance with Section 902, Self-
Authentication, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose 
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of Religious Organizations. [Exception not recog-
nized]
(12) Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar Certificates. [Exception 
not recognized]
(13) Family Records. Statements of fact concerning personal or 
family history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, en-
gravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on 
urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records or Documents Affecting an Interest in Property. 
A registry copy of a document purporting to prove or establish an 
interest in land is admissible as proof of the content of the original 
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person 
who signed it. However, the grantee or entity claiming present 
ownership interest of the property  must account for the absence of 
the original document before offering the registry copy.
(15) Statements in Documents Affecting an Interest in Prop-
erty. Statements of a person’s married or unmarried status, kinship 
or lack of kinship, or of the date of the person’s birth or death 
which relate or purport to relate to the title to land and are sworn 
to before any officer authorized by law to administer oaths may be 
filed for record and shall be recorded in the registry of deeds for 
the county where the land or any part thereof lies. Any such 
statement, if so recorded, or a certified copy of the record thereof, 
insofar as the facts stated therein bear on the title to land, shall be 
admissible in evidence in support  of such title in any court in the 
Commonwealth in proceedings relating to such title.
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(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. Statements in a docu-
ment in existence thirty years or more the authenticity  of which is 
established.
(17) Statements of Facts of General Interest. Statements of facts 
of general interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained 
in a list, register, periodical, book, or other compilation, issued to 
the public, shall, in the discretion of the court, if the court finds 
that the compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in 
that occupation and commonly is used and relied upon by them, 
be admissible in civil cases as evidence of the truth of any  fact so 
stated.
(18) Learned Treatises.
(A) Use in Medical Malpractice Actions. Statements of 
facts or opinions on a subject of science or art contained in a 
published treatise, periodical, book, or pamphlet shall, insofar 
as the court shall find that  the said statements are relevant and 
that the writer of such statements is recognized in his or her 
profession or calling as an expert on the subject, be admissi-
ble in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error, or mis-
take against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hos-
pitals, and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove said facts or 
as opinion evidence; provided, however, that the party  intend-
ing to offer as evidence any such statements shall, not  less 
than thirty days before the trial of the action, give the adverse 
party  or that party’s attorney notice of such intention, stating 
the name of the writer of the statements; the title of the trea-
tise, periodical, book, or pamphlet in which they are con-
tained; the date of publication of the same; the name of the 
publisher of the same; and wherever possible or practicable 
the page or pages of the same on which the said statements 
appear.
(B) Use in Cross-Examination of Experts. To the extent 
called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
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examination, statements contained in published treatises, pe-
riodicals, or pamphlets on a subject  of history, medicine, or 
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the 
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert tes-
timony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may 
be read into evidence, but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. 
Reputation within a family as to matters of pedigree, such as birth, 
marriage, and relationships between and among family members, 
may be testified to by any member of the family.
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. 
Evidence of a general or common reputation as to the existence or 
nonexistence of a boundary or other matter of public or general 
interest concerning land or real property.
(21) Reputation as to Character. A witness with knowledge may 
testify to a person’s reputation as to a trait of character, as pro-
vided in Sections 404, Character Evidence Not Admissible to 
Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes, 405, Methods of Prov-
ing Character, and 608, Impeachment by Evidence of Character 
and Conduct of Witness.
(22) Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final 
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not 
upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty  of a 
crime punishable by  death or confinement in excess of one year, 
to prove any  fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not includ-
ing, when offered by the Commonwealth in a criminal prosecution 
for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons 
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown, 
but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to Personal, Family, or General History, or 
Boundaries. [Exception not recognized]
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(24) Out-of-Court Statement of Child Describing Sexual Con-
tact in Proceeding to Place Child in Foster Care.
(A) Admissibility in General. Any out-of-court  statements of 
a child under the age of ten describing any  act of sexual con-
tact performed on or with the child, or the circumstances un-
der which it occurred, or identifying the perpetrator offered in 
an action brought under G. L. c. 119, §§ 23(C) and 24, shall 
be admissible; provided, however that
(i) the person to whom the statement was made, or who 
heard the child make the statement, testifies;
(ii) the judge finds that the statement is offered as evi-
dence of a material fact and is more probative on the 
point for which it  is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable ef-
fort;
(iii) the judge finds pursuant to Section 803(24)(B) that 
such statement is reliable; and
(iv) the judge’s reasons for relying on the statement ap-
pear in the judge’s findings pursuant to Section 
803(24)(C).
(B) Reliability of Statement. A judge must assess the reli-
ability  of the out-of-court statement by considering the fol-
lowing factors:
(i) the timing of the statement, the circumstances in 
which it was made, the language used by the child, and 
the child’s apparent sincerity or motive in making the 
statement;
(ii) the consistency over time of a child’s statement con-
cerning abuse, expert testimony about a child’s ability to 
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remember and to relate his or her experiences, or other 
relevant personality traits;
(iii) the child’s capacity to remember and to relate, and 
the child’s ability to perceive the necessity of telling the 
truth; and
(iv) whether other admissible evidence corroborates the 
existence of child abuse.
(C) Findings on the Record. The judge’s reasons for relying 
on the statement must appear clearly in the specific and de-
tailed findings the judge is required to make in a care and pro-
tection case.
(D) Admissibility by Common Law or Statute. An out-of-
court statement admissible by common law or by statute shall 
remain admissible notwithstanding the provisions of this sec-
tion.
NOTE
Confrontation Clause. In a criminal case, a hearsay statement offered 
against the accused must satisfy both the confrontation clause and one of 
the hearsay exceptions. For a discussion of the relationship between the 
confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions stated in Section 803, refer 
to the Introductory Note to Article VIII.
Subsection (1). To date, the present sense impression exception has not 
been adopted in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 
Mass. 393, 398 n.3, 436 N.E.2d 912, 916 n.3 (1982).
Subsection (2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 623, 774 N.E.2d 143, 146 (2002). See 
also Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 221–222, 303 N.E.2d 
338, 346–347 (1973). “The statement itself may be taken as proof of the ex-
citing event.” Commonwealth v. Nunes, 430 Mass. 1, 4, 712 N.E.2d 88, 91 
(1999). See Commonwealth v. King, 436 Mass. 252, 255, 763 N.E.2d 1071, 
1075 (2002). The proponent of the evidence is not required to show that the 
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spontaneous utterance qualifies, characterizes, or explains the underlying 
event as long as the court is satisfied that the statement was the product of a 
startling event and not the result of conscious reflection. See Commonwealth 
v. Santiago, 437 Mass. at 624–627, 774 N.E.2d at 147–148.
“[T]he nexus between the statement and the event that pro-
duced it is but one of many factors to consider in determining 
whether the declarant was, in fact, under the sway of the 
exciting event when she made the statement. . . . It illumi-
nates the second aspect of the test; it is not an independent 
requirement, in the same respect that the lapse of time be-
tween the startling event and the declarant’s statement is not 
an independent requirement.”
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. at 625–626, 774 N.E.2d at 147.
“[T]here can be no definite and fixed limit of time [between the incident 
and the statement]. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances.” 
Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. at 223, 303 N.E.2d at 347, quoting 
Rocco v. Boston-Leader, Inc., 340 Mass. 195, 196–197, 163 N.E.2d 157, 158 
(1960). See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 417 Mass. 358, 362, 629 N.E.2d 
1332, 1334 (1994) (statements need not be strictly contemporaneous with 
the exciting cause; a child’s statement five hours later correctly admitted). 
See also Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 81, 634 N.E.2d 565, 569 
(1994) (same). “But the length of time between the incident and statement is 
important; the further the statement from the event, the more difficult it be-
comes to determine whether the statement is the result of reflection, influ-
enced by other factors.” Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 239, 
692 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1998).
A writing may qualify as a spontaneous utterance. See Commonwealth 
v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 238–240, 692 N.E.2d at 49–51. However, “[b]e-
cause a writing is more suspect as a spontaneous exclamation than is an 
oral statement, the circumstances of the writing would have to include indicia 
of reliability even more persuasive than those required for an oral statement 
before [the court] could conclude that the writing qualified as a spontaneous 
exclamation.” Id. at 239, 692 N.E.2d at 50.
A bystander’s spontaneous utterance may be admissible. See Com-
monwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 657–658, 760 N.E.2d 1216, 1219–
1220 (2002). “Although witnesses may not testify unless evidence is intro-
duced sufficient to support a finding that they have personal knowledge of 
the matter about which they are testifying, there is no requirement that the 
declarant have been a participant in the exciting event” (citation omitted). Id. 
at 657, 760 N.E.2d at 1220.
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A statement made in response to a question may qualify as a spontane-
ous utterance. See Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 296, 923 
N.E.2d 58, 72 (2010). But see Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 
849, 926 N.E.2d 1143, 1156–1157 (2010) (statement by the victim of a sexual 
assault to a SANE [sexual assault nurse examiner] at the hospital made in 
the context of a question-and-answer format did not qualify as an excited 
utterance because “the requisite level of spontaneity was not present”).
Confrontation in Criminal Cases. “When the Commonwealth in a 
criminal case seeks to admit the excited utterance of a declarant who is not a 
witness at trial or has completed his testimony at trial, the judge should con-
duct a careful voir dire, evidentiary if needed, before admitting the excited 
utterance in evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 68 n.14, 913 
N.E.2d 850, 863 n.14 (2009) (statement, if testimonial, would be barred by 
the confrontation clause).
Subsection (3)(A). This subsection is derived from Murray v. Foster, 343 
Mass. 655, 658, 180 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1962). See Simmons v. Yurchak, 28 
Mass. App. Ct. 371, 373–375, 375 n.6, 551 N.E.2d 539, 541–542, 542 n.6 
(1990) (upholding trial court’s refusal  to apply Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
803[3] while noting that “[i]t is not self-evident that Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
803[3] propounds a more expansive hearsay exception than the common law 
‘expression of pain’”).
Subsection (3)(B)(i). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Com-
monwealth v. Caldron, 383 Mass. 86, 91, 417 N.E.2d 958, 961 (1981). See 
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 466, 806 N.E.2d 393, 401 
(2004); Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 381 Mass. 306, 310–311, 409 N.E.2d 
188, 192–193 (1980); Commonwealth v. Wampler, 369 Mass. 121, 123, 337 
N.E.2d 892, 893 (1975).
Subsection (3)(B)(ii). The first sentence of this subsection is taken verbatim 
from Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 381 Mass. 306, 310, 409 N.E.2d 188, 192 
(1980). Accord Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 183–184, 31 
N.E. 961, 962–963 (1892) (conviction reversed because trial judge improp-
erly excluded evidence that victim, who was pregnant at the time of her 
death, told her “fortune teller” the day before her drowning that she felt like 
committing suicide). See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 427 Mass. 90, 95, 
692 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1998) (“A declarant’s threat to ‘get’ or kill someone is ad-
missible to show that the declarant had a particular state of mind and that he 
carried out his intent.”); Commonwealth v. Vermette, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 789, 
801–802, 686 N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (1997) (proper to admit statement of inten-
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tion to lie and confess to shooting for purpose of showing that declarant car-
ried out that intent).
The second sentence of this subsection is derived from Commonwealth 
v. Lowe, 391 Mass. 97, 104–105, 461 N.E.2d 192, 197, cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 840 (1984). See Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 281, 491 
N.E.2d 240, 244 (1986) (“exception applies only to the declarant’s present 
intent to act, not to past conduct”). See also Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 
425 Mass. 507, 512, 681 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (1997) (“[a]llowing hearsay 
statements generally under the state-of-mind exception would entirely evis-
cerate the hearsay rule and its important purpose of securing the correctness 
and completeness of testimony through cross-examination”). Accord Shepard 
v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105–106 (1933).
State-of-Mind Exception. The principle contained in this subsection is 
also known as the state-of-mind exception. See Commonwealth v. DelValle, 
351 Mass. 489, 492–493, 221 N.E.2d 922, 924–925 (1966). This subsection 
should be distinguished from circumstances where a person’s state of mind 
is relevant for a purpose other than its truth. See Section 801(c), Definitions: 
Hearsay. First, it is applicable only when the state of mind of the person de-
scribed in the statement is relevant. See Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 
Mass. 1, 7–9, 353 N.E.2d 649, 653–654 (1976). See also Pardo v. General 
Hosp. Corp., 446 Mass. 1, 18, 841 N.E.2d 692, 705 (2006).
“A murder victim’s state of mind becomes a material  issue if 
the defendant opens the door by claiming that the death was 
a suicide or a result of self-defense, that the victim would 
voluntarily meet with or go someplace with the defendant, or 
that the defendant was on friendly terms with the victim.”
Commonwealth v. Magraw, 426 Mass. 589, 593–594, 690 N.E.2d 400, 404 
(1998). Second, if it is being offered against a defendant in a criminal case, 
there must be evidence that the statement was communicated to the defen-
dant.
“The state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule calls for 
admission of evidence of a murder victim’s state of mind as 
proof of the defendant’s motive to kill the victim when and 
only when there also is evidence that the defendant was 
aware of that state of mind at the time of the crime and 
would be likely to respond to it.”
Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 167, 680 N.E.2d 61, 64 (1997). 
Third, the statement is not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.
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“Where evidence of the victim’s state of mind is admitted, it 
may only be used to prove that state of mind, and not to 
prove the truth of what was stated or that a defendant har-
bored certain thoughts or acted in a certain way. Therefore, 
on the defendant’s request, the jury must be given an in-
struction on the limited use of state of mind evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Magraw, 426 Mass. at 594–595, 690 N.E.2d at 404. 
Fourth, before such evidence is admitted, the trial  judge must conduct a 
careful review under Section 403. Id. at 594, 597, 690 N.E.2d at 404, 406.
Subsection (3)(B)(iii). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Mahan 
v. Perkins, 274 Mass. 176, 179–180, 174 N.E. 275, 276 (1931). See id. at 
180, 174 N.E. at 276–277 (“[Testator’s] declarations showing her intention, 
plan or purpose should not be received to support the proponent’s contention 
that the will was signed by her and attested by [the witness].”)
Subsection (4). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Comtois, 
399 Mass. 668, 675, 506 N.E.2d 503, 508 (1987), and Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 355 Mass. 526, 528–529, 246 N.E.2d 419, 420–421 (1969). See 
Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 231, 901 N.E.2d 99, 112 (2009); 
Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 62, 849 N.E.2d 218, 224 
(2006). If made for the purpose of receiving medical advice, the statements 
are admissible under this subsection even if made after the commencement 
of the action. Barber v. Merriam, 93 Mass. 322, 326 (1865).
While the appellate cases cited in this note related to physicians, noth-
ing in the reasoning of those cases exclude other health care professionals. 
See Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527–528, 381 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 
(1978).
Cross-Reference: Section 803(6)(C), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of 
Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Medical  and Hospital 
Services.
Subsection (5)(A). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Nolan, 
427 Mass. 541, 543, 694 N.E.2d 350, 352 (1998), and Commonwealth v. 
Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 663–664, 436 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (1982). A wit-
ness does not have to have a complete lack of memory; all that is required is 
that the witness cannot testify fully. Commonwealth v. Nolan, 427 Mass. at 
544, 694 N.E.2d at 353.
“As to the fourth element of the foundation, where the recording was 
made by another, it must be shown that the witness adopted the writing 
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‘when the events were fresh in [the witness’s] mind’” (emphasis omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 189–190, 786 N.E.2d 375, 382–
383 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. at 664, 436 
N.E.2d at 1233. See Commonwealth v. Fryar, 414 Mass. 732, 746, 610 
N.E.2d 903, 912 (1993), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1033 (1997). The requirement 
that the recording be made when the events were fresh in the witness’s 
memory has been interpreted broadly. See Catania v. Emerson Cleaners, 
Inc., 362 Mass. 388, 389–390, 286 N.E.2d 341, 342 (1972) (holding that 
statement given approximately eight months after accident admissible as a 
past recollection recorded). But see Kirby v. Morales, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 
791–792, 741 N.E.2d 855, 860 (2001) (one year insufficient).
Subsection (5)(B). This subsection is derived from Fisher v. Swartz, 333 
Mass. 265, 267–271, 130 N.E.2d 575, 577–579 (1955). In Fisher, the court 
cautioned that it was not
“laying down a hard and fast rule that in every ‘past recollec-
tion recorded’ situation the writing used by the witness must 
always be admitted in evidence, and that it is error to ex-
clude it . . . . It is conceivable that there might be situations 
where the probative value of the writing as evidence might 
be outweighed by the risk that its admission might create 
substantial  danger of undue prejudice or of misleading the 
jury. In such a case the trial judge in the exercise of sound 
discretion might be justified in excluding the writing.”
Id. at 270, 130 N.E.2d at 579. See Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 
657, 664, 436 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (1982) (error to admit grand jury testimony 
of the witness as past recollection recorded). The witness may read from the 
writing during the witness’s testimony, or the writing may be admitted.
The past recollection recorded exception should not be confused with 
the doctrine of refreshing memory. See Section 612, Writing or Object Used 
to Refresh Memory. For a discussion of the distinction between the two, see 
Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. at 267, 130 N.E.2d at 577.
Subsection (6)(A). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 78. See Beal  Bank, SSB v. Eurich, 444 Mass. 813, 815, 831 
N.E.2d 909, 911 (2005); Commonwealth v. Trapp, 396 Mass. 202, 208, 485 
N.E.2d 162, 166 (1985). See, e.g., Johnson v. MBTA, 418 Mass. 783, 786, 
641 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (1994) (results of laboratory test); Commonwealth v. 
Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 230 & n.15, 402 N.E.2d 1329, 1337 & n.15 (1980) (In 
admitting police journal  entry fixing the time a telephone call was received, 
the Supreme Judicial  Court noted that “[t]he operations of the instrumentali-
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ties of government constitute ‘business’ within the meaning of the statute” 
[citation omitted].); Commonwealth v. Walker, 379 Mass. 297, 302, 397 
N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (1979) (police record of stolen car report). In a criminal 
proceeding where the judge admits a business record under this exception, 
the questions of fact serving as a basis for its admissibility must be submitted 
to the jury. G. L. c. 233, § 78. See Commonwealth v. Reyes, 19 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1017, 1019, 476 N.E.2d 978, 980 (1985). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 79J (certifica-
tion, inspection, and copies of business records).
The trial  judge may, as a condition to admissibility of business records, 
require the party offering the business record into evidence to call a witness 
who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the record. G. L. c. 233, 
§ 78. See Burns v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 92, 373 
N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (1978). A trial  judge must first determine if the writing itself 
qualifies as a business record, and then determine “whether all  or only some 
of the material and information contained in the document qualifies as being 
within the scope of the statutory exception.” Wingate v. Emery Air Freight 
Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 408, 432 N.E.2d 474, 479 (1982) (Liacos, J., concur-
ring). A business record is admissible even when its preparer has relied on 
the statements of others because the personal knowledge of the entrant or 
maker affects only the weight of the record, not its admissibility. Id. at 406, 
432 N.E.2d at 478. However, “unless statements on which the preparer relies 
fall  within some other exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must 
show that all  persons in the chain of communication, from the observer to the 
preparer, reported the information as a matter of business duty or business 
routine.” Id. See NationsBanc Mtge. Corp. v. Eisenhauer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 
727, 733–735, 733 N.E.2d 557, 562–563 (2000) (where records made by 
one business were transferred to another, latter business unable to admit the 
records under business record exception because records were made by 
former business).
Opinions contained in business records are not admissible unless they 
fall  within some other exception to the hearsay rule. See Julian v. Randazzo, 
380 Mass. 391, 392–393, 403 N.E.2d 931, 932–933 (1980); Burke v. Memo-
rial Hosp., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 948, 949–950, 558 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1990). 
Cf. Section 803(6)(C), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immate-
rial: Business and Hospital  Records: Medical and Hospital Services (pro-
vides, under certain circumstances, for the admission of opinion contained in 
medical, dental, and other identified records and reports).
Criminal Cases. A record or report that qualifies as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under this subsection may nevertheless be inadmissible if it 
contains testimonial  statements in violation of the confrontation clause. See 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
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Subsection (6)(B). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79. See 
Commonwealth v. Sheldon, 423 Mass. 373, 376, 667 N.E.2d 1153, 1155–
1156 (1996). A hospital record is admissible at trial  if the trial judge finds that 
(1) it is the type of record contemplated by G. L. c. 233, § 79; (2) the informa-
tion is germane to the patient’s treatment or medical history; and (3) the in-
formation is recorded from the personal knowledge of the entrant or from a 
compilation of the personal knowledge of those under a medical  obligation to 
transmit such information. Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 531, 381 
N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1978). Compare Commonwealth v. Sheldon, 423 Mass. 
at 375–377, 667 N.E.2d at 1155–1156 (blood alcohol tests conducted solely 
to prove the defendant’s sobriety, in circumstances in which there was no 
hospital protocol for conducting such a test, do not qualify for admission un-
der G. L. c. 233, § 79), with Commonwealth v. Dyer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 
855–856, 934 N.E.2d 293, 299 (2010) (blood alcohol test results ordered by 
physician exclusively for the medical  evaluation and treatment of the defen-
dant qualify for admission under G. L. c. 233, § 79). The party offering the 
record into evidence has the burden of proving the statutory requirements, 
Commonwealth v. Dunne, 394 Mass. 10, 16, 474 N.E.2d 538, 543 (1985), 
and need not give advance notice of the intent to offer the record in evi-
dence, Commonwealth v. McCready, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 524–525, 739 
N.E.2d 270, 273 (2000). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 79G (ten days’ advance notice 
required). The trial judge has discretion to exclude portions of an otherwise 
admissible medical record in accordance with Sections 402, Relevant Evi-
dence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible, 403, Grounds 
for Excluding Relevant Evidence, and 611(a), Manner and Order of Interroga-
tion and Presentation: Control by Court. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 
Mass. 132, 138–139, 876 N.E.2d 862, 869–870 (2007).
“[V]oluntary statements of third persons appearing in the record are not 
admissible unless they are offered for reasons other than to prove the truth of 
the matter contained therein or, if offered for their truth, come within another 
exception to the hearsay rule . . . .” Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. at 531, 381 
N.E.2d at 1300. The Supreme Judicial Court has noted that G. L. c. 233, 
§ 79,
“may be read to permit the admission of a medical history 
taken from a person with reason to know of the patient’s 
medical history by virtue of his or her relationship to the pa-
tient. Such a history may contain personal knowledge gained 
from observation or knowledge gained from an intimate rela-
tionship. We think that [G. L. c. 233, § 79] should be read to 
include such statements if made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and if the declarant’s relationship to 
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the patient and the circumstances in which the statements 
are made guarantees their trustworthiness.”
Id. at 531, 381 N.E.2d at 1299.
“[General Laws c. 233, § 79,] has long been construed to 
permit the admission of a record that relates directly and 
primarily to the treatment and medical history of the patient, 
‘even though incidentally the facts recorded may have some 
bearing on the question of liability.’ . . . In application this lib-
eral construction has permitted the admission in evidence of 
statements in hospital records bearing on criminal  culpability 
that seem to relate at most only incidentally to medical 
treatment” (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Dube, 413 Mass. 570, 573, 601 N.E.2d 467, 468–469 
(1992). See Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242, 692 N.E.2d 45, 
52 (1998).
“[General Laws c. 233, § 79,] relies on a ‘pragmatic test of 
reliability’ that permits the introduction of records containing 
even second level hearsay provided the information in the 
record is of a nature that is relied on by medical profession-
als in administering health care. . . . While creating an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, the statute does not permit the 
admission of hospital records that are facially unreliable.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 167, 794 N.E.2d 1214, 
1217 (2003), citing Doyle v. Dong, 412 Mass. 682, 687, 591 N.E.2d 1084, 
1087 (1992). See generally Petitions of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dis-
pense with Consent to Adoption, 399 Mass. 279, 287–288, 503 N.E.2d 1275, 
1280–1281 (1987) (privileged material should be redacted).
Illustrations. Notations on Form 2 in the “Sexual Assault Evidence Col-
lection Kit” made by the SANE (sexual  assault nurse examiner) based on 
statements by the complainant about how he or she received his or her inju-
ries are admissible because they assist the SANE in conducting the exami-
nation, even though the information is also collected to assist investigators. 
Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 396, 930 N.E.2d 707, 717 (2010). 
However, the printed form should not be admitted because it suggests a sex-
ual assault occurred. Id. Notations on hospital  intake forms stating that a pa-
tient was “assaulted” should be redacted. Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 
Mass. at 241–242, 692 N.E.2d at 51–52. In DiMonte, several references to 
the facts of the alleged assault, including “Pt. struck in the face [with] fist” and 
“reports having a plastic container thrown [at] her which struck her [right] 
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forehead,” were admissible. Id. at 241, 692 N.E.2d at 51. Statements con-
sisting of self-diagnosis should be redacted. Commonwealth v. Hartman, 404 
Mass. 306, 316–317, 534 N.E.2d 1170, 1177 (1989). In Commonwealth v. 
Concepcion, 362 Mass. 653, 654–655, 290 N.E.2d 514, 514–515 (1972), 
hospital records where (a) under the heading “Nature of Illness” appeared 
the words “? Assaulted- ? Raped,” (b) under the heading “History and Physi-
cal  Exam” appeared the words “History of recent rape,” and (c) under the 
heading “Diagnosis” appeared the notation “? Rape,” the doctor’s opinions 
were related to the treatment and medical history. Blood tests bearing on the 
patient’s degree of intoxication are admissible; entries made by observing 
nurses are also admissible. Commonwealth v. McCready, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 524, 739 N.E.2d at 272–273. In Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 24 Mass. App. 
Ct. 200, 202, 509 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1987), a “[d]iagnosis” of “sexual molestation,” 
a term “synonymous to laymen with indecent assault and battery,” should 
have been redacted. Cf. Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 934 
N.E.2d 236 (2010) (SAIN [Sexual Abuse Intervention Network] report may be 
admissible in probation violation hearings).
Subsection (6)(C). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79G. The 
text in this subsection places the statutory language in more straightforward 
language and also incorporates the case law. The practitioner, however, is 
cautioned to check the precise statutory language.
This statute applies to criminal cases as well as to civil  cases, and its 
scope is much broader than that of G. L. c. 233, § 79. Commonwealth v. 
Schutte, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 798–800, 756 N.E.2d 48, 51–52 (2001). See 
generally Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. 269, 274, 557 N.E.2d 1136, 
1139 (1990) (declining to adopt Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803[6] for the pur-
pose of admitting physician’s reports given the “carefully crafted provisions of 
§ 79G”).
Scope. This subsection establishes a broad exception to the hearsay 
rule which overlaps to some degree with the hospital records exception pro-
vided in Section 803(6)(B), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Im-
material: Business and Hospital Records: Hospital Records. See McHoul, 
petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 151, 833 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (2005); Ortiz v. Stein, 
31 Mass. App. Ct. 643, 645, 582 N.E.2d 560, 561 (1991). But see Brusard v. 
O’Toole, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 288, 295, 697 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (1998) 
(G. L. c. 233, § 79G, would not allow the admission in evidence of hospital 
policies and procedures). In some respects, however, this subsection is 
broader than the exception for hospital records found in Section 803(6)(B) 
because
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 272
“reports admissible under § 79G may include the ‘opinion of 
such physician . . . as to proximate cause of the condition so 
diagnosed, . . .’ and ‘the opinion of such physician . . . as to 
disability or incapacity, if any, proximately resulting from the 
condition so diagnosed. . . .’ These are not matters usually 
found in a medical record but do pertain to issues commonly 
involved in personal  injury claims and litigation. Thus, the 
concerns that require redaction of information not germane 
to the patient’s treatment in medical records under § 79, see, 
e.g., Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 531 (1978), are 
overridden by express language in § 79G.”
Commonwealth v. Schutte, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 799–800, 756 N.E.2d at 51–
52. Also, since the term “report” is not defined in G. L. c. 233, § 79G, a prop-
erly attested letter from a person’s treating physician explaining the patient’s 
medical condition and its effects based on the physician’s personal  observa-
tions can be qualified as a report. Id.
The full  amount of a medical  or hospital bill  is admissible as evidence of 
the reasonable value of the services rendered to the injured person, even 
where the amount actually paid by a private or public insurer is less than that 
amount. Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 353–354, 930 N.E.2d 126, 130–131 
(2010) (citing G. L. c. 233, § 79G).
Cross-Reference: G. L. c. 233, § 79H (medical records of deceased 
physicians); Section 411(b), Insurance: Limited Admissibility; Section 902(k), 
Self-Authentication: Certified Copies of Hospital and Other Records of 
Treatment and Medical History.
Requirements for Admissibility. Reports offered under G. L. c. 233, 
§ 79G, as opposed to G. L. c. 233, § 78, are admissible even if prepared in 
anticipation of litigation. See O’Malley v. Soske, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 498–
499, 923 N.E.2d 552, 555–556 (2010); Commonwealth v. Schutte, 52 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 799 n.3, 756 N.E.2d at 52 n.3. Medical reports which deal with an 
injured person’s “diagnosis, prognosis, opinion as to the proximate cause of 
the condition so diagnosed, or the opinion as to disability or incapacity,” see 
Section 803(6)(C)(ii), must be by a physician, as that term is defined in the 
subsection, who treated or examined the injured person. See Ortiz v. Stein, 
31 Mass. App. Ct. at 645–646, 582 N.E.2d at 561–562. See also Gompers v. 
Finnell, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 93, 616 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1993) (“Nothing in 
§ 79G authorizes one not a physician or dentist to offer an expert opinion that 
a patient’s physical  symptoms resulted from a particular accident or inci-
dent.”). If a record contains such an opinion, however, it may satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof on the issue of causation in a medical  negligence 
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case. See Bailey v. Cataldo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 228, 
234–236, 832 N.E.2d 12, 17–18 (2005) (explaining that there is no require-
ment that an expert opinion on causation contain the phrase “to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty”).
General Laws c. 233, § 79G, requires that a party who seeks to offer the 
report of a physician or dentist at trial  must serve opposing counsel at least 
ten days in advance of trial with notice and a copy of the report by the physi-
cian or dentist. See Adoption of Seth, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 351–352, 560 
N.E.2d 708, 713 (1990). However, the attestation by the physician or dentist 
does not have to be included with the notice so long as it is present when the 
evidence is offered at trial. See Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. at 274, 
557 N.E.2d at 1139; Knight v. Maersk Container Serv. Co., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 
254, 256, 728 N.E.2d 968, 969–970 (2000).
Cross-Reference: G. L. c. 233, § 79H; Section 902(k), Self-
Authentication: Certified Copies of Hospital and Other Records of Treatment 
and Medical History.
Subsection (7). This subsection is derived from McNamara v. Honeyman, 
406 Mass. 43, 54 n.10, 546 N.E.2d 139, 146 n.10 (1989), and Common-
wealth v. Scanlan, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 173, 182, 400 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (1980). 
See Johnson v. Wilmington Sales, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 858, 858, 364 
N.E.2d 1291, 1292 (1977). Where testimony is offered, proof of the fact that 
an entry does not exist does not require the production of the records them-
selves or the laying of a foundation for the introduction of secondary evi-
dence. Commonwealth v. Scanlan, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 182, 400 N.E.2d at 
1271. See Commonwealth v. Torrealba, 316 Mass. 24, 30, 54 N.E.2d 939, 
943 (1944); Johnson v. Wilmington Sales, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 858, 364 
N.E.2d at 1292.
Subsection (8). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Slavski, 
245 Mass. 405, 415, 140 N.E. 465, 468 (1923). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 76 (admis-
sibility of authenticated government records); Mass. R. Civ. P. 44 (proof of 
official records); Mass. R. Crim. P. 40 (same).
Under the common law, a report or record does not become an official 
record for the purpose of this exception merely because it is filed with a gov-
ernmental agency. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 615, 
619, 827 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (2005); Kelly v. O’Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 
319, 296 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1973). A hearsay statement recorded in an official 
record, if made by someone other than the public officer making the record, 
is not admissible under this exception, although it may be admissible if it falls 
within another hearsay exception. See Sklar v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. 
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Ctr., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 556 n.8, 797 N.E.2d 381, 386 n.8 (2003). 
Evaluative reports, opinions, and conclusions contained in a public  report are 
not admissible at common law. Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 
387–395, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1228–1234 (2008) (ruling that the findings of a 
medical examiner concerning the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries 
and his or her ultimate opinion as to the cause of death were not statements 
of fact excluded by the hearsay rule, but instead were evaluative statements 
that fell outside the public  record exception); Mattoon v. Pittsfield, 56 Mass. 
App. Ct. 124, 135, 775 N.E.2d 770, 779–780 (2002). See Middlesex Supply, 
Inc. v. Martin & Sons, Inc., 354 Mass. 373, 374–375, 237 N.E.2d 692, 693 
(1968); Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 792–
793, 667 N.E.2d 907, 917 (1996).
The following statutes provide for the admission of facts contained in 
public records as prima facie evidence (examples of the records covered are 
in parentheses): G. L. c. 46, § 19 (birth, marriage, and death records); 
G. L. c. 79, § 35 (assessed valuation of real  property); G. L. c. 90, § 30 (re-
cords of the Registry of Motor Vehicles); G. L. c. 111, § 13 (certificate of 
chemical analyses); G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c) (public records at trial  on whether 
person is sexually dangerous); and G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (report of housing 
inspector). Conclusions contained in public  records may be made admissible 
by statute. Shamlian v. Equitable Acc. Co., 226 Mass. 67, 69–70, 115 N.E. 
46, 47 (1917).
Mortality Tables. In Harlow v. Chin, 405 Mass. 697, 714, 545 N.E.2d 
602, 612 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the admissibility of 
mortality tables:
“Mortality tables, though not conclusive proof of life expec-
tancy, help furnish a basis for the jury’s estimation. The ta-
bles themselves are admissible regardless of the poor health 
or extra-hazardous occupation of the person whose life ex-
pectancy is being estimated. When the opposing side be-
lieves that the person in question, because of poor health, 
has a lower life expectancy than that reflected in the mortal-
ity tables, the usual  remedy is to offer evidence to that effect 
and argue the point to the jury.” (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Cases. A record or report that qualifies as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under this subsection may nevertheless be inadmissible if it 
contains testimonial  statements in violation of the confrontation clause. See 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). See also 
Introductory Note to Article VIII.
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Subsection (9). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 46, § 19. 
See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 144, 546 N.E.2d 159, 165 
(1989), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1126 (1997). See also Miles v. Edward Tabor 
M.D., Inc., 387 Mass. 783, 786, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (1982). Records from 
foreign countries are not admissible under G. L. c. 46, § 19, or G. L. c. 207, 
§ 45. Vergnani v. Guidetti, 308 Mass. 450, 457, 32 N.E.2d 272, 276 (1941). 
Cf. G. L. c. 46, § 19C (“The commissioner of public  health shall  use the seal 
of the department of public  health for the purpose of authenticating copies of 
birth, marriage and death records in his department, and copies of such re-
cords when certified by him and authenticated by said seal, shall be evidence 
like the originals.”). General Laws c. 46, § 19, makes the town clerk certifi-
cate admissible in evidence, but not with respect to liability. See Wadsworth 
v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 86, 93, 223 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1967). See also 
G. L. c. 207, § 45 (“The record of a marriage made and kept as provided by 
law by the person by whom the marriage was solemnized, or by the clerk or 
registrar, or a copy thereof duly certified, shall  be prima facie evidence of 
such marriage.”).
Subsection (10). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 803(10), reflects Massachusetts practice. See 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(b); Mass. R. Crim. P. 40(b); Blair’s Foodland, Inc. v. 
Shuman’s Foodland, Inc., 311 Mass. 172, 175–176, 40 N.E.2d 303, 306 
(1942).
Subsection (11). No cases or statutes were located on this issue. Cf. Sec-
tion 803(6)(A), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: 
Business and Hospital Records: Entry, Writing, or Record Made in Regular 
Course of Business.
Cross-Reference: Section 804(b)(7), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant 
Unavailable: Hearsay Exceptions: Religious Records.
Subsection (12). No cases or statutes were located on this issue. Cf. Sec-
tion 804(b)(7), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable: Hearsay Excep-
tions: Religious Records; Kennedy v. Doyle, 92 Mass. 161, 168 (1865) (bap-
tismal record admissible where maker is deceased).
Subsection (13). This subsection, which is taken verbatim from Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 803(13), reflects Massachusetts practice. See North Brook-
field v. Warren, 82 Mass. 171, 174–175 (1860). Cf. Section 803(9), Hearsay 
Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Records of Vital  Statistics; 
Section 804(b)(5)(A), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable: Hearsay 
Exceptions: Statutory Exceptions in Civil Cases: Declarations of Decedent.
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Subsection (14). This subsection is derived from Scanlan v. Wright, 30 
Mass. 523, 527 (1833), and Commonwealth v. Emery, 68 Mass. 80, 81–82 
(1854).
Subsection (15). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 183, 
§ 5A.
Subsection (16). This subsection is derived from Cunningham v. Davis, 175 
Mass. 213, 219, 56 N.E. 2, 4 (1900) (“It is a general rule that deeds appear-
ing to be more than 30 years old, which come from the proper custody, and 
are otherwise free from just grounds of suspicion, are admissible without any 
proof of execution.”). See Whitman v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 451, 460–461, 44 
N.E. 333, 337 (1896) (ancient plan and field notes); Drury v. Midland R.R. 
Co., 127 Mass. 571, 581 (1879) (old plans admitted for purposes of estab-
lishing location of a creek). Cf. Section 901(b)(8), Requirement of Authentica-
tion or Identification: Illustrations: Ancient Documents.
Cross-Reference: Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evi-
dence; Section 805, Hearsay within Hearsay.
Subsection (17). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 79B. 
The word “‘compilation,’ as used in the statute, connotes simple objective 
facts, and not conclusions or opinions.” Mazzaro v. Paull, 372 Mass. 645, 
652, 363 N.E.2d 509, 514 (1977). The trial judge must make “preliminary 
findings that the proposed exhibit is (1) issued to the public, (2) published for 
persons engaged in the applicable occupation, and (3) commonly used and 
relied on by such persons.” Id. See Fall River Sav. Bank v. Callahan, 18 
Mass. App. Ct. 76, 83–84, 463 N.E.2d 555, 561 (1984); Torre v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 672–673, 404 N.E.2d 96, 105–106 
(1980).
See generally G. L. c. 106, § 2-724 (“Whenever the prevailing price or 
value of any goods regularly bought and sold in any established commodity 
market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade journals or in news-
papers or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of such 
market shall  be admissible in evidence. The circumstances of the preparation 
of such a report may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility.”).
Subsection (18)(A). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 
233, § 79C. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 170, 
794 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (2003) (“pill  book” purchased from pharmacy purport-
ing to describe effects of prescription drugs not admissible as learned trea-
tise); Simmons v. Yurchak, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 375–377, 551 N.E.2d 539, 
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542–543 (1990) (instructional videotape not admissible as learned treatise). 
Statements from a treatise satisfying the requirements of G. L. c. 233, § 79C, 
may also be used in medical malpractice tribunals. See G. L. c. 231, § 60B.
“When determining the admissibility of a published treatise under 
G. L. c. 233, § 79C, we interpret the ‘writer of such statements’ to mean the 
treatise author, not the author of each individual item incorporated into the 
treatise text.” Brusard v. O’Toole, 429 Mass. 597, 606, 710 N.E.2d 588, 594 
(1999). “[T]he ‘writer’ of a statement contained in an authored treatise is the 
author of the treatise, and the ‘writer’ of a statement contained in a periodical 
or similarly edited publication is the author of the specific  article in which the 
statement is contained.” Id. The biographical  data about the author in the 
front of the treatise may not be used to establish the expertise of the author, 
see Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 247, 134 N.E.2d 920, 922 
(1956), but an opponent witness who admits that the author of the treatise is 
a recognized expert in the field is sufficient, see Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 
93, 98, 100, 106 N.E.2d 687, 691 (1952). “The statutory notice of the intent to 
introduce a treatise required by G. L. c. 233, § 79C, requires that ‘the date of 
publication’ of the treatise be specified. The edition of a treatise, if applicable, 
should be specified, and parties should be permitted to introduce statements 
from only that edition.” Brusard v. O’Toole, 429 Mass. at 606 n.13, 710 
N.E.2d at 594 n.13.
Subsection (18)(B). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Sneed, 413 Mass. 387, 396, 597 N.E.2d 1346, 1351 (1992), in which the Su-
preme Judicial Court adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(18). Treatises 
are not available to bolster direct examination. Brusard v. O’Toole, 429 Mass. 
597, 601 n.5, 710 N.E.2d 588, 591 n.5 (1999). But see Commonwealth v. 
Sneed, 413 Mass. at 396 n.8, 597 N.E.2d at 1351 n.8 (“We can imagine a 
situation in which, in fairness, portions of a learned treatise not called to the 
attention of a witness during cross-examination should be admitted on re-
quest of the expert’s proponent in order to explain, limit, or contradict a state-
ment ruled admissible under [Section] 803[(18)].”). This subsection “contem-
plates that an authored treatise, and not the statements contained therein, 
must be established as a reliable authority.” Brusard v. O’Toole, 429 Mass. at 
602–603, 710 N.E.2d at 592.
“[The] opponent of the expert witness [must] bring to the wit-
ness’s attention a specific statement in a treatise that has 
been established, to the judge’s satisfaction, as a reliable 
authority. The witness should be given a fair opportunity to 
assess the statement in context and to comment on it, either 
during cross-examination or on redirect examination. The 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 278
judge, of course, will have to determine the relevance and 
materiality of the statement and should consider carefully 
any claimed unfairness or confusion that admission of the 
statement may create.”
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. at 396, 597 N.E.2d at 1351. This is a 
preliminary question of fact for the judge. See Section 104(a), Preliminary 
Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.
Subsection (19). This subsection is derived from Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. 
461, 466, 29 N.E. 1088, 1089 (1892). See Cadorette v. United States, 988 
F.2d 215, 220–222 (1st Cir. 1993). But see Haddock v. Boston & Maine R.R., 
85 Mass. 298, 301 (1862).
Subsection (20). This subsection is derived from Enfield v. Woods, 212 
Mass. 547, 551–552, 99 N.E. 331, 332 (1912) (admitting reputation evidence 
regarding existence or nonexistence of public ownership of land). See 
G. L. c. 139, § 9 (“For the purpose of proving the existence of the nuisance 
the general reputation of the place shall  be admissible as evidence.”). See 
Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 Mass. 765, 767 n.2, 374 N.E.2d 
1331, 1336 n.2 (1978) (G. L. c. 139, § 9, is a statutory exception to hearsay 
rule).
Subsection (21). This exception deals only with the hearsay aspect of evi-
dence of reputation. For additional restrictions on the use of such evidence, 
see Sections 404, Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; 
Exceptions; Other Crimes, 405, Methods of Proving Character, and 608, Im-
peachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness, and the ac-
companying notes.
Subsection (22). This subsection is derived from Flood v. Southland Corp., 
416 Mass. 62, 70, 616 N.E.2d 1068, 1074 (1993), in which the Supreme Ju-
dicial  Court adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(22). See Commonwealth 
v. Powell, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 435–436, 665 N.E.2d 99, 102–103 (1996) 
(error where trial court instructed jury it could consider prior guilty plea of al-
leged joint venturer to charge of armed robbery as circumstantial evidence of 
presence of gun in subsequent trial of other joint venturer on same charge). 
“[A] plea of guilty is admissible in evidence as an admission in subsequent 
civil litigation, but is not conclusive.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 395 
Mass. 737, 747, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1363 (1985). Cf. Section 609, Impeach-
ment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime; Section 410, Inadmissibility of 
Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f).
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Subsection (23). No cases or statutes were located on this issue.
Subsection (24)(A). Subsections (24)(A) through (A)(ii) are taken nearly ver-
batim from G. L. c. 233, § 83(a). Subsections (24)(A)(iii) and (iv) are derived 
from Care & Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 78, 80, 643 N.E.2d 26, 
33, 34 (1994). There is no requirement that the child be unavailable. Id. at 
76–77, 643 N.E.2d at 32. When a care and protection proceeding is joined 
with a petition to dispense with consent to adoption, admissibility of a child’s 
out-of-court statements should comply with the stricter requirements of 
G. L. c. 233, § 82, not § 83. Adoption of Tina, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 733, 
701 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1998).
Subsection (24)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Care & 
Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 79–80, 643 N.E.2d 26, 33 (1994). The 
judge may question the child through a voir dire. Id. The reliability of state-
ments contained in an investigator’s report can be assessed by cross-
examining the investigator. Care & Protection of Leo, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 
241–242, 646 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (1995).
Subsection (24)(C). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Care & 
Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 80, 643 N.E.2d 26, 34 (1994).
Subsection (24)(D). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 83(b).
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Section 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant 
Unavailable
(a) Definition of Unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” in-
cludes situations in which the declarant
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court  on the ground of privilege 
from testifying concerning the subject  matter of the declarant’s 
statement, or
(2) refuses to testify [exception not recognized], or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory [exception not recognized], or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of 
death or then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement 
has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance by process 
or other reasonable means.
A declarant  is not unavailable as a witness if the unavailability is due 
to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for 
the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by  the hear-
say rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Prior Recorded Testimony. Testimony  given as a witness at 
another trial or hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in 
a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the 
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a prede-
cessor in interest, had an opportunity and a similar motive to de-
velop the testimony by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement Made Under Belief of Impending Death. In a 
prosecution for homicide, a statement made by a declarant-victim 
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under the belief of imminent death and who died shortly  after 
making the statement, concerning the cause or circumstances of 
what the declarant believed to be the declarant’s own impending 
death or that of a co-victim.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the 
time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or 
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to 
civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the de-
clarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to 
be true. In a criminal case, the exception does not apply to a 
statement that is offered to exculpate the defendant or that  is of-
fered by the Commonwealth to inculpate the defendant, and that 
tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability, unless corrobo-
rating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement.
(4) Statement of Personal History.
(A) A statement concerning the declarant’s own birth, adop-
tion, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by  blood, or 
ancestry, even if the declarant had no means of acquiring per-
sonal knowledge of the matter stated.
(B) A statement regarding foregoing matters concerning an-
other person to whom the declarant is related [exception not 
recognized].
(5) Statutory Exceptions in Civil Cases.
(A) Declarations of Decedent. In any  action or other civil 
judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall 
not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as private con-
versation between husband and wife, as the case may be, if 
the court  finds that it was made in good faith and upon the 
personal knowledge of the declarant.
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(B) Deceased Party’s Answers to Interrogatories. If a party 
to an action who has filed answers to interrogatories under 
any applicable statute or any rule of the Massachusetts Rules 
of Civil Procedure dies, so much of such answers as the court 
finds have been made upon the personal knowledge of the 
deceased shall not be inadmissible as hearsay or self-serving 
if offered in evidence in said action by a representative of the 
deceased party.
(C) Declarations of Decedent in Actions Against an Estate. 
If a cause of action brought against an executor or administra-
tor is supported by oral testimony of a promise or statement 
made by the testator or intestate of the defendant, evidence of 
statements, written or oral, made by  the decedent, memoranda 
and entries written by the decedent, and evidence of the dece-
dent’s acts and habits of dealing, tending to disprove or to 
show the improbability of the making of such promise or 
statement, shall be admissible.
(D) Reports of Deceased Physicians in Tort Actions. In an 
action of tort  for personal injuries or death, or for consequen-
tial damages arising from such personal injuries, the medical 
report of a deceased physician who attended or examined the 
plaintiff, including expressions of medical opinion, shall, at 
the discretion of the trial judge, be admissible in evidence, but 
nothing therein contained which has reference to the question 
of liability shall be so admissible. Any opposing party  shall 
have the right to introduce evidence tending to limit, modify, 
contradict, or rebut such medical report. The word “physi-
cian” as used in this section shall not  include any person who 
was not licensed to practice medicine under the laws of the 
jurisdiction within which such medical attention was given or 
such examination was made.
(E) Medical Reports of Disabled or Deceased Physicians 
as Evidence in Workers’ Compensation Proceedings. In 
proceedings before the industrial accident board, the medical 
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report of an incapacitated, disabled, or deceased physician 
who attended or examined the employee, including expres-
sions of medical opinion, shall, at the discretion of the mem-
ber, be admissible as evidence if the member finds that such 
medical report was made as the result of such physician’s at-
tendance or examination of the employee.
(6) Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. A statement offered against a 
party  who forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right to object to 
its admission based on findings by the court that (A) the witness is 
unavailable; (B) the party  was involved in, or responsible for, pro-
curing the unavailability  of the witness; and (C) the party acted 
with the intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.
(7) Religious Records. Statements of fact made by a deceased 
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organiza-
tion to perform a religious act, contained in a certificate that the 
maker performed such act, and purporting to be issued at the time 
of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(8) Admissibility in Criminal Proceedings of a Child’s Out-of-
Court Statement Describing Sexual Contact. General Laws 
c. 233, § 81, was adopted prior to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), as well as the Su-
preme Judicial Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 
445 Mass. 1, 833 N.E.2d 549 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 
(2006), and Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 677 
N.E.2d 652 (1997). These decisions call into question the constitu-
tionality of this subsection.
(A) Admissibility in General. An out-of-court statement of a 
child under the age of ten describing an act of sexual contact 
performed on or with the child, the circumstances under 
which it occurred, or which identifies the perpetrator shall be 
admissible as substantive evidence in any  criminal proceed-
ing; provided, however, that
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(i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact 
and is more probative on the point for which it  is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts,
(ii) the person to whom the statement was made or who 
heard the child make the statement testifies,
(iii) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(8)(B) that 
the child is unavailable as a witness,
(iv) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(8)(C) that 
the statement is reliable, and
(v) the statement is corroborated pursuant to Section 
804(b)(8)(D).
(B) Unavailability of Child. The proponent of such state-
ment shall demonstrate a diligent and good-faith effort to 
produce the child and shall bear the burden of showing un-
availability. A finding of unavailability  shall be supported by 
specific findings on the record, describing facts with particu-
larity, demonstrating that
(i) the child is unable to be present or to testify because 
of death or physical or mental illness or infirmity;
(ii) by a ruling of the court, the child is exempt on the 
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the sub-
ject matter of such statement;
(iii) the child testifies to a lack of memory  of the subject 
matter of such statement;
(iv) the child is absent from the hearing and the propo-
nent of such statement has been unable to procure the 
attendance of the child by process or by  other reasonable 
means;
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(v) the court finds, based upon expert testimony from a 
treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician, that testi-
fying would be likely to cause severe psychological or 
emotional trauma to the child; or
(vi) the child is not competent to testify.
(C) Reliability of Statement. If a finding of unavailability is 
made, the out-of-court  statement shall be admitted if the 
judge further finds,
(i) after holding a separate hearing, that such statement 
was made under oath, that it was accurately recorded and 
preserved, and that there was sufficient opportunity  to 
cross-examine, or
(ii) after holding a separate hearing and, where practica-
ble and where not inconsistent with the best interests of 
the child, meeting with the child, that such statement 
was made under circumstances inherently  demonstrat-
ing a special guarantee of reliability.
For the purposes of finding circumstances demonstrating 
reliability  pursuant to this subsection, a judge may  con-
sider whether the relator documented the child witness’s 
statement and shall consider the following factors:
(a) the clarity of the statement, meaning the child’s 
capacity to observe, remember, and give expression 
to that which such child has seen, heard, or experi-
enced; provided, however, that a finding under this 
clause shall be supported by expert testimony from a 
treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician;
(b) the time, content, and circumstances of the 
statement; and
(c) the child’s sincerity  and ability to appreciate the 
consequences of such statement.
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(D) Corroborating Evidence. The out-of-court  statement 
must be corroborated by other independently admitted evi-
dence.
(E) Admissibility by Common Law or Statute. An out-of-
court statement admissible by common law or by statute shall 
remain admissible notwithstanding the provisions of this sec-
tion.
(9) Out-of-Court Statement of Child Describing Sexual Con-
tact in Civil Proceeding, Including Termination of Parental 
Rights.
(A) Admissibility in General. The out-of-court statements of 
a child under the age of ten describing any  act of sexual con-
tact performed on or with the child, the circumstances under 
which it occurred, or which identifies the perpetrator shall be 
admissible as substantive evidence in any civil proceeding, 
except proceedings brought under G. L. c. 119, §§ 23(C) and 
24; provided, however, that
(i) such statement is offered as evidence of a material fact 
and is more probative on the point for which it  is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts,
(ii) the person to whom such statement was made or who 
heard the child make such statement testifies,
(iii) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(9)(B) that 
the child is unavailable as a witness,
(iv) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(9)(C) that 
such statement is reliable, and
(v) such statement is corroborated pursuant to Section 
804(b)(9)(D).
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(B) Unavailability of Child. The proponent of such state-
ment shall demonstrate a diligent and good-faith effort to 
produce the child and shall bear the burden of showing un-
availability. A finding of unavailability  shall be supported by 
specific findings on the record, describing facts with particu-
larity, demonstrating that
(i) the child is unable to be present or to testify because 
of death or existing physical or mental illness or infir-
mity;
(ii) by a ruling of the court, the child is exempt on the 
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the sub-
ject matter of such statement;
(iii) the child testifies to a lack of memory  of the subject 
matter of such statement;
(iv) the child is absent from the hearing and the propo-
nent of such statement has been unable to procure the 
attendance of the child by process or by  other reasonable 
means;
(v) the court finds, based upon expert testimony from a 
treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician, that testi-
fying would be likely to cause severe psychological or 
emotional trauma to the child; or
(vi) the child is not competent to testify.
(C) Reliability of Statement. If a finding of unavailability is 
made, the out-of-court  statement shall be admitted if the 
judge further finds,
(i) after holding a separate hearing, that such statement 
was made under oath, that it was accurately recorded and 
preserved, and that there was sufficient opportunity  to 
cross-examine, or
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(ii) after holding a separate hearing and, where practica-
ble and where not inconsistent with the best interests of 
the child, meeting with the child, that such statement was 
made under circumstances inherently demonstrating a 
special guarantee of reliability.
For the purposes of finding circumstances demonstrating 
reliability  pursuant to this subsection, a judge may  con-
sider whether the relator documented the child witness’s 
statement and shall consider the following factors:
(a) the clarity of the statement, meaning the child’s 
capacity to observe, remember, and give expression 
to that which such child has seen, heard, or experi-
enced; provided, however, that a finding under this 
clause shall be supported by expert testimony from a 
treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician;
(b) the time, content, and circumstances of the 
statement;
(c) the existence of corroborative evidence of the 
substance of the statement regarding the abuse, in-
cluding either the act, the circumstances, or the iden-
tity of the perpetrator; and
(d) the child’s sincerity  and ability to appreciate the 
consequences of the statement.
(D) Corroborating Evidence. The out-of-court  statement 
must be corroborated by other independently admitted evi-
dence.
(E) Admissibility by Common Law or Statute. An out-of-
court statement admissible by common law or by statute shall 
remain admissible notwithstanding the provisions of this sec-
tion.
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NOTE
Confrontation Clause. In a criminal case, a hearsay statement offered 
against the accused must satisfy both the confrontation clause and one of 
the hearsay exceptions. For a discussion of the relationship between the 
confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions stated in Section 804, refer 
to the Introductory Note to Article VIII.
Introduction. Section 804 defines hearsay exceptions that are conditioned 
upon a showing that the declarant is unavailable. Section 804(a) defines the 
requirement of unavailability that applies to all the hearsay exceptions in Sec-
tion 804(b). The second paragraph of Section 804(a) is consistent with the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing adopted by the Supreme Judicial  Court 
in Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 540, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 
(2005).
The exceptions that apply when the declarant of the out-of-court state-
ment is unavailable address only the evidentiary rule against hearsay, except 
in the context of forfeiture by wrongdoing. See Section 804(b)(6), Hearsay 
Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable: Hearsay Exceptions: Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing. In criminal cases, the admissibility at trial of an out-of-court 
statement against the defendant also requires consideration of the constitu-
tional  right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. For a 
discussion of the relationship between the confrontation clause and the hear-
say exceptions stated in Section 804, refer to the Introductory Note to Article 
VIII.
A defendant invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination only makes himself or herself unavailable to another party, but 
the defendant is not unavailable as to himself or herself. See Commonwealth 
v. Labelle, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 698, 701, 856 N.E.2d 876, 879 (2006). It should 
not be presumed that an absent witness may invoke his or her privilege 
against self-incrimination. See Commonwealth v. Lopera, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 
133, 137 n.3, 674 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 n.3 (1997). But where the declarant is a 
codefendant and joint venturer in the crimes charged against the defendant, 
and the declarant’s out-of-court statements directly implicate the declarant in 
the criminal enterprise, the unavailability requirement is satisfied because the 
defendant undoubtedly would invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. See 
Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 677–679, 704 N.E.2d 1137, 
1143–1144 (1999).
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Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Canon, 
373 Mass. 494, 499–500, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1184–1185 (1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 933 (1978) (valid invocation of privilege against self-incrimination 
rendered witness unavailable). Unavailability is not defined simply in terms of 
lack of physical presence, but stems from the inability of opposing counsel to 
cross-examine the witness. Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 382, 
367 N.E.2d 811, 819 (1977). Accord Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 
685, 688–691, 808 N.E.2d 294, 298–299 (2004) (valid claim of spousal privi-
lege by defendant’s wife rendered her unavailable). However, a claim of privi-
lege will not be presumed simply because a witness might have a basis for 
asserting it if the witness had appeared and been called to testify. See Com-
monwealth v. Charros, 443 Mass. 752, 767–768, 824 N.E.2d 809, 820–821 
(2005).
Subsection (a)(2). The Supreme Judicial  Court has not yet adopted Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(2), which, like the Federal  rule, provides that a 
witness who persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his 
or her statement may be deemed to be unavailable. See Commonwealth v. 
Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 355–356, 742 N.E.2d 61, 74 (2001) (explaining that 
absent the assertion of a privilege against self-incrimination, a witness’s re-
fusal to testify does not render the witness unavailable for purposes of the 
hearsay exception for prior recorded testimony).
Subsection (a)(3). Massachusetts law does not recognize lack of memory of 
the subject matter of the testimony as a basis for finding that the witness is 
unavailable. Commonwealth v. Bray, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 758, 477 N.E.2d 
596, 601 (1985). Cf. A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 239 Mass. 59, 61, 
131 N.E. 217, 218 (1921) (declining to extend doctrine of past recollection 
recorded to permit introduction of prior recorded testimony that witness had 
no present memory of but recalled was the truth).
Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Bo-
hannon, 385 Mass. 733, 742, 434 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1982) (“death or other 
legally sufficient reason”), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Mustone, 
353 Mass. 490, 491–492, 233 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1968) (death of witness). In 
Ibanez v. Winston, 222 Mass. 129, 130, 109 N.E. 814, 814 (1915), the Su-
preme Judicial  Court observed that although the death or insanity of a wit-
ness would supply the basis for a finding of unavailability, the mere fact that a 
witness had returned to Spain, without more, did not demonstrate that he 
was unavailable. However, in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 
295, 647 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1995), the Appeals Court noted that
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“[w]hen a witness is outside of the borders of the United 
States and declines to honor a request to appear as a wit-
ness, the unavailability of that witness has been conceded 
because a State of the United States has no authority to 
compel a resident of a foreign country to attend a trial here.”
Subsection (a)(5). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Char-
les, 428 Mass. 672, 678, 704 N.E.2d 1137, 1143 (1999) (“We accept as a 
basis of unavailability the principles expressed in Rule 804[a][5] of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence [1985]”). In Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 
832, 809 N.E.2d 505, 514 (2004), the Supreme Judicial Court noted that
“[b]efore allowing the Commonwealth to introduce prior re-
corded testimony, the judge must be satisfied that the Com-
monwealth has made a good faith effort to locate and pro-
duce the witness at trial. Whether the Commonwealth carries 
its burden on the question of sufficient diligence in attempt-
ing to obtain the attendance of the desired witness depends 
upon what is a reasonable effort in light of the peculiar facts 
of the case.” (Citations and quotation omitted.)
See Commonwealth v. Roberio, 440 Mass. 245, 248, 797 N.E.2d 364, 367 
(2003) (where prosecutor established unavailability before trial  of witness 
who is then located out of State during trial, court is not required to suspend 
trial to obtain presence of witness); Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. at 
678, 704 N.E.2d at 1143 (evidence that declarant is a fugitive satisfies un-
availability requirement); Commonwealth v. Pittman, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 161, 
169–170, 800 N.E.2d 322, 329 (2003) (witness who ignored defense coun-
sel’s subpoena and instead attended an out-of-State funeral was unavail-
able). Contrast Ruml v. Ruml, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 500, 508–509, 738 N.E.2d 
1131, 1139–1140 (2000) (self-imposed exile from Massachusetts does not 
satisfy unavailability requirement); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 
291, 295–296, 647 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1995) (fact that prospective witness is a 
foreign national  outside United States does not excuse proponent of state-
ment from making diligent effort to locate and secure attendance of witness). 
“When former testimony is sought to be offered against the accused, the de-
gree of ‘good faith’ and due diligence is greater than that required in other 
situations.” Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass. 733, 745, 434 N.E.2d 
163, 170 (1982).
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Meech, 380 Mass. 490, 494, 403 N.E.2d 1174, 1177–1178 (1980), and 
Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 380–385, 367 N.E.2d 811, 818–
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820 (1977). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 32 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 35 (use of depo-
sitions in proceedings).
“The prior recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule 
applies ‘where the prior testimony was given by a person, 
now unavailable, in a proceeding addressed to substantially 
the same issues as in the current proceeding, with reason-
able opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion 
for cross-examination of the declarant by the party against 
whom the testimony is now being offered.’”
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 355, 742 N.E.2d 61, 73 (2001), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 638, 492 N.E.2d 1146, 
1149–1150 (1986). The party against whom the testimony is being offered 
need not actually cross-examine the declarant; only an adequate opportunity 
to cross-examine the declarant is required. Commonwealth v. Canon, 373 
Mass. 494, 499–501, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1184–1185 (1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 933 (1978). See Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 62–63, 913 
N.E.2d 850, 859 (2009) (“A defendant is not entitled under the confrontation 
clause to a cross-examination that is ‘effective in whatever way, and to what-
ever extent the defense might wish.’ Rather, what is essential is that the ‘trier 
of fact [have] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment.’” [Citations omitted.]).
The Supreme Judicial Court has applied this hearsay exception when the 
prior recorded testimony was given at a probable cause hearing, see Com-
monwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 492–494, 233 N.E.2d 1, 3–4 (1968), 
and at a pretrial  dangerousness hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. See 
Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. at 63 & n.9, 913 N.E.2d at 860 & n.9 
(noting that there is “no general rule that a witness’s prior testimony at a pre-
trial detention hearing is always admissible at trial if that witness becomes 
unavailable.”). See also id. at 66–67, 913 N.E.2d at 861–862 (when an ex-
cited utterance is admitted at a pretrial  hearing as an exception to the hear-
say rule in circumstances in which the defendant is not given an opportunity 
to cross-examine the declarant about the facts described in the excited utter-
ance, the admission of the evidence violates the confrontation clause). Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Arrington, 455 Mass. 437, 442–445, 917 N.E.2d 734, 738–
740 (2009) (upholding order that excluded from trial  the alleged victim’s tes-
timony at a pretrial dangerousness hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58, on 
grounds that due to her medical  condition [late stage cancer], defense coun-
sel was deprived of reasonable opportunity for cross-examination).
In Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 313–315, 893 N.E.2d 
19, 37–38 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court held that this hearsay excep-
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tion is not generally applicable to prior recorded testimony before the grand 
jury because the testimony of such witnesses is usually far more limited than 
at trial and is often presented without an effort to corroborate or discredit it. 
“If, however, the party seeking the admission of the grand jury testimony can 
establish that the Commonwealth had an opportunity and similar motive to 
develop fully a (now unavailable) witness’s testimony at the grand jury, that 
earlier testimony would be admissible.” Id. at 315, 893 N.E.2d at 38.
The declarant’s prior testimony must be able to be “substantially repro-
duced in all  material particulars.” Commonwealth v. Martinez, 384 Mass. 377, 
381, 425 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1981). See G. L. c. 233, § 80 (official transcripts); 
Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. at 392–394, 367 N.E.2d at 824–825 
(unofficial transcripts); Commonwealth v. Vaden, 373 Mass. 397, 400, 367 
N.E.2d 621, 623 (1977) (tape recordings, whether official or unofficial); 
Commonwealth v. Janovich, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 45, 769 N.E.2d 286, 290 
(2002) (witness present at prior proceeding).
Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Polian, 
288 Mass. 494, 497, 193 N.E. 68, 69 (1934), and Commonwealth v. Vona, 
250 Mass. 509, 511, 146 N.E. 20, 20 (1925). This common-law exception is 
not subject to the defendant’s right to confrontation. See Commonwealth v. 
Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 251, 892 N.E.2d 299, 311 (2008) (“Thus, in the 
unique instance of dying declarations, we ask only whether the statement is 
admissible as a common-law dying declaration, and not whether the state-
ment is testimonial.”). The “dying declaration” allows testimony as to the vic-
tim’s statements concerning the circumstances of the killing and the identity 
of the perpetrator. Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. at 500, 193 N.E.2d at 
70. It may be in the form of oral testimony, gestures, or a writing made by the 
victim. See Commonwealth v. Casey, 65 Mass. 417, 422 (1853) (victim who 
was mortally wounded and unable to speak, but conscious, confirmed iden-
tity of perpetrator by squeezing the hand of her treating physician who asked 
her if it was “Mr. Casey, who worked for her husband”). The Supreme Judicial 
Court has left open the question whether a defendant’s right to confrontation 
is applicable to the current, expanded concept of the dying declaration ex-
ception. See Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. at 252 n.17, 892 N.E.2d 
at 312 n.17, citing G. L. c. 233, § 64 (addressing admissibility of dying decla-
rations of a female whose death results from an unlawful abortion in violation 
of G. L. c. 272, § 19), and Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 26, 407 
N.E.2d 327, 332–333 (1980) (expanding the common-law exception by ad-
mitting a dying declaration to prove the homicides of other common victims).
The declarant’s belief of impending death may be inferred from the sur-
rounding circumstances, including the character of the injury sustained. See 
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Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 602, 766 N.E.2d 827, 830 (2002) 
(“Jenkins had been shot four times shortly before making the statement. Two 
bullets had pierced his chest, one of which had lodged in his spine. When 
police and emergency personnel arrived, he was ‘very frightened,’ grimacing 
in pain, bleeding, and asking for oxygen. He asked a treating emergency 
medical technician if he were going to die. She told him that ‘it didn’t look too 
good’ for him. In the circumstances, it was not error for the judge to find that 
Jenkins believed at the time he made the statements that death was immi-
nent.”); Commonwealth v. Niemic, 427 Mass. 718, 724, 696 N.E.2d 117, 122 
(1998) (“The evidence showed that, when the officer found the victim, he had 
been stabbed in the heart and was bleeding profusely. There was also testi-
mony that, at the hospital, he was ‘breathing heavily’ and ‘appeared to be 
having a hard time’ and that the officer questioning him ‘had to work to get 
his attention to focus.’ It was permissible to infer from this that the victim was 
aware that he was dying.”).
Before admitting the dying declaration, the trial  judge must first deter-
mine by a preponderance of the evidence that the requisite elements of a 
dying declaration are satisfied. Commonwealth v. Green, 420 Mass. 771, 
781–782, 652 N.E.2d 572, 579 (1995). If the statement is admitted, the judge 
must then instruct the jury that they must also find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the same elements are satisfied before they may consider the 
substance of the statement. Id.
The broader statutory exception for declarations of a deceased person 
set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 65, applies only in civil cases. Commonwealth v. 
Dunker, 363 Mass. 792, 794 n.1, 298 N.E.2d 813, 815 n.1 (1973).
Subsection (b)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Carr, 
373 Mass. 617, 622–624, 369 N.E.2d 970, 973–974 (1977), and Common-
wealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 679, 704 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (1999). See 
also Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994). This subsection is 
applicable only to “statements made by witnesses, not parties to the litigation 
or their privies or representatives.” Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 433 Mass. 
558, 565, 744 N.E.2d 47, 53 (2001), quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evi-
dence § 8.10 (7th ed. 1999). This exception against penal  interest is applica-
ble in civil and criminal cases. See Zinck v. Gateway Country Store, Inc., 72 
Mass. App. Ct. 571, 575, 893 N.E.2d 364, 368 (2008). The admission by a 
party-opponent need not be a statement against the declarant’s penal or 
proprietary interest. See Section 801(d)(2), Definitions: Statements Which 
Are Not Hearsay: Admission by Party-Opponent.
A declarant’s narrative may include self-inculpatory and self-exculpatory 
elements.
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“[A]pplication of the evidentiary rule concerning declarations 
against penal interest to a full  narrative requires breaking out 
which parts, if any, of the declaration are actually against the 
speaker’s penal interest. Further, application of the hearsay 
exception requires determination whether the declaration 
has an evidentiary connection and linkage to the matters at 
hand in the trial.”
Commonwealth v. Marrero, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 229, 800 N.E.2d 1048, 
1051–1052 (2003). When the self-inculpatory aspect of the narrative is very 
limited, the trial  judge has discretion either to exclude it entirely or “to allow it 
in with some limited ‘necessary surrounding context’ to prevent its signifi-
cance from being distorted” by opposing counsel. Commonwealth v. Dejar-
nette, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 88, 99, 911 N.E.2d 1280, 1289 (2009).
The judge’s role in determining the admissibility of a statement against 
interest is to determine “whether, in light of the other evidence already ad-
duced or to be adduced, there is some reasonable likelihood that the state-
ment could be true.” Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 76, 489 N.E.2d 
1233, 1241 (1986). This means that in accordance with Section 104(b), Pre-
liminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact, the question whether to 
believe the declarant’s statement is ultimately for the jury. Id.
A statement may qualify for admission as a declaration against penal 
interest even though it supplies circumstantial, and not direct, evidence of the 
declarant’s guilt. See Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. at 679, 704 
N.E.2d at 1144. In Commonwealth v. Charles, the Supreme Judicial Court 
also indicated that even though the exception does not explicitly require cor-
roboration when the statement is introduced against the defendant, it would 
follow the majority rule and require it in such cases. Id. at 679 n.2, 704 
N.E.2d at 1144 n.2. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 280, 
491 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1986) (reversing defendant’s conviction based on er-
roneous admission of extrajudicial statement of a deceased witness; “[w]e do 
not believe that concern for penal  consequence would inspire a suicide victim 
to truthfulness”).
In criminal cases, “[i]n applying the corroboration requirement, judges 
are obliged to . . . consider as relevant factors the degree of disinterested-
ness of the witnesses giving corroborating testimony as well as the plausibil-
ity of that testimony in the light of the rest of the proof.” Commonwealth v. 
Carr, 373 Mass. at 624, 369 N.E.2d at 974. The Supreme Judicial  Court has 
explained that
“behind the corroboration requirement of [Fed. R. Evid.] 
804(b)(3) lurks a suspicion that a reasonable man might 
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sometimes admit to a crime he did not commit. A classic  ex-
ample is an inmate, serving time for multiple offenses, who 
has nothing to lose by a further conviction, but who can help 
out a friend by admitting to the friend’s crime.”
Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. at 74 n.8, 489 N.E.2d at 1240 n.8. The 
Supreme Judicial Court has stated that
“[o]ther factors the judge may consider are: the timing of the 
declaration and the relationship between the declarant and 
the witness, the reliability and character of the declarant, 
whether the statement was made spontaneously, whether 
other people heard the out-of-court statement, whether there 
is any apparent motive for the declarant to misrepresent the 
matter, and whether and in what circumstances the state-
ment was repeated” (citation omitted).
Id. at 76, 489 N.E.2d at 1241. However,
“[i]n determining whether the declarant’s statement has been 
sufficiently corroborated to merit its admission in evidence, 
the judge should not be stringent. A requirement that the de-
fendant corroborate the declarant’s entire statement, for ex-
ample, may run afoul of the defendant’s due process 
rights . . . . If the issue of sufficiency of the defendant’s cor-
roboration is close, the judge should favor admitting the 
statement. In most such instances, the good sense of the 
jury will correct any prejudicial impact.” (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 75 n.10, 489 N.E.2d at 1241 n.10. There is no requirement that when 
the statement is offered by the defendant, the exculpatory portion must also 
inculpate the declarant. See Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 270, 
385 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (1979).
Subsection (b)(4)(A). This subsection is derived from Haddock v. Boston & 
Maine R.R., 85 Mass. 298, 300–301 (1862), and Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. 
461, 466, 29 N.E. 1088, 1089–1090 (1892). In Haddock v. Boston & Maine 
R.R., 85 Mass. at 298–299, the court allowed a witness to testify that she 
came into ownership of the property through her mother and grandmother 
even though the only basis for her knowledge was what the person she al-
leged to be her mother said to her. In Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. at 466, 29 
N.E. at 1089–1090, also a dispute over title to real  property, the court permit-
ted the alleged owner’s granddaughter to testify as to how her grandfather 
came into ownership of the real estate, and that a cousin who owned the 
property before her grandfather died without children, based exclusively on 
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what other family members told her and without any personal  knowledge. 
See also Section 803(13), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Im-
material: Family Records; Section 803(19), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability 
of Declarant Immaterial: Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History.
Subsection (b)(4)(B). Massachusetts has not yet had occasion to consider 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(4)(B), which extends the principle of Sec-
tion 804(b)(4)(A) to others to whom the declarant is related by “blood, adop-
tion or marriage,” or to whom the declarant is so “intimately associated 
with . . . as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter 
declared.”
Subsection (b)(5)(A). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 65. This hearsay exception applies in “all civil cases.” Harrison v. Loyal 
Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 219, 396 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1979). It 
does not apply in criminal proceedings. Commonwealth v. Cyr, 425 Mass. 89, 
94 n.9, 679 N.E.2d 550, 554 n.9 (1997). Nor is it available to a party attempt-
ing to perpetuate the testimony of a person who is expected to die shortly. 
Anselmo v. Reback, 400 Mass. 865, 868–869, 513 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 
(1987). See G. L. c. 233, §§ 46, 47; Mass. R. Civ. P. 27(a) (requirements to 
perpetuate testimony). The proponent of the evidence has the burden of es-
tablishing the foundational  requirements of good faith and personal knowl-
edge for the admissibility of the evidence. Kelley v. Jordan Marsh Co., 278 
Mass. 101, 106, 179 N.E. 299, 302 (1932). Whether the proponent has met 
this burden, including proof that the statement was actually made, is a pre-
liminary question of fact for the trial judge under Section 104(a), Preliminary 
Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. See Slotofski v. Boston Ele-
vated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 318, 321, 102 N.E. 417, 418 (1913).
The only ground of unavailability is the death of the declarant. 
G. L. c. 233, § 65. In the absence of a finding of good faith, the statement is 
not admissible. See Barbosa v. Hopper Feeds, Inc., 404 Mass. 610, 620, 537 
N.E.2d 99, 105 (1989) (excluding declaration because it was made after the 
injury suffered by the plaintiff and at the time when the now-deceased person 
had an incentive to fabricate). “In general  [the declarations] must be derived 
from the exercise of the declarant’s own senses as distinguished from opin-
ions based upon data observed by him or furnished by others.” Little v. Mas-
sachusetts N.E. St. Ry. Co., 223 Mass. 501, 504, 112 N.E. 77, 78 (1916). 
“The declarations of the deceased may be in writing and need not be repro-
duced in the exact words used by the declarant” (citations omitted). Bellamy 
v. Bellamy, 342 Mass. 534, 536, 174 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1961). See id. (oral 
statements also admissible).
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 298
Subsection (b)(5)(B). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 65A. See Thornton v. First Nat’l  Stores, Inc., 340 Mass. 222, 225, 163 
N.E.2d 264, 266 (1960). See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories to par-
ties).
Subsection (b)(5)(C). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 
233, § 66. In Rothwell v. First Nat’l Bank, 286 Mass. 417, 421, 190 N.E. 812, 
814 (1934), the Supreme Judicial Court explained the difference between 
Section 65 and Section 66 of G. L. c. 233. “[Section 66] is narrower than the 
other, in that it relates to the declarations or conduct of one person in one 
sort of case. But it requires no preliminary finding of good faith or other condi-
tions. These two statutes operate concurrently and independently.” Id. See 
Greene v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 255 Mass. 519, 524, 152 N.E. 
107, 108 (1926).
Subsection (b)(5)(D). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 79H.
Subsection (b)(5)(E). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 152, 
§ 20B. The statutory exception, however, might not overcome the further ob-
jection that it contains hearsay-within-hearsay in the form of statements to 
the employee’s physician about how an injury occurred. See Fiander’s Case, 
293 Mass. 157, 164, 199 N.E. 309, 312 (1936).
Subsection (b)(6). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ed-
wards, 444 Mass. 526, 540, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (2005). See Giles v. Cali-
fornia, 554 U.S. 353, 373 (2008) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation is not forfeited by wrongdoing unless the defendant acted with 
the intent to render the witness unavailable); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing [which we accept] 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.”). The 
Massachusetts common-law doctrine expressed in this subsection is fully 
consistent with the Federal doctrine set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6):
“By requiring that the defendant actively assist the witness in 
becoming unavailable with the intent to make her unavail-
able, our doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing is at least as 
demanding as Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), which permits a find-
ing of forfeiture where the defendant ‘acquiesced’ in conduct 
that was intended to, and did, make the witness unavailable 
to testify.”
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Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 862–863, 933 N.E.2d 633, 639–
640 (2010).
“A defendant’s involvement in procuring a witness’s unavailability need 
not consist of a criminal act, and may include a defendant’s collusion with a 
witness to ensure that the witness will not be heard at trial.” Commonwealth 
v. Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540, 830 N.E.2d at 170. In Edwards, the Supreme 
Judicial Court elaborated on the scope of this exception.
“A finding that a defendant somehow influenced a witness’s 
decision not to testify is not required to trigger the application 
of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where there is collu-
sion in implementing that decision or planning for its imple-
mentation. Certainly, a defendant must have contributed to 
the witness’s unavailability in some significant manner. How-
ever, the causal link necessary between a defendant’s ac-
tions and a witness’s unavailability may be established 
where (1) a defendant puts forward to a witness the idea to 
avoid testifying, either by threats, coercion, persuasion, or 
pressure; (2) a defendant physically prevents a witness from 
testifying; or (3) a defendant actively facilitates the carrying 
out of the witness’s independent intent not to testify. There-
fore, in collusion cases (the third category above) a defen-
dant’s joint effort with a witness to secure the latter’s un-
availability, regardless of whether the witness already de-
cided ‘on his own’ not to testify, may be sufficient to support 
a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing.” (Footnote omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540–541, 830 N.E.2d at 171. “[W]
here the defendant has had a meaningful impact on the witness’s unavailabil-
ity, the defendant may have forfeited confrontation and hearsay objections to 
the witness’s out-of-court statements, even where the witness modified the 
initial  strategy to procure the witness’s silence.” Id. at 541, 830 N.E.2d at 
171. See also Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. at 865–866, 933 
N.E.2d at 641–642 (evidence that defendant married alleged victim of his 
assault with the intent to enable her to exercise her spousal  privilege at trial 
supported application of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing and thus the 
use of his wife’s hearsay statements made before the marriage, even though 
it may not have been defendant’s sole or primary purpose).
The proponent of the statement must prove that the opposing party pro-
cured the witness’s unavailability by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. at 542, 830 N.E.2d at 172. “[P]rior to 
a determination of forfeiture, the parties should be given an opportunity to 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 300
present evidence, including live testimony [and the unavailable witness’s out-
of-court statements], at an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence.” 
Id. at 545, 830 N.E.2d at 174. The trial  judge should make the findings re-
quired by Commonwealth v. Edwards either orally on the record or in writing. 
Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. at 864 n.9, 933 N.E.2d at 641 n.9.
Subsection (b)(7). This subsection is derived from Kennedy v. Doyle, 92 
Mass. 161, 168 (1865) (where the court admitted a baptismal record showing 
child’s date of birth as evidence of the person’s age when a contract had 
been made, in circumstances in which the entry was in the hand of the parish 
priest who had been the custodian of the book; Supreme Judicial  Court ob-
served that “[a]n entry made in the performance of a religious duty is cer-
tainly of no less value than one made by a clerk, messenger or notary, an 
attorney or solicitor or a physician, in the course of his secular occupation.”). 
Contrast Derinza’s Case, 229 Mass. 435, 443, 118 N.E. 942, 946 (1918) 
(copies of what purported to be a marriage certificate from a town in Italy not 
admitted in evidence; Supreme Judicial  Court observed that there was no 
“evidence respecting their character, the circumstances under which the re-
cords were kept, or the source from which the certificates came. No one tes-
tified that they were copies of an official original. There was no authentication 
of them as genuine by a consular officer of the United States. There was ab-
solutely nothing beyond the bare production of the copies of the certificates. 
In the absence of a statute making such certificates admissible by them-
selves, or something to show that they were entitled to a degree of credence, 
they were not competent.”). See Section 803(6), Hearsay Exceptions; Avail-
ability of Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records.
Subsection (b)(8)(A). Subsections (b)(8)(A) through (b)(8)(A)(iv) are taken 
nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 81(a), and Subsection (b)(8)(A)(v) is de-
rived from Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 64–66, 643 N.E.2d 19, 
25–26 (1994). See generally Opinion of the Justices, 406 Mass. 1201, 547 
N.E.2d 8 (1989) (concluding that bill on related topic  would, if enacted, offend 
the Massachusetts Constitution). The prosecution must give prior notice to 
the criminal defendant that it will seek to admit hearsay statements under this 
statute. Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. at 64, 643 N.E.2d at 25. It 
must also show a compelling and necessary need to use this procedure by 
more than a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 64–65, 643 N.E.2d at 25.
Subsection (b)(8)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 
233, § 81(b). See Section 804(a), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavail-
able: Definition of Unavailability. A judge’s reasons for finding a child incom-
petent to testify should not be the same reasons for doubting the reliability of 
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the child’s out-of-court statements. Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 
65, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25 (1994).
Subsection (b)(8)(C). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. 
L. c. 233, § 81(c). The separate hearing regarding the reliability of the out-of-
court statement must be on the record, and the judge’s determination of reli-
ability must be supported by specific findings on the record. Commonwealth 
v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 65, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25 (1994). See Commonwealth 
v. Joubert, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 943, 945, 647 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (1995). The 
statement must be substantially reliable to be admissible. Commonwealth v. 
Joubert, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 945, 647 N.E.2d at 1241. See Commonwealth 
v. Almeida, 433 Mass. 717, 719–720, 746 N.E.2d 139, 141 (2001) (state-
ments of sleeping child were not admissible because they lacked indicia of 
reliability). The defendant and his or her counsel should be given the oppor-
tunity to attend the hearing if it would not cause the child witness severe 
emotional trauma. Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. at 65, 643 N.E.2d 
at 25.
Subsection (b)(8)(D). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Co-
lin C., 419 Mass. 54, 66, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25–26 (1994).
Subsection (b)(8)(E). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 81(d).
Subsection (b)(9)(A). Subsections (b)(9)(A)(i) through (iv) are taken nearly 
verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 82, and Subsection (b)(9)(A)(v) is derived from 
Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 893, 678 N.E.2d 1325, 1332 (1997). 
See Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 64–66, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25–26 
(1994) (establishing additional  procedural  requirements for admitting hearsay 
statements of child under G. L. c. 233, § 81). The Department of Children and 
Families must give prior notice to the parents that it will seek to admit hear-
say statements under this statute. Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. at 893, 
678 N.E.2d at 1332. It must also show a compelling and necessary need to 
use this procedure by more than a preponderance of evidence. Id. See also 
Adoption of Arnold, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 752, 741 N.E.2d 456, 463 (2001); 
Adoption of Tina, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 733–734, 701 N.E.2d 671, 676 
(1998) (recognizing additional procedural requirements). When a care and 
protection proceeding is joined with a petition to dispense with consent to 
adoption, admissibility of a child’s hearsay statements should comply with the 
stricter requirements of G. L. c. 233, § 82, not § 83. Adoption of Tina, 45 
Mass. App. Ct. at 733 n.10, 701 N.E.2d at 676 n.10.
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 302
Subsection (b)(9)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from 
G. L. c. 233, § 82(b). See Adoption of Sean, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 266, 630 
N.E.2d 604, 607 (1994). See also Section 804(a), Hearsay Exceptions; De-
clarant Unavailable: Definition of Unavailability.
Subsection (b)(9)(C). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 
233, § 82(c). Note that it appears that the Legislature inadvertently omitted 
from G. L. c. 233, § 82, the following: “finds: (1) after holding a separate 
hearing, that such . . . .” We have inserted that language in the subsection 
above. See Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 890 n.5, 678 N.E.2d 1325, 
1330 n.5 (1997) (noting omission). A judge must make sufficient findings of 
reliability to admit the statements. See Adoption of Tina, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 
727, 733, 701 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1998); Edward E. v. Department of Social 
Servs., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 478, 484–486, 678 N.E.2d 163, 167–168 (1997). 
The separate hearing regarding the reliability of the out-of-court statement 
must be on the record, and the judge’s determination of reliability must be 
supported by specific  findings on the record. Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 
at 893, 678 N.E.2d at 1332. See Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 
65, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25 (1994).
Subsection (b)(9)(D). This subsection is derived from Adoption of Quentin, 
424 Mass. 882, 893, 678 N.E.2d 1325, 1332 (1997). See Commonwealth v. 
Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 66, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25–26 (1994). See also Adoption 
of Arnold, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 753, 741 N.E.2d 456, 463–464 (2001) (ex-
amples of corroborating evidence).
Subsection (b)(9)(E). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, 
§ 82(d).
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Section 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded by the prohibi-
tion of hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with 
a hearsay  exception in accordance with the common law, statutes, and 
rules of court.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Gil, 393 Mass. 204, 218, 471 
N.E.2d 30, 40 (1984), and Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 528–530, 381 
N.E.2d 1295, 1298–1299 (1978). See Commonwealth v. McDonough, 400 
Mass. 639, 643 n.8, 511 N.E.2d 551, 554 n.8 (1987). This type of layered 
hearsay is commonly referred to as “multiple hearsay,” see Commonwealth v. 
Gil, 393 Mass. at 218, 471 N.E.2d at 40; “totem pole hearsay,” see Com-
monwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. 620, 627 n.4, 774 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.4 
(2002); or “hearsay within hearsay,” see Fed. R. Evid. 805. The decisions in 
Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. at 528–530, 381 N.E.2d at 1298–1299, and 
Custody of Tracy, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 481, 484–486, 579 N.E.2d 1362, 1363–
1365 (1991), illustrate the principle that under the terms of certain exceptions 
to the hearsay rule, the statements of multiple out-of-court declarants ap-
pearing in a single report or writing may be admissible, provided that each 
such statement falls within the applicable hearsay exception.
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Section 806. Attacking and Supporting 
Credibility of Hearsay Declarant
When a hearsay  statement has been admitted in evidence, the 
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be 
supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those pur-
poses if the declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a state-
ment or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the de-
clarant’s hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the 
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If 
the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the 
declarant as a witness, the party  is entitled to examine the declarant on 
the statement as if under cross-examination.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Mahar, 430 
Mass. 643, 649, 722 N.E.2d 461, 466–467 (2000), in which the Supreme 
Judicial Court “accept[ed] the principles of proposed [Mass. R. Evid.] 806.” 
See also Commonwealth v. Pina, 430 Mass. 66, 76, 713 N.E.2d 944, 952 
(1999) (“We now adopt the rule in the circumstances of this case.”); Com-
monwealth v. Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 224 n.6, 402 N.E.2d 1329, 1334 n.6 
(1980).
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ARTICLE IX.  AUTHENTICATION 
AND IDENTIFICATION
Section 901. Requirement of Authentication 
or Identification
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identifi-
cation as a condition precedent to admissibility  is satisfied by evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by  way of limi-
tation, the following are examples of authentication or identification 
conforming with the requirements of this section:
(1) Testimony of Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as 
to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity  not ac-
quired for purposes of litigation.
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the 
trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have 
been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, con-
tents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteris-
tics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard 
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or re-
cording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any  time un-
der circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.
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(6) Telephone Conversations. A telephone conversation, by  evi-
dence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by 
the telephone company to a particular person or business, if,
(A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-
identification, show the person answering to be the one 
called, or
(B) in the case of a business, the conversation related to busi-
ness reasonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public Records or Reports.
(A) Originals. Evidence that an original book, paper, docu-
ment, or record authorized by  law to be recorded or filed and 
in fact  recorded or filed in a public place, or a purported pub-
lic record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, 
is from a public office where items of this nature are kept is 
admissible.
(B) Copies. A copy  of any of the items described in subsec-
tion (A), if authenticated by the attestation of the officer who 
has charge of the item, shall be admissible on the same terms 
as the original.
(8) Ancient Documents. Evidence that a document
(A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning 
its authenticity;
(B) was in place where it, if authentic, would likely be; and
(C) has been in existence thirty years or more at the time it 
was offered.
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system 
used to produce a result and showing that the process or system 
produces an accurate result.
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(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of 
authentication or identification provided by a rule of the Supreme 
Judicial Court of this Commonwealth, by statute, or as provided in 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 
373 Mass. 700, 704, 369 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (1977), where the court ac-
knowledged that a police witness at the trial  properly authenticated a finger-
print card by his testimony that it was the same card he used to record the 
defendant’s prints at the time of the defendant’s arrest. “[P]roof of authenticity 
usually takes the form of testimony of a qualified witness either (1) that the 
thing is what its proponent represents it to be, or (2) that circumstances exist 
which imply that the thing is what its proponent represents it to be.” Com-
monwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. at 704, 369 N.E.2d at 1009, quoting W.B. 
Leach & P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 265 (4th ed. 1967). See 
Commonwealth v. Duddie Ford Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 435 n.10, 551 
N.E.2d 1211, 1217 n.10 (1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 409 Mass. 387, 
566 N.E.2d 1119 (1991), quoting Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 901(a). This prin-
ciple is applicable to photographs as well  as other forms of documentary evi-
dence. Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646, 779 N.E.2d 
669, 673 (2002) (“Photographs usually are authenticated directly through 
competent testimony that the scene they show is a fair and accurate repre-
sentation of something the witness actually saw. But authenticity also can be 
established circumstantially by evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 
901[a].” [Quotation and citations omitted.]).
The foundational  requirement of authentication is a preliminary question 
of fact for the trial  judge. Howe v. Boston, 311 Mass. 278, 281–282, 41 
N.E.2d 1, 3–4 (1942). See Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy 
Conditioned on Fact.
Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. La-
Corte, 373 Mass. 700, 704, 369 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (1977), quoting W.B. 
Leach & P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 265 (4th ed. 1967). See also 
Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 933, 935, 678 N.E.2d 168, 
171 (1997).
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Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ryan, 
355 Mass. 768, 770–771, 247 N.E.2d 564, 565–566 (1969). See also Com-
monwealth v. O’Connell, 438 Mass. 658, 667, 783 N.E.2d 417, 425–426 
(2003). Before the lay opinion evidence is admitted, the trial judge must de-
termine that the witness has sufficient familiarity with the genuine handwriting 
of the person in question to express an opinion that the specimen was written 
by that person. Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274, 276 (1873). See Sec-
tion 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. How-
ever, when the evidence includes both authentic samples of the person’s 
handwriting and samples of questionable origin, and where the witness has 
no prior familiarity, there is no necessity for lay opinion testimony and it 
should not be admitted. See Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 130, 112 N.E. 
850, 851 (1916) (“The opinion of the jury under such circumstances is quite 
as good as that of the witness of ordinary experience who has no particular 
acquaintance with the genuine handwriting. There is, under such circum-
stances, no occasion for the opinion of the outsider of only ordinary intelli-
gence.”).
Subsection (b)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
O’Connell, 438 Mass. 658, 662–663, 783 N.E.2d 417, 422–423 (2003). 
Whether a specimen of handwriting is genuine, i.e., the handwriting of a 
named person, is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge. See Davis 
v. Meenan, 270 Mass. 313, 314–315, 169 N.E. 145, 145 (1930). See also 
Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. In 
a criminal  case, if this issue is disputed, the trial  judge also should submit the 
question to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 473–474, 
76 N.E. 127, 133 (1905).
If a genuine specimen of handwriting is in evidence, the jury is capable 
of comparing a specimen of handwriting to it to determine whether the 
specimen is genuine. Commonwealth v. O’Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 209, 
843 N.E.2d 617, 633–634 (2006). In the discretion of the court, the testimony 
of an expert witness may be admissible. Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. 490, 
496–497 (1835).
Subsection (b)(4). This subsection is derived from Irving v. Goodimate Co., 
320 Mass. 454, 459–460, 70 N.E.2d 414, 416–418 (1946) (contents of letter 
used to authenticate signature). See also Connecticut v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 
296, 300 (1817) (reply letter doctrine); Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 56 Mass. 
App. Ct. 641, 645–647, 779 N.E.2d 669, 673–674 (2002) (contents of photo-
graphs and authenticating circumstances).
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Subsection (b)(5). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Williams, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 283, 291, 393 N.E.2d 937, 943 (1979), 
quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(5). See also Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 
Mass. 191, 201 n.4, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 n.4 (1975); Lord Elec. Co. v. Mor-
rill, 178 Mass. 304, 306, 59 N.E. 807, 807 (1901). On the other hand, “[a] 
caller’s mere self-identification, without more, is insufficient authentication 
to admit the substance of a telephone conversation.” Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 324, 677 N.E.2d 233, 234 (1997). Cf. Com-
monwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482, 488, 194 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1963) 
(identification of caller by witness is permitted when caller identifies himself 
and there is other circumstantial evidence pointing to his or her identity).
Subsection (b)(6). This subsection is derived from Massachusetts North-
eastern St. Ry. Co. v. Plum Island Beach Co., 255 Mass. 104, 114–115, 151 
N.E. 84, 86–87 (1926). See Commonwealth v. Williams, 456 Mass. 857, 869, 
926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172–1173 (2010) (discussing foundation requirements for 
Myspace communication). See also Commonwealth v. Anderson, 404 Mass. 
767, 769–770, 537 N.E.2d 146, 147–148 (1989); Bond Pharmacy, Inc. v. 
Cambridge, 338 Mass. 488, 490–491, 156 N.E.2d 34, 36–37 (1959); Com-
monwealth v. Loach, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316, 705 N.E.2d 642, 644–645 
(1999).
Subsection (b)(7)(A). This subsection is derived from Kaufmann v. Kaitz, 
325 Mass. 149, 151, 89 N.E.2d 505, 506 (1949). See Bowes v. Inspector of 
Bldgs. of Brockton, 347 Mass. 295, 296, 197 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1964) 
(authentication of city ordinance by city clerk). See also G. L. c. 233, § 73 (for-
eign oaths and affidavits, if taken or administered by a duly authorized notary 
public  “within the jurisdiction for which he is commissioned, and certified under 
his official seal, shall be as effectual in this commonwealth as if administered 
or taken and certified by a justice of the peace therein”); G. L. c. 233, § 74 
(“Acts of incorporation shall  be held to be public acts and as such may be de-
clared on and given in evidence.”). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 75 (“[P]rinted copies of 
any city ordinances . . . shall be admitted without certification or attestation, 
but, if their genuineness is questioned, the court shall require such certifica-
tion or attestation thereof as it deems necessary.”).
There are a number of statutory provisions dealing with authentication. 
See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 69 (admissibility of records and court proceedings 
of a court of another State or of the United States if authenticated “by the 
attestation of the clerk or other officer who has charge of the records of such 
court under its seal.”); G. L. c. 233, § 73 (foreign oaths and affidavits); 
G. L. c. 233, § 74 (acts of incorporation); G. L. c. 233, § 75 (municipal ordi-
nances); G. L. c. 233, § 76 (documents filed with governmental  depart-
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ments); G. L. c. 233, § 76A (documents filed with Securities and Exchange 
Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 76B (documents filed with Interstate Commerce 
Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 77 (copies of records, books, and accounts of 
banks and trust companies).
Subsection (b)(7)(B). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 76; 
G. L. c. 90, § 30; Mass. R. Civ. P. 40(a)(1); and Commonwealth v. Deramo, 
436 Mass. 40, 47–48, 762 N.E.2d 815, 821 (2002).
“[A]n attested copy of a document is one which has been 
examined and compared with the original, with a certificate 
or memorandum of its correctness signed by the persons 
who have examined it. Thus, to qualify as an attested copy 
there must be a written and signed certification that it is a 
correct copy. The attestation of an official having custody of 
an official  record is the assurance given by the certifier that 
the copy submitted is accurate and genuine as compared to 
the original.” (Citations and quotations omitted.)
Id. In Commonwealth v. Deramo, the Supreme Judicial Court held that “[m]
erely making a copy of the original attestation along with a copy of the under-
lying record does not serve the purpose of the attestation requirement.” Id. at 
48, 762 N.E.2d at 821. See id. (concluding that a copy of the defendant’s 
driver history from the Registry of Motor Vehicles was improperly admitted 
into evidence because it was not supported by an original attestation, but 
only by a copy of the attestation). Unless a statute or regulation provides 
otherwise, an attestation does not have to take the form of an original signa-
ture; it need only be an original mark, such as a stamp or facsimile. See 
Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 170, 920 
N.E.2d 322, 324 (2010) (holding that documents bearing the original 
stamped signature of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles were properly authenti-
cated).
Any error in admitting a copy of a public record may be cured by com-
paring it to a properly authenticated record. Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 
Mass. at 49, 762 N.E.2d at 822. See also G. L. c. 233, § 68 (proof of the 
genuineness of a signature to an attested instrument may be by the same 
methods used for proof of any signature).
Proof of Specific Types of Records. Records and court proceedings 
of a court of the United States or another State are admissible when relevant 
if authenticated “by the attestation of the clerk or other officer who has 
charge of the records of such court under its seal.” G. L. c. 233, § 69. Printed 
copies of State statutes, acts, or resolves “which are published under its 
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authority,” and copies of city ordinances, town bylaws, and the rules and 
regulations of a board of alderman, “if attested by the clerk of such city or 
town, shall be admitted as sufficient evidence thereof in all  courts of law and 
on all occasions.” G. L. c. 233, § 75. Printed copies of rules and regulations 
of a State department, commission, board, or officer of the Commonwealth or 
any city or town authorized to adopt them, printed copies of city ordinances 
or town bylaws, or copies of the United States Code Annotated, the United 
States Code Service, and all  federal regulations, “shall  be admitted without 
certification or attestation, but, if their genuineness is questioned, the court 
shall require such certification or attestation as it deems necessary.” 
G. L. c. 233, § 75. Copies of books, papers, documents, and records in any 
department of State or local government, when attested by the officer in 
charge of the items, “shall be competent evidence in all cases equally with 
the originals . . . .” G. L. c. 233, § 76 (in most cases the genuineness of that 
officer’s signature shall  be attested by the Secretary of the Commonwealth or 
the clerk of a city or town, as the case may be). See also G. L. c. 233, § 76A 
(authentication of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission); G. L. c. 233, § 76B (authentication of documents filed with the In-
terstate Commerce Commission). Copies of records of banks doing business 
in the Commonwealth are admissible in evidence on the same terms as 
originals if accompanied by an affidavit, taken before and under the seal  of a 
clerk of a court of record or notary, “stating that the affiant is the officer hav-
ing charge of the original records, books and accounts, and that the copy is 
correct and is full” insofar as it relates to the subject matter in question. 
G. L. c. 233, § 77. See also G. L. c. 233, § 77A (bank statement showing 
payment of a check or other item, if accompanied by a legible copy of the 
check or other item, “is competent evidence in all cases” and prima facie 
proof of payment of the amount of the check or other item).
Subsection (b)(8). This subsection is derived from Whitman v. Shaw, 166 
Mass. 451, 456–461, 44 N.E. 333, 335–337 (1896). See also Green v. Chel-
sea, 41 Mass. 71, 76–77 (1836). Compare Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(8) and Pro-
posed Mass. R. Evid. 901(b)(8), which shorten the period from thirty to 
twenty years.
Subsection (b)(9). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Whynaught, 377 Mass. 14, 19, 384 N.E.2d 1212, 1215–1216 (1979) (ra-
dar); De Forge v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 178 Mass. 59, 
62–63, 59 N.E. 669, 670–671 (1901) (X-ray).
Subsection (b)(10). This subsection simply establishes that this section is 
not exclusive. For example, the authenticity of a writing which a party intends 
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to offer at trial may be established prior to trial by a demand for an admission 
as to genuineness under G. L. c. 231, § 69. See Waldor Realty Corp. v. 
Planning Bd. of Westborough, 354 Mass. 639, 640, 241 N.E.2d 843, 844 
(1968). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)(A) (“Agreements reduced to writ-
ing in the conference report shall be binding on the parties and shall control 
the subsequent course of the proceeding.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(c) (authenti-
cation of official records or the lack thereof from the Commonwealth or a for-
eign jurisdiction may be accomplished “by any other method authorized by 
law”). Also, certain statutes provide that records may be authenticated as 
part of a hearsay exception by means of an affidavit. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, 
§§ 79, 79G, 79J.
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Section 902. Self-Authentication
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity, as a condition precedent to ad-
missibility, is not required with respect to the following:
(a) Court Records Under Seal. The records and judicial proceed-
ings of a court of another State or of the United States, if authenti-
cated by the attestation of the clerk or other officer who has 
charge of the records of such court under its seal.
(b) Domestic Official Records Not Under Seal. An official re-
cord kept within the Commonwealth, or an entry therein, when 
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official pub-
lication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal 
custody of the record, or by that officer’s deputy. If the record is 
kept in any other State, district, Commonwealth, territory, or insu-
lar possession of the United States, or within the Panama Canal 
Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu 
Islands, any such copy shall be accompanied by a certificate that 
such custodial officer has custody of the record. This certificate 
may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or po-
litical subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by  the 
seal of the court, or may be made by any  public officer having a 
seal of office and having official duties in the district or political 
subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal 
of the office.
(c) Foreign Official Records. A foreign official record, or an en-
try therein, when admissible for any purpose, attested by a person 
authorized to make the attestation and accompanied by a final cer-
tification as to the genuineness of the signature and official posi-
tion (1) of the attesting person or (2) of any foreign official whose 
certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates 
to the attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of 
signature and official position relating to the attestation. A final 
certification may be made by a secretary of embassy  or legation, 
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the 
315 
United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign 
country  assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable 
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authen-
ticity  and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good 
cause shown, (1) admit an attested copy without final certification 
or (2) permit  the foreign official record to be evidenced by an at-
tested summary with or without a final certification.
(d) Certified Copies of Public Records. Copies of public re-
cords, of records described in Sections 5, 7, and 16 of G. L. c. 66, 
and of records of banks, trust companies, insurance companies, 
and hospitals, whether or not such records or copies are made by 
the photographic or microphotographic process if there is annexed 
to such copies an affidavit, taken before a clerk of a court of re-
cord or notary public, under the seal of such court or notary, stat-
ing that the affiant  is the officer having charge of the original re-
cords, books, and accounts, and that the copy is correct and is full 
so far as it relates to the subject matter therein mentioned.
(e) Official Publications.
(1) Printed copies of all statutes, acts, and resolves of the 
Commonwealth, public or private, which are published under 
its authority, and copies of the ordinances of a city, the bylaws 
of a town, or the rules and regulations of a board of aldermen, 
if attested by the clerk of such city or town.
(2) Printed copies of rules and regulations purporting to be 
issued by authority of any  department, commission, board, or 
officer of the Commonwealth or of any  city or town having 
authority to adopt them, or printed copies of any  city  ordi-
nances or town bylaws or printed copies of the United States 
Code Annotated or the United States Code Service and all 
Federal regulations, without certification or attestation; pro-
vided, however, that  if their genuineness is questioned, the 
court shall require such certification or attestation thereof as it 
deems necessary.
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(3) Copies of books, papers, documents, and records in any 
department of the Commonwealth or of any city or town, 
authenticated by the attestation of the officer who has charge 
of the same; provided that the genuineness of the signature of 
such officer shall be attested by  the Secretary  of the Com-
monwealth under its seal or by the clerk of such city or town 
except in the case of books, papers, documents, and records 
of the Department of Telecommunications and Energy in mat-
ters relating to common carriers, and of the Registry of Motor 
Vehicles.
(4) The Massachusetts Register.
(f) Certain Newspapers. Certified copies of any  newspaper, or 
part thereof, made by the photographic or microphotographic 
process deposited in any  public library or a library of any college 
or university located in the Commonwealth.
(g) Trade Inscriptions. A trademark or trade name affixed on a 
product indicating origin.
(h) Acknowledged Documents. All oaths and affidavits adminis-
tered or taken by a notary  public, duly  commissioned and quali-
fied by authority  of any other State or government, within the ju-
risdiction for which the notary  is commissioned, and certified un-
der an official seal; such documents shall be as effectual in this 
Commonwealth as if administered or taken and certified by a jus-
tice of the peace therein.
(i) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial 
paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the 
extent provided by general commercial law.
(j) Presumptions Created by Law. Any signature, document, or 
other matter declared by  any law of the United States or this 
Commonwealth to be presumptively  or prima facie genuine or 
authentic.
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(k) Certified Copies of Hospital and Other Records of Treat-
ment and Medical History. Records or copies of records kept by 
any hospital, dispensary  or clinic, or sanitarium, if certified by  af-
fidavit by the person in custody thereof to be true and complete.
(l) Copies of Hospital and Other Records of Itemized Bills and 
Reports. Itemized bills and reports, including hospital medical 
records and examination reports, relating to medical, dental, hos-
pital services, prescriptions, or orthopedic appliances rendered to 
a person injured, if (1) it is subscribed and sworn to under the 
penalties of perjury by the physician, dentist, authorized agent of a 
hospital or health maintenance organization, pharmacist, or re-
tailer of orthopedic appliances rendering such services; (2) the 
party  offering the evidence gives the opposing party written notice 
of the intention to offer the evidence, along with a copy of the 
evidence, by mailing it  by  certified mail, return receipt requested, 
not less than ten days before the introduction of the evidence; and 
(3) the party offering the evidence files an affidavit of such notice 
and the return receipt is filed with the clerk of the court  after said 
receipt has been returned.
(m) Copies of Bills for Genetic Marker Tests and for Prenatal 
and Postnatal Care. Copies of bills for genetic marker tests and 
for prenatal and postnatal health care of the mother and child, fur-
nished to the adverse party at  least ten days before trial, shall be 
admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed 
and that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.
(n) Results of Genetic Marker Tests. In an action to establish the 
paternity  of a child born out of wedlock, the report of the results 
of genetic marker tests, including a statistical probability of the 
putative father’s paternity  based upon such tests, unless a party 
objects in writing to the test  results upon notice of the hearing date 
or within thirty days prior to the hearing, whichever is shorter.
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NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 69. See also 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 39(a).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(1) 
and Mass. R. Crim. P. 40(a)(1).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(2) 
and Mass. R. Crim. P. 40(a)(2).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, §§ 77 and 79A.
Subsection (e)(1). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 75.
Subsection (e)(2). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 75.
Subsection (e)(3). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 76.
Subsection (e)(4). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 30A, § 6 (“The 
publication in the Massachusetts Register of a document creates a rebuttable 
presumption [1] that it was duly issued, prescribed, or promulgated; [2] that 
all  the requirements of this chapter and regulations prescribed under it rela-
tive to the document have been complied with; and [3] that the text of the 
regulations as published in the Massachusetts Register is a true copy of the 
attested regulation as filed by the agency.”).
Subsection (f). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79D (“Copies 
of any newspaper, or part thereof made by photographic  or microphoto-
graphic  process deposited in any public library or a library of any college or 
university located in the commonwealth, shall, when duly certified by the per-
son in charge thereof, be admitted in evidence equally with the originals.”). 
See also Section 901(b)(1), Requirement of Authentication or Identification: 
Illustrations: Testimony of Witness with Knowledge.
Subsection (g). This subsection is derived from Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 
Mass. 620, 621–623, 377 N.E.2d 954, 955–956 (1978), and Doyle v. Conti-
nental Baking Co., 262 Mass. 516, 519, 160 N.E. 325, 326 (1928). In Smith 
v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. at 623, 377 N.E.2d at 956, the presence of the de-
fendant’s name on the decal on a snowmobile was sufficient to identify the 
defendant as the manufacturer of the snowmobile. In Doyle v. Continental 
Baking Co., 262 Mass. at 519, 160 N.E. at 326, the label on which the defen-
dant’s name appeared was sufficient to identify the defendant as the manu-
319 
facturer of the defective bread. See also G. L. c. 156B, § 11(a) (a corporation 
is not permitted to use the corporate name or trademark of another corpora-
tion registered or doing business in this Commonwealth without their con-
sent).
“Several rationales underlie the acceptance of this rule. First, 
since trademarks and trade names are protected under stat-
utes, the probability that a particular name will be used by 
another corporation is very low. Second, since the probability 
is very high that the corporation whose name appears on a 
product is the corporation which manufactured the product, 
judicial efficiency will be served by allowing the identity of the 
name on a product and the defendant’s name to satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden of identifying the defendant as the manufac-
turer. Finally, the presence of trademarks or trade names on 
products is accepted and relied on in daily life as sufficient 
proof of the manufacturer of the product. This common ac-
ceptance, which has been reinforced by manufacturers’ ad-
vertising, indicates that the identity of a corporation’s name 
and the name on a product should be sufficient to identify 
that corporation as the manufacturer.” (Citations omitted.)
Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. at 622, 377 N.E.2d at 956.
Subsection (h). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 73. See also 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(d).
Subsection (i). This subsection is derived from various statutes and com-
mercial law. See, e.g., G. L. c. 106, § 1-202 (document authorized or re-
quired by a contract to be issued by a third party is prima facie evidence of its 
own authenticity); G. L. c. 233, § 76A (records of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission must be attested by an officer or person who has 
charge of the same and under a certificate of a member); G. L. c. 233, § 76B 
(printed copies of rate schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission are admissible without certification); G. L. c. 233, § 77 (copies from 
the records, books, and accounts of banks and trust companies doing busi-
ness in the Commonwealth must have an affidavit taken before a notary stat-
ing that the officer has charge of the original records); G. L. c. 233, § 78 
(business records shall be admissible if the court finds the record was made 
in good faith, in the regular course of business, before the beginning of legal 
proceedings, and the person who made the entry has personal  knowledge of 
the facts stated in the record).
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Subsection (j). This subsection is derived from statutes which deal with 
authentication not covered in other areas of Article IX, Authentication and 
Identification. See, e.g., G. L. c. 9, § 11 (Great Seal); G. L. c. 111, § 195 (cer-
tified copy of reports of State laboratory for lead and lead poisoning); 
G. L. c. 209C, § 17 (in an action to establish paternity of a child born out of 
wedlock, the report of the results of genetic marker tests shall  be admissible 
without proof of authenticity); G. L. c. 233, § 79B (published statements of 
fact of general interest to persons engaged in an occupation shall be admis-
sible in the court’s discretion in civil cases); G. L. c. 233, § 79C (published 
facts or opinions on a subject of science or art shall be admissible in actions 
of contract or malpractice, conditioned on the court finding that said state-
ments are relevant and that the writer is recognized in his or her profession 
as an expert on the subject); G. L. c. 233, § 80 (stenographic transcripts).
Subsection (k). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79. “[Sec-
tion 79] was enacted primarily to relieve the physicians and nurses of public 
hospitals from the hardship and inconvenience of attending court as wit-
nesses to facts which ordinarily would be found recorded in the hospital 
books” (citation omitted). Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527, 381 N.E.2d 
1295, 1298 (1978).
Cross-Reference: Section 803(6)(B), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of 
Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Hospital Records.
Subsection (l). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79G. Under 
Section 79G, in addition to those already noted are “chiropodists, chiroprac-
tors, optometrists, osteopaths, physical  therapists, podiatrists, psychologists 
and other medical personnel licensed to practice under the laws of the juris-
diction within which such services were rendered.” This subsection applies to 
both civil and criminal cases. See Commonwealth v. Schutte, 52 Mass. App. 
Ct. 796, 797–800, 756 N.E.2d 48, 51–53 (2001).
Cross-Reference: Section 803(6)(C), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of 
Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Medical  and Hospital 
Services.
Subsection (m). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 209C, 
§ 16(f).
Subsection (n). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 209C, § 17. Such 
reports shall not be admissible absent sufficient evidence of intercourse be-
tween the mother and the putative father during the period of probable con-
ception and shall  not be considered as evidence of the occurrence of inter-
course between the mother and the putative father. Id. There is nothing in the 
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statute that requires the test to be court-ordered in order to be admissible. 
Department of Revenue v. Sorrentino, 408 Mass. 340, 344, 557 N.E.2d 1376, 
1379 (1990).
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 322
Section 903. Subscribing Witness Testimony 
Not Necessary
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary  to authen-
ticate a writing unless required by  the laws of the jurisdiction whose 
laws govern the validity of the writing.
NOTE
This section is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 68, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(b) 
(“The signature to an instrument set forth in any pleading shall be taken as 
admitted unless a party specifically denies its genuineness.”).
Authentication of wills in uncontested proceedings is governed by 
G. L. c. 192, § 2. Authentication of a will  in a contested proceeding requires a 
greater level  of support. See Goodwin v. Riordan, 333 Mass. 317, 318–319, 
130 N.E.2d 569, 570 (1955); Werber v. Werber, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 927, 927–
928, 818 N.E.2d 630, 631–632 (2004).
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ARTICLE X.  CONTENTS OF WRITINGS 
AND RECORDS
Section 1001. Definitions
For purposes of this Article, the following definitions are applica-
ble:
(a) Writings and Records. “Writings” and “records” are docu-
ments which consist of letters, words, numbers, or their equiva-
lent. Writings and records do not include photographs, composite 
pictures, tape recordings, videotapes, or digital images.
(b) Original. An “original” of a writing or record is the writing or 
record itself and any copy  intended to have the same effect by a 
person executing or issuing it.
(c) Duplicate. A “duplicate” is a copy of a writing or record which 
is not  intended to be an original, the copies being no more than 
secondary evidence of the original.
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Duhamel, 
391 Mass. 841, 844, 464 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (1984) (tape recording); Com-
monwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 77, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1047 (1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984) (photographs); Commonwealth v. 
Balukonis, 357 Mass. 721, 725, 260 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1970) (composite pic-
tures); Smith v. Palmer, 60 Mass. 513, 520–521 (1850) (best evidence); and 
Commonwealth v. Leneski, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294, 846 N.E.2d 1195, 
1198–1199 (2006) (videotapes or digital images).
This section is not as extensive as Fed. R. Evid. 1001(1) and Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 1001(1), both of which cover recordings and photographs. 
“The best evidence rule is applicable to only those situations where the con-
tents of a writing are sought to be proved” (citation omitted). Commonwealth 
v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 170. “[T]his rule is usually 
regarded . . . as not applicable to any objects but writings. . . . So far, then, as 
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concerns objects not writings, a photographic  representation could be used 
without accounting for the original.” Id. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 171, quoting 
Wigmore, Evidence § 796 (3d ed. 1940). See also Commonwealth v. McKay, 
67 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 402–403, 853 N.E.2d 1098, 1102–1103 (2006).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Quinn v. Standard Oil  Co., 
249 Mass. 194, 201, 144 N.E. 53, 55 (1924), and Peaks v. Cobb, 192 Mass. 
196, 196–197, 77 N.E. 881, 881–882 (1906).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Augur Steel  Axle & Gearing 
Co. v. Whittier, 117 Mass. 451, 455 (1875) (as to letter-press copy of an 
original letter in possession of adverse party, “[t]here was sufficient founda-
tion for the admission of secondary evidence of the contents of the letter”). 
See also Meehan v. North Adams Sav. Bank, 302 Mass. 357, 363–364, 19 
N.E.2d 299, 302–303 (1939) (admissibility of copy of a letter upheld, not to 
prove its contents, but to prove the opponent had received the original letter).
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Section 1002. Requirement of Original 
(Best Evidence Rule)
To prove the content of a writing or recording, but not a photo-
graph, the original writing or recording is required, except as otherwise 
provided in these sections, or by common law or statute.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 6, 746 
N.E.2d 469, 474 (2001), where the court explained as follows:
“The best evidence rule provides that, where the contents of 
a document are to be proved, the party must either produce 
the original or show a sufficient excuse for its nonproduction. 
The rule is a doctrine of evidentiary preference principally 
aimed, not at securing a writing at all  hazards and in every 
instance, but at securing the best obtainable evidence of its 
contents. Thus, where the original has been lost, destroyed, 
or is otherwise unavailable, its production may be excused 
and other evidence of its contents will be admissible, pro-
vided that certain findings are made.” [Quotation and cita-
tions omitted; emphasis omitted.]
See also Commonwealth v. Stevens, 155 Mass. 291, 292, 29 N.E. 508, 509 
(1892); Commonwealth v. Silva, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 28, 35–37, 807 N.E.2d 
170, 177–178 (2004) (written inventory search policy of police department is 
the best evidence of that policy and such documents should be offered in 
evidence to prove it exists).
The best evidence rule does not apply where the writing is so simple 
that the possibility of error is negligible. See Commonwealth v. Blood, 77 
Mass. 74, 77 (1858).
“The best evidence rule [applies] to only those situations where the con-
tents of a writing are sought to be proved.” Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 
Mass. 721, 725, 260 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1970). The rule does not apply to pho-
tographs, Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 77, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 
1047 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984); composite pictures, Com-
monwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 171; tape record-
ings, Commonwealth v. Duhamel, 391 Mass. 841, 844, 464 N.E.2d 1352, 
1355 (1984); or videotapes or digital images, Commonwealth v. Leneski, 66 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 326
Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294, 846 N.E.2d 1195, 1198–1199 (2006). The introduc-
tion of such evidence is subject to other requirements, i.e., relevancy and 
authentication. Id.
The admission of photographs, composite drawings, tape recordings, or 
digital images is within the discretion of the trial  judge, provided that the evi-
dence is accurate, similar enough to circumstances at the time in dispute to 
be relevant and helpful to the jury in its deliberations, and its probative value 
outweighs any prejudice to the other party. See Renzi v. Paredes, 452 Mass. 
38, 52, 890 N.E.2d 806, 817 (2008); Commonwealth v. Duhamel, 391 Mass. 
at 844–845, 464 N.E.2d at 1355; Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. at 
725–726, 260 N.E.2d at 170–171; Commonwealth v. Leneski, 66 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 294, 846 N.E.2d at 1198–1199; Henderson v. D’Annolfo, 15 Mass. App. 
Ct. 413, 428–429, 446 N.E.2d 103, 113 (1983). A witness may testify that a 
photograph or digital  image is substantially similar to the original as long as 
the witness is familiar with the details pictured even though the witness is not 
the photographer. Renzi v. Paredes, 452 Mass. at 52, 890 N.E.2d at 817. 
“Concerns regarding the completeness or production of the image go to its 
weight and not its admissibility.” Id., 890 N.E.2d at 818.
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Section 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates
Where the original has been lost, destroyed, or otherwise made 
unavailable, its production may be excused and other evidence of its 
contents will be admissible, provided that certain findings are made as 
outlined in Section 1004.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 
Mass. 1, 6, 746 N.E.2d 469, 474 (2001).
“As a threshold matter, the proponent must offer evidence 
sufficient to warrant a finding that the original once existed. If 
the evidence warrants such a finding, the judge must as-
sume its existence, and then determine if the original had 
become unavailable, otherwise than through the serious fault 
of the proponent and that reasonable search had been made 
for it.” (Citation, quotation, and ellipsis omitted.)
Id. at 6–7, 746 N.E.2d at 474.
A number of statutes equalize duplicates and originals. See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 233, § 76 (attested-to records of governmental  departments); G. L. c. 
233, § 76A (properly authenticated copies of documents filed with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 77 (copies of books, etc., of 
trust companies and banks); G. L. c. 233, § 79A (duly certified copies of pub-
lic, bank, insurance, and hospital  records); G. L. c. 233, § 79D (duly certified 
copies of newspapers made by photographic process and deposited in cer-
tain public  and college libraries); G. L. c. 233, § 79E (reproductions made in 
the regular course of business); G. L. c. 233, § 79K (duplicate of a computer 
data file or program file unless issue as to authenticity or unfair to admit). 
See also G. L. c. 233, § 78 (court “may” order originals).
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Section 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence 
of Contents
The original is not required, and secondary evidence of the con-
tents of the writing or record is admissible, if:
(a) Originals Lost or Destroyed. All originals are lost or have 
been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad 
faith;
(b) Original Not Obtainable. No original can be obtained by any 
available judicial process or procedure;
(c) Original in Possession of Opponent. At a time when an 
original was under the control of the party  against whom offered, 
that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that 
the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that 
party does not produce the original at the hearing; or
(d) Collateral Matters. The writing or record is not closely re-
lated to a controlling issue.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 1004 and Proposed 
Mass. R. Evid. 1004, both of which reflect Massachusetts practice.
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 
434 Mass. 1, 7, 746 N.E.2d 469, 474 (2001), quoting Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 1004(a). See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 348 Mass. 212, 219, 
202 N.E.2d 785, 790–791 (1964); Fauci v. Mulready, 337 Mass. 532, 540–
542, 150 N.E.2d 286, 291–292 (1958); Joannes v. Bennett, 87 Mass. 169, 
172–173 (1862); Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. Richman, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 
515, 520–521, 475 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (1985).
“[I]n order to permit proof by secondary evidence of the contents of [a 
lost original], the trial judge must make preliminary findings that the original 
had become unavailable, otherwise than through the serious fault of the 
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proponent . . . and that reasonable search had been made for it.” Fauci  v. 
Mulready, 337 Mass. at 540, 150 N.E.2d at 291.
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Topping v. Bickford, 86 
Mass. 120, 122 (1862), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 151 Mass. 491, 495, 
24 N.E. 677, 677–678 (1890).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. 
265, 271, 130 N.E.2d 575, 579 (1955) (defendant had an original  in court and 
refused to produce it on plaintiff’s request so secondary evidence was admit-
ted); Commonwealth v. Slocomb, 260 Mass. 288, 291, 157 N.E. 350, 351 
(1927) (when pleadings disclose proof of a document that will be necessary 
at trial, no further notice is necessary, and if the party fails to produce the 
document, secondary evidence is admissible). Cf. Cregg v. Puritan Trust Co., 
237 Mass. 146, 149–150, 129 N.E. 428, 429 (1921) (“The failure of the de-
fendant to produce its books and accounts when summoned by a subpoena 
duces tecum conferred authority on the court to compel that production by 
proper process, and authorized the plaintiff to introduce parol  evidence of the 
contents of such books and records. A like result follows upon the failure of a 
party at the trial  to produce on reasonable demand writings which are mate-
rial to the issue. The failure to produce documents on demand at a trial  or on 
the subpoena duces tecum, is not in itself evidence of the alleged contents of 
such documents.” [Citations omitted.]).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Smith v. Abington Sav. 
Bank, 171 Mass. 178, 184, 50 N.E. 545, 546 (1898). See also Common-
wealth v. Borasky, 214 Mass. 313, 317, 101 N.E. 377, 379 (1913) (defen-
dant’s objection to testimony of physician, who performed autopsy, on the 
ground that the record was the best evidence, was properly overruled as “[t]
he testimony of the witness who was present and observed the condition 
revealed by the autopsy was admissible”); Beauregard v. Benjamin F. Smith 
Co., 213 Mass. 259, 264, 100 N.E. 627, 628 (1913) (sheriff was permitted to 
testify as to where he served the defendant without producing the official re-
turn of service); Eagle Bank at New Haven v. Chapin, 20 Mass. 180, 182–
183 (1825) (parol  evidence of a notice to an endorser admissible without call-
ing on the party to produce the written notice received by him).
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Section 1005. Official Records
(a) Authentication.
(1) Domestic. An official record kept within the Commonwealth, 
or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may  be evi-
denced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by 
the officer having legal custody of the record, or by  that officer’s 
deputy. If the record is kept in any other State, district, Common-
wealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States, or 
within the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands, any such copy shall be accompa-
nied by  a certificate that such custodial officer has the custody. 
This certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the 
district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authen-
ticated by  the seal of the court, or may  be made by any public of-
ficer having a seal of office and having official duties in the dis-
trict or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenti-
cated by the seal of the office.
(2) Foreign. A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when 
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official pub-
lication thereof, or a copy thereof, attested by a person authorized 
to make the attestation and accompanied by a final certification as 
to the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the 
attesting person or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of 
genuineness of signature and official position relates to the attesta-
tion or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and 
official position relating to the attestation. A final certification 
may be made by  a secretary  of embassy or legation, consul gen-
eral, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or 
a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or 
accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been 
given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy  of 
the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, (A) admit an 
attested copy without final certification or (B) permit the foreign 
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official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or 
without a final certification.
(b) Lack of Record. A written statement that after diligent search no 
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records des-
ignated by the statement, authenticated as provided in Subsection 
(a)(1) of this section in the case of a domestic record or complying 
with the requirements of Subsection (a)(2) of this section for a sum-
mary  in the case of a foreign record, is admissible as evidence that the 
records contain no such record or entry.
(c) Other Proof. This section does not prevent the proof, by any other 
method authorized by  law, of the existence of, or the lack of, an offi-
cial record, or of entry, or lack of entry therein.
NOTE
This section is taken nearly verbatim from Mass. R. Civ. P. 44 and Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 40.
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Section 1006. Summaries
The contents of voluminous writings or records which cannot 
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a 
summary, chart, or the like, which accurately reflects the contents of 
the underlying documents. The originals, or duplicates, may  be made 
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a rea-
sonable time and place. The court may order that  they be produced in 
court.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 
581–582, 160 N.E.2d 181, 197 (1959), and the cases cited in Section 611(a), 
Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Control by Court.
“[I]n a trial embracing so many details and occupying so 
great a length of time . . . during which a great mass of 
books and documents were put in evidence, concise state-
ments of their content verified by persons who had prepared 
them from the originals were the only means for presenting 
to the jury an intelligible view of the issues involved” (quota-
tion and citations omitted).
Id. at 582, 160 N.E.2d at 197.
“[C]are must be taken to insure that summaries accurately reflect the 
contents of the underlying documents and do not function as pedagogical 
devices that unfairly emphasize part of the proponent’s proof” (quotations 
and citations omitted). Welch v. Keene Corp., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 157, 165–
166, 575 N.E.2d 766, 771 (1991). The witness presenting the summary is not 
permitted to state deductions or inferences, but may testify as to the results 
of his or her computations. Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. at 582, 
160 N.E.2d at 197. The court may order that the original be produced. Cf. 
Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 215 Mass. 381, 390–
391, 102 N.E. 625, 628 (1913).
§ 1006 
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Section 1007. Testimony or Written Admission 
of Party
The general principle, as to the production of written evidence as 
the best evidence, does not apply to the admissions of parties.
NOTE
This section is taken verbatim from Smith v. Palmer, 60 Mass. 513, 521 
(1850). See also Cooley v. Collins, 186 Mass. 507, 509–510, 71 N.E. 979, 
980 (1904); Clarke v. Warwick Cycle Mfg. Co., 174 Mass. 434, 435, 54 N.E. 
887, 888 (1899).
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Section 1008. Functions of Judge and Fact Finder
Before secondary evidence of the contents of a writing or record 
may be admitted, the proponent must offer evidence sufficient to war-
rant a finding that an original once existed. If the evidence warrants 
such a finding, the judge must assume its existence and then determine 
if the original is unavailable, not through the serious fault of the pro-
ponent, and if reasonable search has been made for it. If the judge 
makes these findings in favor of the proponent, the judge must allow 
secondary  evidence to establish the contents of the original writing or 
record. Once the secondary evidence is admitted, it is for the trier of 
fact to determine the weight, if any, to give the secondary evidence.
NOTE
This section is derived from Fauci  v. Mulready, 337 Mass. 532, 540–542, 150 
N.E.2d 286, 291–293 (1958), and Dana v. Kemble, 36 Mass. 112, 114 
(1837). See also Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 6–7, 746 N.E.2d 
469, 474 (2001); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, 348 Mass. 212, 219, 202 
N.E.2d 785, 790–791 (1964); Capitol  Bank & Trust Co. v. Richman, 19 Mass. 
App. Ct. 515, 520–522, 475 N.E.2d 1236, 1240–1241 (1985); Buker v. Me-
lanson, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 330–331, 393 N.E.2d 436, 439–440 (1979). If 
secondary evidence is admitted, it is then up to the trier of fact to decide, 
when it is an issue, whether the document ever existed. Fauci  v. Mulready, 
337 Mass. at 542, 150 N.E.2d at 292.
“[T]here are no degrees in secondary evidence, so that a party author-
ized to resort to it is compelled to produce one class of such evidence rather 
than another.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 151 Mass. 491, 495, 24 N.E. 677, 
678 (1890).
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ARTICLE XI.  MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS
Section 1101. Applicability of Evidentiary 
Sections
(a) Proceedings to Which Applicable. Except as provided in Subsec-
tion (c), these sections apply  to all actions and proceedings in the 
courts of the Commonwealth.
(b) Law of Privilege. The sections with respect  to privileges apply  at 
all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings.
(c) Sections Inapplicable. These sections (other than those with re-
spect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary Determinations of Fact. The determination of 
questions of fact preliminary to the admissibility  of evidence 
when the issue is to be determined by the court as addressed in 
Section 104(a), Preliminary  Questions: Determinations Made by 
the Court.
(2) Grand Jury. Proceedings before grand juries.
(3) Miscellaneous Proceedings. Most administrative proceedings; 
bail proceedings; bar discipline proceedings; civil motor vehicle 
infraction hearings; issuance of process (warrant, complaint, ca-
pias, summons); precomplaint, show cause hearings; pretrial dan-
gerousness hearings; prison disciplinary hearings; probation viola-
tion hearings; restitution hearings; sentencing; sexual offender 
registry  board hearings; small claims sessions; and summary 
contempt proceedings.
(d) Motions to Suppress. The law of evidence does not apply with 
full force at motion to suppress hearings. As to the determination of 
probable cause or the justification of government action, out-of-court 
statements are admissible.
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 336
NOTE
Subsection (a). This subsection summarizes the current practice in Massa-
chusetts courts. “The rules of evidence stand guard to ensure that only rele-
vant, reliable, noninflammatory considerations may shape fact finding. With-
out these rules, there would be nothing to prevent trials from being resolved 
on whim, personal affections, or prejudice.” Adoption of Sherry, 435 Mass. 
331, 338, 757 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (2001). In addition to trials, therefore, the 
law of evidence applies at hearings on motions. See Thorell  v. ADAP, Inc., 58 
Mass. App. Ct. 334, 340–341, 789 N.E.2d 1086, 1091–1092 (2003).
Subsection (b). Privileges are covered in Article V, Privileges and Disqualifi-
cations.
Subsection (c)(1). See Note to Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: De-
terminations Made by the Court.
Subsection (c)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Gib-
son, 368 Mass. 518, 522–525, 333 N.E.2d 400, 404–405 (1975), and 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 4(c). See Reporters’ Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 4(c) (“evi-
dence which is not legally competent at trial is sufficient upon which to base 
an indictment”).
Subsection (c)(3). Evidence bearing directly on probable cause, such as 
what a witness, a police officer, or a probation officer tells a court in connec-
tion with a request for an arrest warrant, a probation violation warrant, a war-
rant of apprehension, a search warrant, a capias, or a summons, or in sup-
port of a criminal complaint or as justification for a search and seizure, is not 
objectionable on grounds of hearsay in a judicial  proceeding to determine 
probable cause. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 435 Mass. 558, 567, 760 N.E.2d 
273, 280–281 (2002); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 370 Mass. 416, 418, 348 
N.E.2d 787, 789 (1976); Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 
707, 709 n.3, 755 N.E.2d 817, 819 n.3 (2001). While the traditional rules of 
evidence may not apply in these situations, the evidence must still  be reliable 
and trustworthy. See Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 34–35, 933 
N.E.2d 936, 945–946 (2010); Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & 
Family Ct. Dep’t, 457 Mass. 172, 184–185, 929 N.E.2d 272, 281–282 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 71, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1250 (2006).
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This subsection identifies the various miscellaneous proceedings to 
which the rules of evidence are not applicable, including the following:
209A Hearings. See Silvia v. Duarte, 421 Mass. 1007, 1008, 657 
N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (1995); Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597–598, 651 
N.E.2d 1206, 1210–1211 (1995).
Administrative Proceedings. See G. L. c. 30A, § 11(2); 452 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.11(5); Rate Setting Comm’n v. Baystate Med. Ctr., 422 
Mass. 744, 752–755, 665 N.E.2d 647, 652–654 (1996); Goodridge v. Director 
of Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436 n.1, 377 N.E.2d 927, 929 
n.1 (1978). See also Care & Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 83, 643 
N.E.2d 26, 35 (1994) (a witness at such a proceeding is not permitted to ex-
press an opinion about the credibility of another witness).
Bail Proceedings. See Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 
133, 795 N.E.2d 521, 532 (2003) (bail revocation proceedings); Querubin v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 118, 795 N.E.2d 534, 543 (2003) 
(G. L. c. 276, § 57, proceedings); Snow v. Commonwealth, 404 Mass. 1007, 
1007, 537 N.E.2d 578, 579 (1989).
Bar Discipline Proceedings. See Matter of Abbott, 437 Mass. 384, 
393, 772 N.E.2d 543, 550 (2002).
Civil Motor Vehicle Infraction Hearings. See G. L. c. 90, § 20 (traffic 
citation). Under the Uniform Rules on Civil Motor Vehicle Infractions, the for-
mal rules of evidence do not apply. See Commonwealth v. Curtin, 386 Mass. 
587, 588 n.3, 436 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 n.3 (1982). The same holds true for 
cases involving parking tickets under G. L. c. 90, § 20C. See Lemaine v. City 
of Boston, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1173, 1175, 540 N.E.2d 1338, 1339 (1989).
Issuance of Process (Warrant, Capias, Summons). See Common-
wealth v. Weiss, 370 Mass. 416, 418, 348 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Young, 349 Mass. 175, 179, 206 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1965); 
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 206, 196 N.E.2d 840, 846 (1964); 
Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 707, 709 n.3, 755 N.E.2d 
817, 819 n.3 (2001).
Precomplaint Hearings. See G. L. c. 218, § 35A. The formal rules of 
evidence do not apply at a hearing conducted pursuant to G. L. c. 218, 
§ 35A. Commonwealth v. Clerk-Magistrate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. 
Ct. Dep’t, 439 Mass. 352, 357–358, 787 N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (2003); Com-
monwealth v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 314–315, 764 N.E.2d 338, 342 
(2002) (no right to cross-examine witness).
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Pretrial Dangerousness Hearings. See G. L. c. 276, § 58A(4); Abbott 
A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 30–33, 933 N.E.2d 936, 943–944 
(2010); Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 785–786, 673 N.E.2d 
22, 31–32 (1996).
Prison Disciplinary Hearings. See Murphy v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., 396 Mass. 830, 834, 489 N.E.2d 661, 663 (1986).
Probation Violation Hearings. See Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 
Mass. 119, 132, 934 N.E.2d 236, 248–249 (2010); Commonwealth v. Durling, 
407 Mass. 108, 117–118, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1198 (1990) (hearsay evidence 
must still bear substantial  indicia of reliability and trustworthiness); Com-
monwealth v. Janovich, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 47 n.6, 769 N.E.2d 286, 291 
n.6 (2002). See also Rule 6(a) of the District Court Rules for Probation Viola-
tion Proceedings.
Restitution Hearings. Restitution may be ordered to compensate the 
victim of a crime for economic  losses that are causally related to the offense. 
Courts should apply the law of evidence flexibly so that all  reliable evidence 
is considered. The “process should be flexible enough to consider evidence 
including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in 
an adversary criminal trial.” Commonwealth v. Cassanova, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 
750, 755–756, 843 N.E.2d 699, 705 (2006), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
Sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 Mass. 88, 92, 605 
N.E.2d 827, 831 (1993) (a judge may consider many factors, including hear-
say). See also G. L. c. 276, § 85; Mass. R. Crim. P. 28(d); Commonwealth v. 
Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 461–462, 879 N.E.2d 105, 116 (2008) (evidence of 
uncharged conduct is admissible and relevant to the character of the of-
fender, but may not be used to increase the punishment).
Sexual Offender Registry Board Hearings. See G. L. c. 6, § 178L(2); 
803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1).
Small Claims. See generally G. L. c. 218, §§ 21, 22.
Summary Contempt Proceedings. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 43.
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from United States v. Matlock, 
415 U.S. 164, 172–175 (1974), and Commonwealth v. Young, 349 Mass. 
175, 179, 206 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1965). While out-of-court statements are 
admissible as to the determination of probable cause or the justification of 
government action, other evidence that would be incompetent under the 
rules of evidence is not admissible at suppression hearings or other proceed-
ings in which probable cause is challenged. If a defendant testifies at a mo-
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tion to suppress hearing and subsequently testifies at trial, his or her testi-
mony from the motion to suppress hearing may be used to impeach his or 
her credibility at the later trial. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 
637–638, 682 N.E.2d 636, 640–641 (1997).
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Section 1102. Spoliation or Destruction 
of Evidence
A judge has the discretion to impose sanctions for the spoliation or 
destruction of evidence, whether negligent or intentional, in the under-
lying action in which the evidence would have been offered.
NOTE
This section is derived from Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 439 
Mass. 223, 235–236, 786 N.E.2d 824, 833–834 (2003), and Commonwealth 
v. Henderson, 411 Mass. 309, 311–312, 582 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1991). See 
also Mass. R. Civ. P. 37(b); Kippenhan v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 428 Mass. 124, 
126–129, 697 N.E.2d 527, 530–531 (1998); Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
405 Mass. 191, 197, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (1989). There is no tort cause of 
action for spoliation or destruction of evidence. See Fletcher v. Dorchester 
Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 547, 773 N.E.2d 420, 424 (2002).
“Sanctions may be appropriate for the spoliation of evidence 
that occurs even before an action has been commenced, if a 
litigant or its expert knows or reasonably should know that 
the evidence might be relevant to a possible action. The 
threat of a lawsuit must be sufficiently apparent, however, 
that a reasonable person in the spoliator’s position would 
realize, at the time of spoliation, the possible importance of 
the evidence to the resolution of the potential  dispute.” (Cita-
tions omitted.)
Kippenhan v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 428 Mass. at 127, 697 N.E.2d at 530. 
“While a duty to preserve evidence does not arise automatically from a non-
party’s mere knowledge, there are ways that that duty may be imposed on a 
nonparty.” Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. at 548, 773 
N.E.2d at 425. For example, a witness served with a subpoena duces tecum 
must preserve evidence in his or her control when the subpoena is received, 
or a third-party witness may enter into an agreement to preserve evidence. 
Id. at 549, 773 N.E.2d at 425.
Civil Cases. “[S]anctions for spoliation are carefully tailored to remedy the 
precise unfairness occasioned by that spoliation. A party’s claim of prejudice 
stemming from spoliation is addressed within the context of the action that 
was allegedly affected by that spoliation.” Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. 
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Co., 437 Mass. 544, 551, 773 N.E.2d 420, 426 (2002). “As a general rule, a 
judge should impose the least severe sanction necessary to remedy the 
prejudice to the nonspoliating party.” Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 
Inc., 439 Mass. 223, 235, 786 N.E.2d 824, 833–834 (2003).
“[I]n a civil  case, where an expert has removed an item of 
physical evidence and the item has disappeared, or the ex-
pert has caused a change in the substance or appearance of 
such an item in such circumstances that the expert knows or 
reasonably should know that that item in its original  form 
may be material  to litigation, the judge, at the request of a 
potentially prejudiced litigant, should preclude the expert 
from testifying as to his or her observations of such items 
before he or she altered them and as to any opinion based 
thereon. The rule should be applied without regard for 
whether the expert’s conduct occurred before or after the 
expert was retained by a party to the litigation.”
Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 405 Mass. 191, 197–198, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 
1021 (1989). See also Bolton v. MBTA, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 654, 655–657, 593 
N.E.2d 248, 248–250 (1992) (extending rule to cover spoliation of evidence 
by a party after expert inspection).
“The spectrum of remedies [also] includes allowing the party who has 
been aggrieved by the spoliation to present evidence about the preaccident 
condition of the lost evidence and the circumstances surrounding the spolia-
tion, as well  as instructing the jury on the inferences that may be drawn from 
spoliation” (citations omitted). Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 488, 
802 N.E.2d 521, 527 (2003). A judge may preclude testimony that is disposi-
tive of the ultimate merits of the case. Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 
437 Mass. at 550, 773 N.E.2d at 426. Once the moving party produces evi-
dence sufficient to establish that another party lost or destroyed evidence 
that the litigant or its expert knew or reasonably should have known might be 
relevant to a pending or potential case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving 
party to prove that it was not at fault. Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 790, 799, 
912 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (2009). See also Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
405 Mass. at 195, 199, 539 N.E.2d at 1020, 1022 (defendant entitled to 
summary judgment if excluded testimony prevents plaintiff from making 
prima facie case). For the extreme sanction of dismissal or entering a default 
judgment, ordinarily a finding of wilfulness or bad faith is necessary. Keene v. 
Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 439 Mass. at 235–236, 786 N.E.2d at 834.
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Criminal Cases. In Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 419, 693 
N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (1998), the court addressed the appropriate remedial  ac-
tion in criminal cases:
“[W]hen potentially exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed, 
a balancing test is employed to determine the appropriate-
ness and extent of remedial action. The courts must weigh 
the culpability of the Commonwealth, the materiality of the 
evidence and the potential prejudice to the defendant. To 
establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable 
possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile 
imagination, that access to the [material] would have pro-
duced evidence favorable to [the defendant’s] cause.” (Quo-
tations and citation omitted.)
See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(c); Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 
707, 714, 625 N.E.2d 529, 535 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 (1994); 
Commonwealth v. Willie, 400 Mass. 427, 432–433, 510 N.E.2d 258, 261–262 
(1987). Remedial action in the form of sanctions or a “missing evidence” in-
struction is not appropriate unless the defendant meets “his initial burden of 
showing a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence was exculpatory.” 
Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 554, 870 N.E.2d 57, 63 (2007). If 
remedial action is required, the judge has the discretion to fashion a remedy 
that will protect the defendant’s rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 
Mass. at 557–558, 870 N.E.2d at 65 (missing evidence instruction); Com-
monwealth v. Harwood, 432 Mass. 290, 303, 733 N.E.2d 547, 557 (2000) 
(suppression of evidence). Cf. Commonwealth v. Sasville, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 
15, 28, 616 N.E.2d 476, 484 (1993) (dismissal appropriate only where the 
harm is irremediable).
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Section 1103. Sexually Dangerous Person 
Proceedings
In proceedings for the commitment or discharge of a person al-
leged to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP), hearsay evidence is not 
admissible, except as provided in Subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion.
(a) Hearsay That Is Admissible. Hearsay consisting of reports or 
records relating to a person’s criminal conviction, adjudication of 
juvenile delinquency  or as a youthful offender, the person’s psy-
chiatric and psychological records, and a variety of records cre-
ated or maintained by the courts and other government agencies, 
as more particularly  defined by statute, is admissible in SDP pro-
ceedings.
(b) Hearsay That May Be Admissible. In addition to hearsay 
admissible under Subsection (a), other hearsay  may be admissible 
if it concerns uncharged conduct of the person and is closely re-
lated in time and circumstance to a sexual offense for which the 
person was convicted or adjudicated a juvenile delinquent  or 
youthful offender.
NOTE
Introduction. A person who has been convicted of a sex offense may be 
confined indefinitely for treatment after the termination of the person’s crimi-
nal sentence if the person is found to be a sexually dangerous person in ac-
cordance with statutory procedures. See Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 
544, 547, 903 N.E.2d 1074, 1076–1077 (2009) (discussing G. L. c. 123A, 
§§ 12–14). The current Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 123A, was adopted in 
1999, St. 1999, c. 74, §§ 3–8, and is the successor to an earlier statutory 
scheme for the civil  commitment of sexually dangerous persons (St. 1958, 
c. 646) that was repealed by St. 1990, c. 150, § 304. As a result, the popula-
tion of the Massachusetts Treatment Center includes persons who are con-
fined under commitment orders made prior to 1990 and subsequent to 1999. 
Each population has a right to file a petition in the Superior Court each year 
that requires a redetermination of whether they remain sexually dangerous. 
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See G. L. c. 123A, § 9. The law provides for trial by jury and affords the indi-
vidual the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to 
cross-examine adverse witnesses. Unless the Commonwealth proves that 
the person remains sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt, the per-
son must be released. See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 587, 
593–594, 846 N.E.2d 379, 383, 387–388 (2006) (explaining the statutory 
procedures governing commitment and discharge under G. L. c. 123A). The 
criteria for commitment are set forth in the definition of a “sexually dangerous 
person” found in G. L. c. 123A, § 1. See Commonwealth v. Boucher, 438 
Mass. 274, 275–281, 780 N.E.2d 47, 49–53 (2002). Expert witness testimony 
is required in order for a judge or a jury to make the determination that a per-
son is sexually dangerous. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 
511, 735 N.E.2d 1222, 1238 (2000).
“It is settled that hearsay not otherwise admissible under the rules of 
evidence is inadmissible at the trial of a sexually dangerous person petition 
unless specifically made admissible by statute” (citations omitted). Com-
monwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 335, 771 N.E.2d 778, 782 (2002). 
Thus, the catch-all provision found in G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c) (“Any other evi-
dence” tending to show that the person is sexually dangerous), is not inter-
preted to make any and all hearsay evidence admissible in SDP proceed-
ings. McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 147 n.2, 833 N.E.2d 1146, 1151 n.2 
(2005). See also id. at 151 n.6, 833 N.E.2d at 1153 n.6 (“For example, there 
is no hearsay exception that would allow a party to introduce his own prior 
statements in the various reports and records; if offered by the petitioner, his 
own statements would not be the admission of a party opponent.”). It is 
equally settled that documents made admissible by statute in SDP proceed-
ings such as police reports, psychological assessments, notes about treat-
ment, and the like, are not subject to redaction simply because they contain 
hearsay statements. See id. at 147–148, 151 n.6, 833 N.E.2d at 1151–1152, 
1153 n.6.
“When the Legislature identified the specific records and re-
ports that were to be admissible in sexually dangerous per-
son proceedings, it did so with full knowledge that they rou-
tinely contain information derived from hearsay sources. 
Having made such records and reports ‘admissible,’ the Leg-
islature did not intend that the documents be reduced to iso-
lated shreds of partial information that would result from the 
application of hearsay rules to each individual entry in the 
documents.”
Id. at 150, 833 N.E.2d at 1153. See also Commonwealth v. Reese, 438 
Mass. 519, 527, 781 N.E.2d 1225, 1232 (2003) (G. L. c. 123A, § 14[c], does 
345 
not supercede the requirements of the learned treatise exception to the hear-
say rule).
Miscellaneous Evidentiary Rulings. The Supreme Judicial  Court and 
Appeals Court have addressed several other evidentiary questions that relate 
to these specialized proceedings. See Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 
550, 903 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (2009) (although the annual report of the Com-
munity Access Board as to a civilly committed person’s sexual dangerous-
ness is admissible in discharge proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, the 
Commonwealth cannot proceed to trial  unless at least one of the two quali-
fied examiners opines that the petitioner is a sexually dangerous person); 
Commonwealth v. Connors, 447 Mass. 313, 317–319, 850 N.E.2d 1038, 
1041–1043 (2006) (although the allegedly sexually dangerous person has a 
right to refuse to speak to the qualified examiners, he or she may not offer 
his or her own expert testimony, based on his or her statements made to his 
or her own experts, while refusing to answer the questions of the qualified 
examiners); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. at 593–594, 846 N.E.2d at 
387–388 (civil commitment of an incompetent person under G. L. c. 123A is 
not unconstitutional even though no effective treatment is available); Com-
monwealth v. Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 439–442, 799 N.E.2d 113, 115–117 
(2004) (G. L. c. 123A, § 13[b], which requires that certain material about a 
person alleged to be a sexually dangerous person be given to the qualified 
examiners, does not supercede the patient-psychotherapist privilege); Wyatt, 
petitioner, 428 Mass. 347, 355–359, 701 N.E.2d 337, 343–345 (1998) (ques-
tions concerning the relevancy and probative value of evidence offered in 
proceedings under G. L. c. 123A are within the discretion of the trial judge in 
accordance with Sections 401–403 of this Guide); Kenney, petitioner, 66 
Mass. App. Ct. 709, 714–715, 850 N.E.2d 590, 596 (2006) (admissibility of 
juvenile court records in SDP cases); Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. 
App. Ct. 280, 287, 816 N.E.2d 152, 157–158 (2004) (if reports of qualified 
examiners are admitted pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14[c], the author of the 
report must be made available for cross-examination).
Hearsay Evidence Excluded. Police reports and out-of-court state-
ments of witnesses from cases in which the charges have been dismissed or 
nolle prossed or in which the defendant was found not guilty are not state-
ments of “prior sexual offenses,” as set forth in G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), and 
thus are inadmissible as hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 
Mass. at 335–336, 771 N.E.2d at 781–782. However, this does not mean that 
the testimony of witnesses with personal  knowledge of the facts in cases that 
were dismissed or nolle prossed cases would be inadmissible in SDP cases. 
See id. at 337, 771 N.E.2d at 783.
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Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 9, and 
14(c). In proceedings for the initial  commitment of a person under Section 12 
(including the preliminary, probable cause hearing) and the discharge of 
committed persons under Section 9, the Legislature has removed many of 
the barriers against the admissibility of hearsay evidence. See G. L. c. 123A, 
§§ 6A, 9, 14(c). The case law has harmonized these sections so that the 
general rule is that hearsay admissible in a proceeding under G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 12, is also admissible in a proceeding under Section 9. These statutory 
provisions permit psychiatrists or psychologists who are qualified examiners, 
see G. L. c. 123A, § 1, to testify as experts without an independent determi-
nation by the court that they are qualified and that their testimony meets 
standards of reliability under Section 702, Testimony by Experts. See Com-
monwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 285–289, 816 N.E.2d 152, 
156–159 (2004) (admission of testimony and reports of qualified examiners 
as to a person’s sexual dangerousness does not require the court to assess 
reliability under the standards established in Daubert v. Merrell  Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 [1993], and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 
N.E.2d 1342 [1994]). Cf. Ready, petitioner, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 172–179, 
824 N.E.2d 474, 476–480 (2005) (in a Section 9 proceeding, the trial  judge 
was correct in excluding the results of the Abel Assessment for Sexual Inter-
est test administered by an independent expert witness for the petitioner on 
grounds that it was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific  commu-
nity and thus not reliable under the Daubert-Lanigan standard).
Hearsay Evidence Expressly Made Admissible by Statute. Under 
G. L. c. 123A, § 6A, reports by the community access board of evaluations of 
residents of the Massachusetts Treatment Center are admissible in proceed-
ings for discharge under G. L. c. 123A, § 9. Under G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9 and 
14(c), reports prepared by qualified examiners are admissible. See Com-
monwealth v. Starkus, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 340, 867 N.E.2d 811, 823 
(2007) (leaving open whether the reports of independent experts called by 
the person alleged to be sexually dangerous are admissible under these sec-
tions as “psychiatric  and psychological records”). See also G. L. c. 233, 
§ 79G. There also is a broad exemption from the hearsay rule found in 
G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), which states that the following records are admissible 
in proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 12, for the initial commitment of an 
offender as a sexually dangerous person:
“Juvenile and adult court probation records, psychiatric and 
psychological  records and reports of the person named in 
the petition, including the report of any qualified examiner, as 
defined in section 1, and filed under this chapter, police re-
ports relating to such person’s prior sexual offenses, incident 
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reports arising out of such person’s incarceration or custody, 
oral or written statements prepared for and to be offered at 
the trial  by the victims of the person who is the subject of the 
petition and any other evidence tending to show that such 
person is or is not a sexually dangerous person shall  be ad-
missible at the trial  if such written information has been pro-
vided to opposing counsel reasonably in advance of trial.”
See also Commonwealth v. Morales, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 730, 805 N.E.2d 
1007, 1009 (2004) (“DSS reports and grand jury minutes containing informa-
tion about victims of sexual offenses committed against them by a defendant 
convicted of those offenses are directly admissible in evidence at trials on 
petitions brought under G. L. c. 123A, § 14[a]”). Under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, ei-
ther side may introduce in evidence the report of a qualified examiner, the 
petitioner’s “juvenile and adult court and probation records,” the petitioner’s 
“psychiatric  and psychological  records,” and the Department of Correction’s 
updated annual progress report pertaining to the petitioner. Constitutional 
challenges to the Legislature’s relaxation of the rule against the admissibility 
of hearsay in SDP cases were considered and rejected by the Supreme Ju-
dicial  Court in Commonwealth v. Given, 441 Mass. 741, 746–748, 808 
N.E.2d 788, 793–795 (2004).
When Hearsay Evidence Is the Basis of Expert Testimony. In Com-
monwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 336–339, 771 N.E.2d 778, 782–784 
(2002), the Supreme Judicial  Court applied Department of Youth Servs. v. 
A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531, 499 N.E.2d 812, 820–821 (1986), see Sec-
tion 703(c), Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts, and harmonized the 
demands of the more general law of evidence and the special statutory ex-
emptions from the hearsay rule found in G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9 and 14(c). The 
Supreme Judicial  Court held that in an SDP proceeding, a qualified examiner 
could base an expert opinion on police reports and witness statements per-
taining to the sex offender even though the information is not in evidence, as 
long as the information could be admitted if the witnesses were called to tes-
tify. Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. at 337–338, 771 N.E.2d at 783–
784. Because the statutes, G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9 and 14(c), make the reports of 
these qualified examiners admissible, any independently admissible hearsay 
contained in such reports that is not admitted during the trial must be re-
dacted from the reports before it is presented to the jury. Id. at 339, 771 
N.E.2d at 784. The reason why redaction is required in such cases is not be-
cause the qualified examiner’s report contains hearsay within hearsay, but 
rather because the report is the equivalent of an expert witness’s direct tes-
timony which cannot be used as a vehicle for putting before the jury facts not 
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in evidence. See McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 148 n.4, 833 N.E.2d 
1146, 1152 n.4 (2005).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Given, 
441 Mass. 741, 745, 808 N.E.2d 788, 792–793 (2004). The Supreme Judicial 
Court explained that in proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 9 or § 12, 
G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), makes admissible evidence of uncharged conduct 
when it is closely related in time and circumstance to the underlying sexual 
offense. Id. Cf. id. at 746 n.6, 808 N.E.2d at 793 n.6 (“We do not consider or 
decide whether statements in a police report that include information con-
cerning uncharged misconduct completely unrelated in time and circum-
stance to the underlying sexual offense must be redacted.”).
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Section 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements
In a criminal case in which there is a written agreement between 
the Commonwealth and a witness in which the Commonwealth makes 
a promise to the witness in relation to the charges or the sentence in 
exchange for the testimony of the witness at  trial, the use and admis-
sion of the agreement by  the Commonwealth at trial is within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge subject to the following guidelines:
(a) On direct examination, the prosecution may properly bring out 
the fact  that the witness has entered into a plea agreement and that 
the witness generally understands his or her obligations under it.
(b) The agreement itself is admissible. The timing of the admis-
sion of the agreement is within the judge’s discretion. The judge 
may defer admission of the agreement until redirect examination, 
after the defendant has undertaken to impeach the witness’s credi-
bility by showing that the witness had struck a deal with the 
prosecution in order to obtain favorable treatment.
(c) References to a witness’s obligation to tell the truth, any  certi-
fication or acknowledgment by his or her attorney, and any  provi-
sion that suggest that the Commonwealth has special knowledge 
as to the veracity of the witness’s testimony should be redacted 
from the agreement, on request.
(d) Questions by the prosecutor about the duty of the witness to 
tell the truth and the reading of the agreement are not permitted 
until redirect examination and after the witness has been cross-
examined on the matter.
(e) Care must be taken by the Commonwealth not  to suggest, by 
questions or argument, that it  has knowledge of the credibility of 
the witness independent of the evidence.
(f) The trial judge must instruct the jury by focusing their attention 
on the particular care they  should give in evaluating testimony 
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given pursuant to a plea agreement that is contingent on the wit-
ness’s telling the truth.
NOTE
Subsections (a) and (b). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from 
Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 264, 547 N.E.2d 314, 319 (1989). 
See also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 96, 712 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 
(1999).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Conkey, 
430 Mass. 139, 147, 714 N.E.2d 343, 351 (1999), and Commonwealth v. 
Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 261–262, 547 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1989).
Subsections (d) and (e). These subsections are derived from Common-
wealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 96–97, 712 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1999), and 
Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 264–265, 547 N.E.2d 314, 319–
320 (1989).
Subsection (f). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 
406 Mass. 257, 266, 547 N.E.2d 314, 321 (1989), and Commonwealth v. As-
meron, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 675, 875 N.E.2d 870, 876 (2007). See Com-
monwealth v. Meuse, 423 Mass. 831, 832, 673 N.E.2d 546, 546–547 (1996) 
(reversible error where prosecutor vouched for witness testifying pursuant to 
plea agreement and judge failed to give Ciampa-type instruction); Common-
wealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 739–740, 587 N.E.2d 194, 206 (1992) (no 
special instruction necessary as it did not appear that evidence presented 
realistic  possibility that jury would believe witness’s testimony based on her 
agreement to tell truth); Commonwealth v. Colon, 408 Mass. 419, 445, 558 
N.E.2d 974, 990 (1990) (no special  instructions necessary where plea 
agreement does not condition immunization on truthfulness).
General Application. The above guidelines also apply to nonbinding pretrial 
agreements. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 75, 78–79 & 
n.7, 751 N.E.2d 420, 423 & n.7 (2001) (holding that Ciampa’s prophylactic 
measures are applicable in circumstances in which a Commonwealth witness 
testified that, after he was charged with distribution of marijuana, he agreed 
to help police arrest others involved in the illegal sale of drugs in exchange 
for nonspecific “consideration” from the prosecution).
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In Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 98, 725 N.E.2d 233, 244 
(2000), the Supreme Judicial  Court indicated that the “better practice” is for 
the trial judge to include in the cautionary instruction a warning that the jury 
should not consider an accomplice’s guilty plea as evidence against the de-
fendant.
An agreement that obligates a witness to testify to some particular ver-
sion of the facts in exchange for a charge or sentence concession would be 
grounds for a motion to preclude the testimony or to strike it. See Common-
wealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 261 n.5, 547 N.E.2d 314, 318 n.5 (1989) 
(“Testimony pursuant to a plea agreement made contingent on 
obtaining . . . a conviction, as a result of the witness’s testimony, would pre-
sumably present too great an inducement to lie, [and] would not meet the test 
of fundamental fairness.”). See also Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 
Mass. 533, 553, 562 N.E.2d 797, 811 (1990) (“[W]e do not condone the use 
of agreements which do not require a witness to tell  the truth. Such agree-
ments are antithetical to the fair administration of justice. . . . [F]uture plea 
agreements [should] be drafted so as to make the obligation to testify truth-
fully clear to the witness[.]”).
Cross-Reference: Section 611(b)(2), Manner and Order of Interro-
gation and Presentation: Scope of Cross-Examination: Bias and Preju-
dice.
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Section 1105. Third-Party Culprit Evidence
Evidence that a third party committed the crimes charged against 
the defendant is admissible provided that the evidence has substantial 
probative value. In making this determination, the court must make a 
preliminary finding (a) that the evidence is relevant, (b) that the evi-
dence will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and (c) that there 
are other substantial connecting links between the crime charged and a 
third party or between the crime charged and another crime that could 
not have been committed by the defendant.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 
782, 800–801, 906 N.E.2d 299, 313–314 (2009); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 
392 Mass. 558, 562, 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
282 Mass. 593, 597–598, 185 N.E. 486, 487–488 (1933); and Common-
wealth v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472, 475 (1881).
In Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22, 661 N.E.2d 56, 60 (1996), 
the Supreme Judicial Court observed that
“[i]f the defense offers its own theory of the case (beyond 
merely putting the government to its proof), its evidence 
must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the de-
fense raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or 
speculative. Evidence that another person committed the 
crime charged also poses a real  threat of prejudice, espe-
cially the risk of confusing jurors by diverting their attention 
to wholly collateral matters involving persons not on trial.”
For example, in Commonwealth v. Rosa, the Supreme Judicial  Court upheld 
the trial  judge’s exclusion of so-called third-party culprit evidence consisting 
of the fact that there was another person awaiting trial with a record for 
crimes of violence and who was held in the same jail as the defendant. Id. at 
24–25, 661 N.E.2d at 61. Even though this other person had been mistaken 
for the defendant by his lawyer and had lived in the same neighborhood as 
the defendant at the time of the murder, the court upheld the trial  judge’s de-
cision to exclude the evidence. The court concluded that “[w]ithout more, 
these are fairly common similarities that do not require the admission of evi-
dence of similar crimes.” Id. at 23, 661 N.E.2d at 60. The court contrasted 
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Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267, 385 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 
(1979), where it held that the trial  judge should have admitted evidence “be-
cause there were substantial  connecting links between the robbery charged 
and another robbery in which the defendant could not have participated.” 
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. at 23, 661 N.E.2d at 60. The court noted 
that in Keizer,
“[n]ot only did the two crimes share an identical modus oper-
andi  with several distinctive features, but the two robberies 
also had one common perpetrator (each robbery was by a 
team of three perpetrators). We also found distinctive a spe-
cific link between the identification testimony against the de-
fendant and the identity of the perpetrators of the similar 
crime (only one witness could identify defendant, and same 
witness also identified common perpetrator of two crimes).”
Id. at 23, 661 N.E.2d at 60, citing Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. at 268 
n.2, 385 N.E.2d at 1004 n.2.
The mere fact that a third party had the motive, intent, and opportunity 
to commit the crime, however, does not make evidence about that person 
and his or her possible culpability admissible. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 432 
Mass. 578, 588–589, 736 N.E.2d 841, 851–852 (2000) (explaining that evi-
dence that the victim had expressed fear of the third party in circumstances 
in which there were no substantial  links between the third party and the crime 
was not admissible because it amounted to nothing more than the witness’s 
opinion that the third party committed the crime). Accord Commonwealth v. 
Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 305–306, 805 N.E.2d 26, 39–40 (2004); Common-
wealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 420–421, 693 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 
(1998).
Constitutional Considerations. “The defendant has a constitutional right to 
present evidence that another may have committed the crime.” Common-
wealth v. Keohane, 444 Mass. 563, 570, 829 N.E.2d 1125, 1131 (2005). 
State evidence rules which effectively bar the introduction of third-party cul-
prit evidence deprive a defendant of his or her right to present a meaningful 
defense and violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Hearsay evidence is admissible as third-party 
culprit evidence even though it does not fall within a hearsay exception, but 
“only if, in the judge’s discretion, the evidence is otherwise relevant, will not 
tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and there are other substantial  connect-
ing links to the crime.” Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 
801, 906 N.E.2d 299, 314 (2009), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. 
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Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 72, 489 N.E.2d 1233, 1239 (1986) (noting that in “rare 
circumstances,” the defendant’s constitutional  right to present a defense may 
require the admission of third-party culprit evidence). However, “[a] defendant 
has no ‘constitutional right to the admission of unreliable hearsay.’” Com-
monwealth v. Burnham, 451 Mass. 517, 526, 887 N.E.2d 222, 229 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 Mass. 142, 156, 778 N.E.2d 885, 898 
(2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 966 (2003). Accord Commonwealth v. Morgan, 
449 Mass. 343, 358, 868 N.E.2d 99, 112 (2007) (explaining that an absent 
witness’s statement that a third party told her that he had shot the victim was 
not admissible as a statement against penal  interest or as third-party culprit 
evidence in circumstances in which the third party denied making the state-
ment when interviewed by the police and where there was no corroboration). 
Hearsay evidence which does not qualify as third-party culprit evidence may 
nonetheless be admissible for a different but related purpose of establishing 
the inadequacy of the police investigation. See Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802, 906 N.E.2d at 315 (explaining that based on the 
reasoning in Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486, 399 N.E.2d 
482, 491 (1980), “information regarding a third-party culprit, whose existence 
was known to the police but whose potential involvement was never investi-
gated, may be admissible under a Bowden defense even though it may not 
otherwise be admissible under a third-party culprit defense”). Before such 
evidence is admitted, the judge should conduct a voir dire to determine 
whether the third-party culprit evidence was provided to the police and 
whether its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 802–
803, 906 N.E.2d at 315–316.
Cross-Reference: Section 1107, Inadequate Police Investigation Evi-
dence.
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Section 1106. Abuse Prevention Act Proceedings
In all civil proceedings under the Abuse Prevention Act, 
G. L. c. 209A, the rules of evidence should be applied flexibly by tak-
ing into consideration the personal and emotional nature of the issues 
involved, whether one or both of the parties is self-represented, and the 
need for fairness to all parties.
NOTE
Introduction. This section is derived from G. L. c. 209A and Frizado v. Fri-
zado, 420 Mass. 592, 597–98, 651 N.E.2d 1206, 1210–1211 (1995). Civil 
proceedings under G. L. c. 209A are commenced by filing a civil complaint. 
G. L. c. 209A, § 3A. Violations of orders issued under G. L. c. 209A are pun-
ishable as crimes. G. L. c. 209A, § 7. The remedies that may be ordered by 
the court are set forth in G. L. c. 209A, § 3. Initially, a temporary order may 
be issued, ex parte, if the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of 
immediate danger of abuse. G. L. c. 209A, § 4. When courts are closed, 
emergency relief is available to any person who demonstrates a substantial 
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse. G. L. c. 209A, § 5. Whenever a 
court issues a temporary order, the defendant has a right to be heard no later 
than ten business days after such order. This hearing constitutes a civil, jury-
waived trial. At the temporary hearing and at any subsequent trial  or hearing, 
the Supreme Judicial Court has observed that “the rules of evidence need 
not be followed, provided that there is fairness in what evidence is admitted 
and relied on.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 597–598, 651 N.E.2d at 
1211. For additional information, see Guidelines for Judicial  Practice, Abuse 
P r e v e n t i o n P r o c e e d i n g s , a v a i l a b l e a t 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/domestic/dvtoc.html.
Evidentiary Principles Applicable in G. L. c. 209A Proceedings. In de-
termining whether and how to apply the law of evidence, the Supreme Judi-
cial  Court in Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597–598, 651 N.E.2d 1206, 
1210–1211 (1995), offered the following guidelines.
“[First, t]he burden is on the complainant to establish facts 
justifying the issuance and continuance of an abuse preven-
tion order. The court must on request grant a defendant an 
opportunity to be heard on the question of continuing the 
temporary order and of granting other relief. That opportu-
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 356
nity, however, places no burden on a defendant to testify or 
to present evidence. The defendant need only appear at the 
hearing.” (Quotation omitted.)
Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596, 651 N.E.2d at 1210, quoting 
G. L. c. 209A, § 4.
Second, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 
Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 597, 651 N.E.2d at 1210.
Third, an adverse inference can be drawn by the court from the defen-
dant’s failure to testify in a G. L. c. 209A proceeding. The fact that the defen-
dant may refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination does not bar the 
taking of an adverse inference. However, the adverse inference alone is not 
sufficient to justify the issuance of an abuse prevention order. Frizado v. Fri-
zado, 420 Mass. at 596, 651 N.E.2d at 1210. See also Smith v. Joyce, 421 
Mass. 520, 523 n.1, 658 N.E.2d 677, 680 n.1 (1995) (a judge may not issue 
a restraining order “simply because it seems to be a good idea or because it 
will not cause the defendant any real inconvenience”).
Fourth, “[b]ecause a G. L. c. 209A proceeding is a civil, and not a crimi-
nal, proceeding, the constitutional right to confront witnesses and to cross-
examine them set forth in art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights has no applica-
tion.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596 n.3, 651 N.E.2d at 1210 n.3.
Fifth, “[t]he right of the defendant to be heard includes his right to testify 
and to present evidence.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 597, 651 N.E.2d 
at 1210–1211. It is not sufficient to hear from the defendant’s attorney and to 
deny the defendant the opportunity to present evidence. C.O. v. M.M., 442 
Mass. 648, 657, 815 N.E.2d 582, 590–591 (2004).
Sixth, with respect to cross-examination, “[t]he judge’s discretion in re-
stricting cross-examination may not be unlimited in particular situations.” Fri-
zado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 598 n.5, 651 N.E.2d at 1211 n.5. The Supreme 
Judicial Court cautioned against “the use of cross examination for harass-
ment or discovery purposes. However, each side must be given a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge the other’s evidence.” Id. See C.O. v. M.M., 442 
Mass. at 656–658, 815 N.E.2d at 589–591 (defendant’s due process rights 
were violated when the court refused to permit him to cross-examine wit-
nesses or to present evidence).
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Section 1107. Inadequate Police Investigation 
Evidence
Evidence that certain tests were not conducted, that certain police 
procedures were not followed, or that certain information known to the 
police about another suspect was not investigated, in circumstances in 
which it was reasonable to expect that the police should have con-
ducted such tests, followed such procedures, or investigated such in-
formation, is admissible.
NOTE
This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486, 
399 N.E.2d 482, 491 (1980), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801, 906 N.E.2d 299, 314 (2009) (“[T]he inference 
that may be drawn from an inadequate police investigation is that the evi-
dence at trial  may be inadequate or unreliable because the police failed to 
conduct the scientific tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police inves-
tigation would have conducted or investigated, and these tests or investiga-
tion reasonably may have led to significant evidence of the defendant’s guilt 
or innocence.”); Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 165, 843 N.E.2d 
1024, 1033 (2006) (“Defendants have the right to base their defense on the 
failure of police adequately to investigate a murder in order to raise the issue 
of reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt . . . .”). See also Common-
wealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 857–860, 920 N.E.2d 845, 859–862 (2010) 
(in a prosecution for attempted rape in which the defendant, a convict on 
work release, sought to demonstrate misidentification based on an inade-
quate police investigation because the police did not investigate three other 
Housing Authority employees who were on duty at the time who had criminal 
histories, it was error to refuse to permit the defense to question the police 
about their knowledge of the criminal histories of these employees).
The admission of Bowden evidence does not require the trial judge to 
give a special instruction to the jury. Instead, the judge is simply required not 
to take the issue of the adequacy of the police investigation away from the 
jury. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 687, 790 N.E.2d 662, 
669 (2003).
The Bowden defense “is a two-edged sword for the defendant, because 
it opens the door for the Commonwealth to offer evidence explaining why the 
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE 2011 Edition 358
police did not follow the line of investigation suggested by the defense” (cita-
tions omitted). Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 803 n.25, 906 
N.E.2d at 315 n.25. “[T]he more wide-ranging the defendant’s attack on the 
police investigation, the broader the Commonwealth’s response may be.” 
Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 754–755, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 
(2009) (“Here, the Bowden claim was an expansive one, calling into question 
police competence and judgment about both the leads that were not pursued 
and those that were. In response, the Commonwealth was entitled to elicit 
testimony about why the investigators chose the particular investigative path 
they did . . . .”).
Under a Bowden defense, information regarding a third-party culprit 
whose existence was known to the police but whose potential involvement 
was never investigated may be admissible to prove that the police knew of 
the possible suspect and failed to take reasonable steps to investigate the 
suspect. This information is not hearsay because it is not offered to show the 
truth of the matter asserted, but simply to show that the information was pro-
vided to the police. Therefore, it need not meet the standard set to admit 
hearsay evidence regarding a third-party culprit, including the substantial 
connecting links. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 391–392, 
708 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1999) (police detective could testify to what confiden-
tial  informants had told him about suspect’s motive and opportunity to kill  the 
victim, despite the confidential informants’ potential  lack of firsthand knowl-
edge). There is a lessened risk of prejudice to the Commonwealth from the 
admission of evidence of a Bowden defense because the police are able to 
explain what they did to determine that the suspect was not guilty of the 
crime. See Id. at 391 n.1, 708 N.E.2d at 662 n.1. In contrast to the third-party 
culprit defense, where evidence may be admitted regardless of whether the 
police knew of the suspect, third-party culprit information is admissible under 
a Bowden defense only if the police had learned of it during the investigation 
and failed to reasonably act on the information. Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802–803, 906 N.E.2d at 315. The judge would first 
need to conduct a voir dire hearing to determine whether the third-party cul-
prit information had been furnished to the police, and whether the probative 
weight of the Bowden evidence exceeded the risk of unfair prejudice to the 
Commonwealth from diverting the jury’s attention to collateral  matters. Id. at 
803, 906 N.E.2d at 315.
Cross-Reference: Section 1105, Third-Party Culprit Evidence.
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Section 1108. Access to Third-Party Records 
Prior to Trial in Criminal Cases 
(Lampron-Dwyer Protocol)
(a) Filing and Service of the Motion.
(1) Whenever in a criminal case a party seeks to summons books, 
papers, documents, or other objects (records) from any nonparty 
individual or entity prior to trial, the party shall file a motion pur-
suant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), stating the name and address 
of the custodian of the records (record holder) and the name, if 
any, of the person who is the subject of the records (third-party 
subject), for example, a complainant, and describing, as precisely 
as possible, the records sought. The motion shall be accompanied 
by an affidavit as required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 13(a)(2) and 
Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 806 N.E.2d 72 
(2004) (Lampron).
(2) The moving party shall serve the motion and affidavit on all 
parties.
(3) The Commonwealth shall forward copies of the motion and 
affidavit to the record holder and (where applicable) to the third-
party  subject, and notify them of the date and place of the hearing 
on the motion. The Commonwealth shall also inform the record 
holder and third-party subject that (i) the Lampron hearing shall 
proceed even if either of them is absent; (ii) the hearing shall be 
the third-party subject’s only opportunity to address the court; (iii) 
any statutory privilege applicable to the records sought shall re-
main in effect unless and until the third-party  subject  affirmatively 
waives any such privilege, and that failure to attend the hearing 
shall not constitute a waiver of any such privilege; and (iv) if the 
third-party subject is the victim in the case, he or she has the op-
portunity to confer with the prosecutor prior to the hearing.
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(b) The Lampron Hearing and Findings.
(1) A party moving to summons documents pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17(a)(2) prior to trial must establish good cause by show-
ing (i) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (ii) that 
they  are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial 
by exercise of due diligence; (iii) that  the party cannot properly 
prepare for trial without such production and inspection in ad-
vance of trial, and that  the failure to obtain such inspection may 
tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (iv) that the application is 
made in good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedi-
tion.
(2) At the Lampron hearing, the judge shall hear from all parties, 
the record holder, and the third-party subject, if present. The re-
cord holder and third-party  subject shall be heard on whether the 
records sought are relevant or statutorily privileged.
(3) Following the Lampron hearing, and in the absence of having 
reviewed the records, the judge shall make oral or written findings 
with respect to the records sought from each record holder indicat-
ing (i) that the party seeking the records has or has not satisfied 
the requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), and (ii) that the 
records sought are or are not presumptively  privileged. A judge’s 
determination that any records sought are presumptively privi-
leged shall not be appealable as an interlocutory matter and shall 
carry  no weight in any  subsequent challenge that a record is in 
fact not privileged.
(c) Summons and Notice to Record Holder.
(1) If all Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) requirements have been met 
and there has been a finding that the records sought are not pre-
sumptively privileged or the third-party  subject  has waived all ap-
plicable statutory privileges, the judge shall order a summons to 
issue directing the record holder to produce all responsive records 
to the applicable clerk of the court on the return date stated in the 
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summons. The clerk shall maintain the records in a location sepa-
rate from the court file, and the records shall be made available for 
inspection by counsel, as provided in Subsection (d)(1) below. 
The records shall not be made available for public inspection un-
less and until any record is filed in connection with a proceeding 
in the case or introduced in evidence at the trial.
(2) Where a judge has determined that some or all of the requested 
records are presumptively privileged, the summons shall so in-
form the record holder and shall order the record holder to pro-
duce such records to the clerk of the court in a sealed envelope or 
box marked “PRIVILEGED,” with the name of the record holder, 
the case name and docket number, and the return date specified on 
the summons. The clerk shall maintain the records in a location 
separate from the court file, clearly designated “presumptively 
privileged records,” and the records shall not be available for in-
spection except by counsel as provided in Subsection (d)(2). The 
records shall not be made available for public inspection unless 
and until any record is introduced in evidence at trial.
(d) Inspection of Records.
(1) Nonpresumptively Privileged Records. The clerk of court 
shall permit counsel who obtained the summons to inspect and 
copy all records that are not presumptively privileged. When the 
defendant is the moving party, the Commonwealth’s ability to in-
spect or copy the records is within a judge’s discretion.
(2) Presumptively Privileged Records.
(A) The clerk of court shall permit only defense counsel who 
obtained the summons to inspect the records, and only on 
counsel’s signing and filing a protective order in a form ap-
proved by the court. The protective order shall provide that 
any violation of its terms and conditions shall be reported to 
the Board of Bar Overseers by anyone aware of such viola-
tion.
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(B) [The Supreme Judicial Court has not reached the issue 
of whether the procedures governing defense counsel’s re-
view of presumptively privileged records also apply to the 
Commonwealth.]
(e) Challenge to Privilege Designation.
(1) If, on inspection of the records, defense counsel believes that 
any record or portion thereof is in fact not privileged, then in lieu 
of or in addition to a motion to disclose or introduce at trial (see 
Subsections (f) and (g) below), counsel may  file a motion to re-
lease specified records or portions thereof from the terms of the 
protective order.
(2) Defense counsel shall provide notice of the motion to all par-
ties. Prior to the hearing, counsel for the Commonwealth shall be 
permitted to review such records in order to respond to the mo-
tion, subject to signing and filing a protective order as provided in 
Subsection (d)(2) above.
(3) If a judge determines that any record or portion thereof is not 
privileged, the record shall be released from the terms of the pro-
tective order and may be inspected and copied as provided in Sub-
section (d)(1) above.
(f) Disclosure of Presumptively Privileged Records.
(1) If defense counsel who obtained the summons believes that the 
copying or disclosure of some or all of any presumptively privi-
leged record to other persons (for example, the defendant, an in-
vestigator, an expert) is necessary to prepare the case for trial, 
counsel shall file a motion to modify  the protective order to permit 
copying or disclosure of particular records to specifically named 
individuals. The motion shall be accompanied by  an affidavit ex-
plaining with specificity the reason why copying or disclosure is 
necessary; the motion and the affidavit shall not disclose the con-
tent of any  presumptively  privileged record. Counsel shall provide 
notice of the motion to all parties.
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(2) Following a hearing, and in camera inspection of the records 
by the judge where necessary, a judge may allow the motion only 
on making oral or written findings that the copying or disclosure 
is necessary for the defendant to prepare adequately for trial. The 
judge shall consider alternatives to full disclosure, including 
agreed to stipulations or disclosure of redacted portions of the re-
cords. Before disclosure is made to any person specifically  author-
ized by  the judge, that person shall sign a copy of the court order 
authorizing disclosure. This court order shall clearly state that a 
violation of its terms shall be punishable as criminal contempt.
(3) All copies of any documents covered by a protective order 
shall be returned to the court on resolution of the case, i.e., on a 
change of plea or at the conclusion of any  direct appeal following 
a trial or dismissal of the case.
(g) Use of Presumptively Privileged Records at Trial.
(1) A defendant seeking to introduce at trial some or all of any 
presumptively  privileged record shall file a motion in limine at or 
before any final pretrial conference.
(2) Counsel for the Commonwealth shall be permitted to review 
enough of the presumptively privileged records to be able to re-
spond adequately to the motion in limine, subject to signing and 
filing a protective order as provided in Subsection (d)(2) above.
(3) The judge may allow the motion only on making oral or writ-
ten findings that introduction at trial of a presumptively  privileged 
record is necessary for the moving defendant to obtain a fair trial. 
Before permitting the introduction in evidence of such records, the 
judge shall consider alternatives to introduction, including an 
agreed to stipulation or introduction of redacted portions of the 
records.
(h) Preservation of Records for Appeal. Records produced in re-
sponse to a Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) summons shall be retained by 
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the clerk of court until the conclusion of any direct appeal following a 
trial or dismissal of a case.
NOTE
Introduction. In criminal cases, pretrial discovery is limited to information 
and objects in the possession or control  of the parties and is governed prin-
cipally by Mass. R. Crim. P. 14. When a party seeks access in advance of 
trial to books, papers, documents, or objects (records, privileged or nonprivi-
leged) that are in the hands of a third party, such requests are governed by 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). Commonwealth v. Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 186–
187, 915 N.E.2d 215, 227 (2009) (both prosecutor and defense counsel must 
follow the procedures contained in Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 and obtain prior judi-
cial  approval to obtain access before trial  to any records in the hands of a 
third party, whether privileged or not). See Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 
Mass. 265, 268, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. Hart, 
455 Mass. 230, 243, 914 N.E.2d 904, 914–915 (2009) (Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17(a)(2) is the exclusive method to obtain records from a third party 
prior to trial). When Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) has been satisfied and a non-
party has produced records to the court, the protocol set forth in Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 139–147, 859 N.E.2d 400, 414–420 (2006), 
governs review or disclosure of presumptively privileged records by defense 
counsel. To reference the forms promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court, 
see http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/dwyerforms.html.
At trial, a defendant seeking records must proceed under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17(a)(2). The Commonwealth may either proceed under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17(a)(2) or G. L. c. 277, § 68. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 
Mass. at 243, 914 N.E.2d at 914–915 (a subpoena issued under G. L. c. 277, 
§ 68, may only request a third party to produce records to a court on the day 
of the trial).
Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Lampron, 
441 Mass. 265, 268, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. 
Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 187, 915 N.Ed.2d 215, 227 (2009) (Lampron proce-
dures apply to both prosecution and defense).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived generally from Commonwealth v. 
Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 268, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004), and Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 148, 859 N.E.2d 400, 420 (2006). “The 
Commonwealth’s inability to locate either the record holder or the third-party 
365 
subject shall not delay the Lampron hearing.” Id. at 148 n.2, 859 N.E.2d at 
420 n.2.
In Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 806 N.E.2d 72 (2004), 
the Supreme Judicial Court followed Federal  law as enunciated in United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974), and held that a party moving 
to summons documents pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) prior to trial 
must establish good cause by showing the following:
“(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that 
they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of 
trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot 
properly prepare for trial  without such production and inspec-
tion in advance of trial  and that the failure to obtain such in-
spection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) 
that the application is made in good faith and is not intended 
as a general ‘fishing expedition.’”
Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269, 806 N.E.2d at 76–77. Accord 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 792, 831 N.E.2d 890, 895 (2005) 
(summarizing these requirements as “relevance, admissibility, necessity, and 
specificity”).
“Presumptively privileged records are those prepared in cir-
cumstances suggesting that some or all of the records 
sought are likely protected by a statutory privilege, for exam-
ple, a record prepared by one who holds himself or herself 
out as a psychotherapist, see G. L. c. 233, § 20B; a social 
worker, see G. L. c. 112, § 135B; a sexual  assault counsellor, 
see G. L. c. 233, § 20J; or a domestic  violence victims’ 
counsellor, see G. L. c. 233, § 20K.”
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 148, 859 N.E.2d at 420. Because the 
judge will  not have viewed any of the records sought by the defendant, “the 
judge shall make such determination based on the identity of the record 
holder or record preparer (if known) and any additional information adduced 
at the Lampron hearing. The defendant shall  have the burden of showing that 
records are not presumptively privileged.” Id. at 148 n.3, 859 N.E.2d at 421 
n.3.
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived generally from Commonwealth v. 
Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 806 N.E.2d 72 (2004), and Commonwealth v. 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 859 N.E.2d 400 (2006).
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“Some records, although not presumptively privileged, may contain in-
formation of a personal or confidential nature, such as medical or school re-
cords. See, e.g., G. L. c. 71B, § 3 (special  education records); G. L. c. 111, 
§§ 70, 70E (hospital records). The judge may, in his or her discretion, order 
such records produced subject to an appropriate protective order.” Com-
monwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 149 n.5, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.5.
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived generally from Commonwealth v. 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 149, 859 N.E.2d 400, 421–422 (2006). A judge may 
order that even nonpresumptively privileged records be subject to an appro-
priate protective order. Id. at 149 n.5, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.5 (Appendix).
“The Commonwealth may inspect or copy any records if prior consent is 
given by the record holder and third-party subject (where applicable).” Id. at 
149 n.7, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.7. With respect to nonpresumptively privileged 
records, Subsection (d)(1), a party may have production obligations pursuant 
to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 or other pretrial agreements. See Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 800, 831 N.E.2d 890, 900 (2005).
Subsection (e). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 149–150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 422 (2006).
Subsection (f). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 422 (2006).
Subsection (g). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 422–423 (2006).
Subsection (h). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Common-
wealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 423 (2006).
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Section 1109. View
(a) Availability.
(1) Upon motion in civil and criminal cases, the court has discre-
tion to allow the jury or, in a matter tried without a jury, the judge 
to take a view of the premises or place in question or any  property 
matter or thing relative to the case.
(2) In a limited class of civil cases, a party  has the right, upon re-
quest, to a view.
(b) Conduct. Counsel may  point out the essential features of the place 
or thing that is the subject of the view, but no comment or discussion 
is permitted. No witnesses are heard. Jurors are not permitted to ask 
questions.
(c) Status. Observations made by the jury  or by the judge on a view 
may be used by the finder of fact in making a decision.
(d) Costs. In a civil case, the expenses of taking a view shall be paid 
by the party who makes the motion or in accordance with an agree-
ment between or among some or all of the parties, and may be taxed as 
costs if the party or parties who advanced them prevails. In a criminal 
case, the expenses of taking a view shall be paid by the Common-
wealth.
NOTE
Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. 
Gedzium, 259 Mass. 453, 462, 156 N.E. 890, 893 (1927); Madden v. Boston 
Elevated Ry. Co., 284 Mass. 490, 493–494, 188 N.E. 234, 236 (1933); and 
G. L. c. 234, § 35. In the administrative context, the judge or fact finder also 
may have the right to conduct a view. See, e.g., G. L. c. 152, § 2 (Authority of 
the Division of Industrial Accidents to “make all  necessary inspections and 
investigations relating to causes of injuries for which compensation may be 
claimed . . . .”).
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Ordinarily a view is taken after the jury is sworn but before the evidence 
is taken. However, the court has discretion to take a view after the evidence 
begins and at any time during the trial. See Yore v. City of Newton, 194 
Mass. 250, 253, 80 N.E. 472, 472 (1907) (court permitted jury to take a view 
after deliberations had begun).
The court may exercise its discretion to deny a motion for a view when 
visiting a particular location would not fairly represent the way it appeared or 
the conditions that existed at the time of the events that are the subject of the 
trial. See Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 423 Mass. 318, 327 n.8, 668 N.E.2d 
762, 767 n.8 (1996). However, even though the appearance of premises or a 
thing has changed, if the premises or thing in its altered condition would be 
helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence the court has discretion to 
permit a view. See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 401–402, 55 
N.E.2d 902, 912 (1944) (there was no error in permitting the jury to take a 
view of a nightclub after a fire had severely damaged it and caused the death 
of numerous persons who were trapped inside). The court may deny a mo-
tion for a view because it will not contribute to the jury’s understanding of the 
evidence at trial. See Commonwealth v. Cambell, 378 Mass. 680, 704–705, 
393 N.E.2d 820, 835, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 847 (1979).
Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 80, § 9 (better-
ment assessments); G. L. c. 79, § 22 (eminent domain); and G. L. c. 253, § 7 
(mill flowage).
Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dasca-
lakis, 246 Mass. 12, 29–30, 140 N.E. 470, 477–478 (1923). “Generally, an 
impropriety occurring on a view may be cured by cautionary instructions.” 
Commonwealth v. Cresta, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 560, 562, 336 N.E.2d 910, 913 
(1975), citing Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 313, 151 N.E. 
297, 299 (1926).
Neither the State nor the Federal Constitution gives the defendant in a 
criminal case a right to be present at a view. If a view is taken in a criminal 
case, it is within the judge’s discretion to allow the defendant to be present. 
Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 402–403, 917 N.E.2d 191, 204 
(2009) (“We have held repeatedly that a defendant does not have a right to 
be present during a jury view under either the Sixth or the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights” [citation and quotations omitted].). See also Common-
wealth v. Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 291, 667 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1996) (“The judge 
gave the defendant the option of attending the jury’s view of the crime scene 
if the defendant was in a police car and some distance away from the jury. 
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After consultation with trial  counsel, the defendant decided not to participate 
in the view.”); Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 237, 559 
N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (1990) (“[A] defendant should not assume that the judge 
will  permit his attendance and show up without prior permission. A defendant 
is not entitled of right to confer with his counsel during a view.”).
Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Curry, 
368 Mass. 195, 330 N.E.2d 819 (1975), where the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that
“[t]he chief purpose (of a view) is to enable the jury to under-
stand better the testimony which has or may be introduced. 
The function of the jury . . . is simply to observe. Although 
what is seen on the view may be used by the jury in reaching 
their verdict, in a strict and narrow sense a view may be 
thought not to be evidence.” (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 197–198, 330 N.E.2d at 821. See also Berlandi  v. Commonwealth, 314 
Mass. 424, 451, 50 N.E.2d 210, 226 (1943) (“A view is not technically evi-
dence and subject to all  the principles applicable to evidence . . . [but] it inevi-
tably has the effect of evidence” [citations and quotation omitted].); Com-
monwealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 193–194 n.1, 770 N.E.2d 1, 
6 n.1 (2002) (a view is analogous to a courtroom demonstration or the use of 
a chalk; observations made on a view can be used “to illustrate testimony 
and assist the jury in weighing the evidence they hear” so long as the condi-
tions are similar to the circumstances of the matter to be proved).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 234, § 35.
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................................................................................................and Reports 308
Medical Peer Review Committee
§ 513(b)(1). Proceedings, Reports, and Records of Medical Peer 
.....................................................................................Review Committee 128
Presumptively privileged records
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Article V, Intro. (g). Production of Presumptively Privileged Records 
........................................from Nonparties Prior to Trial in Criminal Cases 73
....................................§ 1108(c). Summons and Notice to Record Holder, (2) 349
§ 1108(d) ..............................................(2). Presumptively Privileged Records 350
.............................§ 1108(f). Disclosure of Presumptively Privileged Records 351
..........................§ 1108(g). Use of Presumptively Privileged Records at Trial 352
Public records or reports
.................................................§ 803(8). Official/Public Records and Reports 249
............................................................§ 901(b)(7). Public Records or Reports 298
...................................................§ 902(d). Certified Copies of Public Records 306
...................................................................................§ 1005. Official Records 320
Records affecting interest in property
................§ 803(14). Records or Documents Affecting an Interest in Property 250
Records defined
.......................................................................§ 1001(a). Writings and Records 313
Records of vital statistics
..................................................................§ 803(9). Records of Vital Statistics 249
Religious organization records
................................................§ 803(11). Records of Religious Organizations 249
.........................................................................§ 804(b)(7). Religious Records 274
Third-party records
§ 1108. Access to Third-Party Records Prior to Trial in Criminal 
Cases (Lampron-Dwyer ............................................................. Protocol) 348
REDACTION
Of amounts paid by health insurers
................................................................§ 411(b), Note. Limited Admissibility 56
Of documents in sexually dangerous person proceedings
§ ...................................1103, Note. Sexually Dangerous Person Proceedings 333
....................................................§ 1103(a), Note. Hearsay That Is Admissible 336
..........................................§ 1103(b), Note. Hearsay That May Be Admissible 337
Of informant’s identity
.............................................................§ 509(a)(2), Note. Identity of Informer 113
Of information not germane to treatment in medical records
...........................................§ 803(6)(C), Note. Medical and Hospital Services 263
Of nature of prior offense
§ 609, Note. Impeachment by Evidence .....................of Conviction of Crime 175
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Of presumptively privileged records
......................§ 1108(f). Disclosure of Presumptively Privileged Records, (2) 352
....................§ 1108(g). Use of Presumptively Privileged Records at Trial, (3) 352
Of Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit forms
................................................................§ 803(6)(B), Note. Hospital Records 262
Of witness cooperation agreements
........................................................§ 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements 338
To protect personal privacy
§ 402, Note. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant 
..................................................................................Evidence Inadmissible 33
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Of expert witnesses
......................§ 803(18)(B), Note. Use in Cross-Examination of Experts 268–269
Regarding matters raised during cross-examination
.....................§ 609, Note. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime 175
Regarding witness cooperation agreements
........................................................§ 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements 338
Scope of 
....................................................§ 611(e). Scope of Subsequent Examination 179
REFRESHMENT OF MEMORY
..........................................§ 612. Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory 185
RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Admissibility
§ 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence 
.................................................................................................Inadmissible 33
Defined
....................................................................................§ 401. Relevant Evidence 31
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION RECORDS
................................................§ 803(11). Records of Religious Organizations 249
.........................................................................§ 804(b)(7). Religious Records 274
REMEDIAL MEASURES
Exclusion of evidence of
.................§ 407(a). Exclusion of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures 48
Limited admissibility 
..........................................................................§ 407(b). Limited Admissibility 48
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REOPENING CASE
...........................................................................................§ 611(f). Reopening 179
REPUTATION
As evidence of character trait
.............................................................§ 404(a). Character Evidence Generally 38
Boundaries
..................§ 803(20). Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History 251
Character
§ 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; 
............................................................................Exceptions; Other Crimes 38
Criminal sexual assault
§ 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
.......................................................................................(Rape-Shield Law) 58
Impeachment of witness
§ 608. Impeachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct 
..................................................................................................of Witness 169
Knowledge of witness
.................................................................§ 405. Methods of Proving Character 44
ROUTINE PRACTICE
.......................................§ 406. Routine Practice of Business; Individual Habit 46
RULINGS
..............................§ 103. Rulings on Evidence, Objections, and Offers of Proof 3
................................................................................§ 104. Preliminary Questions 9
SCOPE
See individual topics
SELF-AUTHENTICATION
................................................................................§ 902. Self-Authentication 305
SEQUESTRATION
.....................................................................§ 615. Sequestration of Witnesses 197
SETTLEMENTS
Compromises and offers to compromise
................§ 408, Note. Compromise and Offers to Compromise in Civil Cases 50
Confidentiality of offer to settle
.............................................................................§ 502(a)(5), Note. Definitions 83
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Evidence of settlement with another defendant
................................................................§ 411(b), Note. Limited Admissibility 56
SEXUAL ASSAULT
First complaint (see FIRST COMPLAINT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT)
Rape-shield law
§ 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
.......................................................................................(Rape-Shield Law) 58
Reputation of complaining witness
§ 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
.......................................................................................(Rape-Shield Law) 58
SAIN evidence/Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit
§ 413(b), Note. Admissibility of Additional Reports of a Sexual Assault 
.......................................................Under an Alternative Evidentiary Basis 67
................................................................§ 803(6)(B), Note. Hospital Records 262
SEXUAL CONDUCT, PRIOR
§ 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
.......................................................................................(Rape-Shield Law) 58
SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSON PROCEEDING
.............................................§ 1103. Sexually Dangerous Person Proceedings 332
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
..................................................§ 1102. Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence 329
STATEMENTS
Against interest, hearsay exception
............................................................§ 804(b)(3). Statement Against Interest 272
Defined
...........................................................................................§ 801(a). Statement 230
Doctrine of completeness 
........................................................................§ 106. Doctrine of Completeness 14
Of personal history, hearsay exception
......................................................§ 804(b)(4). Statement of Personal History 272
Prior
...........................§ 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility 188
Testimonial versus nontestimonial
.........................Article VIII, Intro. (a)(1). Testimonial Versus Nontestimonial 225
Under belief of impending death, hearsay exception
419 
.....................§ 804(b)(2). Statement Made Under Belief of Impending Death 272
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
................................................................................................§ 301. Civil Cases 23
.........................................................................................§ 302. Criminal Cases 26
............................................................§ 902(j). Presumptions Created by Law 307
SUBSCRIBING WITNESS
.....................................§ 903. Subscribing Witness Testimony Not Necessary 312
SUMMARIES
............................................................................................§ 1006. Summaries 322
TESTIMONY
Accused
...........................................................................§ 104(d). Testimony by Accused 9
Basis of, expert
................................................§ 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts 214
Expert (see EXPERT TESTIMONY; EXPERT WITNESSES)
First complaint witness
............................................................§ 413. First Complaint of Sexual Assault 62
Former, hearsay exception
............................................................§ 804(b)(1). Prior Recorded Testimony 271
Lay witnesses
....................................................§ 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses 199
Opinion
....................................................§ 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses 199
.............................................................................§ 702. Testimony by Experts 203
Police officer
§ 413(b), Note. Admissibility of Additional Reports of a Sexual Assault 
.......................................................Under an Alternative Evidentiary Basis 67
Preliminary matters
................................................................................§ 104. Preliminary Questions 9
Prior recorded testimony
............................................................§ 804(b)(1). Prior Recorded Testimony 271
Subscribing witnesses
.....................................§ 903. Subscribing Witness Testimony Not Necessary 312
Ultimate issue
......................................................................§ 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue 217
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Victim, at a pretrial dangerousness hearing
...................................................§ 804(b)(1), Note. Prior Recorded Testimony 283
THIRD-PARTY CULPRIT
...............................................................§ 1105. Third-Party Culprit Evidence 341
ULTIMATE ISSUE, ADMISSIBILITY OF OPINION TESTIMONY
......................................................................§ 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue 217
VICTIM
Character
§ 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; 
............................................................................Exceptions; Other Crimes 38
Past behavior
§ 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
.......................................................................................(Rape-Shield Law) 58
Prior sexual conduct
§ 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation 
.......................................................................................(Rape-Shield Law) 58
Testimony at a pretrial dangerousness hearing
...................................................§ 804(b)(1), Note. Prior Recorded Testimony 283
VIEWS
Availability of
.......................................................................................§ 1109(a). Availability 356
Conduct during
............................................................................................§ 1109(b). Conduct 356
Payment of cost of
................................................................................................§ 1109(d). Costs 356
Unauthorized views of sites by jurors 
.........................§ 606(b), Note. Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment 163
Use of observations made during
................................................................................................§ 1109(c). Status 356
VITAL RECORDS, CERTIFIED COPIES
...................................................§ 902(d). Certified Copies of Public Records 306
VITAL STATISTICS RECORDS
..................................................................§ 803(9). Records of Vital Statistics 249
421 
VOIR DIRE
Of child
....................................................§ 803(24)(B), Note. Reliability of Statement 270
Of deliberating juror
.........................§ 606(b), Note. Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment 167
Of juror during trial
.........................§ 606(b), Note. Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment 166
Of potential juror
.........................§ 606(b), Note. Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment 165
Privilege against self-incrimination during
...........................................§ 511(c)(2), Note. Waiver by Witness’s Testimony 124
Regarding ethnic or racial bias
.........................§ 606(b), Note. Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment 164
Regarding excited utterance
............................§ 803(2), Note. Excited Utterance (Spontaneous Utterance) 255
Regarding feigning lack of memory
§ 801(d)(1)(A), Note. Prior Inconsistent Statement Before a Grand Jury, 
.......................at a Trial, at a Probable Cause Hearing, or at a Deposition 235
Regarding intent to assert privilege
......................................................................§ 525(b)(2), Note. Criminal Case 153
Regarding spousal privilege
..........................................................................§ 504(a)(1), Note. General Rule 95
Regarding third-party culprit evidence
......................................................§ 1105, Note. Third-Party Culprit Evidence 343
Regarding witness’s mental condition
..............................................................§ 601(c), Note. Preliminary Questions 156
VOUCHING
............................................................§ 704, Note. Opinion on Ultimate Issue 217
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
Bowden evidence
..................................................§ 1107, Note. Inadequate Police Investigation 347
Business records
§ 803(6)(A)., Note. Entry, Writing, or Record Made in Regular 
.....................................................................................Course of Business 259
Defects in the chain of custody and
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§ 402, Note. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant 
..................................................................................Evidence Inadmissible 33
Role of the jury
...........................................................................§ 104(e). Weight and Credibility 9
Third-party culprit evidence
..................................................§ 1107, Note. Inadequate Police Investigation 347
WITNESS
Adverse
.................................................................................§ 607. Who May Impeach 168
Bias, impeachment for
................................................................§ 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions 177
Calling by court
....................§ 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court or Jurors 194
Character of
§ 608. Impeachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct 
..................................................................................................of Witness 169
Child
............................................................................................§ 601. Competency 155
Competency
............................................................................................§ 601. Competency 155
Cooperation agreements
........................................................§ 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements 338
Court personnel, competency as
...........................................................§ 605. Competency of Judge as Witness 161
Credibility
................................................................................§ 104. Preliminary Questions 9
Cross-examination
................................................................................§ 104. Preliminary Questions 9
.............................§ 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation 178
Direct examination
.............................§ 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation 178
Exclusion of
.....................................................................§ 615. Sequestration of Witnesses 197
Expert (see EXPERT TESTIMONY; EXPERT WITNESSES)
Feigning lack of memory
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§ 801(d)(1)(A), Note. Prior Inconsistent Statement Before a Grand Jury, 
.......................at a Trial, at a Probable Cause Hearing, or at a Deposition 235
First complaint witness
............................................................§ 413. First Complaint of Sexual Assault 62
Harassment
.............................§ 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation 178
.............................................§ 1106, Note. Abuse Prevention Act Proceedings 345
Hostile
.............................§ 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation 178
Immunity
.......................................................................................§ 511(c)(5). Immunity 117
Impeachment (see IMPEACHMENT)
Incompetency, finding of
............................................................................................§ 601. Competency 155
Interrogation by court
....................§ 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court or Jurors 194
Judge
...........................................................§ 605. Competency of Judge as Witness 161
Juror, competency as
............................................................§ 606. Competency of Juror as Witness 162
Lack of personal knowledge
..................................................................§ 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge 158
Oath
................................................................................§ 603. Oath or Affirmation 159
Out of order
................................................................................§ 611(a). Control by Court 178
Prior statements
...........................§ 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility 188
Privilege
........................................................................§ 511(b). Privilege of a Witness 116
Protected
..............................................................................§ 509(c). Protected Witness 109
Qualification
................................................................................§ 104. Preliminary Questions 9
Questioning by court
.......................................................................§ 614(b). Interrogation by Court 194
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Questioning by jurors
......................................................................§ 614(d). Interrogation by Jurors 194
Recollection refreshed
..........................................§ 612. Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory 185
Sequestration
.....................................................................§ 615. Sequestration of Witnesses 197
Subscribing
.....................................§ 903. Subscribing Witness Testimony Not Necessary 312
Witness cooperation agreements
........................................................§ 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements 338
WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
......................................................§ 502(d)(6), Note. Public Officer or Agency 86
WRITINGS
Ancient
...................................................§ 803(16). Statements in Ancient Documents 250
Contents of (see CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, PROOF)
Defined
............................................................................................§ 1001. Definitions 313
Disputed
...................................§ 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification 297
Doctrine of completeness
§ 106(a), Note. Remainder of Writings or Recorded Statements........................ 14
Made in the regular course of business
§ 803(6)(A)., Note. Entry, Writing, or Record Made in Regular 
.....................................................................................Course of Business 259
Used to impeach
...........................§ 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility 188
Used to refresh memory
..........................................§ 612. Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory 185
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